The Arctic is a New Front Line: Senator Sullivan is Right, and We Need a Stronger Navy Now

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer
Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) recently highlighted a critical shift in global geopolitics: the Arctic is no longer a distant, icy frontier—it is a burgeoning front line. As Russia and China actively challenge American interests in the High North, the urgency that Americans for a Stronger Navy has long advocated is now more apparent than ever.

A recent Wall Street Journal report detailed a chilling technological milestone: Chinese research submarines have successfully navigated thousands of feet beneath the Arctic ice for the first time. This is far more than a scientific expedition; it is a clear military and commercial signal. As Senator Sullivan warns, these “incursions” test our defenses. In the eyes of authoritarian regimes, the only language that resonates is power.

Projecting Power in the Arctic

Senator Sullivan identifies several pillars critical to securing our northern flank:

  • Accelerated Icebreaker Production: Our current fleet is woefully inadequate compared to Russia’s. Establishing a persistent presence requires homeporting new, capable icebreakers directly in Alaska.
  • Enhanced Missile Defense: Strengthening Alaska’s defense infrastructure is vital to protecting the homeland from trans-polar threats.
  • Energy Dominance: Unleashing Alaskan energy resources is a matter of national security, reducing dependence on foreign adversaries.
  • Strategic Infrastructure: Developing Adak and Nome into robust operational hubs ensures our forces have the reach to project power throughout the Arctic.

Our Call to Action

We fully endorse the Senator’s call to “keep the pedal to the metal.” However, true Arctic security requires a Stronger Navy fully integrated with the Coast Guard’s mission. To secure the High North, we must:

  • Close the Icebreaker Gap: We need a sustained shipbuilding plan that delivers Polar Security Cutters on schedule while exploring advanced naval platforms for icy environments.
  • Invest in Undersea Domain Awareness: The breakthrough in Chinese submarine capabilities demands a sophisticated response in undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
  • Strengthen Arctic Logistics: Our fleet needs resilient, forward-operating bases like Nome to maintain a 24/7 deterrent posture.

The Arctic is a vital theater for global trade and strategic maneuver. Senator Sullivan is providing the leadership Alaska—and the nation—needs. Americans for a Stronger Navy stands ready to advocate for the maritime power necessary to ensure “Peace through Strength” extends to the High North.

NAVSEA: The Navy’s Unsung Problem Solvers

Why the organization everyone loves to criticize is actually implementing the solutions research says work

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

As founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I’ve spent the last couple of years trying to help Americans understand why ships, shipyards, maintenance, and industrial capacity matter. I’ve written about rust and readiness, shipbuilding delays, logistics shortfalls, and why design choices can make replacement and repair painfully slow.

Coming from the tech sector in the 1990s, I thought I understood organizational complexity. I’d seen enterprise software projects involving dozens of stakeholders, competing departments, entrenched interests, and billion-dollar budgets. I understood how egos, biases, and financial incentives complicate even straightforward objectives.

Then I started studying how the Navy actually builds and maintains ships.

Building rockets is complex. Building naval warships makes rocket science look straightforward by comparison. SpaceX has one customer, one set of requirements, and Elon Musk making final decisions. Naval shipbuilding? Dozens of organizations, hundreds of contractors, thousands of specialized workers, decade-long timelines, competing requirements from multiple stakeholders, physical irreversibility of design decisions, Congressional funding cycles that change annually, acquisition regulations written over decades, technical standards that must account for 30-year service lives, and operational demands that shift with geopolitical reality—all coordinated through a system most Americans have never heard of.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

If you want to understand why the Navy struggles to build, fix, modernize, and field ships at the pace today’s threats require, you need to understand NAVSEA. And to keep this fair and grounded, we should also look at what independent watchdogs and researchers have reported over the years.

NAVSEA is the Navy’s engineering and ship sustainment backbone. It provides the technical standards, oversight, and support that make shipbuilding, modernization, and maintenance possible. If the Navy were a body, NAVSEA would be the circulatory system—not glamorous, but absolutely essential for life.

NAVSEA has become Washington’s favorite punching bag. Recent headlines tell the story: a Government Accountability Office report revealing $1.84 billion wasted on cruiser modernization, maintenance delays plaguing the fleet, acquisition timelines stretching into decades, and contractor quality failures that forced expensive rework. Critics paint NAVSEA as a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering ships on time or on budget—the personification of everything broken in defense acquisition.

But here’s what the critics miss: NAVSEA doesn’t build ships. NAVSEA doesn’t fund programs. NAVSEA doesn’t set operational requirements.

What NAVSEA does is provide the technical backbone that makes an impossibly complex system function at all. They’re trying to coordinate dozens of organizations with competing interests, conflicting incentives, different accountability

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

If you want to understand why the Navy struggles to build, fix, modernize, and field ships at the pace today’s threats require, you need to understand NAVSEA. And to keep this fair and grounded, we should also look at what independent watchdogs and researchers have reported over the years.

NAVSEA is the Navy’s engineering and ship sustainment backbone. It provides the technical standards, oversight, and support that make shipbuilding, modernization, and maintenance possible. If the Navy were a body, NAVSEA would be the circulatory system not glamorous, but absolutely essential for life.

NAVSEA has become Washington’s favorite punching bag. Recent headlines tell the story: a Government Accountability Office report revealing $1.84 billion wasted on cruiser modernization, maintenance delays plaguing the fleet, acquisition timelines stretching into decades, and contractor quality failures that forced expensive rework. Critics paint NAVSEA as a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering ships on time or on budgets the personification of everything broken in defense acquisition.

But here’s what the critics miss: NAVSEA isn’t the source of the Navy’s readiness crisis. They’re the people actually trying to fix it.

The problems NAVSEA faces today deferred maintenance, inadequate shipyard capacity, antiquated acquisition processes, workforce shortages, supply chain fragility weren’t created in the last five years. They’re the accumulated debt of decades of underinvestment and poor policy choices. NAVSEA inherited a broken system and has been methodically rebuilding it while simultaneously keeping the current fleet operational during a period of unprecedented strategic pressure.

As the professionals inside NAVSEA know from hard experience, this work happens where strategy collides with physics and time. They’re doing extraordinary work inside a system carrying more demand than its capacity and processes can reliably support.

That’s not failure. That’s heroism under impossible conditions.

Before we judge too harshly, Americans deserve to understand what NAVSEA actually does, where it came from, why large defense projects typically fail, and why the scale of today’s challenge shouldn’t be confused with the quality of the response.

A History Lesson: 230 Years of Keeping Ships Ready

The Beginning: Commodore John Barry and the Foundation (1794)

NAVSEA’s lineage extends back to June 14, 1794, when President George Washington gave Commodore John Barry, the Irish-born naval hero who held Commission Number One in the United States Navy a seemingly impossible assignment: build America’s first frigates and ensure “all business harmonized and conformed to the public’s interest.”

Barry had distinguished himself during the Revolutionary War, capturing the first British warship taken in combat and commanding the frigate Alliance in the final naval engagement of the war. Now Washington tasked him with something harder than fighting: creating the systems, standards, and oversight needed to build a navy from nothing.

Barry supervised construction of the frigate USS United States, which launched on May 10, 1797. More importantly, he established the principle that would define NAVSEA’s mission for the next two centuries: technical excellence in service of national defense, with accountability to the American people for every dollar spent and every ship delivered.

The Bureau System: Organizing for Industrial War (1842-1966)

The informal arrangements that worked for Barry became inadequate as the Navy grew. In 1842, Congress abolished the ineffective Board of Navy Commissioners and created the Bureau System specialized administrative units to manage the increasingly complex work of designing, building, and maintaining warships.

Initially, five bureaus divided responsibility: Construction, Equipment and Repair; Ordnance and Hydrography; Provisions and Clothing; Medicine and Surgery; and Yards and Docks. Over time, this evolved into separate bureaus for Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering (later the Bureau of Engineering), Equipment, and Ordnance.

By World War I, this system managed a dramatic expansion. The Bureau of Engineering alone oversaw the fleet’s growth from 350 ships to nearly 2,000 by mid-1918, including all propulsion, communications, and electrical systems. The Bureau of Construction and Repair handled hull design and structural work.

But World War II exposed fatal flaws in this divided authority. In 1939, the Navy discovered that new Sims-class destroyers were dangerously top-heavy because the Bureau of Engineering had underestimated machinery weight and the Bureau of Construction and Repair lacked authority to catch the error during design. When separate organizations controlled different aspects of the same ship, nobody owned the complete integration.

The Bureau of Ships: Integration Under Pressure (1940-1966)

On June 20, 1940 with war clearly approaching Congress merged the Bureau of Construction and Repair with the Bureau of Engineering to create the Bureau of Ships (BuShips). The new bureau would control everything related to ship design, construction, conversion, maintenance, and repair from a single unified command.

Timing mattered. BuShips immediately faced the Fiscal Year 1940 naval procurement plan: 11 aircraft carriers, nine battleships, six large cruisers, 57 other cruisers, 95 destroyers, 73 submarines, and dozens of auxiliary vessels. Then Pearl Harbor turned ambitious plans into desperate necessity.

During World War II, BuShips delivered over 7,000 vessels nearly 1,200 major warships including battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. They pioneered radar integration, advanced damage control systems, and amphibious warfare craft. They managed four naval shipyards, coordinated hundreds of private contractors, and solved unprecedented logistics challenges while maintaining the fleet in combat.

The postwar period brought new challenges: nuclear propulsion, guided missiles, advanced electronics, and the Cold War submarine arms race. BuShips managed development of USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, which demonstrated the technology’s strategic potential by steaming 62,000 miles on its initial reactor core and completing the first underwater transit of the North Pole in 1958. The bureau then scaled nuclear propulsion to ballistic missile submarines, creating the sea-based deterrent that remains the most survivable leg of America’s nuclear triad.

Systems Commands: McNamara’s Reorganization (1966-1974)

By the mid-1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pushed for centralized management to control rising costs and complexity. The traditional bureau system, rooted in 19th-century administrative thinking, seemed inefficient for managing advanced weapons systems that integrated multiple technologies.

On March 9, 1966, DoD abolished BuShips and created the Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS), adopting a systems engineering approach that emphasized integration across technical disciplines. On July 1, 1974, NAVSHIPS merged with the Naval Ordnance Systems Command to form the Naval Sea Systems Command NAVSEA.

The new organization combined responsibility for ships, submarines, combat systems, and weapons into a single command. NAVSEA would engineer, build, buy, and maintain the fleet. It inherited four shipyards, ten warfare centers, and a global network of maintenance facilities. It became the Navy’s largest systems command, eventually managing nearly $30 billion annually roughly one-quarter of the entire Navy budget.

The Essential Continuity

From Commodore Barry in 1794 to Vice Admiral Downey today, the mission remains fundamentally unchanged: deliver warships that work, maintain the fleet so it can fight, and ensure every dollar spent serves the national defense.

What has changed is scale and complexity. Barry supervised construction of a few frigates. Today’s NAVSEA manages 150 acquisition programs simultaneously, maintains a fleet of over 200 ships and submarines, operates four massive shipyards, coordinates work across hundreds of contractors, and keeps the world’s most technologically sophisticated naval force operational in every ocean.

The criticism NAVSEA faces today isn’t new either. Every generation has complained about maintenance delays, cost overruns, and acquisition timelines. What’s different now is the consequences of failure and the impossibly narrow margin for error.

Why Large Projects Fail: Lessons from Research

Before examining NAVSEA’s current challenges, we need to understand what research tells us about why large, complex projects typically fail. This context is essential for evaluating NAVSEA’s performance fairly.

The Megaproject Failure Rate

Oxford University’s Bent Flyvbjerg has compiled the world’s largest database on megaproject performance 16,000 projects from 136 countries spanning infrastructure, defense, IT, and construction. Working with New York-based writer Dan Gardner, Flyvbjerg distilled this research into How Big Things Get Done, published in 2023. The results are sobering.

Only 8.5% of megaprojects meet their cost and schedule targets. Just 0.5% also satisfy their benefit goals. As Flyvbjerg writes, “Most big projects are not merely at risk of not delivering as promised. Nor are they only at risk of going seriously wrong. They are at risk of going disastrously wrong.”

Naval shipbuilding and maintenance programs are textbook megaprojects technically complex, politically visible, spanning multiple years, involving numerous contractors, requiring specialized workforces, and operating under intense scrutiny. They face all the pathologies Flyvbjerg identifies.

The Root Causes: Human Nature and System Design

Flyvbjerg traces megaproject failures to several interconnected factors:

Irrepressible optimism. Project leaders consistently underestimate costs, timelines, and technical challenges. This isn’t dishonesty it’s human nature. We want to believe our plans will work. We discount risks. We assume everything will go smoothly.

Political expediency. Projects get approved based on optimistic projections because realistic estimates would kill political support. Once committed, stakeholders have incentives to downplay problems until they become undeniable.

Poor planning. Projects start without sufficient detail. As Flyvbjerg notes, the Sydney Opera House became notorious for delays and cost overruns because it began construction based on “sketchy designs.” In contrast, Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum Bilbao succeeded through “meticulous, iterative development.”

Adding requirements. Every stakeholder wants their priorities incorporated. Each addition seems reasonable in isolation. Collectively, they drive cost growth and schedule delays. Nobody owns the integration.

Inadequate capacity. Projects assume resources, workers, facilities, materials will be available when needed. Reality proves otherwise. Workforce gaps emerge. Supply chains fail. Facilities need repair.

What Actually Works: The Solutions

Flyvbjerg’s research identifies characteristics common to successful megaprojects:

Empirical planning using reference-class forecasting. Instead of building plans from the ground up based on optimistic assumptions, examine historical data from similar projects. Use actual performance data to forecast realistic timelines and costs. Flyvbjerg developed this technique for the British government; it’s now used in multiple countries.

Iterative development. Test ideas early. Learn from small failures. Refine designs before committing to full-scale production. Pixar’s Oscar-winning director Pete Docter describes his animation process as requiring “an insane amount of work as constant iteration and testing. But it produces better outcomes.

Modularity. Flyvbjerg found that solar, wind, thermal power plants, electricity transmission, and highway projects “do not have considerable risk of going disastrously wrong” because “they are all modular to a considerable degree, some extremely so.” Modular designs allow parallel work streams, reduce integration risk, and enable faster problem-solving.

Accumulated experience. Organizations that repeatedly execute similar projects get better at them. They develop expertise, refine processes, and build institutional knowledge. One-off unique projects are inherently riskier.

Realistic timelines with adequate planning windows. Contractors need time to secure materials, hire workers, and coordinate subcontractors before work begins. Compressed planning periods guarantee problems.

The NAVSEA Connection

Every principle Flyvbjerg identifies applies directly to naval acquisition and maintenance:

  • The cruiser modernization failure? Classic megaproject pathology poor planning, unplanned work, contractor quality issues, and optimistic timelines.
  • Maintenance delays? Insufficient planning windows, unrealistic schedules, capacity constraints.
  • Acquisition taking 10+ years? Complex requirements, inadequate iteration, trying to incorporate everything upfront.

But here’s the critical insight: NAVSEA’s recent reforms align almost perfectly with what research says actually works.

They’re using empirical data (reference-class forecasting) through Perform to Plan initiatives. They’re extending planning windows from 60 to 228 days. They’re adopting modularity with containerized payloads on FF(X). They’re pursuing “build, learn, evolve” iterative approaches instead of trying to perfect designs upfront.

NAVSEA is implementing the solutions that megaproject research validates. The question is whether they’ll get the sustained support, resources, and realistic expectations needed to make those reforms work.

The Current Reality: Fixing Decades of Deferred Maintenance

The Inherited Crisis

When Vice Admiral William Galinis took command of NAVSEA in June 2020, he inherited a readiness catastrophe years in the making. In Fiscal Year 2019, ships collectively overran their planned maintenance schedules by more than 7,000 days. Carriers and submarines were staying in maintenance availabilities 30-40% longer than planned. The maintenance backlog was crushing fleet readiness, forcing longer deployments and creating a vicious cycle where rushed operations led to more maintenance problems.

Fortunately, we don’t have to rely on anecdotes. Independent watchdogs have documented these problems extensively:

Government Accountability Office findings:

  • GAO found that over an extended period, the Navy was unable to begin or complete most attack submarine maintenance periods on time, resulting in significant lost operational days (GAO-19-229).
  • The majority of aircraft carrier and submarine maintenance periods between 2015 and 2019 were completed late, with primary causes being unplanned work discovered after planning began and workforce capacity constraints (GAO-20-588).
  • In 2025, GAO emphasized that shipbuilding and repair capacity itself is a strategic constraint, calling for a more coherent long-term industrial base approach to support the fleet the Navy says it needs (GAO-25-106286).

RAND assessments:

  • RAND research highlights that maintenance capacity is a long-term structural issue that cannot be corrected quickly, with public shipyard capacity identified as a limiting factor for submarine and carrier availability (RAND RR1951).

Navy acknowledgment:

  • USNI News reported that Navy leaders acknowledged that only a small percentage of attack submarines completed maintenance on time over a ten-year period, even as operational demand increased.

The root causes ran deep:

Inadequate shipyard capacity. America’s four naval shipyards Portsmouth, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound had been chronically underfunded for decades. Facilities were antiquated. Dry docks needed repair. Cranes were obsolete. The physical infrastructure couldn’t support efficient work.

Workforce shortages. The skilled trades that keep ships operational welders, pipefitters, electricians, machinists were in desperately short supply. Years of hiring freezes had created a demographic cliff. Experienced workers were retiring faster than new workers could be trained.

Poor planning. The Navy awarded maintenance contracts only 60 days before work was scheduled to begin far too late for contractors to secure materials, hire workers, or plan efficiently. Contracts often started without complete work packages, guaranteeing unplanned growth work that blew schedules.

Supply chain failures. Critical parts weren’t arriving when needed. Ships sat idle waiting for components. Nobody was coordinating material delivery across the enterprise.

Unrealistic schedules. Maintenance durations were based on optimistic assumptions rather than empirical data. Ships were consistently planned for availabilities shorter than they actually needed, creating the appearance of delays that were really planning failures.

This wasn’t NAVSEA’s fault. This was the bill coming due for decades of decisions made by Congress, administrations, and Navy leadership that prioritized new procurement over maintenance, allowed shipyards to deteriorate, and failed to invest in workforce development.

The NAVSEA Response: Data-Driven Reform

Rather than making excuses, NAVSEA leadership got to work. They implemented a series of interconnected reforms designed to address each element of the maintenance crisis:

Perform to Plan (P2P). NAVSEA conducted detailed analysis of what actually happened during maintenance availabilities versus what was planned. They examined every step: work package development, execution planning, material delivery, testing requirements, contractor performance. The data revealed systematic planning failures availabilities were being planned too short based on outdated assumptions.

The solution wasn’t to lower standards or move goalposts. It was to reset maintenance duration baselines using empirical data about how long complex work actually takes. New baselines created realistic schedules that contractors could execute.

The results were dramatic. By Fiscal Year 2020, total maintenance delays dropped from 7,000 days to approximately 1,100 days. Measured against the new realistic baselines, that represented an 80% reduction in delays. Even measured against the old optimistic baselines, delays dropped 40%.

Contracting Reform. NAVSEA extended contract award timelines from 60 days to 120 days before maintenance start, then pushed toward 180 days. Rear Admiral Andrew Biehn, NAVSEA’s director of surface ship maintenance, explained that industry had been clear: “60 days was not enough time to plan and prepare for a successful maintenance period.”

In 2026, NAVSEA awarded a maintenance contract for the amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima 228 days ahead of times”nearly eight months for the contractor to order materials, hire workers, and coordinate with subcontractors.

Longer planning windows created predictability. Contractors could maintain stable workforces. Suppliers could plan material delivery. The entire ecosystem became more efficient.

Material Management. NAVSEA stood up a dedicated Material Management Group with a single mission: ensure all materials needed for a maintenance availability arrive at the shipyard by day one of the work period. No more ships sitting idle waiting for parts. No more scrambling to source critical components mid-availability.

This required intense coordination across supply chains, better forecasting of material needs, earlier ordering of long-lead items, and tighter integration between maintenance planning and logistics.

Workforce Development. NAVSEA hired thousands of new workers for the naval shipyards. They invested in training programs to develop skilled trades, partnered with community colleges and trade schools, and created apprenticeship programs to transfer knowledge from experienced workers to new hires.

This wasn’t quick. Training a journeyman shipyard worker takes years. But NAVSEA understood that long-term readiness required long-term investment in people.

Unplanned Work Reduction. Growth work unplanned maintenance discovered after an availability begins was a major driver of delays. NAVSEA worked to stabilize class maintenance plans, pushing more routine work into “directed work” categories that could be planned in advance. They scheduled activities most likely to generate growth work—like tank inspections early in availabilities so discoveries could be incorporated into the plan.

The goal was to minimize surprises through better forecasting and more thorough advance planning.

Current Status: Real Progress Under Pressure

At the Surface Navy Association symposium in January 2026, Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, Commander of Naval Surface Forces, outlined continued progress: “On-time completion remains our number one goal as we drive towards zero days of maintenance delay.”

Vice Admiral James Downey, NAVSEA’s current commander, reported that 90 ships are under contract for construction, 57 are actively under construction, and 52 ships are in maintenance availabilities. Keeping those maintenance periods on schedule is NAVSEA’s top priority.

Rear Admiral Dan Lannamann, who runs the Navy Regional Maintenance Centers, acknowledged the challenge honestly: “I got 41 percent [on-time completion], so we missed the mark. We reset the mark for this year. I’m looking at north of 60 percent, and I’m on plan to make that.”

That’s the right approach: set ambitious goals, measure performance honestly, adjust based on results, and keep pushing forward. NAVSEA isn’t claiming victory. They’re showing their work and committing to improvement.

Addressing the Legitimate Criticisms

The Cruiser Modernization Failure

The GAO report on cruiser modernization is damning, and NAVSEA deserves criticism for significant failures. The Navy planned to modernize 11 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, extending their service life by five years and upgrading combat capability. The program became a $3.7 billion disaster. Only three cruisers will complete modernization, none will gain the intended five years of service life, and $1.84 billion was wasted on four cruisers that were divested before deploying.

The failures included:

  • Poor planning leading to 9,000 contract changes
  • Contractor performance issues and quality problems (such as the botched sonar dome work on USS Vicksburg)
  • Weak oversight and reluctance to use monetary penalties
  • Failure to identify root causes or develop prevention strategies

This was a significant acquisition failure, and the GAO correctly identified systemic problems that must be fixed before future modernization efforts.

But here’s the important context: NAVSEA acknowledged the problems, is conducting root cause analysis, and is applying lessons learned to the next major surface ship modernization effort 23 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The question isn’t whether NAVSEA made mistakes with cruiser modernization. They clearly did. The question is whether they’re learning from those mistakes and implementing better processes.

The early evidence suggests they are. The destroyer modernization program is incorporating improved planning processes, more realistic schedule baselines, and better quality control measures. NAVSEA is being held accountable for past failures while working to prevent future ones.

Acquisition Timelines

Critics rightly point out that NAVSEA acquisition programs take 10+ years to field capability. By the time ships are delivered, the strategic environment has evolved and technology has advanced. As one Navy leader noted, it’s like “fielding a 2015 iPhone today already obsolete on arrival.”

This is a real problem, but it’s not primarily NAVSEA’s fault. The acquisition system is designed for risk reduction rather than speed. Complex requirements processes allow every stakeholder to add requirements, increasing cost and delaying delivery. Acquisition regulations slow decision-making. Testing requirements are thorough but time-consuming.

NAVSEA operates within the constraints of federal acquisition law, DoD regulations, and Navy requirements processes. They can advocate for reform, implement process improvements where they have authority, and try to accelerate timelines. But they can’t unilaterally override the legal and regulatory framework Congress and DoD have created.

The recent announcement of FF(X) the Navy’s new frigate program based on a proven Coast Guard design shows NAVSEA learning from past mistakes. Chris Miller, Executive Director at NAVSEA, emphasized a “design that is producible, it has been proven, it is operationally in use today, and it will evolve.” The approach prioritizes getting ships into production quickly, then evolving capability over time through modular containerized payloads.

That’s the right philosophy: field capability fast, then improve it incrementally. It’s a significant departure from past programs that tried to incorporate every possible requirement upfront.

Bureaucratic Processes

Yes, NAVSEA is a large bureaucracy with 84,000 personnel, nine directorates, eight affiliated Program Executive Offices, and a budget approaching $30 billion. Complex organizations develop complex processes. Some of those processes are valuable ensuring safety, maintaining technical standards, managing risk. Some are unnecessary bureaucracy that slows things down.

The challenge is distinguishing between essential process and wasteful bureaucracy. NAVSEA has been working to streamline operations, eliminate redundant approvals, and empower decision-making at lower levels. But this is genuinely difficult work that requires balancing speed with safety, innovation with standards, and delegation with accountability.

Anyone who has worked in a large organization knows that reforming bureaucratic processes is harder than criticizing them.

Why NAVSEA Matters: The Unglamorous Work of Maritime Power

They Turn Policy into Hardware

Every naval strategy document, every force structure assessment, every geopolitical analysis ultimately depends on one thing: ships that work. NAVSEA is where strategy meets reality.

When the 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes “First Island Chain denial defense,” NAVSEA is responsible for delivering the submarines, destroyers, and combat systems that make that strategy viable. When Navy leadership commits to 80% of ships being deployable at any given time, NAVSEA is responsible for the maintenance performance that achieves that readiness.

The National Commission on the Future of the Navy can recommend force structure changes. The CNO can publish new operational concepts. Congress can authorize new ship construction. But none of it matters without NAVSEA doing the unglamorous work of engineering systems, managing contracts, supervising construction, training workers, and fixing broken ships.

They Manage Impossible Tradeoffs

NAVSEA operates under contradictory demands:

  • Keep the current fleet operational while building the future fleet
  • Maintain aging ships past their design service life while investing in new construction
  • Move fast to meet urgent threats while ensuring ships are safe and effective
  • Manage cost while meeting expanding requirements
  • Take acceptable risk without catastrophic failures

Every decision involves tradeoffs. Extend maintenance contracts to give contractors more planning time? That delays ship availability. Accelerate new construction? That stresses the industrial base. Prioritize nuclear work? That means surface ships wait longer. Fund facility upgrades at public yards? That’s money not available for procurement.

NAVSEA leadership makes these tradeoffs every day, often with incomplete information, under intense pressure, with billions of dollars and potentially lives at stake. It’s easy to criticize specific decisions in hindsight. It’s much harder to make better decisions in real time.

They Build National Capacity

NAVSEA’s mission extends beyond today’s fleet to building the industrial capacity America needs for tomorrow’s challenges. That means:

  • Investing in shipyard modernization even when those facilities won’t generate returns for decades
  • Training workers who might spend entire careers maintaining ships
  • Developing domestic suppliers for critical components
  • Maintaining technical expertise in specialized fields
  • Preserving institutional knowledge about complex systems

These long-term investments don’t generate headlines. They don’t produce quick wins. But they’re essential for sustained maritime power.

When Vice Admiral Downey reports 90 ships under construction contract and 57 actively being built, that represents years of NAVSEA work managing industrial capacity, negotiating contracts, coordinating suppliers, and solving technical problems most Americans never hear about.

They Carry the Weight of Institutional Memory

NAVSEA maintains continuity through strategic transitions, political changes, and shifting priorities. They remember what worked during the Reagan-era naval expansion. They carry lessons learned from the post-Cold War drawdown. They apply hard-won knowledge from decades of maintaining nuclear-powered vessels.

When new leadership arrives with new ideas, NAVSEA provides the institutional ballast that prevents dramatic swings between extremes. They explain why certain technical standards exist, what happened when past programs cut corners, and which shortcuts lead to catastrophic failures.

This conservative instinct can seem like resistance to change. Sometimes it is. But often it’s the voice of experience preventing repeated mistakes.

What NAVSEA Needs: Support, Not Just Criticism

Legislative Authority for Acquisition Reform

NAVSEA has identified acquisition processes that slow capability delivery. They’ve proposed reforms. But many changes require legislative action that only Congress can provide.

The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act included provisions for expedited technology qualification processes. That helps, but more comprehensive acquisition reform is needed:

  • Delegating more decision authority to program managers
  • Streamlining requirements processes
  • Reforming testing protocols to enable faster iteration
  • Creating exemptions for proven commercial technologies

Congress needs to give NAVSEA the authority to move faster while maintaining appropriate oversight.

Sustained Funding for Shipyard Modernization

America’s four naval shipyards need billions in infrastructure investment: new dry docks, modern cranes, upgraded facilities, environmental improvements. These investments take years to design and decades to recoup. They’re perfect targets for budget cuts because the consequences won’t appear immediately.

But without modern shipyards, NAVSEA cannot maintain readiness. Period.

Vice Admiral Moore noted in 2016 that private shipyards like Newport News have invested heavily in their physical plants while public yards have been neglected. NAVSEA needs Congress and Navy leadership to make the business case for MILCON funding and stick with those investments over multiple budget cycles.

Workforce Development Support

Training skilled shipyard workers requires partnerships with community colleges, trade schools, and apprenticeship programs. NAVSEA needs support from federal, state, and local governments to:

  • Fund training programs
  • Provide housing assistance in expensive shipyard communities
  • Offer tax incentives for workers entering skilled trades
  • Create pathways from military service to civilian shipyard careers

The workforce crisis won’t be solved by NAVSEA alone. It requires a national commitment to rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base.

Realistic Expectations

Most importantly, NAVSEA needs Americans to understand that fixing decades of deferred maintenance and underinvestment takes time. Maintenance delays won’t disappear overnight. Acquisition timelines won’t collapse to 18 months. Industrial capacity won’t triple in two years.

Progress is happening. Delays are declining. Planning is improving. But the work is difficult, the challenges are real, and setbacks are inevitable.

NAVSEA deserves credit for confronting these problems honestly, implementing data-driven reforms, and making measurable progress under extraordinary pressure. They deserve support, not just criticism.

Conclusion: The Builders, Not the Critics

Americans for a Stronger Navy exists to advocate for the naval power America needs to secure its economic prosperity and defend its interests. We’re builders, not critics. We focus on implementation mechanisms, not just policy positions.

That’s why we defend NAVSEA.

The men and women of NAVSEA are doing the hardest work in naval policy: turning strategic concepts into operational capability. They’re managing the impossible tradeoffs inherent in maintaining today’s fleet while building tomorrow’s. They’re learning from failures, implementing reforms grounded in what research tells us actually works, and making measurable progress.

NAVSEA’s reforms align with proven megaproject success principles:

  • Using empirical data for planning (Flyvbjerg’s reference-class forecasting) → Perform to Plan
  • Extending planning windows → 60 to 228 days for contract awards
  • Pursuing modularity → Containerized payloads on FF(X)
  • Iterative development “Build, learn, evolve” philosophy
  • Building accumulated experience training thousands of new shipyard workers

Are they perfect? No. Should they be held accountable for failures like cruiser modernization? Absolutely. Do acquisition processes need reform? Without question.

But the fundamental criticism of NAVSEA that they’re a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering results is wrong. NAVSEA has reduced maintenance delays by 80%, extended contract planning windows from 60 to 228 days, hired thousands of new shipyard workers, stood up dedicated material management groups, and delivered 90 ships under construction contracts while maintaining over 200 ships and submarines.

That’s not failure. That’s competent management under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

This is bigger than the Navy. It is a national industrial and governance challenge.

You cannot surge ships. You cannot surge shipyards. You cannot surge skilled engineers and nuclear-qualified trades overnight. Naval power is built years, often decades, before it is needed. Deterrence depends on industrial reality, not speeches. When maintenance runs late, fewer ships are available for training, presence, and crisis response. That affects America’s leverage and our allies’ confidence.

When Commodore John Barry accepted his commission from President Washington in 1797, he established a standard: deliver ships that work, ensure all business serves the public interest, and do it with integrity. NAVSEA has upheld that standard for 230 years through wars hot and cold, through periods of expansion and drawdown, through technological revolutions from sail to steam to nuclear power.

They deserve our support as they confront the most challenging period in American naval history since World War II. The criticism will continue some of it deserved. But Americans should understand who’s actually doing the work of keeping the fleet ready.

It’s the 84,000 people of NAVSEA. Give them the resources, authority, and realistic expectations they need to succeed.

Americans cannot support what they do not understand. NAVSEA is not a political talking point. It is where naval power becomes real, or fails to. If you want a Stronger Navy, you need to understand NAVSEA and support the industrial strength that makes NAVSEA’s mission achievable.

The security of our maritime commons depends on it.

This article is part of Americans for a Stronger Navy’s “Charting the Course: Voices That Matter” ongoing series educational initiative breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Learn more at StrongerNavy.org.

China’s “Floating Great Wall” Just Rehearsed a Sea-Lane Blockade — And Most Americans Didn’t Notice

Image
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This wasn’t a military drill. It was lawfare, logistics warfare, and supply-chain coercion in plain sight.

In late December and again in January, thousands of Chinese “fishing vessels” formed long, coordinated lines and rectangles across major shipping lanes in the East China Sea near Taiwan. Cargo ships were forced to zigzag through the formation. AIS signals were active. The message was visible to the world.

These were not fishing expeditions.

They were rehearsals.

And they revealed something most Americans never think about: control of sea lanes doesn’t require missiles or warships. It can be done with civilian hulls, legal ambiguity, and scale.

China’s maritime militia — civilian fishing vessels operating under military direction — just demonstrated how to create a floating wall across global commerce.

What Happened — And Why It Matters

China assembled formations of up to 2,000 vessels stretching for hundreds of miles. Analysts noted the precision, coordination, and positioning near critical routes. Many of these boats are part of a maritime militia that operates alongside the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Liberation Army Navy, often blurring the line between civilian and military activity.

Under international maritime law, warships must “give way” to vessels engaged in fishing. That legal protection becomes a weapon when the “fishing fleet” is massed, directed, and used for coercion.

This is lawfare at sea.

No shots fired. No war declared. But commercial traffic disrupted, insurance risk raised, and a Navy forced into hesitation by the rules it respects.

Why Americans Should Care

More than one-third of global trade transits the waters around Taiwan and the East and South China Seas. The goods on American shelves, the energy markets we depend on, the components in our technology supply chains all pass through sea lanes like these.

China just practiced how to slow shipping without firing a shot, raise costs for global commerce, create economic pressure on rivals, complicate lawful naval responses, and establish coercive control over maritime arteries.

This is not about Taiwan alone.

This is about the arteries of the global economy.

Implications for the Navy

The United States Navy is built to deter fleets, submarines, missiles, and aircraft. But this tactic targets something different: the legal and operational space between peace and war.

A destroyer captain facing 2,000 “fishing boats” cannot treat them like warships. A collision becomes an international incident. Determining which vessels are legitimate military targets becomes nearly impossible in real time.

China understands this.

And they are practicing it in daylight.

Implications for Our Allies

This tactic has already been used against the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in the South China Sea. It pressures smaller nations to back down without Beijing ever crossing the threshold into open conflict.

For allies who rely on these sea lanes such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners, this is a preview of how maritime coercion can be applied gradually, persistently, and legally ambiguously.

The Industrial Reality Behind the Strategy

China can do this because it possesses the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet, tens of thousands of industrial vessels that can be mobilized at scale.

The United States cannot.

This is not simply a Navy gap. It is an American maritime industrial gap.

Civilian maritime capacity, shipbuilding, port infrastructure, and merchant marine strength are not side issues. They are central to national security in an era where civilian hulls can be weaponized for state power.

The Real Headline

China just demonstrated it can interfere with the sea lanes that feed the American economy using fishing boats.

That should get our attention.

Because naval strength is not just about ships with guns. It is about protecting the lawful flow of commerce across oceans that most Americans never see but depend on every day.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

USS John F. Kennedy Goes to Sea — And Why That Matters to Every American

USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) 
Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

The future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) has begun shipbuilder sea trials.

That sentence sounds technical. Routine. Almost boring.

It is anything but.

I still remember the first time I saw USS Enterprise (CVN-65).

Not in a book. Not in a documentary. But in person — a city of steel at sea that didn’t just float… it projected presence. You didn’t need anyone to explain what it meant. You felt it.

Eight reactors. A flat deck that seemed to stretch to the horizon. Sailors moving with purpose. Aircraft launching into the sky like it was routine business for a nation that understood the oceans mattered.

Enterprise wasn’t just a ship. She was a statement.

She told the world that the United States knew how to build big things, maintain them, crew them, and keep them forward where they mattered most.

That memory came rushing back this week as the future USS John F. Kennedy began sea trials.

Different era. Different technology. Same message trying to break through the noise:

America still knows how to build ships like this.

But here’s the part that concerns me.

When I saw Enterprise, there was no question we had the industrial base, the shipyards, the workforce, and the national will to keep ships like her coming. Today, every new carrier feels like a minor miracle of coordination, learning curves, delays, and hard-won progress.

Sea trials for Kennedy are more than a shipbuilder milestone. They’re a reminder of what we used to do routinely — and what we now must work very hard to preserve.

And that’s why this moment matters far more than most Americans realize..

For the first time, America’s next nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is operating in open water, testing the systems that will carry U.S. power, deterrence, and stability across the world’s oceans for the next 50 years.

This is not just a shipyard milestone.
This is a strategic milestone for the United States.

What Sea Trials Really Mean

Sea trials are where theory meets reality.

This is where:

  • the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System is proven at sea
  • the Advanced Arresting Gear is tested in real conditions
  • the new SPY-6 radar begins to show what modern naval sensing looks like
  • and lessons learned from USS Gerald R. Ford are put into practice

This is the Navy and the shipyard proving that American industrial capability still works.

But There’s A Catch Most People Miss

USS John F. Kennedy won’t join the fleet until 2027.

In that time:

  • USS Nimitz retires this spring
  • USS Harry S. Truman begins a long overhaul
  • USS John C. Stennis is already over a year behind schedule in overhaul

That means for the next two years, the Navy will be operating with fewer carriers than planned during a period when China is expanding its fleet, its shipyards, and its maritime presence at record speed.

This is the readiness gap Americans don’t see.

Why Americans Should Care

Aircraft carriers are not symbols. They are mobile sovereign territory.

They protect:

  • global trade routes
  • allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific
  • undersea cables and energy lanes
  • the economic system Americans rely on every day

When carriers are in overhaul and replacements are delayed, coverage shrinks.
And when coverage shrinks, deterrence weakens.

Implications for the Navy

The Navy is doing what it can with what it has.
Shipbuilders are learning from past mistakes and improving delivery.

But the industrial timeline is unforgiving. You cannot rush nuclear carriers.
You cannot surge shipyards overnight.
You cannot rebuild lost capacity in a crisis.

This is why shipbuilding, maintenance, and industrial capacity are national security issues — not procurement trivia.

Implications for Our Allies

Allies don’t measure American commitment by speeches.
They measure it by hulls at sea.

Sea trials for John F. Kennedy signal that more hulls are coming.
But the gap between now and 2027 is where risk lives.

The Bigger Picture

This story isn’t about one carrier.

It’s about whether America remembers how to build, maintain, and sustain the fleet that keeps the world’s oceans stable.

That’s why this matters.

That’s why Americans should care.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

America’s Hidden Superpower: The Mississippi River and the Foundation of Naval Power

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

I want to give a huge shout-out to CDR Salamander for consistently providing the “intel” that helps advocates like us stay informed. We are all part of this maritime endeavor, and the more we learn, the stronger our Navy becomes.

A recent post of his was just a simple image: a map of the Mississippi River and its tributaries. Two words above it: “America’s superpower.”

No explanation. No thread. Just a map.

But for anyone who understands naval logistics, industrial capacity, and how wars are actually sustained, that image says more than a thousand white papers.

This is not a river map. This is a national supply chain diagram.

The Bench That Wins Wars

Wars are not won by the best starting lineup. They are won by the deepest bench.

The Mississippi River system connects:

  • Farms to factories
  • Mines to mills
  • Rail to ports
  • The American heartland to the sea

From Minnesota to Louisiana, from Pittsburgh to New Orleans, this inland waterway network moves grain, steel, coal, petroleum, chemicals, machinery, and countless other goods at a scale and efficiency no rail or highway system can match.

Long before most Americans ever think about ships, fleets, or carriers, this river system is quietly doing the work that makes naval power possible.

This is the bench.

Why This Matters to Naval Power

The U.S. Navy does not exist in isolation. It is supported by a vast civilian industrial ecosystem that begins far inland.

Shipyards require steel.
Steel requires ore and energy.
Factories require raw materials and transport.
Ports require cargo to move.

That cargo comes from here.

This river system is why the United States was able to mobilize so rapidly during World War II. It is why American industry could surge production. It is why America became a maritime power before most Americans even realized we were one.

You cannot understand American sea power without understanding this map.

Geography Is Destiny

Other nations build ports.
America inherited a continent designed for logistics.

The Mississippi and its tributaries create a natural internal highway system that feeds directly into the Gulf of Mexico and global sea lanes. It is an unmatched geographic advantage that has quietly powered American prosperity and military capability for over a century.

This is strategic geography in its purest form.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans think naval strength begins with ships and sailors.

It doesn’t.

It begins with rivers, rail, roads, ports, trades, factories, and supply chains. It begins with civilian infrastructure that allows the Navy to exist at scale.

If this system weakens, naval power weakens.
If this system thrives, naval power thrives.

Understanding this connection is essential if Americans are to understand what it really means to support a Stronger Navy.

Implications for the Navy

The Navy’s strength is tied directly to the health of:

  • Inland logistics networks
  • Industrial capacity
  • Shipbuilding trades
  • Port infrastructure
  • Maritime commerce

When we talk about the industrial base, we are talking about this map.

When we talk about sealift, replenishment, and sustainment, we are talking about this map.

When we talk about readiness, we are talking about this map.

Implications for Our Allies

America’s ability to project power and keep sea lanes open for our allies is made possible by this inland capacity. Our partners rely on the stability created by U.S. naval presence, and that presence is supported by the economic engine that flows down these waterways.

This is not just an American advantage. It underwrites global stability.

Seeing the Whole System

CDR Salamander’s simple post is a reminder that naval power is a system, not a platform.

A fleet is the visible tip.
This river system is the foundation beneath it.

The more Americans understand this connection, the more clearly they can see why supporting maritime infrastructure, shipbuilding, and industrial resilience is not optional—it is essential.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

Zumwalt’s Second Life: What a Hypersonic Destroyer Really Tells Americans About Naval Power

Abstract

USS Zumwalt has returned to sea after one of the most radical ship conversions in modern naval history. Its guns are gone. In their place: the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon system. On the surface, this looks like a story about cutting-edge weapons and futuristic warfare. But the deeper story is about something far more important for Americans to understand: how naval power is evolving from platforms to systems—and how design decisions, industrial capacity, and national alignment determine whether innovation becomes usable combat power.

This is not just a story about a destroyer. It is a story about whether the United States can adapt fast enough to a changing era of warfare.

What Actually Happened

After entering the yard in 2023, Zumwalt was taken out of the water, structurally modified on land, stripped of its twin 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, and rebuilt to host large-diameter launch infrastructure for hypersonic missiles. Builder’s sea trials in January 2026 validated propulsion, power generation, hull integrity, and ship systems after this extraordinary redesign.

This was not a maintenance period. This was a repurposing of a warship’s entire combat identity.

The Navy took a class originally built for precision naval gunfire support and turned it into the first surface ship designed to deliver hypersonic strike.

That decision tells us a lot.

Why This Matters Beyond the Headlines

Hypersonic weapons are impressive. Speeds above Mach 5. Maneuverability. Minimal warning time. Ability to penetrate advanced defenses.

But the more important question is this:

What does it take to put a weapon like this to sea?

The answer is uncomfortable.

It required removing the original mission.
It required structural redesign.
It required years in the yard.
It required extraordinary industrial effort.
It required a ship with unusual power capacity and internal space.

In other words:

You can’t just bolt hypersonics onto any ship.

You need design margin.
You need electrical power.
You need internal volume.
You need shipyards capable of radical modification.
You need a Navy and an industrial base that can adapt.

That is the real story.

A Ship as a System, Not a Platform

For years, Americans have been taught to think of naval strength as “how many ships we have.”

Zumwalt shows the flaw in that thinking.

Naval power is not a hull count.
It is whether your ships can evolve when the fight changes.

This ship was able to change because of how it was originally designed:

  • Integrated electric propulsion
  • Excess power generation
  • Internal growth space
  • Signature management for survivability

Most of our fleet does not have that kind of design margin.

And that is where this story becomes national.

The Hidden Constraint No One Talks About

Hypersonic missiles are huge.

The launchers are huge.

Magazine depth is limited.

This is not a “volume of fire” weapon. It is a high-impact, precision, strategic signaling weapon.

Which means the value of Zumwalt is not how many missiles it carries.

The value is what it does to an adversary’s planning.

A mobile, hard-to-target, forward-deployed ship that can strike time-sensitive targets with almost no warning from unpredictable sea locations forces an adversary to defend everything.

That is naval maneuver used as a weapon.

And that is a concept most Americans have never been taught.

What Others Will Focus On

Many analysts will talk about:

  • The cost of the Zumwalt program
  • The failure of the original gun system
  • Whether hypersonics belong at sea
  • Magazine limitations
  • Strategic signaling risks

All valid discussions.

But they miss the bigger lesson.

The question is not whether Zumwalt was worth it.

The question is whether we are designing today’s ships so they can adapt tomorrow.

Because wars between major powers are not decided by what we start with.

They are decided by what we can modify, replace, and evolve after the fighting begins.

Why Americans Should Care

This story is about far more than a destroyer.

It is about:

  • Shipyard capacity
  • Industrial skill
  • Design philosophy
  • Electrical power margins in ships
  • Flexibility in fleet architecture
  • The ability to change missions without building a new class of ship

That is national strength.

That is governance.

That is whether budgets, priorities, and industry are aligned with the realities of modern warfare.

Most Americans think innovation happens in labs.

Zumwalt shows that innovation must be built into the steel of ships years before it is needed.

Implications for the Navy

The Navy now has proof that:

  • Large-scale mission conversion is possible
  • Integrated electric ships have enormous future value
  • Hypersonic strike can be distributed across surface platforms
  • Ship design margin is not a luxury—it is a warfighting requirement

The remaining two Zumwalts will follow.

But the real question is whether future ship classes are being designed with this lesson in mind.

Implications for Our Allies

Allies watching this are learning something important:

The U.S. Navy is not just adding new weapons.

It is learning how to adapt existing platforms into new roles.

That flexibility is a form of deterrence.

Because it signals that the fleet they see today is not the fleet they will face tomorrow.

The Governance Lesson Hiding in Plain Sight

This did not happen because of a single weapon.

This happened because:
National will → budgets
Budgets → priorities
Priorities → ship design
Ship design → adaptability
Adaptability → readiness

That chain is what turns technology into combat power.

Break that chain anywhere, and innovation stays on paper.

The Bigger Takeaway

USS Zumwalt is no longer a story about a controversial ship.

It is now a case study in how naval power must be built for change.

And that is a lesson Americans need to understand if we want a Navy that can fight—and adapt—in the decades ahead.

Because the future of naval warfare will not be decided by what ships were built to do.

It will be decided by what they can become.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

China’s New Invasion Barges Reveal a Bigger Truth About Modern Power

Chinese Shuiqiao-class invasion barges

What Just Happened

Between January 11 and 15, 2026, China deployed three newly built Shuiqiao-class invasion barges to Nansan Island in the South China Sea. These are not ordinary ships. They are mobile, self-deploying logistics platforms designed to create instant docks, temporary ports, and heavy equipment offload points where no infrastructure exists.

Each barge can drive into shallow water, jack itself above the surface, and deploy roadway systems that turn open coastline into a functioning logistics hub.

This is not experimentation. This is rehearsal.

China is practicing how to build ports on demand.

Why This Is Different

Most people imagine amphibious invasions as waves of troops and armored vehicles storming beaches.

That image is outdated.

Modern war is won by logistics.

Fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, medical care, maintenance, and the continuous movement of people and equipment matter more than the first landing. Whoever sustains operations longest wins.

These barges are not weapons.
They are infrastructure.

And infrastructure is what makes everything else possible.

By deploying these platforms, China is demonstrating its ability to:

  • Create instant ports
  • Establish temporary logistics hubs
  • Sustain forces across islands
  • Operate without fixed bases
  • Support heavy equipment transfers
  • Expand control incrementally

This is how power is consolidated in the 21st century.

My Commentary

If you once doubted China’s intentions, think again.

This is not defensive infrastructure. This is not routine maritime development. This is not a commercial experiment.

This is about control.

This is about reach.

This is about being able to move, land, supply, reinforce, and sustain military forces wherever and whenever they choose.

You don’t build mobile ports unless you intend to use them.

This is not about one island.
This is about a system.

Why Americans Should Care

Naval power is not a platform.
It is a system.

Ships, ports, logistics, repair facilities, supply chains, workforce, industrial capacity, and governance all matter.

China understands this.

That’s why it is investing in portable infrastructure, modular logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities—while the United States struggles with:

  • Aging sealift
  • Fragile port security
  • Long shipyard delays
  • Limited surge capacity
  • Shrinking industrial depth
  • Vulnerable maritime infrastructure

Power today is not just about firepower.

It is about who can show up, stay, and sustain.

China is building that capability deliberately.

What This Signals About China’s Strategy

This development aligns with a broader pattern:

  • Artificial islands
  • Dual-use ports
  • Civil-military fusion
  • Expeditionary logistics
  • Rapid infrastructure construction
  • Maritime normalization

China is not just building ships.

It is building the scaffolding of dominance.

And it is doing so quietly, persistently, and methodically.

This is how territorial control is modernized.

This Is a Governance Issue, Not Just a Military One

Military capability does not appear by accident.

It is built through alignment:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

China is aligning all five.

The United States is not.

We debate platforms.
They build systems.

We argue procurement.
They build logistics.

We delay shipyards.
They build mobile ports.

This is not about spending more.
It is about thinking differently.

What Must Change

America must stop treating naval strength as a niche defense topic.

It is economic security.
It is supply chain security.
It is alliance credibility.
It is deterrence.
It is peace.

If we fail to understand how power is now constructed, we will lose it without a single dramatic moment.

That is the real danger.

Not invasion headlines.
Not dramatic conflict.

But quiet displacement.

Closing

China just showed us something important.

Not with missiles.
Not with warships.
But with infrastructure.

And that should worry anyone who believes in a free, open, and stable maritime world.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.


Rust, Readiness, and Reality: Why This Debate Matters to Every American

Why This Is Not a Navy Problem, but an American One

This essay explores why the current debate over rust and warfighting readiness is not an internal Navy issue, but a national one. The real problem is not cosmetic—it is systemic. Sailors are capable. The American public is supportive. What often fails is alignment upstream—where Congress, the Department of Defense, and senior leadership decide what gets funded, staffed, scheduled, and rewarded.

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

From the Founder

I served on a U.S. Navy destroyer in the 1970s. Some of the hardest-working, most capable people I’ve ever known wore Navy uniforms—officers and enlisted, engineers and operators, deckplate sailors and watchstanders. They weren’t lazy. They weren’t careless. And they weren’t disconnected from the mission.

They were doing the best they could inside a system that constantly forced tradeoffs.

That experience is why I’m paying close attention to the public debate about rust, preservation, and warfighting readiness. Because this is not a Navy culture fight. It’s not a generational fight. And it’s not an internal matter.

It’s a national readiness issue.

What Sparked This Debate

A recent article by LT Spike Dearing, published on the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), argued that today’s surface fleet is being inspected more for preservation than for warfighting. His point was not that preservation doesn’t matter—it absolutely does—but that what leaders choose to inspect shapes what sailors prioritize.

His concern is simple and serious: if warfighting performance is rarely inspected, it will inevitably become secondary.

The article prompted multiple responses in the CIMSEC comment section, including from naval historian and analyst Steven Wills, and was later republished on other defense platforms—signaling that its themes are resonating beyond its initial posting.

This is not a closed-door conversation. This is a public one—because the consequences of readiness, or the lack of it, do not stay inside the Navy.

What Steven Wills Gets Right

Steven Wills made an important point: corrosion is not cosmetic. Rust is not superficial. Preservation reflects discipline. And visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay.

He’s right.

Saltwater destroys steel. Systems fail. Neglect spreads. No serious warfighting force can afford to treat material condition as optional.

But this is where people often misframe the issue.

This is not a choice between paint and warfighting.

It is about whether the system enables both.

What LT Dearing Gets Right

LT Dearing is also right.

People respond rationally to what leaders inspect.

If leaders inspect surfaces, crews will optimize for surfaces. If leaders inspect tactics, crews will optimize for tactics.

That’s not laziness. That’s survival.

After the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, the Navy made fire safety non-negotiable. Inspections changed. Behavior changed. Training changed.

That’s how priorities shift.

Standards Matter — But Systems Decide Whether They Are Achievable

When defense analyst Brent Sadler says that a clean ship is a well-run ship and a combat-ready ship, he is pointing to something real: discipline, standards, and leadership signals matter. Order reflects process. Process reflects leadership. And leadership shapes behavior.

But that truth only holds when the system supporting those standards is aligned.

A ship can only be clean, disciplined, and well-run if crews are given the time, manpower, training windows, maintenance access, and parts availability needed to meet those standards. Without that support, expectations become performative instead of operational.

This is where the problem becomes systemic.

When standards are enforced without the resources to meet them, discipline turns into distortion. Crews are not failing — they are adapting. And adaptation is not weakness. It is rational behavior inside a misaligned system.

This is why this is not a deckplate problem.

This is a governance problem.

Who sets the priorities? Who controls the budgets? Who defines the metrics? Who decides what gets inspected, rewarded, and penalizedReadiness is not free. It is built—or it is hollowed out—by budgets, manpower decisions, and time allocations.

Those decisions are made upstream.

Sadler’s point about cleanliness is not wrong — it is incomplete without a systems lens. A clean ship should reflect readiness. But that only works when leadership designs a system that makes real readiness possible, not just presentable.

This is why LT Spike Dearing’s argument about what leaders choose to inspect matters. And it is why Steven Wills is right to warn that visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay. Both are describing the same thing from different angles: signals versus systems.

Signals matter. But systems decide outcomes.

My Experience

When I served, my shipmates worked relentlessly. We fought corrosion while underway. We knew what mattered. But we also knew what inspectors looked for.

So when inspections came, we painted.

Not because we didn’t care about readiness. But because we cared about protecting our command inside the system.

And a lot has changed since the 1970s. The Navy is smaller now and stretched even further. The systems are more complex, the demands are higher, and many of the sailors and officers carrying this load today could be my children. In many cases, they may not even have the time to paint over rust—because they are busy keeping the ship running, the systems online, and the mission moving.

That doesn’t weaken this argument. It strengthens it.

That’s not moral failure.

That’s a warning sign.

Hardworking people will always try to do everything. When they can’t, they triage based on what leadership rewards.

This Is Not a Navy-Internal Problem

This is not about sailors. This is not about pride. This is not about tradition.

This is about alignment.

Sailors are capable. Sailors are disciplined. Sailors are supported by the American people.

What they often lack is consistent backing from those who control resources, manpower, time, and priorities.

Readiness is not a slogan. It’s a system.

And when that system is misaligned, people adapt.

Why Americans Should Care

The Navy does not exist for the Navy. It exists for the American people.

If we want deterrence, we must prepare seriously. If we want peace, we must be credible. If we want stability, we must invest in real readiness—not performative readiness.

You cannot paint your way to warfighting competence.

Implications for the Navy

This debate exposes a dangerous risk: a force that looks ready but is not consistently evaluated for the conditions it will actually face.

War does not care about inspections. Adversaries do not grade on appearance. And there are no do-overs.

Implications for Our Allies

Our allies don’t just watch our ships. They watch our seriousness.

Credibility comes from demonstrated competence under stress—not polish.

The Bottom Line

Preservation matters. Warfighting matters more. Both must be enabled.

This is not about rust. It is about readiness design.

Real readiness cannot be painted on.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

The Wake-Up Call America Can’t Ignore: Captain Fanell’s Stark Warning on China’s Naval Supremacy

A Navy Intelligence Officer Was Fired for Telling the Truth. Now We’re Living His Warning.

In February 2014, Captain James Fanell, then the senior Intelligence Officer for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, gave a speech that would cost him his career. His crime? Warning that China was modernizing its navy at an alarming rate and preparing for what Beijing called a “short, sharp war.”

The Pentagon’s response was swift and chilling. Rather than heed his warning, they publicly rebuked him. An Office of the Secretary of Defense officer visited his secure facility with a direct order: stop giving speeches like that. The message was clear—don’t “provoke” China. Within months, Captain Fanell was fired.

Ten years later, his testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability reads like a prophetic indictment of three decades of strategic failure. And for Americans who care about naval power and national security, it should be required reading.

The Numbers Don’t Lie: We’re Losing the Naval Race

Here’s the reality Captain Fanell laid out in stark terms: In 2005, the U.S. Navy enjoyed a 76-warship advantage over China. By 2023, we faced a 39-combatant deficit. That’s a swing of 115 naval platforms in less than two decades—and the trend shows no sign of reversing for at least another decade.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy is now the largest in the world. But it’s not just about numbers. China has achieved qualitative parity, if not superiority, in critical areas. Their new Renhai-class cruisers pack 112 vertical launch tubes carrying supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles with ranges of 186 miles. Meanwhile, our carrier strike groups lack sufficient defenses against hypersonic weapons.

Captain Fanell’s assessment is blunt: “If there is conflict with the PRC, it will be on, over, and below the high seas, from Okinawa to Guam to Honolulu, all the way to the West Coast and into the U.S. homeland. This will be a conflict the likes of which the U.S. has not experienced since World War II.”

How Did We Get Here? The Anatomy of Strategic Failure

Captain Fanell identifies three catastrophic failures that brought us to this precipice:

1. Threat Deflation by the Intelligence Community

For decades, the U.S. intelligence community consistently underestimated China’s capabilities and intentions. Admiral Robert Willard noted in 2009 that China had “exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability and capacity every year.” This wasn’t occasional miscalculation—it was systematic error, always in the same direction: underestimating the threat.

The intelligence community failed its prime directive. As Commander Joseph Rochefort, the architect of America’s victory at Midway, famously said: an intelligence officer must tell his commander today what the enemy will do tomorrow. On China, our intelligence apparatus failed spectacularly.

2. Avarice Over Strategy

Business interests and financiers prioritized profits over national security. The promise of cheap labor and vast markets blinded American leaders to a fundamental strategic truth: every dollar China earned was partly spent building the military force that now threatens us.

As Captain Fanell notes: “From a strategic perspective, there is no ‘Goldilocks’ amount of safe trade in high tech with China. Indeed, the right amount is zero.”

3. A Flag Officer Corps That Failed to Sound the Alarm

Perhaps most damning is Captain Fanell’s assessment of Navy leadership. He contrasts today’s admirals with the principled officers of the Cold War—admirals like Arleigh Burke and Hyman Rickover, who fought relentlessly for the capabilities needed to counter the Soviet threat.

Where are today’s equivalents? For 20 years, not a single U.S. Navy admiral spoke out publicly against the dangerous trajectory of naval power shifting to China. Instead, they embraced “engagement at all costs,” hosting Chinese admirals on our carriers and submarines, while China used those very lessons to build a navy specifically designed to defeat us.

The culture became one of “going along to get along”—where career advancement trumped the oath to the Constitution.

The Scarborough Shoal Lesson: When Weakness Invites Aggression

Captain Fanell recounts a watershed moment that demonstrates the cost of our failures: the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident. When China attempted to seize the shoal from the Philippines, the U.S. brokered an agreement for both sides to withdraw. The Philippines complied. China did not.

The U.S. response? Nothing. We failed to back our treaty ally, and China seized sovereign territory without firing a shot.

The lesson China learned was clear: America will not stand up to Chinese aggression. Within a year, under the leadership of then-Vice President Xi Jinping, China began building seven militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea—three of them the size and capacity of Pearl Harbor. Today, they’re fully militarized despite Xi’s 2014 assurances to President Obama that they wouldn’t be.

What Must Be Done: Seven Urgent Recommendations

Captain Fanell doesn’t just diagnose the problem—he prescribes bold solutions:

  1. The National Security Community Must Admit Failure – Only by acknowledging how completely they missed the threat can we begin to fix the system.
  2. Restructure Decision-Making – Move CFIUS chairmanship from Treasury to Defense. Economic interests can no longer trump national security.
  3. Expect Resistance and Stay the Course – The “engagement” advocates will fight every reform. We must persist despite bureaucratic resistance.
  4. Act with Urgency – We don’t have years to correct course. China’s timeline for the “Great Rejuvenation” is measured in years, not decades.
  5. Create a “Team B” on China – Just as alternative analysis challenged benign assumptions about the Soviet Union in the 1970s, we need contrarian voices on China now.
  6. Study Chinese Military Doctrine – During the Cold War, we knew Soviet doctrine inside and out. We must achieve the same familiarity with PLA thinking and strategy.
  7. Target the CCP Directly – This requires political warfare, rolling back Chinese gains in the South China Sea, and making clear that the Chinese Communist Party is illegitimate.

A Navy Built for the Fight We Face

Americans for a Stronger Navy has long advocated for the fleet we need, not the fleet we can afford. Captain Fanell’s testimony reinforces this urgency.

We need:

  • A crash naval building program reminiscent of the 1940 Naval Expansion Act
  • Hypersonic weapon defenses for our carrier strike groups
  • A distributed maritime architecture that can survive and fight in contested waters
  • Forward-deployed forces capable of deterring Chinese aggression

But ships and weapons aren’t enough. We need leadership willing to speak hard truths, even when they’re politically inconvenient. We need admirals who will fight for the Navy our nation requires, not manage their careers toward comfortable retirements.

The Stakes: Freedom or Totalitarian Abyss

Captain Fanell frames this struggle in the starkest terms: “The Sino-American security competition is the great struggle of the 21st Century and promises to resolve the dispositive question of the age—whether the world will be free and protected by the U.S. or fall into a totalitarian abyss as sought by the PRC.”

This isn’t hyperbole. It’s the assessment of an intelligence officer who spent his career studying Chinese capabilities and intentions—and was punished for telling the truth.The Choice Before Us

We face the same reality as a patient diagnosed with cancer. We can follow the prescribed treatment—painful, expensive, and difficult though it may be—or we can ignore the diagnosis and hope for the best.

Captain Fanell’s testimony shows us that hope is not a strategy. Engagement failed. Wishful thinking about China’s “peaceful rise” failed. Prioritizing corporate profits over national security failed.

What remains is the hard work of rebuilding American naval power, restructuring our national security apparatus, and confronting—not engaging—the Chinese Communist Party’s bid for global hegemony.

The good news? America still possesses fundamental strengths: our Constitution, our tradition of individual liberty, our innovative spirit, and our alliances. These are more powerful and durable than the Chinese Communist Party’s coercion and control.

But these strengths won’t matter if we lack the naval power to defend them. And we won’t build that power unless we acknowledge how badly we’ve failed, learn from officers like Captain Fanell who tried to warn us, and commit to the urgent work of reclaiming maritime dominance.

A Call to Action

Americans for a Stronger Navy exists precisely for this moment. We need:

  • Public Awareness: Share Captain Fanell’s testimony. Demand that political leaders address this threat honestly.
  • Congressional Action: Pressure representatives to fund naval shipbuilding and reform the national security bureaucracy.
  • Cultural Change: Celebrate officers who speak truth to power, even when that truth is uncomfortable.
  • Strategic Seriousness: Reject engagement policies that strengthen our adversary.

Captain Fanell ends his testimony with optimism rooted in American exceptionalism. We should share that optimism—but only if it’s paired with urgent action.

The decade of concern is here. The question is whether we’ll rise to meet it.


Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for robust maritime power as essential to American security and prosperity. Captain Fanell’s full testimony is available through the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability and deserves wide distribution among citizens, policymakers, and military professionals.

The War on Warriors: What We Can Learn About the China Threat

A Book Review from Americans for a Stronger Navy

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

A Note on Staying in Our Lane

Pete Hegseth’s 2024 The War on Warriors has ignited fierce debate across America. As I write this, decorated veterans like Senator Mark Kelly and Pete Hegseth—both men who’ve served with distinction—are in public conflict.

Americans for a Stronger Navy is not going to adjudicate those battles.

What started as an effort to understand Pete Hegseth’s perspective through his book and interviews evolved into something else entirely. As I watched his past interviews and listened to the three-hour conversation with Shawn Ryan, I found myself repeatedly pulled back to our core mission: the urgent need for a Navy capable of deterring China and defending American interests.

While I agree with many of Hegseth’s principles about building a stronger fighting force and improving resources for veterans, I also recognize that his book and interviews reflect a specific moment in time—the period leading up to and following publication. The debates they’ve sparked are important, and good people disagree on the solutions.

But while we debate internally, China doesn’t pause its carrier production.

Our lane is clear: advocating for the naval power necessary to protect America’s future. While others debate military culture, we’re compelled to focus on what both Shawn Ryan and Pete Hegseth spent significant time discussing in their three-hour interview: the existential threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

Our veterans deserve better care than they’re receiving. When the VA is failing the warriors who already served, spending defense dollars on elective procedures while vets wait months for basic care is unconscionable. This isn’t a cultural position—it’s a resource management position. Every dollar matters when China is building carriers faster than we can.

With that stated, let’s focus on what should unite all Americans regardless of political persuasion: “China has us by the balls,” says Hegseth. And by our best estimates, we’re running out of time to do something about it.

The Strategic Reality

The most critical parts of the Hegseth-Ryan interview aren’t about DEI or pronouns. They’re about strategic vulnerability to an adversary that’s been playing the long game while we’ve been distracted.

Here’s Pete Hegseth’s unvarnished assessment:

“When they’ve already got us by the balls economically, with our grid, culturally, with elite capture going on around the globe, microchips, everything—why do they want Taiwan? They want to corner the market completely on the technological future. We can’t even drive our cars without the stuff we need out of China these days. They have a full-spectrum, long-term view of not just regional but global domination, and we have our heads up our asses.”

Here’s the short 50 second YouTube clip, watch it for yourself.

Let’s break down what “by the balls” actually means:

Economic Leverage: Our Grid is Their Weapon

China produces all of our electrical transformers, solar panels, and wind turbines. Not most. All. They’re already embedded in our power grid infrastructure. FBI Director Christopher Wray has publicly confirmed Chinese operatives have pre-positioned malware in our electrical grid and water treatment facilities.

As Wray stated, “the dashboard is flashing red and smoking.”

Think about what this means: In the opening hours of a Taiwan conflict, before a single shot is fired at a carrier strike group, China could potentially darken American cities, shut down water systems, and cripple our ability to mobilize.

Our Navy can’t sortie from ports without power. Our sailors can’t fight if their families are in crisis at home.

Naval Asymmetry: We’re Losing the Numbers Game

Hegseth reveals what Pentagon insiders know but rarely admit publicly:

“In the past 10-15 years, the Pentagon has a perfect record in all of its war games against China. We lose every time.”

Every. Single. Time.

Why? Multiple factors:

Numerical Inferiority: China’s Navy now exceeds the U.S. Navy in sheer hull numbers. They’re building aircraft carriers and advanced destroyers at a pace we cannot match with our current industrial base.

Hypersonic Missiles: China has developed hypersonic weapons specifically designed to defeat our carrier strike groups. As Hegseth notes: “If 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what does that look like?”

Our primary tool of power projection—the carrier strike group—may be obsolete on Day One of a Pacific conflict.

Supply Chain Dependency: When Shawn Ryan mentions defensive technologies like directed EMP weapons (from companies like Epirus) that can counter drone swarms, even he expresses concern: “I don’t know if anything’s coming from China. I don’t know what other weapons we have and what’s manufactured in China or what IP they’ve stolen from us.”

We can’t even be certain our most advanced defensive systems aren’t compromised by Chinese components or stolen intellectual property.

The Microchip Chokepoint: Taiwan is Everything

Why does China want Taiwan? Not reunification nostalgia. Taiwan is the beating heart of the global economy and modern civilization.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) doesn’t just produce “the majority” of advanced microchips—it produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. These aren’t chips for smartphones and laptops. These are the chips that power:

  • Every advanced weapon system – F-35s, guided missiles, radar systems, naval combat systems
  • Every AI system – From civilian applications to military command and control
  • Every modern vehicle – Cars, trucks, tractors, commercial aircraft
  • Every hospital – MRI machines, CT scanners, surgical robots, monitoring equipment
  • Every communications system – Cell towers, satellites, internet infrastructure
  • Every financial system – Banking, stock markets, payment processing

If China controls Taiwan, China controls the technological backbone of human civilization.

This isn’t hyperbole. During the COVID chip shortage, automobile production halted worldwide. Factories sat idle. Dealership lots emptied. That was a supply chain hiccup. Imagine China with a monopoly, deciding who gets chips and who doesn’t.

American weapon systems would depend on Chinese approval for components. American hospitals would need Chinese permission to operate. American banks would require Chinese consent to process transactions.

This is why Taiwan isn’t just another regional territorial dispute. Taiwan is the strategic fulcrum upon which the entire 21st century will turn.

And China knows it. That’s why they’re building a military specifically designed to take Taiwan before we can effectively respond. That’s why every hypersonic missile, every carrier, every amphibious assault ship they build is calculated toward this single objective.

Salt Typhoon: They’re Already Inside

In late 2024, U.S. intelligence agencies revealed that Chinese hackers operating under the codename “Salt Typhoon” had achieved deep, persistent access to American telecommunications infrastructure.

Not a probe. Not a test. Deep, persistent access.

They’re inside AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile networks. They can intercept phone calls, text messages, internet traffic. They’ve targeted senior government officials, military personnel, critical infrastructure operators.

This isn’t theoretical preparation for future conflict. This is active intelligence collection happening right now.

Combined with their penetration of our electrical grid (FBI Director Wray’s “flashing red dashboard”), their control over our transformer supply chains, their dominance in 5G infrastructure, and their positioning in our water treatment systems—China has achieved the infiltration necessary to paralyze America without firing a shot.

When the Taiwan crisis comes—and it will come—our response will be shaped by what China has already positioned to cripple us from within.

The Indo-Pacific: Where Our Future Will Be Decided

The Indo-Pacific region isn’t one theater among many. It’s THE theater where American prosperity and security will be won or lost.

Consider the stakes:

Economic: Over 60% of global maritime trade flows through the South China Sea. $3.4 trillion in trade passes through the Taiwan Strait annually. If China controls these waters, they control global commerce.

Alliance Structure: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, India—our entire network of Pacific allies depends on American commitment. If we cannot or will not defend Taiwan, why would anyone trust American security guarantees?

Resources: Critical minerals, rare earth elements, advanced manufacturing—the Indo-Pacific is the industrial and technological center of the 21st century. Ceding this region to Chinese dominance means accepting permanent economic subservience.

Naval Power Projection: If China controls the First Island Chain (Japan-Taiwan-Philippines), American naval power is effectively contained to Pearl Harbor and San Diego. Our ability to operate globally collapses.

This isn’t about the military-industrial complex wanting another war. This is about the economic and security future of our children and grandchildren.

This is Nothing Like Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan

I understand the skepticism. Both Pete Hegseth and Shawn Ryan expressed it in their interview—they’re both “recovering neocons” who supported Iraq and Afghanistan and now recognize those were strategic disasters.

Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were wars of choice built on questionable premises:

  • Nation-building missions in societies we didn’t understand
  • No vital national interests at stake
  • No clear victory conditions
  • Counterinsurgency in impossible terrain against irregular forces
  • Decades-long occupations with no end state
  • Trillions spent with nothing to show for it

The potential Taiwan conflict is fundamentally different:

1. Vital National Interests: Taiwan semiconductors aren’t optional. Modern civilization depends on them. This isn’t about abstract concepts like “democracy promotion”—it’s about maintaining access to the technology that runs everything from hospitals to power grids.

2. Deterrence, Not Occupation: We don’t need to occupy Chinese territory or rebuild their society. We need to make the cost of taking Taiwan prohibitively high. That’s classic deterrence, not nation-building.

3. Conventional Warfare: This would be state-on-state naval and air conflict where American technological advantages matter, not counterinsurgency in urban terrain where they don’t.

4. Clear Objectives: Maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence and semiconductor production. That’s it. No “hearts and minds,” no transforming societies, no endless occupation.

5. Alliance Structure: We’d fight alongside Japan, Australia, potentially South Korea and others with shared interests. This isn’t America alone trying to remake a foreign society.

6. Existential Stakes: If China controls Taiwan’s chips, they control the global economy. If they demonstrate American security guarantees are worthless, our entire alliance system collapses. If they dominate the Indo-Pacific, American prosperity ends.

The lesson from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan isn’t “never fight wars.” It’s “don’t fight stupid wars based on lies about stupid objectives in stupid ways.”

Deterring China from taking Taiwan is none of those things. It’s the most strategically vital mission American naval power faces.

This is about ensuring our grandchildren grow up in a free, prosperous America—not one subordinated to Chinese Communist Party dictates because we couldn’t muster the will to maintain our position when it mattered most.

Economic Warfare: The Crypto Scam Example

Hegseth and Ryan discuss an underreported aspect of Chinese strategic operations: systematic economic extraction through crypto scams.

Chinese operatives run sophisticated confidence schemes:

  1. Approach target with small crypto investment opportunity ($15,000)
  2. Deliver real returns quickly ($45,000) to build trust
  3. Escalate to larger investments ($200,000)
  4. When target invests life savings ($1,000,000+), disappear with everything

This isn’t individual crime—it’s organized economic warfare to extract American wealth before potential conflict.

Ryan’s local sheriff’s department just tracked one operator across multiple states to Las Vegas. “It’s happening all over the place,” Ryan notes.

Cultural Infiltration: TikTok and Beyond

As Hegseth observes: “We let in TikTok where they can trans our kids and they don’t trans their kids.”

Whether you agree with his framing or not, the strategic point is valid: China operates TikTok to influence American youth while banning it domestically. That’s not cultural exchange—that’s information warfare.

The CCP understands something we’ve forgotten: The side that controls what the next generation believes controls the future.

The Long Game: China’s Strategic Patience

Here’s what separates China’s approach from ours:

China’s Strategy:

  • Multi-decade planning horizon
  • Systematic IP theft and technology acquisition
  • Economic positioning for future conflict
  • Military buildup specifically designed to defeat the United States
  • Cultural and political elite capture
  • Infrastructure positioning (ports, 5G networks, supply chains)

America’s Strategy:

  • 2-4 year election cycles driving policy
  • Letting China manufacture our critical infrastructure
  • Outsourcing our industrial base for quarterly profit margins
  • Assuming the international rules-based order will protect us
  • Internal political warfare consuming our attention

As Hegseth puts it: “China is playing chess while we’re arguing about pronouns.”

The Timing Question: When Will They Strike?

Both Ryan and Hegseth wrestle with a critical strategic question: When will China make its move on Taiwan?

Ryan’s analysis is chilling:

“If I was them, I would put in the scenario into war games and see what the probability is that we’re going to come out on top. I wouldn’t make a move until after this election because they know what’s going on. They see it. Nobody made any weird moves under Trump that I’m aware of. As soon as they got in—Russia went after Ukraine, tensions with Taiwan getting stronger, the border, Israel—everybody that wanted to make a chess move on the board did it as soon as Trump was out of office.”

“If I was them, I would make my move the first day that Trump is in office because that would be the weakest point before we start to see an incline. And if Kamala gets in there, I would wait another four years, just let it keep declining, and that would just let this place get as weak as it possibly can, and then I would pull the trigger.”

Think about that logic:

  • China runs the scenarios through their war game simulations
  • They update the probability matrices with current data
  • Every year we decline, their probability of victory increases
  • They wait until the optimal moment

The clock is ticking. And we’re not on it.

What This Means for the Navy

Everything Hegseth discusses in the Army context applies with even greater urgency to naval forces:

Recruitment Crisis: The Navy can’t crew the ships we have, let alone the fleet we need. If patriotic families from military traditions are second-guessing service, where do future sailors come from?

Retention Problems: Experienced petty officers and junior officers are leaving. Institutional knowledge walks out the door with them.

Technical Expertise Gap: Modern naval warfare requires STEM-educated personnel. Our education system is producing activists, not engineers.

Readiness vs. Rhetoric: Hegseth mentions sailors in the DMZ in Korea reporting they have “basically enough artillery for 3 days—the rest of it’s in Ukraine.” How many naval munitions have been drawn down? How many maintenance dollars diverted?

Close Quarters Reality: Destroyers, cruisers, submarines—these platforms require maximum unit cohesion in confined spaces over extended deployments. Any policy that complicates that dynamic affects operational capability.

Industrial Base Collapse: We can’t build ships fast enough. China launches a new carrier while we’re still arguing about shipyard contracts.

Why the Navy? Why Not Just “Military” Generally?

Americans for a Stronger Navy focuses specifically on naval power for a fundamental reason: The China challenge is inherently a maritime problem.

Consider the geography:

70% of Earth’s surface is water. The Indo-Pacific theater is defined by vast ocean expanses, island chains, and sea lanes. This isn’t the deserts of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan—it’s a maritime domain where naval power is decisive.

Taiwan is an island 100 miles from mainland China. Any conflict over Taiwan is fundamentally an amphibious assault/defense scenario. China must cross water. We must defend across water. The Air Force matters, the Army matters, but the Navy is the primary deterrent.

The First Island Chain is maritime. Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia—the strategic barrier that contains Chinese power projection is a series of islands. Controlling this chain means controlling maritime access. Losing it means Chinese naval dominance from the South China Sea to the Pacific.

Global trade flows through water. Over 90% of global trade moves by ship. The South China Sea handles $3.4 trillion annually through the Taiwan Strait alone. If China controls these sea lanes, they control global commerce. You can’t secure maritime trade with land forces.

Distance matters. The nearest U.S. territory to China is Guam—3,000 miles from California. You can’t project power across the Pacific with the Army. The Navy is how America reaches the theater. The Navy is how we sustain operations. The Navy is how we defend allies. Without naval dominance, we’re not even in the game.

China understands this. That’s why they’re building the world’s largest navy. Not the world’s largest army (they already had that). They’re specifically building carriers, destroyers, submarines, amphibious assault ships—naval power to challenge American naval power.

They’ve studied American carrier strike groups and designed hypersonic missiles to sink them. They’ve built artificial islands in the South China Sea to extend their naval reach. They’re developing a blue-water navy capable of operating globally.

The Indo-Pacific challenge is a naval challenge. China’s threat is a naval threat. Our response must be naval.

That’s why Americans for a Stronger Navy exists. We’re not generically “pro-military.” We’re specifically focused on the domain where the 21st century’s decisive competition will be won or lost: the sea.

The Resource Allocation Question

Here’s where Americans for a Stronger Navy takes a clear position:

Military resources must be allocated to maximize readiness and deterrence. Period.

That means:

This isn’t about culture. It’s about math.

If we’re losing every war game against China, if our carriers are vulnerable to hypersonic missiles, if our grid can be darkened remotely, if Taiwan is the strategic prize of the century—then every resource decision matters.

The Education Pipeline: Tomorrow’s Sailors

Hegseth spends significant time in both the book and interview discussing education, and this directly impacts naval readiness.

The Navy needs:

  • Nuclear-trained operators for submarines and carriers
  • Electronics technicians for advanced systems
  • Engineers for damage control and propulsion
  • Cryptologists and cyber warriors
  • Aviators with complex technical training

This requires:

  • Strong STEM education
  • Rigorous academic standards
  • Technical aptitude
  • Problem-solving capability
  • Discipline and work ethic

What’s happening in K-12 education:

  • Math and science proficiency declining
  • Reading scores dropping
  • Grade inflation masking actual competency
  • Social-emotional learning replacing academic rigor
  • Anti-American narratives that discourage service

The pipeline is broken. Even if we solve every other problem, we can’t crew a technically complex fleet with graduates who can’t do algebra.

This is where Hegseth’s education critique directly intersects with naval readiness. China is graduating millions of STEM students. We’re graduating activists who think America is irredeemably evil. Who’s going to win that competition?

What We Learned From a Destroyer Sailor

I served on a U.S. Navy destroyer in the 1970s. Several shipmates reached out over the past few years expressing concerns about changes in today’s Navy. I’ll admit I was initially skeptical—were they exaggerating? Were they just resistant to change?

After reading Hegseth’s book and listening to the three-hour Ryan interview, I realize I should have listened more carefully to the warnings. But I also realize something else:

We’re spending so much energy fighting each other that we’re not focusing on the actual threat.

My shipmates on both sides of these cultural debates all agree on one thing: China is the threat. They disagree on solutions to internal problems, but they all recognize the external danger.

That’s where Americans for a Stronger Navy needs to focus.

Let the cultural debates happen. Let good people like Senator Kelly and Pete Hegseth have their disagreements. Our job is to relentlessly advocate for:

  1. Sufficient naval hulls to match China’s growing fleet
  2. Advanced weapon systems that counter hypersonic threats
  3. Industrial base that can actually build ships at competitive speed
  4. Recruitment and retention of qualified personnel
  5. Training and readiness focused on war-fighting
  6. Supply chain independence from Chinese manufacturing
  7. Electrical grid hardening so our bases can operate
  8. Cybersecurity that prevents Chinese infrastructure penetration
  9. Educational reform that produces STEM-capable recruits
  10. Budget prioritization toward capabilities over social experiments

The Three-Hour Wake-Up CalIf the warnings from Ryan and Hegseth about the CCP don’t shake you to the core, I don’t know what will.

Here’s what should terrify every American:

  • Pentagon loses every war game against China
  • China’s Navy now exceeds ours in numbers
  • Hypersonic missiles can sink our carriers in minutes
  • Chinese malware already embedded in our grid
  • Taiwan’s semiconductor monopoly is China’s target
  • Economic warfare extracting American wealth daily
  • Our sailors report ammunition shortages
  • Recruiting and retention in crisis
  • Industrial base can’t build ships competitively
  • Education system failing to produce technical talent

And while all this is happening, Americans are fighting each other instead of the actual enemy.

Our Call to Action

Americans for a Stronger Navy has a clear mission: advocating for the naval power necessary to defend America and deter aggression.

After reviewing Hegseth’s book and the extended Ryan interview, here’s what we’re calling for:

Immediate Priorities:

1. China Threat Education We will dedicate equal or greater time to educating Americans about the CCP threat as we spend on internal debates. The Ryan-Hegseth interview should be required viewing for anyone concerned about national security.

2. Resource Allocation Focus Every dollar matters when you’re losing war games. We support policies that maximize readiness and deterrence, including ending taxpayer funding for elective medical procedures that render service members non-deployable.

3. Industrial Base Revival We cannot have a strong Navy without shipyards that can build ships. This requires industrial policy, workforce development, and political will.

4. Grid Hardening Naval bases can’t operate without power. American families can’t support deployed sailors if they’re in crisis at home. Chinese control of our infrastructure must end.

5. Supply Chain Independence We must stop buying critical military components from our primary adversary. Yes, it will be expensive. No, we don’t have a choice.

6. Education Pipeline Repair Supporting classical education, STEM focus, and programs that produce technically capable recruits is a national security imperative.

7. Bipartisan Unity on China This is the one thing that should unite Americans across political divides. China is not Republican or Democrat. They’re our adversary, and they’re winning.

What You Can Do:

1. Watch the Full Interview The three-hour Shawn Ryan Show interview with Pete Hegseth contains more strategic analysis than most national security briefings. Share it widely.

2. Contact Your Representatives Demand they prioritize naval shipbuilding, infrastructure hardening, and China competition over internal political warfare.

3. Support STEM Education Whether through donations, volunteering, or advocacy—we need the next generation capable of operating advanced naval systems.

4. Spread Awareness Most Americans have no idea how vulnerable we are or how aggressively China is positioning for dominance. Change that.

5. Stay Focused on the Mission Don’t let internal debates distract from external threats. We can disagree on culture while agreeing on China.

Conclusion: The Enemy Gets a Vote—But So Do We

There’s a military axiom: “The enemy gets a vote.”

While America argues about pronouns, DEI, and cultural issues, China is voting with carrier launches, hypersonic missile tests, infrastructure infiltration, and economic positioning.

While good Americans like Senator Kelly and Pete Hegseth have their necessary debates about military culture, China is running war game simulations and updating their probability matrices for success.

While we fight over what makes someone qualified for military service, China is building the fleet that will challenge our ability to defend Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.

The clock is ticking.

But here’s what the alarm shouldn’t become: despair.

What started as a book review to understand Pete Hegseth’s perspective became a stark reminder of what actually matters: our children’s future. And that future is not predetermined. China’s rise is not inevitable. American decline is a choice, not a destiny.

We Have Advantages China Can’t Match

American Innovation: When we freed American energy production, we became energy independent within years. When COVID hit, we developed multiple vaccines in record time. When we commit to solving problems, we still lead the world in innovation.

Emerging Technologies: Directed energy weapons, autonomous systems, AI-enabled targeting, hypersonic defense systems—American companies are developing technologies that can offset Chinese numerical advantages. The Epirus directed EMP system Ryan and Hegseth discussed is just one example.

Alliance Structure: China stands largely alone. We have Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and emerging partnerships with India and others. China has no equivalent alliance structure. Authoritarian systems inspire fear, not loyalty.

Economic Strength: Despite our challenges, the U.S. economy remains the most dynamic, innovative, and resilient in the world. Our capital markets, universities (when focused on STEM), and entrepreneurial culture are unmatched.

Geographic Position: China must project power across oceans to threaten American territory. We’re protected by two vast moans and friendly neighbors. They have hostile or unreliable neighbors on every border.

The WWII Precedent: In 1940, America had the 17th largest military in the world. By 1945, we had built the arsenal of democracy and defeated two major powers simultaneously on opposite sides of the globe. When America gets serious, we can mobilize faster than any nation on Earth.

This is Winnable—If We Act Now

The Pentagon may lose every war game against China today, but war games assume current capabilities. We can change those capabilities.

We can build more ships. We built 175 ships in two years during WWII. We can revitalize our shipyards.

We can harden our infrastructure. We built the Interstate Highway System, the Hoover Dam, put men on the moon. We can protect our power grid.

We can secure our supply chains. We can reshore critical manufacturing. We can incentivize chip fabrication in America.

We can fix our education system. Classical education is growing. Homeschooling is expanding. STEM-focused alternatives exist.

We can restore deterrence. China only moves on Taiwan if they believe they’ll win. Make the cost prohibitive, and they won’t move.

This requires political will, not miracles. It requires Americans to stop fighting each other and focus on the actual adversary. It requires leaders who prioritize national security over political advantage. It requires citizens who demand action.

And it requires a Navy capable of controlling the seas.

Pete Hegseth’s The War on Warriors contains valuable warnings about institutional problems. The debates his book has sparked are important, and good people disagree on solutions. But the most critical warning in both the book and the Ryan interview isn’t about wokeness—it’s about China.

“They have a full-spectrum, long-term view of not just regional but global domination, and we have our heads up our asses.”

I understand the weariness from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Both Hegseth and Ryan express it—they’re “recovering neocons” who supported wars they now recognize as mistakes. But the Taiwan situation isn’t another optional nation-building adventure. It’s about the semiconductor supply that powers modern civilization, the alliance structure that maintains global stability, and the economic future our grandchildren will inherit.

This isn’t about the military-industrial complex wanting another war. This is about whether America remains a free, sovereign nation or becomes economically subordinated to Chinese Communist Party control.

Americans for a Stronger Navy exists because we understand that naval power is not optional in a maritime century against a maritime threat. We exist because someone needs to focus relentlessly on building the fleet, supporting the sailors, and educating Americans about what’s at stake.

We need a stronger Navy. We need it now. We need the tools, resources, training, personnel, and industrial base to match the threat.

Our veterans who already served deserve the care they earned—not to see their VA benefits delayed while billions go elsewhere.

Our sailors need ammunition, not just for three days, but for sustained operations.

Our children need semiconductor access that doesn’t depend on Chinese permission.

Our grandchildren deserve to grow up in a free America, not one bowing to Beijing because we couldn’t maintain our naval power when it mattered most.

But they also deserve to grow up knowing their parents and grandparents didn’t give up. That when faced with a determined adversary, America remembered who we are and what we’re capable of achieving.

Everything else is secondary to this mission.

Let’s stop fighting each other and start focusing on the actual enemy. Let’s stop despairing and start building. Let’s stop the internal warfare and restore the external deterrence.

The Salt Typhoon hackers are already inside our telecommunications systems. Chinese malware is pre-positioned in our electrical grid. China controls our transformer supply. They’re building carriers while we argue about culture. They’re war-gaming Taiwan scenarios while we debate pronouns.

But we can still win this. We have time—barely—to restore deterrence, rebuild capacity, and secure our position.

The question isn’t whether we can. It’s whether we will.

Americans for a Stronger Navy is committed to this fight. We’ll continue advocating for the naval power our nation needs. We’ll continue educating Americans about the China threat. We’ll continue supporting the sailors who keep us safe.

Join us. The future our grandchildren inherit depends on what we do right now.

Note: In future posts, we’ll address specific topics including:

  • Detailed naval force structure requirements and shipbuilding timelines
  • The shipyard and industrial base crisis—and how to solve it
  • Allied burden-sharing and the AUKUS partnership
  • Economic warfare beyond military competition (ports, Belt and Road, fentanyl, elite capture)
  • How to pay for naval expansion and why we can’t afford not to
  • Concrete legislative actions and how to engage your representatives effectively

Stay focused on the mission. The Navy we need is within reach if we have the will to build it.

About Americans for a Stronger Navy

Americans for a Stronger Navy is dedicated to promoting peace through strength by supporting a robust, modern, and capable United States Navy. We advocate for the resources, policies, and personnel necessary to ensure American naval dominance and the security of our maritime interests.

Our mission is focused, non-partisan, and urgent: Build the Navy we need to deter the China threat.

This review reflects the analysis of one destroyer sailor who served in the 1970s and believes Americans on all sides of cultural debates can unite around the China threat. We encourage readers to form their own opinions on internal military debates while maintaining absolute clarity on external threats.

The War on Warriors: Behind the Betrayal of the Men Who Keep Us Free
By Pete Hegseth
Published 2024

Recommended for: Anyone concerned about national security, China competition, and America’s strategic position

Key Takeaway: Stop fighting each other. Start focusing on China.

Rating: ★★★★ (Important Strategic Warning)