Help Them Feel Like Sailors — Blake Herzinger

America at Sea: Blake Herzinger

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

Blake Herzinger is a career naval officer. He spent ten years on active duty as an intelligence officer, then moved to the Navy Reserve as a foreign area officer specializing in Asia, and was mobilized to USS Lewis B. Puller in the Arabian Gulf from 2019 to 2020. He has lived in Singapore since 2013, where he once helped plan U.S. Navy exercises across the region and has watched maritime statecraft play out up close.

What’s Working: Maritime Diplomacy as Industrial Policy

Herzinger sees pragmatic shipbuilding policy taking hold, starting in the Biden administration and hitting its stride under the current one. He credits the shipbuilding team at the Office of Management and Budget led by Jerry Hendrix [1].

“We’re fighting out of a hole with regard to our shipbuilding capacity. And that’s not something you fix overnight. You can’t just magic up a shipyard.”

What excites him are deals that build capacity while ships get built: the “Finland model,” where foreign builders start construction overseas and shift it to American yards as the workforce is trained; Hanwha’s investment in Philly Shipyard [2]; and Arsenal-2, the new shipyard Anduril and the U.S. government are building at Sparrows Point, Maryland [3]. To him, it all reflects a renewed awareness that America is a maritime nation, something we got distracted from for decades.

The Biggest Barrier: Capacity, and the Sea Blindness Behind It

The barrier, he says, is capacity, and for years the conversation went in circles. We need more ships. The industrial base can’t handle it. Builders with one customer turn out one or two destroyers a year, and can’t scale without the promise of more money.

Underneath it all, he argues, was sea blindness. The nation focused on wars in Southwest Asia and the Middle East and lost the awareness earlier generations had of why the sea matters to our security and our economy. Partners and adversaries kept that awareness and watched with concern as U.S. hulls in the water dwindled and port calls grew rare.

“We are in a period of elevated risk, because while we are now investing, we are still in a period of real risk out to ’28, 2030, when these investments actually start coming online. The fleet’s too small, it’s run ragged, and we won’t be able to start fixing it ourselves for still a number of years.”

Fix One Thing: Help Sailors Feel Like Sailors

Herzinger calls his answer “a bit self-indulgent.” He was raised by a Reagan-era sailor, a nuclear operator on USS Enterprise, and grew up on his father’s stories and cruise books: Australia, Pakistan, Pearl Harbor, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Naples. He still has the poster on his wall: Not just a job, it’s an adventure.

He wants the Navy to find its footing in that spirit again, instead of what he calls the “rah-rah, digital camouflage” warrior image of the war on terror.

“You join the Navy from Idaho like I did, and you see things that you would have never seen if you’d stayed home. Whether you stay in for four years or 30 years, you see the world and it changes you.”

A sailor who spends six to eight months off the coast of a desert nation probably won’t stay in, he says, and won’t tell friends how amazing it was. That is partly a fleet too small to do more than one thing at a time, and partly a vision of the service that “doesn’t feel maritime.”

“I think we need to help people feel like sailors, and we need to help them tell the story at home of why the Navy matters to America. And I think it begins with that kind of spiritual awakening.”

The Takeaway

Herzinger connects two problems that are usually discussed separately: a shipbuilding base that can’t keep up, and a public that stopped seeing why the sea matters. His fix links them. Sailors who see the world come home and tell the story, and that story is how a nation recovers from sea blindness.

He is not alone. Several America at Sea voices have raised the same question about how the Navy sees itself, and it is one this organization intends to keep asking: are we training warriors who happen to go to sea, or sailors ready to fight when the nation asks?

About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

About the Guest

Blake Herzinger is a career naval officer. After ten years on active duty as an intelligence officer, he moved to the Navy Reserve as a foreign area officer specializing in Asia, and was mobilized to USS Lewis B. Puller in the Arabian Gulf from 2019 to 2020. Based in Singapore since 2013, he has worked for American-headquartered multinationals across technology, defense, and finance, and previously helped plan U.S. Navy exercises across the Indo-Pacific.

References

[1] USNI News, “White House Shipbuilding Effort Moves to Office of Management and Budget,” July 18, 2025: https://news.usni.org/2025/07/18/white-house-shipbuilding-effort-moves-to-office-of-management-and-budget
[2] Hanwha Group acquired Philly Shipyard in December 2024, its first U.S. shipyard investment.
[3] Naval Technology, “US Navy, Anduril plan $6.6bn Arsenal-2 shipyard in Maryland,” October 7, 2026: https://www.naval-technology.com/newsletters/arsenal-2-shipyard-us-navy

No Strategy, No Navy — Seth Cropsey

America at Sea: Seth Cropsey

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

Seth Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute, which focuses on the influence of the maritime sphere on commerce, geopolitics, strategy, and America’s relations with allies and adversaries [1]. A former naval officer and former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, he writes regularly on naval and maritime issues and is the author of three books, including Seablindness and, this year, Breaking the New Axis: A U.S. Grand Strategy for Eurasia from the Naval Institute Press [2][3].

His view of the moment is sobering: adversaries growing stronger at the same time Americans are growing more reluctant to engage. “That makes for a dangerous combination,” he says.

What’s Working: Washington Is Finally Listening

Ten years ago, Cropsey says, you could hardly get anyone to listen. Today people are talking about the Navy’s problem, and the budgets show it. By his count, the first Trump administration, with Congress, funded 50 ships, and the 2027 budget proposal includes money for 34 more.

But money is not ships.

“Unfortunately, you can’t buy a ship like you buy a pretzel. It takes a lot longer to make a ship than a pretzel.”

In the meantime, he notes, China is turning out ships “like hotcakes,” its navy is already numerically larger than ours, and many U.S. ships built 40 or more years ago will retire before the new ones arrive. “It’s a mixed picture.”

The Biggest Barrier: Washington Keeps Losing Its Navy Experts

Cropsey’s barrier is political. The members of Congress who truly understand the Navy keep leaving office. He names former Rep. J. Randy Forbes of Virginia, who “knew more about the Navy than anybody else in Congress,” and, after him, former Rep. Elaine Luria of Virginia, a former naval officer. Both lost their seats.

“We don’t have a Carl Vinson today. We don’t have somebody who is a preeminent national figure on the Navy.”

Vinson was the Georgia congressman behind the 1940 Two-Ocean Navy Act, which built the fleet that won World War II [4]. Cropsey argues that kind of recognition exists today only “in pockets,” even as China builds a huge merchant fleet and a navy to protect it, “a page out of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book” [5], and as attacks on shipping near the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea show how exposed the sea lanes are.

“We just don’t seem to realize as a country how dependent we are for our security and our commerce on the seas. And that’s got to change.”

Fix One Thing: A Maritime Strategy

The quickest fix, Cropsey says, is to buy ships from foreign builders who can build to American specifications. But the most important fix is deciding what we are buying and why.

“The root of the problem is that there is no maritime strategy today. It does not exist, as it did, for example, during the end of the Cold War.”

That 1980s strategy, he says, didn’t require everyone to agree, only to understand. It was the driver that produced the Reagan Navy: “We knew what we were going to do with it. We knew how to do it. We practiced for it. We trained for it.”

Asked how to get there, he starts at the top. It would help a great deal, he says, if the president would explain these facts to the American people and take a personal interest in the nation’s maritime strategy.

“It doesn’t mean that he has to come up with it himself. It just means that he has to show some interest in it and explain why it’s important.”

He adds a second fix: secretaries of the Navy who arrive already knowing the job. The average secretary serves about two years, he notes, and someone coming from Wall Street or an unrelated field spends much of that time learning before they can make real change.

The Takeaway

Cropsey’s three answers point to one gap: the nation has the money flowing and the threat in plain view, but no one at the top who owns the question of what the Navy is for. In his telling, the understanding exists in a handful of members of Congress and staff, and it doesn’t get outside that bubble.

That diagnosis, no maritime strategy and no one at the top who owns it, is the case for putting maritime strategy on the President’s desk, through a dedicated Maritime Security Advisor in the White House. That is our conclusion, not his, but it follows from his argument.

—

About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

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About the Guest

Seth Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, and writes and lectures widely on naval, maritime, and foreign policy. His work has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, National Review, RealClearDefense, and Foreign Affairs. He is the author of Seablindness, Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy, and Breaking the New Axis: A U.S. Grand Strategy for Eurasia (Naval Institute Press, 2026).

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References

[1] Yorktown Institute: https://yorktowninstitute.org
[2] Seth Cropsey, Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower and What to Do About It (Encounter Books, 2017).
[3] Seth Cropsey, Breaking the New Axis: A U.S. Grand Strategy for Eurasia (Naval Institute Press, 2026).
[4] The Two-Ocean Navy Act (Vinson-Walsh Act) of July 1940 authorized a roughly 70 percent expansion of the U.S. Navy’s combatant tonnage, the largest naval procurement in U.S. history.
[5] Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890).

Robots in Harm’s Way — Bryan Clark

America at Sea: Bryan Clark

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., and director of its Center for Defense Concepts and Technology. A retired Navy submariner, he served as director of the Commander’s Action Group for Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and spent three years in the Navy’s assessment division before joining the think tank world [1].

His answers are the kind that start arguments, and that is the point. He is willing to say what many in the naval community would rather not.

What’s Working: Sailors Under Fire

Clark starts with the people. Against the Houthis and now Iran, the Navy’s air and missile defenses have worked, and its ships have sustained high readiness through months of real combat. It is the first time in generations that American sailors have operated under sustained fire.

“You train and you train and you test these systems out and you’re not totally sure if they’re going to work when the time comes to use them against a real threat. And we’ve seen that across the board. Those have been effective in this fight.”

He sees that experience as preparation. The Houthis and Iran have given sailors confidence they can do the job they would face against China.

The Biggest Barrier: Buying Differently, and Fielding Robots

Clark names two barriers.

The first is munitions. The weapons the Navy built to counter the Soviets and the Chinese are overkill against cheaper Iranian threats, and the stockpile has paid the price. The acquisition system makes it hard to buy something deliberately less capable but far more affordable.

“The normal acquisition process doesn’t give you that flexibility to say, I want to buy something that’s not as good as the best thing I can buy.”

The second is unmanned systems. Iran, the Houthis, Russia, and Ukraine have all shifted to drones. The U.S. Navy has struggled to make that transition, partly because it lacks the process to deploy robots into a theater the way it deploys ships and aircraft.

“I would rather put those robots in harm’s way rather than a bunch of people, and I’d rather use the robots’ service life up instead of burning through the service life of my ships.”

He adds that large, highly integrated warships cannot change quickly, while Ukraine updates its drones in days or weeks. His answer is to keep a core traditional fleet while buying more of the new technology now, rather than treating it as an add-on.

Fix One Thing: Readiness Before New Hulls

This is where Clark gets controversial, and he says so. His first fix would be the Navy’s readiness accounts, even at the expense of some new construction.

His reasoning is about the bills that come after the ribbon-cutting. By his estimate, every dollar spent buying a ship brings about five dollars in operating, maintenance, and personnel costs over its life, and those future bills are not funded in advance.

“We’re signing up future administrations, future Congresses to pay those bills. And our experience is they don’t do it.”

He notes that the Navy has retired more ships than it has built over the last decade, and that today’s fleet, about half the size it was 40 years ago, costs roughly the same to operate, crew, and maintain.

“We have a readiness crisis in the Navy today that doesn’t get solved by just buying a couple more ships. It gets solved by putting the money into readiness and managing the fleet at a size where it’s sustainable, rather than signing up a future administration to have a hollow force that is big on paper but not so big out in the water.”

The Takeaway

Clark’s answers challenge a comfortable assumption, including one this organization holds: that more ships is always the answer. His warning is that a fleet the nation will not pay to sustain becomes a hollow force. That is the same lesson behind our own motto, you can’t surge what you didn’t sustain.

Not everyone will agree with his prescription. Many will argue the answer is a bigger budget, not a trade between ships and readiness. But his question deserves an answer from anyone making the case for a larger fleet: who pays to keep it at sea?

—

About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

—

About the Guest

Bryan Clark is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute. A retired Navy submariner, he previously served as special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and director of his Commander’s Action Group, and worked in the Navy’s assessment division. Before joining Hudson, he was a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

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References

[1] Hudson Institute, Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Defense Concepts and Technology: https://www.hudson.org

Ships, Shipyards, and the Law — Charlie Papavizas

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation presented by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action, and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each guest answers three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? And what would you fix first? The goal: find common ground and deliver a report to policymakers, their staffs, and the public.

Charlie Papavizas is a partner at Winston & Strawn LLP and one of the most recognized maritime lawyers in the United States. He is the author of Journey to the Jones Act: U.S. Merchant Marine Policy 1776–1920 and currently chairs the firm’s Maritime, Ship Finance & Offshore practice. A former chair of the Maritime Law Association of the United States’ Government Regulation Committee and a longtime member of the American Bureau of Shipping, Papavizas has spent four decades advising shipowners, operators, and government agencies on the legal frameworks that govern American shipping. He is currently at work on a second volume, covering the era from World War I through the Korean War. [1]

What’s Working

Papavizas begins with what he sees as the foundation — the programs that have sustained the U.S. commercial maritime industry over decades.

“We have maintained a core commercial maritime industry through several means. One, the Jones Act. Two, the security programs — maritime security program, tanker security program, cable security program. Three, through reserving U.S. government cargos to U.S.-flag commercial vessels. Those three things have maintained a pretty vibrant domestic industry. But for those things, you would have nothing.”

Those programs — the Maritime Security Program, cargo preference laws, and Jones Act cabotage requirements — form the legal scaffolding that keeps American-flag ships operating in a global market that rewards the lowest possible cost. Papavizas knows that scaffolding better than almost anyone. He helped build parts of it, and he has defended it for decades.

The Biggest Barrier

Papavizas does not sugarcoat the problem. The barrier, he says, is the same one identified by the Lynch Commission in 1870, and by every commission and study since.

“They always point to one basic factor — the commercial maritime industry around the world can move anywhere and do everything that’s needed anywhere. That means lowest cost is driven to very lowest cost. And the U.S. standard of living does not permit us to have the very lowest cost, because you can’t hire people. You can’t maintain the shipyards here at those levels of cost.”

An American chief engineer, Papavizas notes, could just as easily make a substantial salary at a power plant. He or she is not going to work for what a Croatian captain or Indian chief engineer will accept. That is not a policy failure. It is math. And that math has shaped every maritime debate in Washington for more than a century.

What Would You Fix First

This is where the conversation turns urgent. Papavizas identifies two overlapping priorities — and both require the federal government to act.

First: rebuild the shipyard base through series production.

“We really need to provide for an order book that will give them the ability to plan. And the essential element for that is series production. Standard design, no design variance, long series production. Which commercial owner can do that? Well, there aren’t any. No one’s going to order 50 ships from U.S. shipyards, or 100 or 150. But the U.S. government can. We did it in the lead-up to World War II when private owners were not ordering enough ships. The U.S. government stepped in and ordered ships to its designs.”

He points to the 1950s Mariner program, when the government ordered 50 advanced break-bulk ships — relatively fast, with military utility. A substantial investment, but one that kept yards alive and workforces trained. The same model could work today: pick a commercial design, spread it across four or five yards on a 10- to 15-year horizon. And there are signs of movement: Kiewit and Hyundai recently announced plans for a new shipyard in Ingleside, Texas — the kind of greenfield investment the industry has not seen in decades. [2]

Second: offer tariff incentives for U.S.-flag shipping.

“The very first promotional program for U.S.-flag shipping in 1789 was a discount on the carriage of tea from China to the United States. If you carried it in a U.S.-flag vessel, you paid a lower tariff. Tariffs have come back in style. Well, why don’t we just automatically have a 10 percent discount across the board? Any tariff, 10 percent discount, use a U.S.-flag ship. People would re-document ships in the United States.”

He and his clients have studied the numbers — especially in cars, where a 10 percent discount on a 25 percent tariff is a big deal. He notes the SHIPS Act and other current proposals as positive steps, but warns they may not move quickly enough. Even if ships were ordered tomorrow, the first hull would be three and a half years out. [3]

Why Americans Should Care

Papavizas reaches back more than a century to make the case. In 1914, when war broke out in Europe, every available ship was chartered to carry war materiel. The United States — officially neutral — suddenly could not move its own exports. Unemployment spiked. The economy tanked.

“This is what happened when we had no merchant marine to speak of in the foreign trade, even in 1914, as a hedge. We had no hedge. So what happens today if the Chinese government or some other government does that to the United States? What’s our hedge? We don’t have a hedge. We don’t have anywhere near enough ships for that eventuality.”

The second argument is military logistics. The U.S. cannot fight anywhere beyond its own continent — including to defend Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Guam — without commercial sealift. And foreign-flag crews have refused to enter war zones before. During Vietnam, crews on foreign vessels declined to sail into combat areas. It is, Papavizas notes, their right under international maritime law — and a risk the United States cannot afford to take again. [4]

He draws a line through every major American conflict: in World War I, in World War II, and in Korea, the country needed years to build up shipyard capacity and tonnage. A Harvard study commissioned by the Navy after World War II asked the obvious question — and gave a blunt answer.

“Harvard did a study commissioned by the Navy and by the War Shipping Administration. Basically, how big of a fleet do we need? And the Harvard study was pretty blunt: In World War I, we had time before we got into the war to build up a capacity. And that saved us. In World War II, we had time to build up a capacity, and that saved us. Is that going to be the same the next time? Harvard said, there’s no reason to think that that’s going to be the case.”

Papavizas also raises the once-significant Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet — foreign-flagged vessels owned by American companies, often registered in Panama or Liberia. The theory was that in a crisis, those ships could be called into service. That fleet, he says, effectively no longer exists. The Maritime Administration no longer tracks it the way it once did, and nobody should count on it as a strategic reserve. [5]

The Takeaway

Charlie Papavizas has spent a career inside the legal architecture of American shipping. His message is plain: the programs that sustain U.S.-flag shipping work, but they are not enough. The shipyard base needs a long-term government order book — series production of standard commercial designs, sustained over a decade or more. And tariff incentives could put market forces to work rebuilding the American-flag fleet. The history is clear. Every time the United States needed ships and did not have them, it paid in time, treasure, and sometimes blood. The question is whether Washington will act before the next crisis answers it for us.

About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day conversation about the future of American sea power. Presented by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action, and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions:

1. What’s working in American maritime?
2. What’s the biggest barrier?
3. What would you fix first?

A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of the series.

About the Guest

Charlie Papavizas is a partner at Winston & Strawn LLP, where he chairs the Maritime, Ship Finance & Offshore practice group. He is the author of Journey to the Jones Act: U.S. Merchant Marine Policy 1776–1920, a history of American merchant marine policy. A former chair of the Government Regulation Committee of the Maritime Law Association of the United States, he has been recognized as a leading maritime attorney by Chambers USA, Legal 500, Best Lawyers in America, and Lawdragon 500. He serves as a member of the American Bureau of Shipping, the Propeller Club, and the editorial board of the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. He is currently at work on a second volume, covering the era from World War I through the Korean War.

References

[1] Charlie Papavizas, Journey to the Jones Act: U.S. Merchant Marine Policy 1776–1920. See also Winston & Strawn LLP attorney profile.

[2] On series production and government shipbuilding programs, see Salvatore Mercogliano, “The Maritime Administration and the U.S. Merchant Marine,” in The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security (Routledge, 2022).

[3] The Sustaining and Honing International Partnerships for Shipping Act (SHIPS Act) and the President’s Maritime Action Plan both propose measures to expand American shipbuilding capacity and the U.S.-flag merchant fleet. Key provisions were included in the House version of the FY 2027 NDAA but face resistance in the Senate, where the Commerce Committee chairman has been skeptical. Most maritime provisions may not survive conference.

[4] On the history of foreign crew refusals to enter combat zones, see Arthur Donovan and Joseph Bonney, The Box That Changed the World (Commonwealth Business Media, 2006), and the Maritime Administration’s sealift readiness studies.

[5] The Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet (EUSC) was tracked by the Maritime Administration through the Cold War. See MARAD annual reports and Papavizas’ discussion in Journey to the Jones Act.

Who Commands the Robots?

One idea, four answers: how opinions on the Pentagon’s new Autonomous Warfare Command are taking shape, and why it matters to the future of the fleet.

On Veterans Day, Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), wrote that wars are won in shipyards and factories as much as at sea. In the same column, he called the Pentagon’s new Autonomous Warfare Command a good step, likening it to how the U.S. reorganized its commands to manage new technology in the Pacific in World War II [1].

Two weeks earlier, Dr. Steven Wills of the Center for Maritime Strategy argued the opposite: the services do not need a four-star command for autonomous warfare at all [2].

Both men are serious naval thinkers. Both want the Navy to win. So who is right? To answer that, it helps to look past the headline.

Why this matters to every American

Drones are no longer a side show. In Ukraine and in the Middle East, cheap unmanned systems have changed how wars are fought, and how fast. The Navy expects that unmanned aircraft could one day make up as much as 60 percent of a carrier air wing [2]. Whoever decides how these systems are bought, trained on and commanded will shape the Navy your children and grandchildren serve in.

There is also a “who pays” question. The Pentagon’s 2027 budget request proposed roughly $54 billion for its autonomous warfare effort, up from about $226 million the year before [3]. Where that money sits, and who controls it, is exactly what this debate is about.

What the Pentagon actually announced

On September 30, Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the Autonomous Warfare Command, or AUTOWARCOM, in a speech at Marine Corps Base Quantico [4]. It would be a four-star combatant command, the first new one since U.S. Space Command was reestablished in 2019 [5].

A few facts are often lost in the coverage:

It doesn’t exist yet. The target date is October 1, 2027, and it depends on legislation and on decisions about budgets, personnel and command relationships that haven’t been made [6].

It is meant to have “service-like” authorities. That means its own manpower, budget, acquisition authority and career paths, not just a headquarters [4][6].

It is not meant to replace the services’ own drone programs. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Space Force would keep providing forces. The command would set joint requirements and integrate them [6].

An interim effort is already running. Project Agincourt, led by Defense Innovation Unit director Owen West and Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser, is building the path to the new command [6].

The services are moving at the same time

The Army didn’t wait. Two days after the announcement, it created its own Futures and Autonomous Systems Command, or FASCOM, to put autonomy into its formations, buying and training, with priority capabilities fielded no later than fiscal 2028 [7].

“We are done with the bureaucratic inertia holding back modernization.” — Acting Army Secretary Adam Telle [7]

The Navy has been at it too. Earlier this year, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said the Navy was weighing a dedicated commander for robotic and autonomous systems [8]. In September, the Navy stood up a Robotic and Autonomous Systems Warfighting Development Center to bring order to years of scattered experiments across its warfare communities, labs and acquisition offices [9].

So the question isn’t whether the military should adopt autonomous systems. Everyone agrees on that. The question is who should be in charge of it.

Why the timing matters. Whatever authority Congress gives the new command, it will have to draw lines around organizations the services are already building. The Army moved first and fastest. The Navy has started, more quietly. Organizations that are up and running are hard to take apart, so the services moving now may end up with the strongest say over the systems they will fight with. That is worth watching, especially for the Navy.

The case for a four-star command

Retired Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, makes the strongest case. His model is 1986, when Congress, frustrated that special operations forces were scattered across the services, created U.S. Special Operations Command with the power to organize, equip and advocate for that mission [10]. Drones, he argues, face the same problem today. He also warns that a reform made by one Pentagon leadership team can be undone by the next.

“Administrative action can begin reform, but lasting change requires Congress.” — Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, USMC (Ret.) [10]

Admiral Stavridis comes at it from history. In World War II, he notes, the U.S. adapted its command structures to keep up with radar, code-breaking and the carrier [1].

The case against

Dr. Wills thinks the SOCOM comparison falls short. Special Operations Command was born from a specific failure, the 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran. No similar failure with unmanned systems has happened. And drones, unlike special operations forces, are becoming part of the regular force [2].

His better comparison is aviation between the world wars. The U.S. let the Army and Navy develop aircraft for their own needs, and the Navy built carrier aviation into the heart of the fleet. Britain put all military aircraft under the Royal Air Force, and its naval aviation fell behind for two decades. A single command, he warns, risks a “one-size-fits-all, lowest-bid solution” [2].

Others add their own concerns:

It cuts against flattening the force. Retired Army Special Forces Lt. Col. Stephen Cook points out that the same Pentagon leadership ordered cuts to four-star billets. Autonomy, he argues, is a technology to be fitted to each service, not a domain like cyberspace. He calls a new four-star headquarters “the ultimate bureaucratic paradox” and would instead put autonomy experts inside the services’ program offices [11].

Who does what isn’t settled. Army officer Michael Carvelli warns of a command-and-control collision between AUTOWARCOM and the Army’s FASCOM, and expects the other services to build their own versions. Without clear lines on requirements, buying, testing and fielding, he writes, the command “risks reproducing the gaps that it was created to close” [12].

Congress holds the real power

The Pentagon can create a command. Only Congress can give it money and authority. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the 2027 defense bill would permit, but not require, a robotic and autonomous systems combatant command [5][13]. As Navy Captain Justin Hardy put it in Proceedings, Congress must decide what authority such a command will have [13].

That is where this debate will be settled: in the details of the final defense bill, not in the speeches.

What both sides agree on

Strip away the arguments over org charts and there is real common ground:

The current system is too slow. Supporters and critics alike say acquisition hasn’t kept pace with how fast drones are changing on the battlefield.

The warfighter has to own the result. Even supporters say the services will keep providing and fighting the forces. Critics say that is exactly why the services should keep control of development.

Clarity has to come first. Nearly every writer, for or against, asks the same questions: who sets requirements, who controls the money, and who answers for results.

The takeaway

This isn’t a fight between people who want drones and people who don’t. It is an argument among serious people about how to organize for them. History offers lessons on both sides: SOCOM shows what a dedicated command can do, and naval aviation between the wars shows what service-led experimentation can do.

For the Navy, the stakes are high. Unmanned systems will fly from its carriers, sail with its destroyers and patrol beneath the surface. Whatever structure emerges, it has to help sailors fight, not add another layer between them and the tools they need. And as Admiral Stavridis reminds us, none of it matters if we can’t build the ships and systems in the first place.

We’ll keep tracking this debate as it unfolds, and we’ll share what the voices in America at Sea say about it. Where do you come down? Join the conversation on X.

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first? Views expressed are the speakers’ own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

References

[1] James Stavridis, “World War II Still Has Lessons for Today’s Wars,” Bloomberg Opinion, November 11, 2026.
[2] Steven Wills, “The Services Do Not Need a Four-Star Autonomous Warfare Command,” RealClearDefense, October 24, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/pentagon/articles/the-services-do-not-need-a-four-star-autonomous-warfare-command-2026-10-24
[3] Covington & Burling, Inside Government Contracts, “The Pentagon’s New Sub-Unified Command for Autonomous Warfare: What It Means and Where It Might Land.” https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/tag/autonomy/
[4] Military Times, “Hegseth announces new four-star command for autonomous warfare,” September 30, 2026. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/09/30/hegseth-announces-new-four-star-command-for-autonomous-warfare/
[5] Air & Space Forces Magazine, “Lawmakers Eye Four-Star Command for Unmanned, Autonomous Systems.” https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lawmakers-four-star-command-unmanned-autonomous-systems/
[6] IDGA, “AUTOWARCOM Explained: Inside the Pentagon’s New Autonomous Warfare Command,” October 26, 2026. https://www.idga.org/
[7] U.S. Army, “Army announces Futures and Autonomous Systems Command,” October 2, 2026. https://www.army.mil/article-amp/295913/army_announces_futures_and_autonomous_systems_command
[8] Breaking Defense, “Navy weighs creating robotic autonomous systems commander amid unmanned push,” February 2026. https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/navy-weighs-creating-robotic-autonomous-systems-commander-amid-unmanned-push/
[9] DefenseScoop, “Navy creates robotic autonomous systems warfighting development center,” September 25, 2026. https://defensescoop.com/2026/09/25/navy-creates-robotic-autonomous-systems-warfighting-development-center/
[10] Arnold Punaro, “The Lesson of 1986 for the Pentagon’s New Autonomous Warfare Command,” RealClearDefense, October 14, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/military-strategy/articles/the-lesson-of-1986-for-the-pentagons-new-autonomous-warfare-command-2026-10-14
[11] Stephen D. Cook, “Why an Autonomous Combatant Command Hinders Lethality,” RealClearDefense, October 12, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/military-strategy/articles/why-an-autonomous-combatant-command-hinders-lethality-2026-10-12
[12] Michael Carvelli, “AUTOWARCOM Is Heading for a Command and Control Collision,” RealClearDefense, October 20, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/us-army/articles/autowarcom-is-heading-for-a-command-and-control-collision-2026-10-20
[13] Justin Hardy, “May, Not Shall: Congress’s Role in the Autonomous Warfare Command,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2026. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/november/may-not-shall-congresss-role-autonomous-warfare-command

A Nation Built by Water — Colin Grabow

A Nation Built by Water

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

America’s strength at sea is more than the Navy. It is the ships that move goods along our coasts and rivers, the fleet that carries our trade overseas, and the shipyards, ports and mariners behind all of it. In a crisis, the Navy leans on the same yards, crews and cargo ships that keep our economy moving. That is why this series covers all three.

Our guest is Colin Grabow, Associate Director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, where his research focuses on the Jones Act and other domestic trade protections [1]. Colin is one of the country’s best-known critics of the Jones Act. Not everyone in this series agrees with him, and that is the point. We want every serious voice in this conversation. His views here are his own.

Question 1: What’s working?

Colin’s answer is blunt: in his opinion, very little. He explains why with a thought experiment. Look down at the United States from space, he says, and you see thousands of miles of coastline lined with major cities, inland rivers, the Great Lakes, and states and territories that can only be reached by sea. A reasonable person would conclude that moving goods by water must be a very big deal here.

It isn’t. Of the freight moved inside the country by road, rail and water, water carries less than 10 percent, measured in ton-miles. Coastal shipping is around 4 percent. Most of what does move by water is crude oil and petroleum products, plus cargo to and from Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico, where there is no other option.

“We’ve taken what should be a really optimal means of moving goods in a country as big as the United States, and we’ve made it the last resort.”

The reason, he says, is cost. Three container ships now being built at the Philly Shipyard each cost more than $330 million [2]. He estimates the same ships would cost less than $80 million in Asia. Of roughly 60,000 ships in the world, he counts fewer than 100 in U.S. domestic commerce. The domestic fleet has become mostly barges, and it is old. Ships that would be scrapped at 20 to 30 years overseas often sail past 40 here.

His sharpest example is Pasha Hawaii. Rather than order new ships, the company sent two container ships built in 1980 to a state-owned shipyard in China to convert them from steam to LNG power [3][4].

“No other country in the world does this. This is purely a product of U.S. maritime dysfunction.”

He points to the same pattern on the Great Lakes, in the tugboat and fishing fleets, and in shipbuilding itself. Last year, by his count, the United States produced 0.03 percent of the world’s commercial shipbuilding output, ranking 19th, just ahead of Croatia [5]. He also notes, while saying he is not a naval expert, that nearly every major Navy shipbuilding program is late and over budget, and that the Coast Guard’s first heavy icebreaker, ordered in 2019 for 2024 delivery, has slipped years. A recent GAO report now projects 2033 [6].

Question 2: What’s in the way?

Colin’s answer will surprise no one who follows his work: the Jones Act. He doesn’t call it the only cause of the problems he describes, but he calls it a major one. Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 limits domestic water transportation to ships that are U.S.-flagged, at least 75 percent U.S.-owned, and built in the United States [7].

Defenders call the law the foundation of U.S. maritime policy. Colin’s reply: when things go wrong, check the foundation. Tying shipping to a costly shipbuilding industry that builds few ships, he argues, fails the very industry it is meant to protect. We don’t require U.S.-built aircraft or rail cars, he notes, so why ships?

“It is a self-imposed embargo. It’s what our enemies would want to do to us.”

He traces U.S.-build rules back to 1817, and arguably 1789, when American yards were among the most competitive in the world. That is not the world we live in now, he says. And high ship prices suit companies that already own ships, because they raise the value of those ships and keep competitors out.

“I think reasonable people can disagree about the exact changes that are needed, but I totally reject the notion that it’s fine.”

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Repeal the Jones Act’s U.S.-build requirement, or at least change it in a major way. In his view, it puts a heavy financial burden on shipping in exchange for very little shipbuilding. Over the last 25 years, he says, all U.S. shipyards combined have built about 2.6 large ships a year on average.

He also takes on the argument that at least what we build is built here, so we don’t depend on foreigners. We already do, he says. Pasha’s newest U.S.-built container ship, the Janet Marie, has a Chinese-built propeller and a South Korean-built engine. He recalls a Philly Shipyard executive saying around 2015 that about half of the roughly one million parts in one of its ships were imported.

“Just purely within the scope of the self-interest of the U.S. maritime industry, this is a requirement that just has to go.”

The takeaway

Colin’s diagnosis is hard to dismiss. A country built around coasts, rivers and lakes barely ships by water, its domestic fleet is small and old, and its commercial yards produce a sliver of world output. His prescription is where people part ways. Defenders of the build requirement, including the American Maritime Partnership, argue it keeps the industrial capacity the country needs to build its own ships in a crisis [8]. Colin’s answer is that 0.03 percent of world output is not much capacity to protect. Whichever side you lean toward, the numbers he lays out are worth knowing. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

Colin Grabow is Associate Director at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, where his research focuses on domestic trade protections such as the Jones Act and the U.S. sugar program. He is the author of the Cato study Rust Buckets: How the Jones Act Undermines U.S. Shipbuilding and National Security and co-editor, with Inu Manak, of The Case against the Jones Act. His writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, National Review and The Hill. Before joining Cato, he did political and economic analysis for a Japan-based trading and investment firm and research on U.S.-Asia relations for an international affairs consulting firm. He holds a BA in international affairs from James Madison University and an MA in international trade and investment policy from George Washington University [1].

References

[1] Cato Institute, “Colin Grabow.” https://www.cato.org/people/colin-grabow
[2] iMarine News, “Hanwha Philly Shipyard’s $1B Matson Container Ship Order Delayed to Q2 2028.” https://www.imarinenews.com/34992.html
[3] Marine Log, “Pasha to repower veteran box ship to LNG dual fuel.” https://www.marinelog.com/news/pasha-to-repower-veteran-box-ship-to-lng-dual-fuel/
[4] Marine Log, “MARAD funds two LNG-as-fuel projects” (Horizon Spirit, delivered 1980). https://www.marinelog.com/news/marad-funds-two-lng-as-fuel-projects/
[5] Colin Grabow, “New Data Lay Bare the Jones Act’s Broken Shipbuilding Bargain,” Cato Institute, June 26, 2026. https://www.cato.org/blog/new-data-lays-bare-jones-acts-broken-shipbuilding-bargain
[6] gCaptain, “U.S. Polar Security Cutter Delayed to 2033 as Costs Top $6 Billion, GAO Warns.” https://gcaptain.com/u-s-polar-security-cutter-delayed-to-2033-as-costs-top-6-billion-gao-warns/
[7] Colin Grabow, “The Jones Act Is Protecting U.S. Shipyards to Death,” Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/commentary/jones-act-protecting-us-shipyards-death
[8] Marine Link, “AMP Opposes Amendment to Eliminate US Shipbuilding.” https://www.marinelink.com/news/shipbuilding-amendment383916.aspx

Fighter Pilot’s Three Answers —Matthew “Whiz” Buckley

America at Sea: Matthew “Whiz” Buckley

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

Matthew “Whiz” Buckley flew the F/A-18 Hornet for the U.S. Navy for about 15 years. He graduated from the Navy Fighter Weapons School adversary program, flew combat sorties over southern Iraq in support of Operation Southern Watch, deployed aboard USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Kitty Hawk, and was mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. After a stint on Wall Street, he founded the No Fallen Heroes Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to ending veteran suicide [1].

He answers like a fighter pilot: direct, fast, and with no wasted motion.

What’s Working: Forward Presence

For Buckley, the answer starts with the oldest question in American crisis management: when something goes wrong in the world, the first thing a president asks is where’s the nearest carrier?

He tells the story on a friend, Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine, an F-16 pilot Buckley has known for decades. Whenever something happens, Buckley says, even an Air Force fighter pilot has to ask where the boats are: the carriers, the subs, the nearest strike group, the nearest Marine Expeditionary Unit.

“What’s working with the Navy is being forward deployed, projecting our power on 75% of this planet, which obviously is water. When we can put four and a half acres of sovereign U.S. territory off somebody’s coast, it allows us to project power and get the job done.”

The Biggest Barrier: Deployments That Wear Out Ships, Aircraft, and People

The same forward presence that works is also the barrier. Deployments are getting longer, and they are combat deployments. Carriers have been dodging missiles, and an F/A-18 went over the side of a carrier during hard maneuvering to evade hostile fire [2].

“Literally every landing I had in the F-18 Hornet was a car crash. It’s the equivalent force. So we’re beating up the airplanes, we’re beating up the boats, and we’re beating up the people, and you can only do that for so long.”

His prescription is plain: more carriers, more air wings, more ships. And he takes the threat at its word. He points to the 2027 date for the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan, a timeline U.S. intelligence officials have said Xi Jinping set for his military [3].

“The threat ain’t getting less, it’s getting more. We’re really putting our Navy and Marine Corps team to a lot of stress right now. And I think our leaders need to address that.”

Fix One Thing: Peace First, Then Overwhelming Force

Asked what he would fix first if he were king for a day, Buckley starts somewhere unexpected: there wouldn’t be any wars. He says he never served with anyone who wanted to go kill people, and he paraphrases General Douglas MacArthur’s observation that the soldier, above all others, prays for peace because he must bear the deepest wounds of war.

But the world has people who wish America harm. If the nation has to fight, he says, it should fight to end the war quickly. He contrasts the grinding war in Ukraine and 20 years in Afghanistan and Iraq with the Powell and Schwarzkopf doctrine of overwhelming force.

“If I were king for a day, I’d want peace. But if we get pushed to the point of having to use force, overwhelming massive firepower. And that’s where a strong Navy is going to come in.”

Where to Learn More

Buckley’s passion today is the No Fallen Heroes Foundation. More than five years ago, he traveled to Mexico with Marcus Luttrell, the Navy SEAL and author of Lone Survivor, for psychedelic-assisted therapy that he says saved and changed his life. In April 2026, he and Luttrell were in the Oval Office when President Trump signed an executive order directing federal agencies to accelerate research and review of psychedelic treatments for PTSD and other conditions affecting veterans [4].

The foundation gives grants to veterans and their families. And Buckley closes with a personal offer:

“If you’re a veteran and you’re not in a good place, man, I’m available 24/7. I’m here for you. Healing is possible. There is a way out.”

Learn more at NoFallenHeroes.com and WhizBuckley.com [1][5].

If you are a veteran in crisis, or worried about one, call or text the Veterans Crisis Line: dial 988, then press 1 [6].

The Takeaway

Buckley’s three answers make one argument. Forward presence is what America’s Navy does best, and it is wearing out the ships, aircraft, and sailors who provide it. The fix is a Navy big enough to stay forward without breaking, strong enough that adversaries never test it, and decisive enough to end a fight quickly if they do.

He also brings something no other guest has: a reminder that the people who serve carry the cost long after they come home. A stronger Navy means taking care of them too.

—

About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

—

About the Guest

Matthew “Whiz” Buckley flew the F/A-18 Hornet for the U.S. Navy for about 15 years. A graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School adversary program, he flew combat sorties over southern Iraq in support of Operation Southern Watch, deployed aboard USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Kitty Hawk, and was mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. He is the founder of the No Fallen Heroes Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to ending veteran suicide.

—

References

[1] No Fallen Heroes Foundation: https://nofallenheroes.com
[2] In April 2025, an F/A-18E Super Hornet and its tow tractor were lost overboard from USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea when the carrier turned hard to evade Houthi fire. Both crew members survived.
[3] In February 2023, CIA Director William Burns said U.S. intelligence indicated Xi Jinping had instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, while noting that this did not mean Xi had decided to do so.
[4] The White House, “President Trump’s Landmark Order Advances Breakthrough Mental Health Treatments — Delivering New Hope to Veterans,” April 20, 2026. The executive order was signed April 18, 2026.
[5] Matthew “Whiz” Buckley: https://whizbuckley.com
[6] Veterans Crisis Line: https://www.veteranscrisisline.net

Strategy First — Dr. Steven Wills

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

Our guest is Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist at the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy and a senior advisor to Americans for a Stronger Navy [1][2]. Steve served 20 years as a Navy surface warfare officer, including as executive officer of a mine countermeasures ship, before earning a PhD in military history. He is the author of Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning and, with former Navy Secretary John Lehman, Where Are the Carriers? [1]

Question 1: What’s working now?

Steve sees more interest in shipbuilding than at any time in the last 25 years. There is bipartisan, bicameral interest in the SHIPS for America Act and in the President’s Maritime Action Plan, and voices across Washington and the country are saying the same thing: we don’t build enough ships.

He thinks COVID was the wake-up call. People found out their toilet paper and frozen fish came from somewhere else, on a ship, and that very few ships fly the American flag. Meanwhile the Navy went from close to 600 ships at the end of the Cold War to fewer than 300 today, despite a 355-ship goal on the books for a decade.

“There is really a significant interest in fixing the maritime industrial base in this country. And I’m very heartened by that. Good time for all of us to throw in and try and make that work better.”

Question 2: What are the barriers?

Steve sorts them into three kinds: structural, cultural and economic.

Structural. Warships are funded one year at a time. A program might get full funding one year and less the next, and Congress has run on continuing resolutions “forever,” which means last year’s funding for this year’s problems. For 35 to 40 years after the Cold War, there was also no threat at sea to rally around. The Navy became a supporting force for wars in Southwest Asia. The rise of China’s navy has changed that, and he sees the Navy reworking its acquisition processes in response.

Cultural. “We told people to go away from the trades. We said everybody should go to college.” Now the country needs those tradespeople more than ever if it wants to bring basic industries home.

Economic. The industry has shrunk, so ships cost more to build. They are also far more complex than the ships of the 1990s, which calls for new technology, new workers and new ways of building.

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Steve’s answer is a maritime strategy, like the one the Navy had in the 1980s under President Reagan, led by Navy Secretary John Lehman and the admirals of that era.

“It really said, this is what the Navy is gonna do in peace and war. And here’s exactly the fleet that you need to accomplish these missions. We had that very well defined. We don’t have that as much now.”

For anyone who wants to dig deeper, he points to two Center for Maritime Strategy publications, both free online:

Returning from Ebb Tide: Renewing the United States Commercial Maritime Enterprise [3], which Steve edited, covers how America used to build ships and how it got away from that. It includes ideas from contributors including Capt. Brent Sadler, a section on Military Sealift Command as the backstop for a country that “always plays an away game,” and a section on recruiting, training and keeping mariners, written by California maritime academy instructors.

Pier Review: Leveraging the Allied Maritime Industrial Base for U.S. Shipbuilding [4] comes from visits to shipyards in South Korea, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Canada. The point, he says, is not to build American ships overseas. It is to learn what allies do well and apply it at home.

The takeaway

Steve sees a rare moment of national attention on shipbuilding, and real barriers in budgets, workforce and cost. His first fix is the one that ties the rest together: a clear strategy that says what the Navy must do and what fleet it takes to do it. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy of the Navy League of the United States and a senior advisor to Americans for a Stronger Navy. He served 20 years as an active-duty Navy officer, retiring in 2010, with sea tours on small and medium surface combatants, including as executive officer of a mine countermeasures ship, and shore tours at the Defense Intelligence Agency and NATO commands in Naples, Italy. He holds a bachelor’s in history from Miami University, a master’s in national security studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and a master’s and PhD in military history from Ohio University. He is the author of Strategy Shelved (Naval Institute Press, 2021) and co-author, with John Lehman, of Where Are the Carriers? (2021) [1][2].

References

[1] Center for Maritime Strategy, “Dr. Steven Wills.” https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/experts/dr-steven-wills/
[2] Americans for a Stronger Navy, “Steven Wills, Senior Advisor.” https://strongernavy.org/steven-wills/
[3] Center for Maritime Strategy, Returning from Ebb Tide: Renewing the United States Commercial Maritime Enterprise. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org
[4] Center for Maritime Strategy, Pier Review: Leveraging the Allied Maritime Industrial Base for U.S. Shipbuilding. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/pier-review/

Free trade isn’t free — CAPT Bill Hamblet

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

Our guest is CAPT Bill Hamblet, USN (Ret.), Editor-in-Chief of Proceedings, the U.S. Naval Institute’s flagship magazine [1][2]. He spent nearly 30 years as a Navy intelligence officer, serving with an F/A-18 squadron, a SEAL team, a carrier air wing and a carrier strike group. Ashore, he served as naval attaché to Russia, led the China Division at the Joint Intelligence Operations Center in the Pacific, and was in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, where he helped lead the initial intelligence response [1]. His views here are his own, not those of the Naval Institute.

Question 1: What’s working now?

Bill starts with the people. Carrier strike groups, destroyers and logistics ships have been deploying for 10, 11 and even 12 months at a time over the past year or two, with one or two port visits or none at all. He calls that unheard of since the Vietnam War. The fleet has run combat operations, blockades, strike warfare and mine warfare at the end of long supply lines.

He points to Operation Epic Fury, when Fifth Fleet’s headquarters in Bahrain, also a key logistics hub, was lost on day two. The fleet adapted and kept its carrier strike groups armed, fueled and on station.

“For any graybeards or veterans out there who want to say that today’s sailors are just a bunch of snowflakes, I would challenge you to go on a 9, 10, 11, 12 month deployment with 0, 1, 2 port visits.”

He is just as clear that this pace can’t last. Navy leaders, including Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle, have been saying the fleet will need a reset after being “ridden hard and put away wet” [3]. But credit goes where it is due: the sailors and officers of today’s fleet “have performed magnificently.”

Question 2: What are the barriers?

Bill names two. The first is that America took sea power for granted after the Cold War, and that cut across both parties. The Navy shrank from almost 600 ships in 1988 to fewer than 300 today. As he puts it, borrowing a line he has heard from others, we are running an 11-carrier Navy in a 15- or 17-carrier world.

Open sea lanes, he reminds us, were never a given. They were bought and guaranteed by the U.S. Navy and its closest allies in World War II, then patrolled through the Cold War. The Reagan buildup toward a 600-ship Navy helped defeat the Soviet Union. Then the country drifted.

“Free trade isn’t free. Its price is a strong Navy working in concert with strong like-minded allies to keep global sea lines open and protected.”

The second barrier is that the government has been a bad customer. Budgets fluctuated, requirements and designs changed, and the Navy tried to do too much with the lead ships of several classes. Building carriers, destroyers and submarines takes heavy capital and a large skilled workforce. Telling a builder like Huntington Ingalls or General Dynamics Electric Boat “five, no two, no one, and four in three years” is, in his words, hell on those companies and their workers.

“It’s really important that Congress, the Department of Defense and the Navy specifically send consistent demand signals, pass budgets on time and minimize change orders.”

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Bill’s answer starts with the public. Americans need to understand that China, and to a lesser extent Russia, Iran and North Korea, are already at war with us in the gray zone, below the threshold of open conflict, while preparing to fight if they must. China’s navy already outnumbers ours in ships, and he expects it to pass us in total tonnage within about five years.

“They’re putting new ships in the water like dumplings in the soup.”

During the Cold War, he says, most Americans understood we were in a long game with a serious adversary: the space race, the military buildup, NATO and the defense of Western Europe. We need to get back on that footing and understand what China wants the world to look like by mid-century.

“Without a strong Navy, nothing the United States wants to accomplish is possible. If our citizens and their elected leaders understood that we’re in a serious contest, and that naval power were key to their security, key to their way of life, I think appropriate strategy and investment would follow.”

More from the conversation

After the three questions, we kept talking, and Bill added a few points worth sharing.

“The strongest military in the world.” Presidents of both parties, he noted, routinely tell military audiences that America has the strongest military in the world. Repeated often enough, that message tells the public there is nothing to worry about. When he tells family that naval power is not trending well, the answer he sometimes gets is, “I saw Top Gun: Maverick. Looked pretty good.”

What a broken demand signal costs. On a tour of General Dynamics Electric Boat, he was told that during the 1980s buildup the U.S. was buying about four and a half submarines a year, and Electric Boat had about 26,000 workers. After the Cold War, orders fell to roughly one submarine in five years and the workforce fell to about 6,000. A decade later, when the Navy wanted one Virginia-class boat a year again, the yards struggled to deliver, and they still are.

Too much on one hull. He pointed to the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the Ford-class carrier as examples of packing too many new technologies onto a single class at once.

A book to read. He recommended Arthur Herman’s Freedom’s Forge, which tells how industrialists like William Knudsen and Henry J. Kaiser turned American industry toward war production before and during World War II, and why the companies doing that work had to be able to turn a profit [4].

The takeaway

Bill sees a fleet performing remarkably under heavy strain, and a country that forgot sea power has to be paid for. His fixes run from Washington to the kitchen table: steady demand signals and on-time budgets for the builders, and a public that understands the contest we are in. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

CAPT Bill Hamblet, USN (Ret.), is Executive Vice President for Periodicals and Editor-in-Chief of Proceedings at the U.S. Naval Institute, which he joined in 2016 as deputy editor-in-chief. A 1987 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served nearly 30 years as a Navy intelligence officer, including tours with an F/A-18 squadron, a SEAL team, a carrier air wing and a carrier strike group, on the Joint Staff J-2, as naval attaché to Russia, as head of the China Division at the Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific, and at the National Counterterrorism Center. He holds a master’s in national resource strategy from the Eisenhower School at National Defense University [1].

References

[1] U.S. Naval Institute, “CAPT Bill Hamblet, USN (Ret.).” https://www.usni.org/about-us/executive-staff/capt-bill-hamblet-usn-ret
[2] U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings
[3] USNI News, “New CNO Caudle Calls for New Fleet Design in First Speech,” August 25, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/08/25/new-cno-caudle-calls-for-new-fleet-design-in-first-speech
[4] Arthur Herman, Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II (Random House, 2012).

Steady Orders, Steady Yards — Michael Roberts

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix firstOur guest is Mike Roberts, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology and a nonresident senior fellow with the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy [1][2]. Before Hudson, Mike spent decades inside the American maritime industry. He was general counsel and senior vice president of government relations at Crowley, and he served as president and chairman of the American Maritime Partnership [1][2]. He works from Jacksonville, Florida, and has spent the last few years talking with members of Congress from both parties about how America gets back into the business of building and sailing its own ships.

Question 1: What’s working now?

Mike starts with something easy to overlook: the country is waking up. For decades, he says, Americans have had “sea blindness.” Most people didn’t know where their stuff comes from or why the commercial maritime industry matters, and had at best a vague idea of why the Navy matters. “That is changing,” he says. “The good news is it’s changing. The bad news is it’s changing because there’s a real reason for that.”

He points to three things that are working.

A serious bill in front of Congress. The SHIPS for America Act is bipartisan and bicameral, with support in both the House and the Senate. Mike calls it what would be “the most consequential legislation since 1936,” the year of the Merchant Marine Act. More than 100 lawmakers are now pushing to include it in this year’s defense bill [4].

Trade tools are in play. The Section 301 case at the U.S. Trade Representative put fees on Chinese-built and Chinese-owned ships calling at U.S. ports. The investigation began under the Biden administration, and the Trump administration imposed the fees in 2025. They were suspended for a year in November 2025 under a U.S.-China trade deal, and USTR has proposed extending the pause to January 2027 [5]. “We’ll see where that goes,” Mike says, “but at least that’s in play.”

Private capital is leaning in. The poster child is Hanwha, the Korean shipbuilder that bought Philly Shipyard [6]. Fincantieri owns the Marinette yard in Wisconsin, and other allied shipbuilders are looking at U.S. partnerships because Washington is signaling that real investment may pay off.

“We are well ahead of where we were in terms of an understanding of the need to move forward. And that’s encouraging.”

Question 2: What are the barriers?

The big-picture barrier, Mike says, is a mindset stuck in the 1990s, and it cuts across both parties. In his view, progressives struggle to accept that America has real enemies, while conservatives cling to the idea that the market will solve every problem. Both views made sense for most of a generation, from about 1990 to 2015. “But they leave us very vulnerable,” he says. “We have real enemies, and they are playing a totally different game than we’re playing when it comes to free trade and economics.”

The specific barrier is the lack of a consistent source of demand to build commercial ships in U.S. shipyards and sail them under the U.S. flag. He is not talking about Navy or Coast Guard ships, where demand is way up. He means cargo ships, whose buyers have no reason to be loyal to American yards and buy Chinese ships because that’s where they get the best deal.

Growing that commercial base matters for two reasons. It would diversify and grow the shipbuilding industrial base, meaning the workforce, the facilities and the supplier base, using commercial dollars on top of government dollars. And a larger U.S.-flag fleet gives the Pentagon more ships and more skilled American mariners to keep troops supplied in a conflict. It’s the same dual-use idea America has relied on before.

So where does the demand come from? The domestic Jones Act market is small, about a hundred self-propelled cargo ships, with limited room to grow. The international market is huge, around 60,000 ships, by Mike’s count. But U.S. costs run two to three times China’s before you count Chinese subsidies. American workers have options and need decent pay to work in a shipyard or spend months at sea. Chinese steel is heavily subsidized and costs roughly half as much as American steel. Even Korea, he notes, gets a large share of its steel and components from China.

Mike offers two cautions. First, cutting regulation won’t close the gap. “I have fought unnecessary regulation my whole career,” he says, but the idea that we can make up much ground on China that way “is not remotely realistic.” Second, innovation alone won’t get us back in the game. China builds far more ships than we do – almost 300 for every one of ours (corrected from the 75-to-1 estimate mentioned in the video).  And China has more industrial robots than the rest of the world combined. “We can’t expect to lead in shipbuilding if we’re not actually building ships.”

“Shipyards don’t invest in capacity or in upgrades for episodic, ship-by-ship procurement. They do that when they can see a 10-to-15-year production horizon with a lot of contractual certainty.”

Everything tried over the last 50 years, from the Maritime Security Program to Title XI loan guarantees to cargo preference, has been piecemeal. Each program is modest, and none is guaranteed to continue. Meanwhile, Mike says, China holds 75 percent or more of new ship orders, close to 90 percent for some ship types like VLCC supertankers.

“They see decades of guaranteed demand. Our shipyards see appropriation cycles.”

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Mike’s answer is specific: pass and fund the Strategic Commercial Fleet program in the SHIPS for America Act [3][7]. “It’s the one piece of the SHIPS Act that creates sustained demand,” he says: 250 U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged ships over 15 years. Shipyards would get the demand signal, plan against it and innovate.

He likes many other parts of the bill, like rejuvenating Kings Point and the state maritime academies, and grants for shipyards to upgrade. But his test for any provision is how many commercial ships it actually gets built and flagged in the United States. “If we don’t have demand for the ships, there won’t be jobs for the people when they graduate,” he says, and the grant money won’t be used without customers.

The ships in the program would sign emergency preparedness agreements, a national security commitment. Mike says commercial freight revenue would cover roughly half the cost, about a dollar for every federal dollar, and that includes money from Chinese exporters. “It’s not a subsidy program. It’s an industrial policy program that’s disciplined by a competitive bidding process.” The federal share is meant to be covered by trade-related fees through the Maritime Security Trust Fund. He puts the cost at about $1.8 billion a year gross, or $1.3 billion net after savings, such as replacing part of the aging Ready Reserve Force. That fleet keeps about 40 ships, many of them 45-year-old steamships, in storage.

“In federal budget terms, it’s a rounding error. In maritime terms, it will rebuild the industry.”

“If we don’t act on it in this Congress, we’ll be having the same conversation five years from now, and we’ll have an even bigger hole to fill.”

The takeaway

Mike sees real progress: a public waking up, a bipartisan bill, trade tools in play and private money coming in. His core point is simple, though. Shipyards build to steady demand. Training programs, grants and regulatory fixes help, but they don’t put orders on the books. For Mike, the Strategic Commercial Fleet is the piece that does, and the time to act is this Congress. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

Michael G. Roberts is a Senior Fellow with the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology and a nonresident senior fellow with the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy. His work focuses on policy affecting the American commercial maritime industry in light of competition with China. He joined Hudson in 2022 after a decades-long career in the maritime industry, including service as general counsel, board secretary and senior vice president of government relations at Crowley, and as president and chairman of the American Maritime Partnership. With Bryan Clark, he co-authored the Hudson report Shoring Up the Foundation: Affordable Approaches to Improve US and Allied Shipbuilding and Ship Repair [1][2][8].

References

[1] Hudson Institute, “Michael Roberts.” https://hudson.org/experts/1427-michael-roberts

[2] Center for Maritime Strategy, “Michael Roberts.” https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/experts/michael-roberts/

[3] Michael Roberts, “The Strategic Commercial Fleet Program: How America Rebuilds Its Maritime Industry,” Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/strategic-commercial-fleet-program-how-america-rebuilds-its-maritime-industry-michael-roberts

[4] gCaptain, “More Than 100 Lawmakers Push to Include SHIPS for America Act in Defense Bill,” October 29, 2026. https://gcaptain.com/more-than-100-lawmakers-push-to-include-ships-for-america-act-in-defense-bill/

[5] Holland & Knight, “USTR Proposes 2-Month Extension of Suspension of Section 301 Actions,” October 2026. https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/10/ustr-proposes-2-month-extension-of-suspension-of-section-301

[6] gCaptain, “Hanwha Completes $100M Acquisition of Philly Shipyard, Marking First Korean Shipbuilder in U.S.” https://gcaptain.com/hanwha-completes-100m-acquisition-of-philly-shipyard-marking-first-korean-shipbuilder-in-u-s/

[7] FreightWaves, “Updated Shipping Bill Calls for 250-Vessel US Cargo Fleet.” https://www.freightwaves.com/news/updated-shipping-bill-calls-for-250-vessel-us-cargo-fleet

[8] Midrats, “Improving US & Allied Shipbuilding & Repair, with Michael Roberts & Bryan Clark.” https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/improving-us-and-allied-shipbuilding