Blog - Americans for a Stronger Navy

April 24, 2026April 25, 2026

Allied ‘Say Versus Do’ Gap Raises New Questions Over U.S. Sea Power

In a conversation with CDR Salamander, I explore allied readiness, the Strait of Hormuz, burden-sharing and the Navy’s structural crisis.

America’s allies often say the right things about maritime security. The harder question is whether they can still do them.

That “say versus do” gap sits at the center of my conversation with CDR Salamander — a retired U.S. Navy officer, former NATO staff officer, and one of the most respected independent voices in naval commentary for nearly two decades.

We discussed Europe’s shrinking naval capacity, the Strait of Hormuz, burden-sharing, the industrial base, and the structural failures that have brought the U.S. Navy to a readiness crisis that many veterans recognize all too well.

I came to the conversation as a student. I left it convinced that Americans need a wider, more honest debate about sea power, allied obligations, and the real cost of keeping global trade moving. His explanation of the global economy is one of the most important parts of the interview.

Why I Asked These Questions

I started Americans for a Stronger Navy about two and a half years ago. Before that, I spent over three decades in telecommunications and web technologies — building and leading organizations at the intersection of global internet infrastructure, international business, and nonprofit professional management. I traveled to China and Russia during the early 2000s tech transfer era — and to other emerging markets in between — and watched, firsthand, how economic integration and strategic naivety can compound into serious long-term risk. That ground-level view of how these economies operate, and how they think about America, shapes everything I do at StrongerNavy.org.

I am not a think tank fellow. I am not a defense contractor. I am not a retired flag officer. I am a former blue water destroyer sailor who stood watches aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s during the original hollow Navy era.

That outsider status used to feel like a liability. I’ve come to think it’s an asset. Fresh eyes — from someone who has managed global organizations, tracked technology transfer across borders, and spent thirty years watching how interconnected systems succeed and fail — can sometimes see patterns that are harder to spot from inside a specialized community. That’s not a criticism. It’s an argument for a bigger tent.

My goal has never been to be the loudest voice in the room. It has been to listen carefully, learn honestly, connect what we learn to concrete legislative action — and help build the coalition this moment requires.

Which is why I reached out to CDR Salamander. If you want to understand where the naval community’s thinking actually is, you start there.

What follows is that conversation. I hope you’ll read it the same way I tried to have it.

Europe’s Readiness Gap

Q: The Royal Navy was significantly larger in 1982 than it is today, and they barely scraped together a task force to retake the Falkland Islands. The RAF was making the case that carriers were obsolete and land-based air could handle everything — they were months away from not having that carrier in the South Atlantic at all. France, the Netherlands, Denmark — Europe had a real, robust military then. Fast forward to 2026. Is that capability still there?

We find ourselves in a situation where there’s a certain inertia to assumptions — we just assume our allies can do something. You see announcements like the French carrier getting underway with a European strike group to help defend Cyprus because the British can’t get a single destroyer underway. And that’s great. But the French have one carrier. Some of their allied units are genuinely impressive — the Spanish F-100 Aegis destroyer is a fine piece of kit — but there just aren’t that many of them. They can do this one deployment. They have no follow-on. They have no endurance.

Even they themselves still carry this inertia of a memory of a military that could do things. And it’s simply not there anymore.

CDR Salamander: You have to be very careful what you take from Europe at face value, because a lot of what they’re proposing isn’t what’s best — it’s what they’re capable of. We make fun of the “strongly worded letter,” but if that’s all you have, that’s what you lean on. If you need things to delay, to push to the right, to wait for a UN or EU meeting — that’s what you’re going to do, because you don’t have the military capability to do anything else.

And even as NATO allies approach that 2% GDP threshold — which is laudable — you have to ask: what can they actually do with that? A lot of our assumptions, everything from mine sweeping to escort ships to underway replenishment, don’t hold up when you look at the actual order of battle. Mike Mullen’s “Thousand-Ship Navy” concept still echoes, but do we really have allies who can fill those billets?

Even in the Red Sea the operational experience has been revealing. CDR Salamander noted that one allied navy’s top-line unit deployed and discovered its hardware couldn’t communicate with a partner nation’s radar systems. And on the British Type 45 destroyers — everybody loves those ships — CDR Salamander observed that at least one was unable to use its main gun against air targets in the Red Sea because of a software capability that had not been purchased, a cost-saving decision that reflected years of accumulated underinvestment.

That’s the “say versus do” problem. A lot of what Europeans are saying cannot be backed up because they have so under-resourced their militaries. They can posture, protest, and stand at sight. That’s it.

Politics and NATO

Q: Is this primarily a capability problem, or is politics a bigger factor in why allies haven’t stepped up?

CDR Salamander: It depends on the nation. I say this as a former NATO staff officer who genuinely loves the alliance. I loved who I served with. In Afghanistan, I spent more time with NATO partner nations than with Americans. But out of respect — because they speak clearly to us — we should speak clearly back.

There are a couple of powerful undercurrents in Europe. One is a latent anti-Americanism that’s part of the political landscape. The other — especially in France and to a lesser degree Germany — is a desire for EU primacy over NATO. They resent American influence in the alliance. Any opportunity to position the EU as an alternative to NATO is taken, because if they can detach European security from the American relationship, the EU becomes more powerful.

You also have national habits. Some allies are simply accustomed to the US carrying the load — and then commenting from the sidelines in ways that play well domestically. And the Israel dimension cannot be discounted. The fact that the US is operating alongside Israel has triggered large portions of the European electorate in ways that make allied political leaders unwilling to be seen as part of this operation — even when it’s clearly in their own economic interest.

This was true under Carter, Clinton, and Obama as much as under Reagan, Bush, and Trump. The Europeans just don’t map their political spectrum onto ours, and right now that disconnect is making things worse.

Why Hormuz Still Matters

A note before this next section: whether you follow naval policy closely or you’re coming to this conversation for the first time, what follows is the most important part of this interview. CDR Salamander explains, in plain language, why the Strait of Hormuz matters to Americans who don’t buy a drop of Gulf oil — and why the global economy is far more fragile than most people understand. It deserves close attention.

Q: What’s the one thing Americans aren’t getting from traditional news coverage about the Strait of Hormuz?

CDR Salamander: The hardest thing to explain — but the most important — is that the US hasn’t relied on Hormuz hydrocarbons for a long time. We’re energy self-sufficient. So when people ask why this matters to Americans, the answer isn’t about our gas prices. It’s about the entire architecture of the global economy.

After the Cold War, decisions were made across North America and Europe to de-industrialize. That doesn’t mean you stop needing manufactured goods — it means you offshore the manufacturing to Asia, and you don’t have to see any of it. That works until it doesn’t. And it doesn’t work when the energy supply chain feeding Asian manufacturing gets disrupted.

The vast majority of hydrocarbons moving through the Strait of Hormuz are going to China, Japan, India, Thailand, Australia. If that energy supply is disrupted, the cost of hard industrial manufacturing in Asia rises to the point where supply chains feeding Western industries start to collapse. The whole system wavers.

And it’s not just oil. It’s fertilizer derived from natural gas — the feedstock that made the Green Revolution possible and held back mass starvation. It’s helium, a byproduct of natural gas production, essential for semiconductor manufacturing and fuel cell development. People don’t see those connections.

What they really don’t understand is that if you want to stop economic migration, you need strong economies in Southeast Asia. If you want a buffer against an expansionist China — and a Russia probing NATO’s eastern flank and an Iran that has spent forty years treating the Gulf as its own private lake — you need viable economies in Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia. That can’t happen if those nations can’t access hydrocarbons at market prices.

Burden-Sharing Without Mercenaries

Q: Asian economies receive the overwhelming share of crude moving through the Strait of Hormuz — China, India, Japan and South Korea among the largest exposed markets. We’re backstopping maritime insurance, deploying carrier strike groups, burning through hardware and personnel. What’s the value proposition for the American taxpayer?

CDR Salamander: Too many people in positions of political power don’t know how money works. They don’t understand interconnected economic systems. And they’re operating in a political environment where maintaining their coalition comes before strategic clarity.

Some of them genuinely believe that contributing to an escort operation in the Strait of Hormuz means being part of the conflict. We saw that when Italy and Spain withdrew base access for operations involving Israel. They’re making decisions out of spite and domestic political calculation — even though the disruption will hurt their own economies far more than it hurts ours.

The argument that the beneficiaries of American naval protection should contribute more is legitimate. But how you structure that contribution matters enormously.

Q: We’ve had financial models before where countries paid for protection. Kuwait in 1987. Japan in 1991. Is there a precedent for a more formal burden-sharing arrangement?

CDR Salamander: I guess in theory it could work, but I’m not a fan of the concept as it’s usually framed. America has a voluntary military. These are the sons and daughters of American citizens who chose to serve their country. If we do anything that even smacks of being somebody else’s mercenary force, I don’t want to be the one explaining to a mother why her kid came home in a box because someone was cutting us a check to do their job for them.

Now — contributing nations don’t have to contribute forces. If Iceland doesn’t have a military but will buy diesel fuel for the operation, that counts. Resources and services in lieu of forces — that’s legitimate burden sharing. That’s the Daughters of the American Revolution model: you don’t need an ancestor who fought at Yorktown. Someone who drove a supply wagon qualifies too.

But pure payment for services rendered? That leaves a bad taste. Why is Bangladesh so active in UN peacekeeping? Because they like the money. I don’t want the United States Navy in that equation.

What the Navy Commission Must Confront

Q: The National Commission on the Future of the Navy has begun its work. If you were advising the commission — not on ship counts, but on structural questions — what are the two or three things they absolutely cannot afford to skip?

CDR Salamander: First, back up and ask why this commission exists at all. It exists because the institutions given stewardship over American sea power have done a poor enough job over the last three decades that Congress felt compelled to create external oversight. So the question isn’t “what ships do we need” — it’s “what structural dysfunctions produced this situation?”

My answers are unsexy. But the foundations of a house are unsexy. Plumbing is unsexy. You can’t have a functioning structure without them.

The first thing is industrial base. The only reason we won World War II is our industrial capacity — including our maritime industrial capacity. Right now we have submarines waiting over a year for repairs. We have dry dock capacity so constrained that ships are receiving depot-level maintenance in 2026 at a rate that would have gotten people fired in 1986. We need incentives and disincentives that grow, support, and sustain a geographically and institutionally diverse shipbuilding and maintenance industry. That will take a decade to fix. Start now.

Second: officer corps incentives. How we promote people and why. The current system is not fit for purpose. If it were, we wouldn’t be where we are.

Third: geographic presence. The Navy has disappeared from the view of too many Americans. San Francisco Bay is geographically ideal for naval facilities and sits at the center of American technology and influence — and we BRAC’d our way out of it. The “Master Base” concept — concentrating everything in San Diego, Jacksonville, and Norfolk — only makes sense to an accountant. It certainly doesn’t make sense in an era of drone swarms that can take out entire airfields. We need a distributed presence.

And underneath all of this: we need a national understanding of maritime power, not just a maritime strategy document. By geography and economy, we are a maritime and aerospace nation. Our budgetary priorities don’t reflect that. Changing them will require taking resources from what is not our comparative advantage as a non-continental land power. We have to be willing to make that fight. We need more Vice Admiral Tom Connollys and fewer officers who can’t get through a sentence without the word “joint.”

The Case for Sea and Air Power

Q: Final question. What’s the key takeaway — for Navy professionals and for civilians who might be listening?

CDR Salamander: There’s an opportunity here, and it’s being missed.

Every carrier deployed for nine, ten, eleven months is proof we don’t have a large enough navy. Every static airfield attacked ashore is an argument for sea-based power projection. Every Houthi missile fired at a merchant ship is a demonstration that the only answer is at sea. Every Chinese fishing fleet strip-mining the territorial waters of a South American coastal nation is a mission for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. Every Russian submarine probing undersea infrastructure in the North Atlantic is a reminder of who owns the depths. Every Iranian fast boat swarming a merchant vessel in the Gulf is a test of resolve we cannot afford to fail.

The Western Pacific threat is maritime and aerospace. What Australia, Japan, the Philippines, New Zealand need most is help securing their maritime connections and their airspace. That is our lane.

All the argument points have been delivered to us on a plate. We have the receipts. And I’ve been frustrated for a while that the stars are aligned, the case is right there, but too much of our senior leadership would rather talk about “joint” — or worse, say nothing at all.

This isn’t parochial. It’s about the security of the Republic. We have secure land borders. Europe has the population and economy to handle most of its own land and air requirements. We don’t need to find ourselves in another land war in Asia. But we do have a unique, irreplaceable role at sea and in the air.

If conflict comes — something like what we’re watching off Iran right now — the best outcome for America is one where we limit our involvement to sea power and air power. That’s not isolationism. That’s strategy. It’s the argument we should be making every day, because it’s an easy argument to make — and right now, the world is making it for us.

Bill’s Takeaway

A few honest reflections after sitting with this conversation.

CDR Salamander is an exceptional teacher. His ability to move from a 1982 carrier nearly decommissioned by RAF budget politics to a 2026 British destroyer unable to use its main gun in the Red Sea — and have both illuminate the same structural failure — is a gift. I’d encourage every reader to go back through his answers on the global economy section slowly.

What he makes clear — and what most people never connect — is that we do not live in silos. The fertilizer derived from natural gas that feeds billions also underpins the modern technology supply chain. The strong economies in Southeast Asia that buffer against Chinese expansionism are the same economies that prevent mass migration crises from landing on our doorstep. Freedom of navigation isn’t an abstraction. It is the load-bearing wall of the modern world. Remove it and everything above it comes down.

That lesson applies closer to home too. The naval advocacy community has its own silo problem. Veterans organizations, individual advocates, civic groups, and policy voices are all making versions of the same argument — but separately, in parallel, without a unified message. A trade association of defense contractors speaks for an industry. A coalition of veterans, citizens, and civic advocates speaks for the Republic. Those are not the same thing, and the difference matters.

I don’t agree with everything he said. I want to be straightforward about that, because intellectual honesty is the only foundation worth building on.

His objection to burden-sharing — the mercenary framing — is one I take seriously. He made it with conviction and genuine feeling for the men and women who serve. I respect that completely.

But here’s my honest position: The United States is not operating from a position of unlimited fiscal strength. Debt-service costs are rising, readiness needs are growing, and the nations benefiting most from open sea lanes — China, India, Japan and South Korea among the largest — have an obligation to contribute to the cost of keeping them open. That isn’t mercenary. That’s arithmetic.

And here’s where I think CDR Salamander and I are actually closer than it might appear. His own instinct — Iceland buying diesel fuel, basing access, logistics support, the wagon driver — is a barter framework. Contributions in kind rather than cash. I’ll take it. That’s a step in the right direction. The principle that beneficiaries contribute is the thing that matters. The mechanism is a conversation worth having.

We will have more to say about the legislative path forward at StrongerNavy.org in the weeks ahead. Watch this space.

CDR Salamander and I share the core conviction: the United States is a maritime and aerospace power, the Navy is underfunded and structurally undermined, and the window to fix it is narrow. That is enough to work with.

Stronger together. Break the silos.

— Bill Cullifer
Americans for a Stronger Navy | StrongerNavy.org

About CDR Salamander

CDR Salamander is a retired U.S. Navy officer and former NATO staff officer. He has written at CDRSalamander.com for nearly two decades and publishes regularly on Substack. His post “Europe’s Say v. Do Problem” served as the starting point for this conversation.

About Americans for a Stronger Navy

I founded Americans for a Stronger Navy (StrongerNavy.org) after serving as a Quartermaster/helmsman aboard USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) in the 1970s. Our mission is simple: advocate for a properly funded, capable U.S. Navy as a cornerstone of American security and economic prosperity. Full audio of this interview is available at StrongerNavy.org.

April 7, 2026April 7, 2026

The Golden Fleet Needs a Funding Engine. We Built One.

Brent Sadler at The Heritage Foundation just published one of the most comprehensive naval shipbuilding blueprints in recent memory. The 40-page Special Report, To Build the Golden Fleet, released March 25, 2026, is required reading for anyone serious about what it will actually take to rebuild American sea power. We’ve read every page. Sadler gets it right.

But the report has a gap. And we’ve spent two and a half years building the mechanism to fill it.

First, the numbers that should stop every American cold.

As of March 2026, China’s fleet stands at 474 warships. Ours stands at 291. Since September 2016 — when Congress set a goal of 355 ships — China’s fleet has grown by more than 100 warships. We added 17. [1]

The 2016 Force Structure Assessment identified the real requirement as 459 warships. Budget pressure compressed that to 355. And 325 ships was assessed as “maximum acceptable risk” — a floor, not a goal. We are operating below that floor today.

Submarine production currently runs at 1.1 boats per year. The requirement is 2.33 per year — and above 3.0 per year once AUKUS demand kicks in. [1]

Secretary Phelan has said 250,000 new shipyard workers will be needed over the next decade. And according to the Navy’s own acquisition executive, 50 to 60 percent of new industrial base hires quit within their first year. [1]

There are eight U.S. shipyards capable of building vessels over 400 feet in length. Eight. For a nation that needs to build a generational fleet larger than the Reagan-era 600-ship buildup.

These are not advocacy numbers. These are Sadler’s numbers, sourced from the Pentagon, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Navy’s own planning documents.

What the Golden Fleet Report Gets Right

Sadler’s blueprint is built around two simultaneous imperatives that most naval commentary treats as separate problems. He holds them together correctly.

The first is getting firepower to sea now. The bridge fleet — largely unmanned platforms deploying existing weapons like Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 missiles, built faster at smaller shipyards — addresses the 2027 Davidson Window without waiting for the industrial base to catch up. The USV Ranger’s successful SM-6 launch in September 2021 is the proof of concept. This is executable today.

The second is the generational industrial revival. New public shipyards in the Pacific. Design sprint teams collocated with shipbuilders. Vessel Construction Manager models that consolidate accountability. Modular construction techniques. Robotic welding systems that South Korean and Japanese shipyards have shown increase productivity by 20 percent. Block buys that give industry the funding predictability to invest in workforce and infrastructure rather than managing quarter-to-quarter. [1]

Sadler is particularly sharp on a point that rarely gets named directly: budgets must not predetermine the size or delivery schedule of the Golden Fleet. The threat informs the requirement. The requirement informs the budget. Not the other way around. Budget-led planning is how we got from a real requirement of 459 ships to a compromise of 355 to an actual fleet of 291 — while China added 100 warships.

The Gap the Report Doesn’t Fill

Sadler calls for novel contracting mechanisms — specifically SAWS, the Shipyard Accountability and Workforce Support contracting approach — matched with reformed tax structures that incentivize capital investment in shipbuilding capacity over pleasing Wall Street. He calls for a Naval Act with block buy authority. He calls for a fifth public shipyard in the Pacific at an estimated cost of $20 billion, with Congress appropriating initial funding now. [1]

These are the right prescriptions. But they share a structural dependency that the report doesn’t fully resolve: they all require sustained, predictable, mandatory funding that the annual appropriations process has consistently failed to deliver.

The White House Maritime Action Plan, released February 13, 2026, directed OMB to propose a legislative mechanism for a Maritime Security Trust Fund — a dedicated, mandatory funding stream. The directive was clear. The mechanism was left unspecified.

That mechanism is the Strategic SEAS Act.

The Funding Engine

The Strategic SEAS Act — the Shipbuilding Economic Acceleration and Security Act — proposes a sector-based defense reinvestment framework. Companies whose global operations depend on the maritime security the U.S. Navy provides contribute to a Maritime Security Trust Fund dedicated to shipbuilding capacity, fleet expansion, and maritime workforce development.

The logic is direct. American technology, developed with public investment and deployed at global scale, enabled the commercial operations that now depend on open sea lanes. China’s own shipbuilding capacity — the one producing more tonnage annually than the entire U.S. fleet — relies on logistics networks and advanced manufacturing that trace lineage to American innovation. The companies that benefit most from maritime security should have a structural stake in sustaining it.

This is not a new tax. It is a reinvestment framework — the same principle Sadler invokes when he calls for incentive structures that reward capital investment in shipbuilding over short-term financial returns.

The SEAS Act provides what SAWS and block buys cannot provide on their own: a funding stream that does not depend on annual appropriations decisions, does not compete with other defense priorities in the FYDP, and does not evaporate when political priorities shift between administrations.

Sadler’s Golden Fleet blueprint is the architecture. The SEAS Act is the funding engine that makes it executable across budget cycles.

The full framework has been published by the Center for Maritime Strategy as “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy.” [2]

One More Data Point Worth Naming

In the comments section of Sadler’s September 2025 Washington Times piece, a reader identifying himself as the leader of the 2016 Force Structure Assessment study team wrote the following:

“I led the study team that developed the 2016 force structure assessment and just wanted to point out that the different numbers were based on assessed risk. CNO chose the 355-ship force that we assessed as ‘moderate risk’ while the 459 was minimal risk. We even had a 325-ship ‘maximum acceptable risk’ — which should say something about our current force level.”

Read that carefully. Three hundred twenty-five ships was the floor — the maximum acceptable risk threshold established by the people who ran the assessment. We have 291. We are not below the goal. We are below the floor.

That is not a readiness problem. That is a national security emergency dressed in budget language.

What Comes Next

Secretary of the Navy John Phelan confirmed this week that the Golden Fleet is no longer a blueprint — it is an active program. In a public statement, Phelan outlined decisive action already underway: canceled programs not delivering results, new Portfolio Acquisition Executives with accountability for integrated capabilities, a Rapid Capabilities Office to accelerate technology delivery, and Ship OS now scaled to two major shipbuilders, four public shipyards, and 100 suppliers. Most significantly for the funding argument, Phelan stated plainly that “the era of free money is over — industry now has skin in the game and investing in their own expansion.” That is the SEAS Act’s core logic stated from the highest level of Navy civilian leadership. The reinvestment principle is no longer outside advocacy. It is official policy direction waiting for a legislative mechanism.

The Golden Fleet details will emerge in the coming days as the Navy’s budget and 30-year shipbuilding plan follow the report. Sadler’s three metrics for judging whether it’s worthy remain the right standard: firepower to sea, new operational concepts to deter China, and maritime industrial revival.

The third metric — industrial revival — cannot be sustained by legislative authorization alone. It requires a funding architecture that outlasts administrations and survives budget cycles. The SEAS Act is that architecture.

Americans for a Stronger Navy has been building toward this moment for two and a half years. Eight hundred published posts. A nonpartisan record. A framework developed in consultation with naval policy experts, constitutional scholars, and defense industry stakeholders.

The blueprint exists. The funding mechanism exists. What remains is the political will to connect them.

That is what we are working on. And we are not going anywhere.

References

[1] Brent Sadler, “To Build the Golden Fleet,” The Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 328, March 25, 2026. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/build-the-golden-fleet

[2] Bill Cullifer, “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy: The Strategic SEAS Act and Industrial Base Competition,” Center for Maritime Strategy, 2026. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/defense-reinvestment-as-naval-strategy-the-strategic-seas-act-and-industrial-base-competition/

[3] White House Maritime Action Plan, February 13, 2026.

Bill Cullifer is the founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy and a former blue-water destroyer sailor who served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7). StrongerNavy.org.

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026

The World’s Oil. One Navy Protects It. Who Else Is Paying?

“We strongly encourage other nations whose economies depend on the strait far more than ours to come and help us.”

Those are President Trump’s words. Not a think tank analyst. Not a naval advocacy group. The President of the United States, standing in the White House, publicly demanding that the nations who benefit most from American naval protection start paying their share.

He’s right. And there’s already a legal framework to make it happen.

The Strongly Worded Letter

On March 19, 2026, twenty nations issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Britain. France. Germany. Japan. South Korea. Canada. Twenty signatures. Strong language. Zero ships.

The statement expressed “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage.” France and Germany were more direct — any coalition would only form after a ceasefire. The German chancellor said he would only join a mission with an international legal mandate, and only after the fighting stopped.

Meanwhile, American sailors — some at sea more than 250 days — are doing it now.

This is not a new pattern. It is the defining pattern of post-Cold War burden-sharing. Allies sign statements. America sends ships. The bill goes to the American taxpayer.

What’s Actually at Stake

The Strait of Hormuz is not a regional waterway. It is the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. Roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes through it daily. Since Iran’s effective closure began on February 28, tanker traffic has dropped by approximately 70 percent. Over 150 ships anchored outside the strait rather than risk transit. Oil crossed $100 a barrel.

Then Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility — the world’s largest. QatarEnergy reported extensive damage. Their CEO said repairs would take three to five years. This is not a temporary disruption. The economic consequences will be measured in years, not weeks.

Who depends on that oil?

China imports approximately 11 million barrels per day through Gulf sea lanes secured by the U.S. Navy. India imports 5 million. Japan 3 million. South Korea 3 million. Europe 3 million. Japan gets 95 percent of its crude oil from the Gulf. South Korea is similarly dependent.

One navy keeps it flowing. Ours.

The Precedent Already Exists

This is not uncharted territory. The beneficiary-pays principle has been established twice in living memory.

In 1987, Kuwait paid the United States Navy to escort their tankers through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq tanker war. Operation Earnest Will established a clear precedent: nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of their commercial interests contribute to the cost of that protection.

In 1991, Japan paid $13 billion toward Operation Desert Storm. Japan did not send combat troops. Japan wrote a check. The Special Measures Agreement made the burden-sharing arrangement formal and documented.

The precedent exists. What is missing is a permanent, mandatory mechanism.

The Gap in the Framework

Every crisis produces a new round of negotiations, statements, and voluntary contributions — or the lack thereof. The 1987 model worked because Kuwait had a direct and immediate interest in the outcome. The 1991 model worked because Japan faced intense diplomatic pressure and the threat of real consequences.

Neither model is durable. Neither model is predictable. Neither model builds the naval industrial base that sustained forward presence requires.

The current Hormuz crisis will eventually resolve. The Iranian threat will recede, or be defeated, or be negotiated away. And when it does, the allied nations who signed that joint statement will declare victory, go home, and resume importing Gulf oil on America’s dime.

Until the next crisis. When the cycle repeats.

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

Americans for a Stronger Navy has proposed the Gulf Maritime Protection and Burden Sharing Act — the Gulf Act — as a permanent legislative solution to a permanent structural problem.

The Gulf Act establishes a mandatory burden-sharing mechanism requiring nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of Gulf sea lanes to contribute to the cost of that protection. It is grounded in the 1987 Earnest Will precedent and the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Special Measures model. It codifies what has previously been left to ad hoc diplomacy and presidential pressure.

The core principle is straightforward: if you benefit, you contribute.

This is not isolationism. It is not a withdrawal from global leadership. It is the application of a basic fairness principle that the American people already understand instinctively. You don’t get to import millions of barrels of oil through a strait secured by American sailors — some of whom haven’t seen their families in eight months — and sign a statement saying you’ll help out after the shooting stops.

The Window Is Now

President Trump has made burden-sharing a front-page issue. The Hormuz crisis has made the stakes visible to every American who has filled a gas tank in the last month. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is examining the structural questions underlying American naval power.

This is the moment to move from principle to legislation.

The strongly worded letter had twenty signatories. The Gulf Act needs one vote.

Learn more at StrongerNavyDotOrg.

References

[1] Axios, “Seven U.S. allies back potential Strait of Hormuz coalition,” March 19, 2026. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/19/strait-hormuz-coalition-allies-statement-uk

[2] Wikipedia, “2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis,” accessed March 24, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis

[3] Al Jazeera, “European nations, Japan to join ‘appropriate efforts’ to open Hormuz Strait,” March 19, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/19/european-nations-japan-to-join-appropriate-efforts-to-open-hormuz-strait

[4] Naval News, “The challenges of securing Hormuz as 6 nations issue joint statement,” March 2026. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/the-challenges-of-securing-hormuz-as-6-nations-issue-joint-statement/

[5] GOV.UK, “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz,” March 19, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-kingdom-france-germany-italy-the-netherlands-and-japan-on-the-strait-of-hormuz-19-march-2026

[6] Operation Earnest Will / Special Measures Agreement, 1987. Historical record.

[7] Desert Shield/Desert Storm burden-sharing agreements, Japan Special Measures, 1991. Historical record.

March 23, 2026March 23, 2026

The Five-Day Reprieve: Fleet Strain and Diplomatic High-Stakes in the Gulf

1. The “Five-Day Reprieve”: Trump Postpones Strikes
In a major de-escalation move today, President Donald Trump announced a five-day extension on his deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Citing “very good and productive” conversations involving intermediaries, the President has instructed the Department of War to postpone planned strikes on Iranian power plants and civilian energy infrastructure.

* The Market Reaction: Global oil prices dropped nearly 10% following the announcement as markets reacted to the potential for a “total resolution” of hostilities.
* The Catch: The President noted that the pause is “subject to the success” of ongoing meetings throughout the week.

2. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Sabotage Investigation
The USS Gerald R. Ford arrived at Souda Bay, Crete, today for emergency repairs. However, the focus has shifted from a simple fire to a formal criminal inquiry.
* The Investigation: Investigators are formally examining whether the 30-hour laundry room fire on March 12 was an act of internal sabotage. One theory suggests industrial dryers were intentionally overloaded to trigger the blaze.
* Crew Impact: The fire destroyed the ship’s laundry capability and displaced over 600 sailors from their berths. To provide relief, the Navy successfully airlifted 1,000 mattresses from the future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79).

3. Long-Range Escalation: Diego Garcia Targeted
Over the weekend (March 21), Iran demonstrated a previously unrevealed long-range capability by firing two ballistic missiles at the joint U.S.-U.K. base at Diego Garcia.
* The Defense: The strike covered a distance of approximately 2,500 miles (4,000 km), double Iran’s previously claimed 2,000 km limit. One missile failed mid-flight, and the second was successfully intercepted by a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer.
* Significance: This marks Iran’s first operational use of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), confirming they can now reach high-value U.S. logistics hubs far outside the Middle East.

4. “Lightning Carrier” Arrival: USS Tripoli (LHA 7)
The amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are expected to take up station in the North Arabian Sea within the next 24 hours.
* The Mission: Carrying over 2,200 Marines and F-35B stealth fighters, the Tripoli provides a flexible “raid” capability. Despite the diplomatic pause, this force is positioned to forcefully reopen the Strait or conduct maritime interdictions if negotiations fail.

5. Shipbuilding & Fleet Renewal
* USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124): The Navy’s newest Arleigh Burke-class destroyer arrived at its homeport in Norfolk on March 20. It is officially scheduled for commissioning on April 11, 2026.
* Budget Boost: Congress has finalized a $27.2 billion shipbuilding budget for FY2026—a $6.5 billion increase over initial requests—to fund 17 new ships, including a Columbia-class ballistic missile sub and two Virginia-class attack subs.

March 20, 2026March 20, 2026

Mission: General David Petraeus on the Conflict in Iran

Why This Matters: The High Stakes for American Seapower

As we watch the events unfold in the Persian Gulf, many Americans are asking: Why should we care? For the team here at StrongerNavy.org, the answer is clear. This isn’t just a regional skirmish; it is a stress test for the very foundation of global commerce and the U.S. Navy’s role as its guardian.

The Chokepoint of the World: The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical energy artery. Roughly 20% of global oil and LNG pass through here. A threat to this “chokepoint” is a direct threat to your gas prices and home heating bills.
A New Era of Naval Warfare: Our Navy is facing a “swarm” threat of low-cost drones. The challenge is “missile math”—defending against a $20,000 drone without exhausting million-dollar interceptors.
The Cost of Deterrence: With munitions costs hitting $6 billion in the first week, we see exactly why a properly funded, technologically superior Navy is the only way to prevent wider aggression.

The Interview: Objective Analysis in a Complex War

In what I consider to be one of the most objective and hard-hitting interviews on the current conflict, Katie Couric sat down with General David Petraeus to dissect the joint U.S.-Israeli operations. Couric asked the tough questions about shifting goals, while Petraeus provided a masterclass in strategic analysis.

The Rationale: Why Now?

General Petraeus identified two primary triggers for the timing of this operation:

Missile Reconstitution: Israel observed Iran rapidly rebuilding its missile program. The “missile math”—the ratio of launchers to interceptors—was becoming “uncomfortable.”
Fleeting Intelligence: The U.S. gained “exquisite intelligence” on the patterns of the Supreme Leader. The administration struck in broad daylight to capitalize on this window.

Naval Neutralization: “Giving Them the Bottom Half”

The U.S. Navy has effectively erased Iran’s ability to project power at sea. The numbers are historic:

120+ Vessels Sunk or Damaged: Including the IRIS Soleimani and the Makran forward-base ship.
Submarine Force Eradicated: All 11 Iranian submarines, including midget Ghadir-class mine-layers, are reported neutralized.
Carrier Power: The USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln are leading the charge, proving American steel remains the ultimate deterrent.

📊 QUICK STATS SIDEBAR: The Naval Front

Iranian Vessels Sunk/Damaged: 120+
Submarine Capability: 0 (Total Neutralization)
Missile Launch Reduction: 90% Decrease since Week 1
U.S. Carrier Presence: 2 Strike Groups (Ford & Lincoln)
Munitions Cost (Week 1): $6 Billion

The “Pottery Barn” Rule

Couric asked the poignant question regarding the “Pottery Barn Rule”—if you break it, you own it. Petraeus offered a sobering distinction: without boots on the ground, the U.S. doesn’t “own” the aftermath. “The Iranians own it,” he noted, while acknowledging that we may be “revisiting this periodically” if a new agreement isn’t reached.

Watch the full interview below to see General Petraeus navigate these complex waters.

Bill
Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org

March 15, 2026March 15, 2026

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

The Navy needs money. Taxpayers are tapped out. So where does the funding come from?

That is not a rhetorical question. It is the defining challenge of American naval policy in 2026. The fleet is shrinking. Shipyards are strained. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year. And the American taxpayer — already carrying an unsustainable fiscal burden — cannot be the answer to every problem.

But there is an answer. It just requires asking who else benefits from American naval power — and whether they are paying their share.

The United States Navy keeps the Persian Gulf open. Every tanker that transits the Strait of Hormuz does so because American sailors, American ships, and American taxpayers back the deterrent that makes it possible.

Japan imports it. South Korea imports it. Germany imports it. The economic engines of our closest allies run on Gulf-sourced petroleum — secured by a Navy they do not fund.

That is not an alliance. That is a subsidy.

We’ve Seen This Before

This is not a new problem. In 1987, Iran began attacking tankers in the Persian Gulf. The Reagan administration launched Operation Earnest Will — the largest naval convoy operation since World War II — reflagging Kuwaiti tankers as American vessels and providing direct Navy escort through waters Japan depended on for survival.

Congress noticed. If the U.S. Navy was protecting Japan’s oil supply, Japan should help pay for it. The pressure produced the first formal Special Measures Agreement in 1987, requiring Japan to contribute to the cost of U.S. forces providing that protection. The principle was established: beneficiaries of U.S. naval protection should contribute to it.

That agreement has been renewed and expanded ever since. The precedent has held for nearly four decades.

The Gap Has Grown

What was true in 1987 is more true today. Gulf oil revenues exceed $350 billion annually. The nations collecting that revenue — and the allies consuming it — benefit from sea lanes the U.S. Navy patrols at a cost of billions per year.

The Navy keeps the sea lanes open. The beneficiaries collect the profits.

Meanwhile, the Navy that provides this service is smaller, older, and more strained than at any point in recent memory. Shipyards are at capacity. The fleet is shrinking. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year.

Allies reliant on Gulf energy are not being asked to share that burden in proportion to their dependence on it.

The Gulf Act: Applying an Established Principle

The Gulf Act is the logical extension of the 1987 burden-sharing framework to the present day. The concept is straightforward: nations that depend on Gulf energy security — and the sea lane access that makes it possible — should contribute meaningfully to the naval forces that provide it.

This is not a radical idea. It is the application of a 35-year-old precedent to a threat environment that has grown more complex, not less.

The mechanisms can take multiple forms — direct contributions to naval operations, minesweeper deployments, escort ship commitments, or financial contributions to a dedicated naval modernization account. The form matters less than the principle: if you benefit, you contribute.

A Note on Why We’re There

Some will argue that the United States has multiple reasons for maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf — and they are right. Security commitments to allies in the region, Iranian nuclear ambitions, freedom of navigation as a global principle, and counterterrorism interests all play a role. The Gulf Act does not dispute any of that.

But those reasons are a separate question from this one: who should pay for the benefit they receive?

The two questions are separable. In 1987, the U.S. had multiple reasons for being in the Gulf too — and Congress still established that Japan, as the primary beneficiary of tanker protection, should contribute to its cost. The Gulf Act asks the same narrow, defensible question: if your economy depends on sea lanes the U.S. Navy keeps open, what is your fair share of that bill?

This is not about relitigating American strategy. It is about making sure the nations that benefit most are not free-riding on the nations that bear the cost.

The SEAS Act Connection

Regular readers will recognize the parallel. The Strategic SEAS Act applies the same beneficiary-pays doctrine to U.S. corporations with significant China operations — companies that helped build the industrial base now threatening American naval superiority should help fund the response.

The Gulf Act and the SEAS Act are two applications of the same governing principle:

Those who extract value from American naval protection should share the cost of providing it.

Whether the beneficiary is an allied nation importing Gulf oil or a Fortune 500 company running supply chains through Chinese ports, the logic does not change.

The Cost of Doing Nothing

If the burden-sharing argument sounds abstract, consider what is happening right now in the Persian Gulf.

According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate cited by Defense One on March 12, 2026, the first 100 hours of Operation Epic Fury cost approximately $3.7 billion — roughly $891 million per day. Air defense munitions costs alone ranged from $1.2 billion to $3.7 billion. [2]

The cost asymmetry is stark. Iran’s Shahed drones cost around $30,000 each. The missiles used to shoot them down — AIM-120s at $1 million, PAC-3 interceptors at $4 million — cost orders of magnitude more. As one defense analyst put it: every cheap drone that forces the U.S. to fire an expensive interceptor is a win for Iran. [2]

Six U.S. soldiers were killed at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, when an Iranian drone evaded air defenses. Three F-15E Strike Eagles were lost in a friendly fire incident over Kuwait. [2]

Meanwhile, the nations whose energy supplies depend on the Gulf’s sea lanes — Japan, South Korea, Germany — are not bearing these costs. The American taxpayer is.

That is the externality the Gulf Act is designed to correct.

The Question Sadler Asked

Captain Brent Sadler of the Heritage Foundation recently raised this directly in the context of a potential Gulf convoy mission, asking whether it was time for allies dependent on Gulf petroleum to contribute escort ships and minesweepers. [1]

The answer is yes. It has always been yes. The 1987 precedent proved it was politically achievable. The current fiscal and force structure reality — and the live situation unfolding today in the Strait of Hormuz — makes it urgent.

The Navy cannot be the world’s free security service while simultaneously being asked to compete with a Chinese fleet building ships at a rate that dwarfs American production. Something has to give — or someone else has to contribute.

What Comes Next

Americans for a Stronger Navy will be developing the Gulf Act framework in the coming months, including burden-sharing models, historical precedents, and legislative pathways. This post is the opening argument.

If you agree that nations benefiting from American naval protection should help fund it, share this post. The conversation Sadler started on X deserves a longer answer than a tweet.

The sea lanes don’t protect themselves.

— Bill Cullifer, Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

References

[1] Brent D. Sadler (@brentdsadler), X (formerly Twitter), March 11, 2026. Captain Sadler serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

[2] Thomas Novelly, “Fighter jets are downing Iranian drones—a dangerous, expensive mission,” Defense One, March 12, 2026. Cost figures sourced from CSIS estimate and Forecast International report cited therein.

March 9, 2026March 9, 2026

The Old Guard Departs, The New Tech Arrives:

The Mine countermeasure ship USS Avenger (MCM 1) “Old Gaurd” heads out for decommision.

The New Guard: Independence-class LCS as a ‘Mother Ship’

The transition to the Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) represents a fundamental shift in naval doctrine. As seen in recent operations, vessels like the USS Canberra (LCS 30) utilize their massive mission bays and stern launch capabilities to act as a command hub for uncrewed systems.

Independence-class LCS deploying surface assets from the mission bay.

Technical Deep Dive: The AN/AQS-20 Sonar

Central to the new MCM Mission Package is the AN/AQS-20 sonar set. Unlike the legacy hull-mounted systems on the Avenger ships, this towed array uses five separate sonar arrays to detect and classify mines in a single pass, providing 3D bottom mapping with high-resolution clarity.

The AN/AQS-20 sonar being prepared for deployment.

A Strategic Evolution

By moving the primary sensors and sweep systems off the manned ship and onto uncrewed platforms, the Navy significantly reduces the risk to sailors. These autonomous systems can operate closer to the threat while the “Mother Ship” remains at a safe standoff distance, ensuring our sea lanes remain open through advanced technology rather than wooden hulls.

Technical Spotlight: AN/AQS-20C Specifications

Sensors: 5 Sonars (including Synthetic Aperture) + Laser Imaging
Range: Full water column (Seafloor to Surface) in one pass
Intelligence: Automated Target Recognition (ATR)
Platforms: Independence-class LCS / CUSV / MH-60S Helicopter

March 8, 2026March 8, 2026

Understanding the U.S. Navy’s Industrial Challenge

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered (Part 1 of 8)

I served as a blue-water destroyer sailor in the 1970s, and like many veterans, I’ve spent the years since trying to understand how America maintains the naval strength that protects our country, our allies, and the global sea lanes we all depend on.

The charts and analysis below help tell part of that story.

This article is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter, our ongoing educational series exploring the future of American sea power and the policies, people, and industrial strength that sustain the U.S. Navy.

If you’re new to the series, you can start with the introduction here:
Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

This article also launches a focused 8-part series within Charting the Course examining some of the most important questions facing the Navy today — from shipbuilding capacity and fleet readiness to workforce challenges and the future of maritime deterrence.

We’re calling it The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

For most Americans, the Navy is something we think about only in moments of crisis. A conflict erupts, a carrier group deploys, or a headline mentions tensions in the Pacific or the Middle East.

But the strength of the U.S. Navy is not decided during those moments. It is determined years — sometimes decades — earlier in shipyards, classrooms, industrial plants, research labs, and congressional hearings.

Today the United States faces serious questions about shipbuilding capacity, industrial readiness, and long-term naval strategy. China is building ships at a pace the world has not seen in generations. Russia continues to challenge Western stability at sea. Critical maritime infrastructure and supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

And yet many Americans remain understandably disconnected from the decisions shaping the future of our fleet.

The strength of the U.S. Navy is determined long before ships sail into crisis—it is built in shipyards, sustained by skilled workers, and shaped by decisions made years earlier in industry, technology, and national policy.

Why Americans Should Care

America is, and has always been, a maritime nation.

Nearly 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. The global economy depends on secure shipping lanes. Energy markets, supply chains, and the stability of democratic alliances all rely on freedom of navigation.

The U.S. Navy has quietly safeguarded those sea lanes for generations.

But maintaining that advantage requires more than ships — it requires people, industry, technology, and public understanding.

Chart: Global Operational Demand on the U.S. Navy

This Heritage Foundation chart illustrates the geographic reach of U.S. naval operations across multiple regions. Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups are routinely deployed worldwide, highlighting the constant global demand placed on the fleet.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Over the coming weeks, this series will explore several critical questions about the future of U.S. sea power.

Can America rebuild the shipbuilding capacity required to compete in a new era of great power competition?

Do we have enough skilled workers — engineers, welders, and naval architects — to sustain fleet growth?

How serious is the maintenance backlog affecting submarines and surface ships?

Are current procurement processes helping or hurting the Navy’s ability to modernize?

How should the United States balance aircraft carriers, submarines, uncrewed systems, and logistics platforms?

What role do civilian shipyards and maritime infrastructure play in national security?

Can the United States scale submarine production fast enough to match emerging threats?

And perhaps most importantly: how do we ensure the American public remains engaged in decisions that affect the future of the fleet?

These are not partisan questions. They are national questions.

Understanding the Industrial Challenge

Much of the discussion about naval power focuses on ships already at sea. But the true story begins on land — in America’s shipyards and industrial base.

Chart: Age Distribution of Chinese and U.S. Naval Fleets

This chart compares the age distribution of Chinese and U.S. naval fleets. China’s fleet contains a larger number of relatively new ships, reflecting rapid shipbuilding expansion in recent years.

China now possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding industry by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, American shipyards face workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and unpredictable funding cycles.

Chart: U.S. Navy Ships Nearing or Exceeding Service Life

This chart shows the growing number of U.S. Navy ships approaching — or exceeding — their expected service life, placing additional strain on fleet readiness and modernization timelines.

The Human Factor

Ships and technology matter — but ultimately the Navy is built on people.

From sailors standing watch at sea tonight to the skilled workers building submarines and carriers at home, the strength of the fleet depends on the dedication and expertise of thousands of Americans.

Implications for Our Allies

America does not operate alone at sea.

Alliances with countries such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners form a critical part of global maritime stability.

These partnerships reinforce an important truth: deterrence is strongest when democracies stand together.

Public Engagement Matters

The U.S. Navy ultimately belongs to the American people.

Yet the complexity of defense planning can make it difficult for citizens to understand how decisions about shipbuilding, budgets, and strategy affect national security.

That is one of the reasons we created StrongerNavy.org.

Our goal is simple: help Americans better understand the challenges facing the fleet, the industrial base that supports it, and the people who serve at sea and in shipyards across the country.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered — Series Guide

Part 1 – Understanding the Industrial Challenge (this article)

Part 2 – Can America Rebuild Shipbuilding Capacity?

Part 3 – The Submarine Production Challenge

Part 4 – Maintenance and Fleet Readiness

Part 5 – Workforce and the Maritime Industrial Base

Part 6 – The Role of Allies in Sea Power

Part 7 – Procurement, Policy, and the Future Fleet

Part 8 – Why Public Engagement Matters

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing
educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next.

Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

March 4, 2026March 5, 2026

Strait of Hormuz: The Facts, The Warning, and What America Can Do

Special Report | March 5, 2026

Cutting through the noise on the world’s most critical waterway — and why this moment calls for resolve, not panic.

There is a lot of noise right now about the Strait of Hormuz. Some of it is accurate. Some of it is not. All of it is loud. Before you form an opinion about what this crisis means — and what America should do about it — you deserve the facts, stated plainly, without an agenda.

That is what we do at StrongerNavy.org. Plain language. Verified facts. No spin.

What Is Actually Happening

The Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide waterway on Iran’s southern border — is the single maritime exit for the Persian Gulf. Every barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Iran that leaves by sea passes through this one gap. It carries 20% of the world’s oil and a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas. There is no alternative route. Ships that cannot use the strait must sail around the southern tip of Africa — adding two to three weeks to every voyage.

Since February 28, that strait has been effectively closed to nearly all commercial shipping. Let’s be precise about what that means.

It is legally open. The U.S. Central Command has confirmed the strait “remains open to international navigation.” Iran has not formally closed an international waterway — it cannot under maritime law.

It is operationally closed. Ship traffic is down 94%, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center. The world’s largest shipping companies — Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, CMA CGM — have all suspended transits. Approximately 750 ships are caught in or around the strait, unable to move.

The reason ships stopped is not Iran’s navy. It is marine insurance. A European regulatory framework called Solvency 2 requires insurers to hold capital sufficient for a once-in-200-year loss event at all times. When conflict escalated, insurers recalculated their exposure overnight. Cancelling war risk coverage takes seven days. Raising new capital takes months. The math was simple — and 90% of the world’s commercial fleet lost its coverage. As maritime historian Sal Mercogliano put it plainly on March 4: “It’s not the Iranians closing the strait. The decision was made by the shipping companies.”

Iran’s weapon is not its fleet. It is economic fear. And it has worked — for now.

What It Tells Us

None of this should be a surprise. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has been documented for decades. Naval planners have war-gamed this scenario repeatedly. The question was never whether it could happen. The question was whether America would be ready when it did.

On March 3, President Trump ordered the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide government war risk insurance for all maritime trade in the Gulf — effective immediately, at what he described as “a very reasonable price.” It was the right instinct. Private insurers had fled the market overnight, and the insurance gap — not Iranian guns — was what stopped the ships.

Whether it moves the needle remains to be seen. The shipping industry has signaled the offer may not be sufficient to restore confidence on its own. And if vessels are damaged, American taxpayers could face a bill in the hundreds of millions — potentially billions. The commitment is real. The details are still emerging.

On March 4, President Trump pledged the U.S. Navy would escort commercial tankers through the strait. Within hours, Lloyd’s List reported the Navy had privately told shipping industry leaders it does not currently have sufficient assets to fulfill that commitment. Approximately 125 ships transit the strait daily under normal conditions. The U.S. has roughly eight guided-missile destroyers and three Littoral Combat Ships in the region. As Mercogliano noted: “This is nowhere near enough assets. They just do not have the assets to do it.”

There are no frigates available — because the U.S. has not yet built a replacement frigate. The Littoral Combat Ships present cannot reliably provide air defense against drones and missiles, as the Red Sea campaign demonstrated. And even as U.S. forces degrade Iran’s conventional navy — including the March 4 torpedo sinking of the Iranian corvette IRS Dena, the first U.S. submarine sinking of a warship since World War II — the asymmetric threat remains. Drones, mines, and fast boats do not require a functioning navy. The Houthis proved that. The Ukrainians proved that in the Black Sea.

We also do not know the full readiness picture of the ships operating in the Gulf tonight — because the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey readiness reports have been classified since 2008. The American public cannot independently verify whether those vessels are fully mission-capable. That is unacceptable. #FreeTheData

The gap between the President’s public commitment and the Navy’s private assessment is not a failure of this administration alone. It is the accumulated result of a generation of deferred shipbuilding, underfunded shipyards, and what we have long called seablindness — America’s institutional tendency to underinvest in naval power during periods of relative peace, then scramble when a crisis arrives.

You cannot build a destroyer in a crisis. The fleet available tonight was determined by decisions made — and deferred — over the past decade.

We Have Been Here Before

I want to say something that tends to get lost in the noise: America has fixed this before.

I served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s. That was the hollow Navy — undermanned, underfunded, demoralized after Vietnam, outpaced by a Soviet fleet that was growing faster than ours. The readiness gap then was real. The threat was real. The concern among those of us who served was real.

And then America came together and fixed it.

The Reagan-era naval buildup — driven by bipartisan recognition that sea power was not optional for a global superpower — took a Navy that could barely sustain itself and rebuilt it into the 600-ship force that helped end the Cold War without firing a single shot at its primary adversary. It did not happen because of panic. It happened because enough Americans, in and out of uniform, looked at the problem clearly and decided the answer was investment, not retreat.

That is the moment we are in again. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not the end of the story. It is the alarm clock.

What America Does Now

The framework for action already exists. The President signed Executive Order 14269 restoring America’s maritime dominance. The Maritime Action Plan, released in February 2026, identified exactly the investments needed — shipbuilding capacity, workforce development, industrial base expansion, a Maritime Security Trust Fund with dedicated funding. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is preparing public hearings in Q2 2026. The SHIPS for America Act has bipartisan support in Congress.

The architecture is there. What has been missing is national will — the public demand that elected representatives treat naval power as the non-negotiable strategic necessity it is.

That is what StrongerNavy.org exists to build. Not alarm. Not partisanship. Not finger-pointing. A clear-eyed, evidence-based, nonpartisan case that a strong Navy is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It is an American issue — as fundamental to our security and prosperity as any question before the country today.

The Strait of Hormuz will reopen. Insurance markets will recalibrate. Ships will move again. But the underlying readiness gap — the shipyard capacity shortfall, the escort deficit, the classified readiness reports, the two-theater question that nobody in Washington wants to answer plainly — will still be there the morning after.

The question is whether this crisis produces the national conversation that leads to real investment, or whether we absorb the shock, breathe a sigh of relief, and go back to sleep.

America does not have to choose seablindness. We chose our way into this. We can choose our way out.

“The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.” — John F. Kennedy

The sun is not shining right now. But when it does — and it will — let’s make sure we remember what this week felt like. And build accordingly.

Stay Informed. Stay Engaged.

StrongerNavy.org has been covering the naval readiness gap for over two years — plain language, verified facts, no spin. If this post was useful, share it with someone who needs to understand what is at stake. And follow our ongoing coverage as this crisis develops.

This is America’s wake-up call. What we do with it is up to us.

March 2, 2026March 2, 2026

When Navigation Becomes a Weapon

Strength at sea now includes protecting the invisible systems that guide global trade.

Electronic warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield. In the days following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, maritime intelligence firms reported that more than 1,100 ships operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz experienced GPS or AIS disruption. Vessels appeared inland on digital maps. Others showed strange circular patterns off the coasts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. Maritime officials described the risk level in the region as “critical.”

This is what modern conflict looks like.

Not just missiles. Not just drones.
Navigation. Commerce. Confidence.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime chokepoints on Earth. Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil moves through that narrow passage. When positioning systems degrade in such a congested, militarized waterway, the risk of collision, grounding, or miscalculation rises sharply. Add aerial threats and naval maneuvering to the equation, and degraded navigation becomes a risk amplifier.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans will never sail through the Strait of Hormuz. But they will feel the effects if shipping slows, insurance premiums spike, or energy markets react to instability. Maritime security is economic security. The sea lanes quietly underpin global supply chains, energy flows, and financial stability. When GPS signals flicker in a strategic chokepoint, markets notice.

Electronic interference aimed at navigation systems is not just a military tactic. It directly impacts civilian shipping. Tankers hesitate. Routes change. Traffic patterns compress. The cost of uncertainty ripples outward. In a globally connected economy, those ripples eventually reach American households.

For years, we have warned that maritime chokepoints are soft underbellies in a fragile system. This latest episode underscores that warning. The battlespace now includes the invisible infrastructure of positioning, navigation, and timing.

Implications for the Navy

When commerce comes under electronic pressure, the U.S. Navy becomes the stabilizer. Escort missions, presence operations, surveillance, and deterrence all require ships, crews, logistics depth, and technological resilience. Strength at sea is not abstract. It is measured in hulls, readiness, training, and industrial capacity.

Yet we continue to fund our maritime industrial base through unstable, year-to-year appropriations cycles. We debate ship counts while the underlying architecture remains fragile. Predictable investment is not about expansion for its own sake. It is about reducing systemic risk.

Electronic warfare against commercial shipping highlights the need for redundancy. Redundancy in fleet capacity. Redundancy in basing and logistics. Redundancy in navigation technologies. If GPS can be degraded in one of the world’s most vital trade routes, resilience cannot be optional.

The Case for Predictable Maritime Investment

This moment should not trigger panic. It should prompt clarity.

America’s maritime security underwrites global commerce. Yet the economic beneficiaries of secure sea lanes are not structurally aligned with long-term investment in the maritime industrial base. That mismatch creates vulnerability.

The Strategic Economic Alignment for the Maritime Industrial Base Act, the SEAS Act, is about architecture, not urgency. It seeks to create stability and predictability in funding so that shipyards, suppliers, and maritime infrastructure can plan for the long term. It recognizes that maritime security is foundational economic infrastructure.

If navigation becomes a weapon, then resilience becomes a responsibility.

Strength is built on redundancy. Stability is built on predictability. The events in the Strait of Hormuz are a reminder that modern conflict increasingly targets the connective tissue of commerce. We can either respond episodically, or we can build a durable framework that matches the strategic environment.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we believe the American people must understand what is at stake. The Navy belongs to the nation. Its readiness, its resilience, and its industrial foundation require public awareness and engagement.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.