Blog - Americans for a Stronger Navy

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026

The World’s Oil. One Navy Protects It. Who Else Is Paying?

“We strongly encourage other nations whose economies depend on the strait far more than ours to come and help us.”

Those are President Trump’s words. Not a think tank analyst. Not a naval advocacy group. The President of the United States, standing in the White House, publicly demanding that the nations who benefit most from American naval protection start paying their share.

He’s right. And there’s already a legal framework to make it happen.

The Strongly Worded Letter

On March 19, 2026, twenty nations issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Britain. France. Germany. Japan. South Korea. Canada. Twenty signatures. Strong language. Zero ships.

The statement expressed “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage.” France and Germany were more direct — any coalition would only form after a ceasefire. The German chancellor said he would only join a mission with an international legal mandate, and only after the fighting stopped.

Meanwhile, American sailors — some at sea more than 250 days — are doing it now.

This is not a new pattern. It is the defining pattern of post-Cold War burden-sharing. Allies sign statements. America sends ships. The bill goes to the American taxpayer.

What’s Actually at Stake

The Strait of Hormuz is not a regional waterway. It is the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. Roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes through it daily. Since Iran’s effective closure began on February 28, tanker traffic has dropped by approximately 70 percent. Over 150 ships anchored outside the strait rather than risk transit. Oil crossed $100 a barrel.

Then Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility — the world’s largest. QatarEnergy reported extensive damage. Their CEO said repairs would take three to five years. This is not a temporary disruption. The economic consequences will be measured in years, not weeks.

Who depends on that oil?

China imports approximately 11 million barrels per day through Gulf sea lanes secured by the U.S. Navy. India imports 5 million. Japan 3 million. South Korea 3 million. Europe 3 million. Japan gets 95 percent of its crude oil from the Gulf. South Korea is similarly dependent.

One navy keeps it flowing. Ours.

The Precedent Already Exists

This is not uncharted territory. The beneficiary-pays principle has been established twice in living memory.

In 1987, Kuwait paid the United States Navy to escort their tankers through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq tanker war. Operation Earnest Will established a clear precedent: nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of their commercial interests contribute to the cost of that protection.

In 1991, Japan paid $13 billion toward Operation Desert Storm. Japan did not send combat troops. Japan wrote a check. The Special Measures Agreement made the burden-sharing arrangement formal and documented.

The precedent exists. What is missing is a permanent, mandatory mechanism.

The Gap in the Framework

Every crisis produces a new round of negotiations, statements, and voluntary contributions — or the lack thereof. The 1987 model worked because Kuwait had a direct and immediate interest in the outcome. The 1991 model worked because Japan faced intense diplomatic pressure and the threat of real consequences.

Neither model is durable. Neither model is predictable. Neither model builds the naval industrial base that sustained forward presence requires.

The current Hormuz crisis will eventually resolve. The Iranian threat will recede, or be defeated, or be negotiated away. And when it does, the allied nations who signed that joint statement will declare victory, go home, and resume importing Gulf oil on America’s dime.

Until the next crisis. When the cycle repeats.

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

Americans for a Stronger Navy has proposed the Gulf Maritime Protection and Burden Sharing Act — the Gulf Act — as a permanent legislative solution to a permanent structural problem.

The Gulf Act establishes a mandatory burden-sharing mechanism requiring nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of Gulf sea lanes to contribute to the cost of that protection. It is grounded in the 1987 Earnest Will precedent and the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Special Measures model. It codifies what has previously been left to ad hoc diplomacy and presidential pressure.

The core principle is straightforward: if you benefit, you contribute.

This is not isolationism. It is not a withdrawal from global leadership. It is the application of a basic fairness principle that the American people already understand instinctively. You don’t get to import millions of barrels of oil through a strait secured by American sailors — some of whom haven’t seen their families in eight months — and sign a statement saying you’ll help out after the shooting stops.

The Window Is Now

President Trump has made burden-sharing a front-page issue. The Hormuz crisis has made the stakes visible to every American who has filled a gas tank in the last month. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is examining the structural questions underlying American naval power.

This is the moment to move from principle to legislation.

The strongly worded letter had twenty signatories. The Gulf Act needs one vote.

Learn more at StrongerNavyDotOrg.

References

[1] Axios, “Seven U.S. allies back potential Strait of Hormuz coalition,” March 19, 2026. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/19/strait-hormuz-coalition-allies-statement-uk

[2] Wikipedia, “2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis,” accessed March 24, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis

[3] Al Jazeera, “European nations, Japan to join ‘appropriate efforts’ to open Hormuz Strait,” March 19, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/19/european-nations-japan-to-join-appropriate-efforts-to-open-hormuz-strait

[4] Naval News, “The challenges of securing Hormuz as 6 nations issue joint statement,” March 2026. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/the-challenges-of-securing-hormuz-as-6-nations-issue-joint-statement/

[5] GOV.UK, “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz,” March 19, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-kingdom-france-germany-italy-the-netherlands-and-japan-on-the-strait-of-hormuz-19-march-2026

[6] Operation Earnest Will / Special Measures Agreement, 1987. Historical record.

[7] Desert Shield/Desert Storm burden-sharing agreements, Japan Special Measures, 1991. Historical record.

March 23, 2026March 23, 2026

The Five-Day Reprieve: Fleet Strain and Diplomatic High-Stakes in the Gulf

1. The “Five-Day Reprieve”: Trump Postpones Strikes
In a major de-escalation move today, President Donald Trump announced a five-day extension on his deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Citing “very good and productive” conversations involving intermediaries, the President has instructed the Department of War to postpone planned strikes on Iranian power plants and civilian energy infrastructure.

* The Market Reaction: Global oil prices dropped nearly 10% following the announcement as markets reacted to the potential for a “total resolution” of hostilities.
* The Catch: The President noted that the pause is “subject to the success” of ongoing meetings throughout the week.

2. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Sabotage Investigation
The USS Gerald R. Ford arrived at Souda Bay, Crete, today for emergency repairs. However, the focus has shifted from a simple fire to a formal criminal inquiry.
* The Investigation: Investigators are formally examining whether the 30-hour laundry room fire on March 12 was an act of internal sabotage. One theory suggests industrial dryers were intentionally overloaded to trigger the blaze.
* Crew Impact: The fire destroyed the ship’s laundry capability and displaced over 600 sailors from their berths. To provide relief, the Navy successfully airlifted 1,000 mattresses from the future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79).

3. Long-Range Escalation: Diego Garcia Targeted
Over the weekend (March 21), Iran demonstrated a previously unrevealed long-range capability by firing two ballistic missiles at the joint U.S.-U.K. base at Diego Garcia.
* The Defense: The strike covered a distance of approximately 2,500 miles (4,000 km), double Iran’s previously claimed 2,000 km limit. One missile failed mid-flight, and the second was successfully intercepted by a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer.
* Significance: This marks Iran’s first operational use of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), confirming they can now reach high-value U.S. logistics hubs far outside the Middle East.

4. “Lightning Carrier” Arrival: USS Tripoli (LHA 7)
The amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are expected to take up station in the North Arabian Sea within the next 24 hours.
* The Mission: Carrying over 2,200 Marines and F-35B stealth fighters, the Tripoli provides a flexible “raid” capability. Despite the diplomatic pause, this force is positioned to forcefully reopen the Strait or conduct maritime interdictions if negotiations fail.

5. Shipbuilding & Fleet Renewal
* USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124): The Navy’s newest Arleigh Burke-class destroyer arrived at its homeport in Norfolk on March 20. It is officially scheduled for commissioning on April 11, 2026.
* Budget Boost: Congress has finalized a $27.2 billion shipbuilding budget for FY2026—a $6.5 billion increase over initial requests—to fund 17 new ships, including a Columbia-class ballistic missile sub and two Virginia-class attack subs.

March 20, 2026March 20, 2026

Mission: General David Petraeus on the Conflict in Iran

Bill Cullifer, Founder — Bill Cullifer, Founde

Why This Matters: The High Stakes for American Seapower

As we watch the events unfold in the Persian Gulf, many Americans are asking: Why should we care? For the team here at StrongerNavy.org, the answer is clear. This isn’t just a regional skirmish; it is a stress test for the very foundation of global commerce and the U.S. Navy’s role as its guardian.

The Chokepoint of the World: The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical energy artery. Roughly 20% of global oil and LNG pass through here. A threat to this “chokepoint” is a direct threat to your gas prices and home heating bills.
A New Era of Naval Warfare: Our Navy is facing a “swarm” threat of low-cost drones. The challenge is “missile math”—defending against a $20,000 drone without exhausting million-dollar interceptors.
The Cost of Deterrence: With munitions costs hitting $6 billion in the first week, we see exactly why a properly funded, technologically superior Navy is the only way to prevent wider aggression.

The Interview: Objective Analysis in a Complex War

In what I consider to be one of the most objective and hard-hitting interviews on the current conflict, Katie Couric sat down with General David Petraeus to dissect the joint U.S.-Israeli operations. Couric asked the tough questions about shifting goals, while Petraeus provided a masterclass in strategic analysis.

The Rationale: Why Now?

General Petraeus identified two primary triggers for the timing of this operation:

Missile Reconstitution: Israel observed Iran rapidly rebuilding its missile program. The “missile math”—the ratio of launchers to interceptors—was becoming “uncomfortable.”
Fleeting Intelligence: The U.S. gained “exquisite intelligence” on the patterns of the Supreme Leader. The administration struck in broad daylight to capitalize on this window.

Naval Neutralization: “Giving Them the Bottom Half”

The U.S. Navy has effectively erased Iran’s ability to project power at sea. The numbers are historic:

120+ Vessels Sunk or Damaged: Including the IRIS Soleimani and the Makran forward-base ship.
Submarine Force Eradicated: All 11 Iranian submarines, including midget Ghadir-class mine-layers, are reported neutralized.
Carrier Power: The USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln are leading the charge, proving American steel remains the ultimate deterrent.

📊 QUICK STATS SIDEBAR: The Naval Front

Iranian Vessels Sunk/Damaged: 120+
Submarine Capability: 0 (Total Neutralization)
Missile Launch Reduction: 90% Decrease since Week 1
U.S. Carrier Presence: 2 Strike Groups (Ford & Lincoln)
Munitions Cost (Week 1): $6 Billion

The “Pottery Barn” Rule

Couric asked the poignant question regarding the “Pottery Barn Rule”—if you break it, you own it. Petraeus offered a sobering distinction: without boots on the ground, the U.S. doesn’t “own” the aftermath. “The Iranians own it,” he noted, while acknowledging that we may be “revisiting this periodically” if a new agreement isn’t reached.

Watch the full interview below to see General Petraeus navigate these complex waters.

Bill
Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org

March 15, 2026March 15, 2026

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

The Navy needs money. Taxpayers are tapped out. So where does the funding come from?

That is not a rhetorical question. It is the defining challenge of American naval policy in 2026. The fleet is shrinking. Shipyards are strained. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year. And the American taxpayer — already carrying an unsustainable fiscal burden — cannot be the answer to every problem.

But there is an answer. It just requires asking who else benefits from American naval power — and whether they are paying their share.

The United States Navy keeps the Persian Gulf open. Every tanker that transits the Strait of Hormuz does so because American sailors, American ships, and American taxpayers back the deterrent that makes it possible.

Japan imports it. South Korea imports it. Germany imports it. The economic engines of our closest allies run on Gulf-sourced petroleum — secured by a Navy they do not fund.

That is not an alliance. That is a subsidy.

We’ve Seen This Before

This is not a new problem. In 1987, Iran began attacking tankers in the Persian Gulf. The Reagan administration launched Operation Earnest Will — the largest naval convoy operation since World War II — reflagging Kuwaiti tankers as American vessels and providing direct Navy escort through waters Japan depended on for survival.

Congress noticed. If the U.S. Navy was protecting Japan’s oil supply, Japan should help pay for it. The pressure produced the first formal Special Measures Agreement in 1987, requiring Japan to contribute to the cost of U.S. forces providing that protection. The principle was established: beneficiaries of U.S. naval protection should contribute to it.

That agreement has been renewed and expanded ever since. The precedent has held for nearly four decades.

The Gap Has Grown

What was true in 1987 is more true today. Gulf oil revenues exceed $350 billion annually. The nations collecting that revenue — and the allies consuming it — benefit from sea lanes the U.S. Navy patrols at a cost of billions per year.

The Navy keeps the sea lanes open. The beneficiaries collect the profits.

Meanwhile, the Navy that provides this service is smaller, older, and more strained than at any point in recent memory. Shipyards are at capacity. The fleet is shrinking. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year.

Allies reliant on Gulf energy are not being asked to share that burden in proportion to their dependence on it.

The Gulf Act: Applying an Established Principle

The Gulf Act is the logical extension of the 1987 burden-sharing framework to the present day. The concept is straightforward: nations that depend on Gulf energy security — and the sea lane access that makes it possible — should contribute meaningfully to the naval forces that provide it.

This is not a radical idea. It is the application of a 35-year-old precedent to a threat environment that has grown more complex, not less.

The mechanisms can take multiple forms — direct contributions to naval operations, minesweeper deployments, escort ship commitments, or financial contributions to a dedicated naval modernization account. The form matters less than the principle: if you benefit, you contribute.

A Note on Why We’re There

Some will argue that the United States has multiple reasons for maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf — and they are right. Security commitments to allies in the region, Iranian nuclear ambitions, freedom of navigation as a global principle, and counterterrorism interests all play a role. The Gulf Act does not dispute any of that.

But those reasons are a separate question from this one: who should pay for the benefit they receive?

The two questions are separable. In 1987, the U.S. had multiple reasons for being in the Gulf too — and Congress still established that Japan, as the primary beneficiary of tanker protection, should contribute to its cost. The Gulf Act asks the same narrow, defensible question: if your economy depends on sea lanes the U.S. Navy keeps open, what is your fair share of that bill?

This is not about relitigating American strategy. It is about making sure the nations that benefit most are not free-riding on the nations that bear the cost.

The SEAS Act Connection

Regular readers will recognize the parallel. The Strategic SEAS Act applies the same beneficiary-pays doctrine to U.S. corporations with significant China operations — companies that helped build the industrial base now threatening American naval superiority should help fund the response.

The Gulf Act and the SEAS Act are two applications of the same governing principle:

Those who extract value from American naval protection should share the cost of providing it.

Whether the beneficiary is an allied nation importing Gulf oil or a Fortune 500 company running supply chains through Chinese ports, the logic does not change.

The Cost of Doing Nothing

If the burden-sharing argument sounds abstract, consider what is happening right now in the Persian Gulf.

According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate cited by Defense One on March 12, 2026, the first 100 hours of Operation Epic Fury cost approximately $3.7 billion — roughly $891 million per day. Air defense munitions costs alone ranged from $1.2 billion to $3.7 billion. [2]

The cost asymmetry is stark. Iran’s Shahed drones cost around $30,000 each. The missiles used to shoot them down — AIM-120s at $1 million, PAC-3 interceptors at $4 million — cost orders of magnitude more. As one defense analyst put it: every cheap drone that forces the U.S. to fire an expensive interceptor is a win for Iran. [2]

Six U.S. soldiers were killed at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, when an Iranian drone evaded air defenses. Three F-15E Strike Eagles were lost in a friendly fire incident over Kuwait. [2]

Meanwhile, the nations whose energy supplies depend on the Gulf’s sea lanes — Japan, South Korea, Germany — are not bearing these costs. The American taxpayer is.

That is the externality the Gulf Act is designed to correct.

The Question Sadler Asked

Captain Brent Sadler of the Heritage Foundation recently raised this directly in the context of a potential Gulf convoy mission, asking whether it was time for allies dependent on Gulf petroleum to contribute escort ships and minesweepers. [1]

The answer is yes. It has always been yes. The 1987 precedent proved it was politically achievable. The current fiscal and force structure reality — and the live situation unfolding today in the Strait of Hormuz — makes it urgent.

The Navy cannot be the world’s free security service while simultaneously being asked to compete with a Chinese fleet building ships at a rate that dwarfs American production. Something has to give — or someone else has to contribute.

What Comes Next

Americans for a Stronger Navy will be developing the Gulf Act framework in the coming months, including burden-sharing models, historical precedents, and legislative pathways. This post is the opening argument.

If you agree that nations benefiting from American naval protection should help fund it, share this post. The conversation Sadler started on X deserves a longer answer than a tweet.

The sea lanes don’t protect themselves.

— Bill Cullifer, Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

References

[1] Brent D. Sadler (@brentdsadler), X (formerly Twitter), March 11, 2026. Captain Sadler serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

[2] Thomas Novelly, “Fighter jets are downing Iranian drones—a dangerous, expensive mission,” Defense One, March 12, 2026. Cost figures sourced from CSIS estimate and Forecast International report cited therein.

March 9, 2026March 9, 2026

The Old Guard Departs, The New Tech Arrives:

The Mine countermeasure ship USS Avenger (MCM 1) “Old Gaurd” heads out for decommision.

The New Guard: Independence-class LCS as a ‘Mother Ship’

The transition to the Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) represents a fundamental shift in naval doctrine. As seen in recent operations, vessels like the USS Canberra (LCS 30) utilize their massive mission bays and stern launch capabilities to act as a command hub for uncrewed systems.

Independence-class LCS deploying surface assets from the mission bay.

Technical Deep Dive: The AN/AQS-20 Sonar

Central to the new MCM Mission Package is the AN/AQS-20 sonar set. Unlike the legacy hull-mounted systems on the Avenger ships, this towed array uses five separate sonar arrays to detect and classify mines in a single pass, providing 3D bottom mapping with high-resolution clarity.

The AN/AQS-20 sonar being prepared for deployment.

A Strategic Evolution

By moving the primary sensors and sweep systems off the manned ship and onto uncrewed platforms, the Navy significantly reduces the risk to sailors. These autonomous systems can operate closer to the threat while the “Mother Ship” remains at a safe standoff distance, ensuring our sea lanes remain open through advanced technology rather than wooden hulls.

Technical Spotlight: AN/AQS-20C Specifications

Sensors: 5 Sonars (including Synthetic Aperture) + Laser Imaging
Range: Full water column (Seafloor to Surface) in one pass
Intelligence: Automated Target Recognition (ATR)
Platforms: Independence-class LCS / CUSV / MH-60S Helicopter

March 8, 2026March 8, 2026

Understanding the U.S. Navy’s Industrial Challenge

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered (Part 1 of 8)

I served as a blue-water destroyer sailor in the 1970s, and like many veterans, I’ve spent the years since trying to understand how America maintains the naval strength that protects our country, our allies, and the global sea lanes we all depend on.

The charts and analysis below help tell part of that story.

This article is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter, our ongoing educational series exploring the future of American sea power and the policies, people, and industrial strength that sustain the U.S. Navy.

If you’re new to the series, you can start with the introduction here:
Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

This article also launches a focused 8-part series within Charting the Course examining some of the most important questions facing the Navy today — from shipbuilding capacity and fleet readiness to workforce challenges and the future of maritime deterrence.

We’re calling it The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

For most Americans, the Navy is something we think about only in moments of crisis. A conflict erupts, a carrier group deploys, or a headline mentions tensions in the Pacific or the Middle East.

But the strength of the U.S. Navy is not decided during those moments. It is determined years — sometimes decades — earlier in shipyards, classrooms, industrial plants, research labs, and congressional hearings.

Today the United States faces serious questions about shipbuilding capacity, industrial readiness, and long-term naval strategy. China is building ships at a pace the world has not seen in generations. Russia continues to challenge Western stability at sea. Critical maritime infrastructure and supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

And yet many Americans remain understandably disconnected from the decisions shaping the future of our fleet.

The strength of the U.S. Navy is determined long before ships sail into crisis—it is built in shipyards, sustained by skilled workers, and shaped by decisions made years earlier in industry, technology, and national policy.

Why Americans Should Care

America is, and has always been, a maritime nation.

Nearly 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. The global economy depends on secure shipping lanes. Energy markets, supply chains, and the stability of democratic alliances all rely on freedom of navigation.

The U.S. Navy has quietly safeguarded those sea lanes for generations.

But maintaining that advantage requires more than ships — it requires people, industry, technology, and public understanding.

Chart: Global Operational Demand on the U.S. Navy

This Heritage Foundation chart illustrates the geographic reach of U.S. naval operations across multiple regions. Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups are routinely deployed worldwide, highlighting the constant global demand placed on the fleet.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Over the coming weeks, this series will explore several critical questions about the future of U.S. sea power.

Can America rebuild the shipbuilding capacity required to compete in a new era of great power competition?

Do we have enough skilled workers — engineers, welders, and naval architects — to sustain fleet growth?

How serious is the maintenance backlog affecting submarines and surface ships?

Are current procurement processes helping or hurting the Navy’s ability to modernize?

How should the United States balance aircraft carriers, submarines, uncrewed systems, and logistics platforms?

What role do civilian shipyards and maritime infrastructure play in national security?

Can the United States scale submarine production fast enough to match emerging threats?

And perhaps most importantly: how do we ensure the American public remains engaged in decisions that affect the future of the fleet?

These are not partisan questions. They are national questions.

Understanding the Industrial Challenge

Much of the discussion about naval power focuses on ships already at sea. But the true story begins on land — in America’s shipyards and industrial base.

Chart: Age Distribution of Chinese and U.S. Naval Fleets

This chart compares the age distribution of Chinese and U.S. naval fleets. China’s fleet contains a larger number of relatively new ships, reflecting rapid shipbuilding expansion in recent years.

China now possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding industry by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, American shipyards face workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and unpredictable funding cycles.

Chart: U.S. Navy Ships Nearing or Exceeding Service Life

This chart shows the growing number of U.S. Navy ships approaching — or exceeding — their expected service life, placing additional strain on fleet readiness and modernization timelines.

The Human Factor

Ships and technology matter — but ultimately the Navy is built on people.

From sailors standing watch at sea tonight to the skilled workers building submarines and carriers at home, the strength of the fleet depends on the dedication and expertise of thousands of Americans.

Implications for Our Allies

America does not operate alone at sea.

Alliances with countries such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners form a critical part of global maritime stability.

These partnerships reinforce an important truth: deterrence is strongest when democracies stand together.

Public Engagement Matters

The U.S. Navy ultimately belongs to the American people.

Yet the complexity of defense planning can make it difficult for citizens to understand how decisions about shipbuilding, budgets, and strategy affect national security.

That is one of the reasons we created StrongerNavy.org.

Our goal is simple: help Americans better understand the challenges facing the fleet, the industrial base that supports it, and the people who serve at sea and in shipyards across the country.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered — Series Guide

Part 1 – Understanding the Industrial Challenge (this article)

Part 2 – Can America Rebuild Shipbuilding Capacity?

Part 3 – The Submarine Production Challenge

Part 4 – Maintenance and Fleet Readiness

Part 5 – Workforce and the Maritime Industrial Base

Part 6 – The Role of Allies in Sea Power

Part 7 – Procurement, Policy, and the Future Fleet

Part 8 – Why Public Engagement Matters

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing
educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next.

Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

March 4, 2026March 5, 2026

Strait of Hormuz: The Facts, The Warning, and What America Can Do

Special Report | March 5, 2026

Cutting through the noise on the world’s most critical waterway — and why this moment calls for resolve, not panic.

There is a lot of noise right now about the Strait of Hormuz. Some of it is accurate. Some of it is not. All of it is loud. Before you form an opinion about what this crisis means — and what America should do about it — you deserve the facts, stated plainly, without an agenda.

That is what we do at StrongerNavy.org. Plain language. Verified facts. No spin.

What Is Actually Happening

The Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide waterway on Iran’s southern border — is the single maritime exit for the Persian Gulf. Every barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Iran that leaves by sea passes through this one gap. It carries 20% of the world’s oil and a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas. There is no alternative route. Ships that cannot use the strait must sail around the southern tip of Africa — adding two to three weeks to every voyage.

Since February 28, that strait has been effectively closed to nearly all commercial shipping. Let’s be precise about what that means.

It is legally open. The U.S. Central Command has confirmed the strait “remains open to international navigation.” Iran has not formally closed an international waterway — it cannot under maritime law.

It is operationally closed. Ship traffic is down 94%, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center. The world’s largest shipping companies — Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, CMA CGM — have all suspended transits. Approximately 750 ships are caught in or around the strait, unable to move.

The reason ships stopped is not Iran’s navy. It is marine insurance. A European regulatory framework called Solvency 2 requires insurers to hold capital sufficient for a once-in-200-year loss event at all times. When conflict escalated, insurers recalculated their exposure overnight. Cancelling war risk coverage takes seven days. Raising new capital takes months. The math was simple — and 90% of the world’s commercial fleet lost its coverage. As maritime historian Sal Mercogliano put it plainly on March 4: “It’s not the Iranians closing the strait. The decision was made by the shipping companies.”

Iran’s weapon is not its fleet. It is economic fear. And it has worked — for now.

What It Tells Us

None of this should be a surprise. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has been documented for decades. Naval planners have war-gamed this scenario repeatedly. The question was never whether it could happen. The question was whether America would be ready when it did.

On March 3, President Trump ordered the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide government war risk insurance for all maritime trade in the Gulf — effective immediately, at what he described as “a very reasonable price.” It was the right instinct. Private insurers had fled the market overnight, and the insurance gap — not Iranian guns — was what stopped the ships.

Whether it moves the needle remains to be seen. The shipping industry has signaled the offer may not be sufficient to restore confidence on its own. And if vessels are damaged, American taxpayers could face a bill in the hundreds of millions — potentially billions. The commitment is real. The details are still emerging.

On March 4, President Trump pledged the U.S. Navy would escort commercial tankers through the strait. Within hours, Lloyd’s List reported the Navy had privately told shipping industry leaders it does not currently have sufficient assets to fulfill that commitment. Approximately 125 ships transit the strait daily under normal conditions. The U.S. has roughly eight guided-missile destroyers and three Littoral Combat Ships in the region. As Mercogliano noted: “This is nowhere near enough assets. They just do not have the assets to do it.”

There are no frigates available — because the U.S. has not yet built a replacement frigate. The Littoral Combat Ships present cannot reliably provide air defense against drones and missiles, as the Red Sea campaign demonstrated. And even as U.S. forces degrade Iran’s conventional navy — including the March 4 torpedo sinking of the Iranian corvette IRS Dena, the first U.S. submarine sinking of a warship since World War II — the asymmetric threat remains. Drones, mines, and fast boats do not require a functioning navy. The Houthis proved that. The Ukrainians proved that in the Black Sea.

We also do not know the full readiness picture of the ships operating in the Gulf tonight — because the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey readiness reports have been classified since 2008. The American public cannot independently verify whether those vessels are fully mission-capable. That is unacceptable. #FreeTheData

The gap between the President’s public commitment and the Navy’s private assessment is not a failure of this administration alone. It is the accumulated result of a generation of deferred shipbuilding, underfunded shipyards, and what we have long called seablindness — America’s institutional tendency to underinvest in naval power during periods of relative peace, then scramble when a crisis arrives.

You cannot build a destroyer in a crisis. The fleet available tonight was determined by decisions made — and deferred — over the past decade.

We Have Been Here Before

I want to say something that tends to get lost in the noise: America has fixed this before.

I served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s. That was the hollow Navy — undermanned, underfunded, demoralized after Vietnam, outpaced by a Soviet fleet that was growing faster than ours. The readiness gap then was real. The threat was real. The concern among those of us who served was real.

And then America came together and fixed it.

The Reagan-era naval buildup — driven by bipartisan recognition that sea power was not optional for a global superpower — took a Navy that could barely sustain itself and rebuilt it into the 600-ship force that helped end the Cold War without firing a single shot at its primary adversary. It did not happen because of panic. It happened because enough Americans, in and out of uniform, looked at the problem clearly and decided the answer was investment, not retreat.

That is the moment we are in again. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not the end of the story. It is the alarm clock.

What America Does Now

The framework for action already exists. The President signed Executive Order 14269 restoring America’s maritime dominance. The Maritime Action Plan, released in February 2026, identified exactly the investments needed — shipbuilding capacity, workforce development, industrial base expansion, a Maritime Security Trust Fund with dedicated funding. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is preparing public hearings in Q2 2026. The SHIPS for America Act has bipartisan support in Congress.

The architecture is there. What has been missing is national will — the public demand that elected representatives treat naval power as the non-negotiable strategic necessity it is.

That is what StrongerNavy.org exists to build. Not alarm. Not partisanship. Not finger-pointing. A clear-eyed, evidence-based, nonpartisan case that a strong Navy is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It is an American issue — as fundamental to our security and prosperity as any question before the country today.

The Strait of Hormuz will reopen. Insurance markets will recalibrate. Ships will move again. But the underlying readiness gap — the shipyard capacity shortfall, the escort deficit, the classified readiness reports, the two-theater question that nobody in Washington wants to answer plainly — will still be there the morning after.

The question is whether this crisis produces the national conversation that leads to real investment, or whether we absorb the shock, breathe a sigh of relief, and go back to sleep.

America does not have to choose seablindness. We chose our way into this. We can choose our way out.

“The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.” — John F. Kennedy

The sun is not shining right now. But when it does — and it will — let’s make sure we remember what this week felt like. And build accordingly.

Stay Informed. Stay Engaged.

StrongerNavy.org has been covering the naval readiness gap for over two years — plain language, verified facts, no spin. If this post was useful, share it with someone who needs to understand what is at stake. And follow our ongoing coverage as this crisis develops.

This is America’s wake-up call. What we do with it is up to us.

March 2, 2026March 2, 2026

When Navigation Becomes a Weapon

Strength at sea now includes protecting the invisible systems that guide global trade.

Electronic warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield. In the days following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, maritime intelligence firms reported that more than 1,100 ships operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz experienced GPS or AIS disruption. Vessels appeared inland on digital maps. Others showed strange circular patterns off the coasts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. Maritime officials described the risk level in the region as “critical.”

This is what modern conflict looks like.

Not just missiles. Not just drones.
Navigation. Commerce. Confidence.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime chokepoints on Earth. Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil moves through that narrow passage. When positioning systems degrade in such a congested, militarized waterway, the risk of collision, grounding, or miscalculation rises sharply. Add aerial threats and naval maneuvering to the equation, and degraded navigation becomes a risk amplifier.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans will never sail through the Strait of Hormuz. But they will feel the effects if shipping slows, insurance premiums spike, or energy markets react to instability. Maritime security is economic security. The sea lanes quietly underpin global supply chains, energy flows, and financial stability. When GPS signals flicker in a strategic chokepoint, markets notice.

Electronic interference aimed at navigation systems is not just a military tactic. It directly impacts civilian shipping. Tankers hesitate. Routes change. Traffic patterns compress. The cost of uncertainty ripples outward. In a globally connected economy, those ripples eventually reach American households.

For years, we have warned that maritime chokepoints are soft underbellies in a fragile system. This latest episode underscores that warning. The battlespace now includes the invisible infrastructure of positioning, navigation, and timing.

Implications for the Navy

When commerce comes under electronic pressure, the U.S. Navy becomes the stabilizer. Escort missions, presence operations, surveillance, and deterrence all require ships, crews, logistics depth, and technological resilience. Strength at sea is not abstract. It is measured in hulls, readiness, training, and industrial capacity.

Yet we continue to fund our maritime industrial base through unstable, year-to-year appropriations cycles. We debate ship counts while the underlying architecture remains fragile. Predictable investment is not about expansion for its own sake. It is about reducing systemic risk.

Electronic warfare against commercial shipping highlights the need for redundancy. Redundancy in fleet capacity. Redundancy in basing and logistics. Redundancy in navigation technologies. If GPS can be degraded in one of the world’s most vital trade routes, resilience cannot be optional.

The Case for Predictable Maritime Investment

This moment should not trigger panic. It should prompt clarity.

America’s maritime security underwrites global commerce. Yet the economic beneficiaries of secure sea lanes are not structurally aligned with long-term investment in the maritime industrial base. That mismatch creates vulnerability.

The Strategic Economic Alignment for the Maritime Industrial Base Act, the SEAS Act, is about architecture, not urgency. It seeks to create stability and predictability in funding so that shipyards, suppliers, and maritime infrastructure can plan for the long term. It recognizes that maritime security is foundational economic infrastructure.

If navigation becomes a weapon, then resilience becomes a responsibility.

Strength is built on redundancy. Stability is built on predictability. The events in the Strait of Hormuz are a reminder that modern conflict increasingly targets the connective tissue of commerce. We can either respond episodically, or we can build a durable framework that matches the strategic environment.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we believe the American people must understand what is at stake. The Navy belongs to the nation. Its readiness, its resilience, and its industrial foundation require public awareness and engagement.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

February 25, 2026February 25, 2026

The Conversation Is Shifting on Sea Power — Now Americans Must Engage

Something important is happening.

For years, maritime decline has been treated as a niche issue — something for defense insiders, shipyard executives, or Navy circles to debate quietly. That is beginning to change.

Recently, Senator Todd Young published, in American Affairs Journal a thoughtful piece arguing that rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base is essential to both economic strength and national security. He traced the issue back to the Revolution, through Mahan, and into the present-day competition with China.

That matters.

Not because of who wrote it. But because of what it signals.

Maritime Power Is Back in the Conversation

For decades, America has allowed its commercial fleet to shrink. Shipyards have closed. Skilled labor has aged out. Foreign-flagged vessels now move the overwhelming majority of our trade.

Meanwhile, China designated shipbuilding a strategic industry and built accordingly.

This is not about panic. It is about arithmetic.

Eighty percent of global trade moves by sea. Most of America’s trade does too. If we cannot build, repair, and crew ships at scale, we are strategically exposed — economically and militarily.

The encouraging sign is that leaders are once again speaking openly about maritime strength.

That is progress.

Policy Is Necessary — But Not Sufficient

Legislation like the proposed SHIPS Act is an important step. Tax incentives, regulatory reform, maritime academy modernization — these are serious proposals.

But here is the harder truth:

Industrial revival cannot be sustained by legislation alone.

Shipbuilding capacity requires:

Workforce development
Steel production
Port modernization
Cybersecurity resilience
Long-term capital investment
And, above all, public understanding

Without public buy-in, even well-crafted policy fades with political cycles.

This Is Not a Coastal Issue

One of the most overlooked truths in this debate is that maritime strength touches every American.

Indiana steel feeds shipyards.
Midwestern grain moves to global markets by sea.
Energy exports rely on tankers.
Supply chains run through ports.

Sea power is not about nostalgia. It is about jobs, commerce, resilience, and deterrence.

When ships deploy longer because the fleet is too small…
When maintenance backlogs grow…
When sealift capacity shrinks…

Those are not abstract statistics. They are signs of strain in a system Americans depend on every day.

Civic Engagement Is the Missing Ingredient

We can debate fleet numbers. We can debate funding mechanisms. We can debate industrial policy.

But unless Americans understand why this matters — and choose to participate in the conversation — nothing lasting will change.

Rebuilding sea power is not simply a government project. It is a civic project.

It requires voters who ask informed questions.
Taxpayers who demand accountability.
Educators who teach maritime history and strategy.
Industry leaders willing to invest long-term.

America’s maritime strength has always rested on the character and engagement of its people.

That spirit has not disappeared.

The conversation is shifting. That is a good sign.

Now the responsibility shifts to us.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

Read the full article here.

February 21, 2026February 21, 2026

Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

As a former blue water sailor and founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I learned early that naval strength is not defined by speeches or strategies alone. It is defined by readiness—by ships that work, sailors who are trained, and shipyards that can sustain them.

Over the past two years, through Americans for a Stronger Navy and StrongerNavy.org, I have worked to better understand the forces shaping the future of our Navy. What I have discovered is both reassuring and sobering.

Reassuring because the Navy’s leadership clearly understands the changing threat environment. Sobering because serious professionals—inside and outside the Navy—are actively debating how best to prepare for it.

This series is designed to help Americans understand that debate.

A Navy in Transition

The United States Navy is undergoing one of its most significant strategic transitions since the end of the Cold War. For decades, our Navy operated in an environment where it could project power with relative freedom. That era is over.

China now operates the world’s largest navy by ship count and continues expanding its industrial capacity at a pace unmatched in modern times. Russia remains a capable undersea competitor. Meanwhile, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and directed-energy weapons are changing how naval warfare may be conducted in the decades ahead.

The Navy’s leadership recognizes this reality. They are adapting strategy, exploring new technologies, and rethinking how naval forces will operate in the future. But within that effort, there are important and healthy debates—and Americans deserve to understand them.

Different Perspectives, Shared Purpose

Some leaders emphasize the continued importance of traditional crewed ships—destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers—as the backbone of naval power. Others emphasize the growing role unmanned systems may play in extending reach and enhancing survivability. Still others focus on the industrial foundation that makes both possible: shipyards, maintenance infrastructure, and workforce capacity.

These are not disagreements about the mission. They are discussions about how best to ensure the Navy remains ready, effective, and capable in a changing world. What unites these perspectives is a shared recognition that readiness requires sustained national support.

Ships must be built. Shipyards must be modernized. Sailors must be trained. Infrastructure must be maintained. None of this happens automatically.

Why Industrial Capacity Matters

One of the most important lessons from this work is that naval power is built on industrial strength. Strategy determines what the Navy needs to do. Industrial capacity determines whether it can do it.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), our public and private shipyards, and the skilled workforce that supports them form the foundation of naval readiness. Without their ability to build, maintain, and modernize ships, even the best strategy cannot succeed.

This is not a criticism. It is simply reality—and it is why public understanding matters. Americans deserve to know how their Navy works, what challenges it faces, and what is required to sustain it for future generations.

From Understanding to Sustained Support: The Strategic SEAS Act

Understanding the challenge is the first step. Sustaining readiness over time requires structural solutions.

That is why Americans for a Stronger Navy developed the Strategic SEAS Act—a framework designed to provide predictable, sustained funding for shipbuilding capacity, shipyard modernization, workforce development, and allied maritime infrastructure. Its purpose is straightforward: to help ensure that the Navy and the maritime industrial base have the long-term support necessary to meet national security requirements.

The Strategic SEAS Act complements legislative efforts like the SHIPS Act by addressing a critical question: how to provide sustained, reliable funding to support the Navy’s long-term readiness. Readiness is not built in a year. It is built over decades.

Why This Matters Now

The decisions being made today—about ships, shipyards, technology, workforce, and sustained funding—will define America’s naval strength for the next generation. These decisions are being made now, in budget cycles and legislative sessions that most Americans never see.

Meanwhile, serious questions are being raised by experienced naval professionals, defense analysts, and members of Congress about whether America’s shipbuilding capacity and industrial base can support the strategy at the pace required. Those questions deserve honest, public answers.

This series is intended to provide that clarity—directly, responsibly, and in plain English.

The Questions This Series Will Address

Among them:

• Are traditional ships like destroyers, submarines, and carriers still essential in the age of drones and autonomous systems?

• Can unmanned systems truly enhance naval power—or are they being asked to do too much, too soon?

• Is America’s shipbuilding and repair infrastructure strong enough to sustain the Navy the nation requires?

• What role does Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) play in ensuring readiness—and what challenges does it face?

• How does America’s shipbuilding capacity compare to China’s—and what does that mean strategically?

• Can the Navy realistically surge its fleet when needed?

• What role do Congress, industry, and the American people play in sustaining naval strength over time?

• And most importantly: what must be done—practically, responsibly, and sustainably—to ensure the United States Navy remains ready to protect American interests for decades to come?

These are not political questions. They are national questions. And Americans deserve clear, honest answers.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects far more than military interests. It safeguards global commerce, deters conflict, reassures allies, and protects the economic system Americans depend on every day. When the Navy is ready, it helps preserve peace through strength. When industrial capacity declines, readiness becomes harder to sustain.

The decisions being made today will shape America’s naval strength for decades to come. Americans deserve to understand those decisions.

What This 8-Part Series Will Explore

In the weeks ahead, this series will examine why traditional naval ships remain essential, how unmanned systems are changing naval operations, the critical role of NAVSEA and America’s shipyards, the industrial and workforce foundation behind naval readiness, how China and other nations are approaching maritime power, how naval strength is sustained over time, and what must be done to ensure continued readiness.

This is not about choosing sides in a debate. It is about understanding the full picture—because an informed public is essential to sustaining a strong Navy.

Let’s get to work.