Blog - Americans for a Stronger Navy

September 24, 2025September 24, 2025

The Bashi Channel: Connecting the Dots in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Introduction
Over the last few months, we’ve reported on a series of developments that highlight the rising stakes in the Indo-Pacific:

China’s destruction of the environment at Scarborough Shoal
The revival of Subic Bay in the Philippines as a center of allied shipbuilding and logistics
The British carrier HMS Prince of Wales sailing through the South China Sea alongside U.S. partners .

Each of these stories pointed to a contest for control of the waterways, ports, and infrastructure that sustain both military power and the global economy.

Today, we turn to the Bashi Channel—a narrow strip of water between southern Taiwan and the northern Philippines that may be the least known, but most decisive, chokepoint in the region. If Scarborough Shoal shows us the contest over reefs and fishing rights, and Subic Bay demonstrates the value of allied ports, the Bashi Channel reveals why geography itself remains the ultimate factor in global power.

A Geography Lesson with Global Stakes
The Bashi Channel is less than 90 miles wide. Yet it connects Taiwan’s largest port, Kaohsiung—which handles over 60% of the island’s cargo—with the Pacific Ocean. In an invasion scenario, China would rely on Kaohsiung as a logistics hub, while the United States and allies would race to resupply Taiwan through bases in the Philippines and Japan. That makes the Bashi not just a strait, but a lifeline.

Building on What We’ve Reported

At Subic Bay ([read here][subic-link]), we saw how new shipyards and bases allow U.S. forces to operate closer to Taiwan. The Bashi Channel explains why: northern Luzon and the Batanes islands are the staging ground for resupply lines directly into Taiwan’s southern flank.
At Scarborough Shoal ([read here][scarborough-link]), we documented China’s attempts to normalize control through coercion. The same pattern is at play here—Chinese live-fire drills in 2022 pushed further south, right into the Bashi, to test how far they can go without pushback.
When the British carrier transited the South China Sea ([see coverage][carrier-link]), it demonstrated allied commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Bashi Channel is where that commitment will be tested in practice.

The Digital Dimension
As we’ve stressed in earlier posts, undersea cables are the invisible arteries of the modern world. Between 97% and 99% of all international data traffic travels through them, and the Bashi Channel is one of the most congested corridors. If cables here were cut, Americans would feel it instantly—in internet outages, stalled financial transactions, and disrupted supply chains. The stakes are no longer abstract; they’re personal.

Why Americans Should Care
The Bashi Channel matters for the same reasons Subic Bay and Scarborough Shoal matter: because adversaries see them as pressure points against America. A disruption here could raise prices at U.S. gas pumps, slow down the internet in our homes, and challenge the freedom of movement that underpins our prosperity. Ignoring this geography doesn’t make the threat go away—it just leaves us less prepared.

Implications for the Navy
For the U.S. Navy, this isn’t just about patrolling a waterway. It’s about ensuring freedom of movement for allies, safeguarding undersea cables, and keeping logistics flowing in the event of conflict. Ships, submarines, and surveillance aircraft operating in and around the Bashi Channel aren’t just defending Taiwan—they are defending the arteries of the global economy.

Implications for Our Allies
The Philippines, Japan, and Australia all depend on the Bashi Channel for security and trade. As we saw in Subic Bay’s revival, Manila’s choices are central to allied strategy. If political winds shift in the Philippines, America’s ability to project power and protect cables through the Bashi could be compromised. That makes alliances more than symbolic—they’re the difference between deterrence and vulnerability.

Conclusion
Scarborough Shoal, Subic Bay, and now the Bashi Channel all point to one truth: the contest in the Indo-Pacific is about control of the chokepoints that sustain trade, communication, and freedom itself. Geography cannot be changed, but strategy can. For generations to come, the Bashi Channel will remain a pivot in the U.S.–China confrontation.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter—a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

September 22, 2025September 22, 2025

Don’t Bet Against America: A Response to Dan Wang on China’s Rise

Introuction

Dan Wang’s recent interview on Interesting Times with Ross Douthat offers an intriguing argument: that China, as an “engineering state” may outbuild, out-innovate, and outlast the United States. I respect Wang’s analysis — but I believe it overstates China’s strengths, underestimates America’s, and risks mistaking curated facades for lasting power.

I speak from experience. I served as a Cold War-era Navy destroyer sailor, worked in telecommunications at AT&T, helped set standards for web technologies, and founded Americans for a Stronger Navy. In 2008, I traveled to Beijing as a guest expert at the World Wide Web Conference. That visit — on the eve of the Olympics — revealed the gap between projection and reality.

Facades and Reality

Wang contrasts Shanghai’s clean subways and manicured parks with New York’s noisy infrastructure. I saw another reality. Behind Beijing’s gleaming new airport, residential homes were bulldozed to make way for Olympic tourism. Poverty was hidden, smog choked the skies, and the environmental cost of China’s rapid growth was impossible to ignore. Having served in Hong Kong in the 1970s, I could compare its then-crystal skies with Beijing’s haze in 2008 — a stark reminder that much of China’s “progress” is extraction, not sustainability.

Systematic Extraction

My telecom and security background made me see what others missed. The building across from our Hilton bristled with antennas pointed at us. Government “observers” monitored our sessions. The million-dollar fee to host the conference wasn’t just business — it was leverage.

More troubling were the Western executives — many half my age, fresh from Silicon Valley — using unsecured phones and laptops in this environment. I spoke with a young GM engineer who had developed a novel windshield wiper. He admitted openly that it would be copied and sold back to his own company at lower cost. Yet corporate pressure compelled him to manufacture in China anyway. Days later, flying home through London, I read an FBI advisory warning Olympic visitors not to bring their cell phones. That confirmed every operational concern I had seen firsthand.

The Population Trap

Wang points to China’s vast numbers of engineers and competing firms as proof of superiority. But scale alone does not equal strength. With 1.4 billion people, China naturally produces more engineers than America’s 330 million. The question is quality and innovation, not headcount. At the World Wide Web Conference, Chinese capabilities often lagged global standards. The proliferation of thousands of solar companies reflects size, not necessarily superior organization or creativity.

Naval Realities

Wang worries that China could quickly overwhelm Taiwan and that America’s Navy might not respond effectively. My perspective as a Navy veteran is different. Amphibious assaults across a strait are among the most complex operations in warfare. China’s navy, for all its growth, remains untested in major combat, dependent on land-based missiles with finite range, and lacking the blue-water experience U.S. forces have honed through decades of global deployment. To suggest America cannot meet this challenge underestimates both our power projection and the operational realities that matter at sea.

America’s Resilience

Perhaps Wang’s greatest omission is the resilience factor. History shows America’s ability to respond decisively when existential threats become clear: after Pearl Harbor, in the space race following Sputnik, and after 9/11. The same will be true in the face of today’s strategic competition.

Even China’s own people signal doubts about their system’s sustainability. Wang himself notes the “brain drain”: wealthy families buying homes in Irvine and Vancouver, entrepreneurs relocating to Singapore, tens of thousands crossing the Darién Gap to reach America. They are voting with their feet — and their futures.

A Balanced View

I do not dismiss Wang entirely. He is right to criticize U.S. naiveté in assuming economic engagement would democratize China. He is right that corporations prioritized profits over national resilience. But his analysis is filtered through carefully curated experiences and misses the darker realities: surveillance, forced extraction, environmental costs, and intellectual property theft.

Don’t Bet Against America

China has built dazzling infrastructure and manufacturing scale. But a system built on control, imitation, and exploitation is brittle. America’s advantages remain decisive: our Navy, our innovation ecosystem, our demographics, and above all our proven resilience.

Dan Wang is correct about one thing: this is a long competition. But if history is a guide, the nation that adapts, mobilizes, and earns the trust of its people and partners will prevail. That nation is not China. Don’t bet against America.

September 21, 2025September 21, 2025

Britain Joins the Fray: South China Sea Alliance Grows as UK Considers Troop Agreement with Philippines

Britain Signals New Military Role in Indo-Pacific

In a major development, the United Kingdom is considering deploying troops to the South China Sea under a new Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines. This move, announced by the Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., comes as China intensifies its claims over virtually the entire South China Sea—threatening the sovereignty of key regional allies.

A VFA would give the UK legal grounds to base forces in the Philippines for training, cooperation, and potential conflict readiness. It marks a new chapter in Britain’s Indo-Pacific posture and could eventually bring British troops within 200 kilometers of Taiwan—a critical flashpoint in the U.S.-China rivalry.

Why This Matters

The South China Sea is more than a disputed body of water—it’s a global trade superhighway and a strategic military corridor. A British military presence adds to a growing list of nations pushing back on China’s coercion and militarization of the region.

If finalized, this deal would place the UK alongside the U.S., Japan, Australia, and France in holding joint access agreements with the Philippines. It reinforces a growing international coalition determined to uphold freedom of navigation and resist revisionist claims that threaten peace in the Indo-Pacific.

Background on the Philippines’ Strategic Role

The Philippines’ northernmost islands in the Batanes chain are only 120 miles from Taiwan. These islands have become a focal point for U.S.-Philippines joint drills—including the recent deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps’ NMESIS “ship-killer” missile system.

As tensions rise over Taiwan and Chinese interference at sea escalates, the Philippines is building deeper defense ties not just with the United States, but also with regional and global allies.

Implications for the U.S. Navy

A stronger allied presence in the region could bolster logistics, interoperability, and rapid response capability—all crucial for countering China’s area-denial strategies. It also eases the burden on the U.S. Navy by increasing multinational deterrence capacity.

The move may encourage other NATO and European partners to follow suit, diversifying the military footprint in the Pacific and reinforcing the global rules-based order.

Implications for Our Allies

For Japan, Australia, and South Korea—nations already aligned with the Philippines and the U.S. in multilateral exercises—Britain’s involvement signals a maturing trilateral-plus framework. As these alliances deepen, they collectively raise the cost of aggression and ensure no single country bears the burden alone.

Why Americans Should Care

Every product you rely on—from cars to phones to food—moves through global sea lanes, and much of that commerce passes through the South China Sea. If those lanes are choked, the ripple effects would hit every American household.

A stronger presence of allied nations protects those trade routes, deters aggression, and reassures nations on the front lines of Chinese expansionism that the world is watching—and prepared to act.

This isn’t just about Britain and the Philippines. It’s about defending peace, stability, and freedom of the seas.

Closing Note:

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

September 17, 2025September 17, 2025

Strategic Ambiguity: A Heavy Burden for the Navy, a Confusing Signal for America

Introduction

For more than two years, I’ve been writing about the Navy, America’s role in the Pacific, and the choices our leaders face. What I’ve learned is simple: policies that sound abstract in Washington — like “strategic ambiguity” — land hard on the decks of U.S. Navy ships and in the lives of everyday Americans.

As a former destroyer sailor, I see the burden ambiguity places on today’s fleet. And as a citizen, I see the confusion it creates for the American public and the Congress that reflects their will. RAND and other respected voices have warned of the risks, but too often the public doesn’t hear the full story. That’s why I’m weighing in directly.

The Policy of Ambiguity
Since 1979, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has rested on “strategic ambiguity.” Washington avoids clear promises, keeping adversaries guessing but leaving options open. It worked for decades, deterring Beijing without emboldening Taipei. But under President Trump’s return to office, ambiguity is back in sharper form — and it carries consequences.

Trump’s Ambiguity and Taiwan’s Uncertainty
President Trump has made it clear he will not commit publicly to Taiwan’s defense. When asked, he replied: “I never comment on that. I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.” That is strategic ambiguity in its rawest form.

Even more striking is his transactional framing: “Taiwan should pay us for defense … We’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” Rather than signaling clarity of purpose, this remark underscores uncertainty. For naval planners, it adds complexity. For the American public, it raises questions about whether Taiwan is seen as an ally or a customer.

Clarity in the South China Sea, Ambiguity in the Strait
Contrast that with Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent words on Scarborough Shoal: “Beijing claiming Scarborough Reef as a nature preserve is yet another coercive attempt to advance sweeping territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea at the expense of its neighbors, including by preventing Filipino fishermen from accessing these traditional fishing grounds.”

Here, the U.S. drew a firm line. But in the Taiwan Strait, ambiguity still rules. The Navy now faces a dual challenge: enforcing clarity in one theater while operating under uncertainty in another.

Why Americans Should Care
Taiwan’s leaders know the stakes. As Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng warned: “If Taiwan were to be taken over by China by force, it will trigger a domino effect, undermine the regional balance of power, and directly threaten the security and prosperity of the United States.”

RAND research reinforces that point: Taiwan’s ability to resist depends heavily on the speed, clarity, and credibility of U.S. support. Delay or hesitation in Washington could tip the balance, not only for Taiwan’s survival but for America’s security and economic stability.

Ambiguity also creates a chain reaction at home: Public → Voters → Congress → Navy.
When the public struggles to understand why Taiwan matters, voters hesitate to back costly commitments overseas. And when voter sentiment wavers, Congress hesitates to fully fund the Navy’s needs. Ambiguity at the top becomes confusion on Main Street, which turns into hesitation on Capitol Hill — all of it compounding the burden on sailors at sea.

Implications for the Navy
Strategic ambiguity translates into an enormous burden for the Navy. Without knowing if or when the order to act will come, the fleet must prepare for every possibility:

Breaking a blockade.
Resupplying Taiwan.
Responding to missile strikes.
Countering a full-scale invasion.

RAND findings emphasize that even as Taiwan strengthens its defenses and increases spending, U.S. naval power remains indispensable. Only the Navy has the forward presence, logistics, and strike capacity to counter China’s military pressure. Ambiguity at the top means complexity at sea.

Implications for Our Allies
Mixed U.S. signals ripple outward. Allies like Japan and Australia watch Washington’s every move. If America is clear about Scarborough Shoal but vague about Taiwan, they are left to wonder where the next line will be drawn. RAND analysts describe Taiwan as facing “strategic anxiety” with its primary security partner — a sentiment likely shared across the Indo-Pacific.

The Bottom Line
Strategic ambiguity may give presidents room to maneuver, but it burdens the Navy with complexity and leaves Americans confused about what is truly at stake. Taiwan’s security — and the stability of the Indo-Pacific — depend on clarity of purpose, credible deterrence, and above all, a strong Navy.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

September 16, 2025September 16, 2025

Mapping China’s Grip: The Islands, Reefs, and Bases Reshaping the South China Sea

Introduction

This post is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — our ongoing educational series at Americans for a Stronger Navy examining the strategic threats facing the U.S. Navy and why they matter to every American. In this installment, we focus on China’s maritime buildup. China isn’t just making claims — it’s building infrastructure, militarizing reefs, and transforming sea features into forward bases. This map-driven guide walks you through where China has control, what they’ve built, and why it matters for U.S. strategy, regional allies, and global maritime security

Map & Visuals

Use one or more of the mapped images above to show:
- China’s “Nine-Dash Line” claim
- Areas with Chinese military build-up (Subi, Mischief, Fiery Cross, etc.)
- Overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs) claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc.

Key Chinese-Controlled Features
Here are the major reefs, atolls, and islands China controls or heavily influences. For each, we’d provide location, current state (military infra, runways, radars), and why it’s strategically important.

Feature	Militarization (Yes / No)	What’s Built / Recent Activity	Strategic Importance
Subi Reef	Yes	Runway, radars, missile systems, hardened shelters	Forward base; near Thitu Island; high capability to surveil / interdict
Mischief Reef	Yes	Airstrip, hangars, radar, anti-ship missile systems	Major Chinese hub; within Philippines’ EEZ
Fiery Cross Reef	Yes	Similar infrastructure; airstrip, radar, etc.	Power projection over Spratlys; enhances range
Gaven Reefs	Yes	Support buildings, radar / comms sites	Part of island chain to extend Chinese reach
Cuarteron Reef	Yes	Build-up like hangars, radar	Controls access routes; supports larger operations
Scarborough Shoal	De facto control	Coast guard, militia presence; possible construction; blocks Filipino access	Symbolic and strategic choke point; EEZ stakes
Paracel Islands	Yes	Many features; garrisons, military infrastructure	Proximity to mainland China; strategic flank toward Vietnam / Philippines

Why This Map Matters

Mapping shows how much of the Spratly / Paracel archipelagos are now “ militarized territory”
It reveals how close China’s bases are to other countries’ claimed waters (especially the Philippines)
Visual clarity helps Americans see this is not abstract — it’s real geography being altered, with legal, military, and economic implications

U.S. Strategic Implications

Presence: Where and how the U.S. Navy can operate
Deterrence: What it takes to make these bases costly for Beijing to use aggressively
Alliances: How neighboring countries feel and what they do (e.g. Philippines’ diplomatic protests, joint patrols)

Call to Action
Let the map sharpen our resolve. Knowing the terrain is step one. Step two is educating, advocating, and ensuring our Navy, our Congress, and our allies are equipped for what’s next.

Closing Thought
Geography doesn’t shift overnight — but power can. When maps are redrawn, either by diplomacy or force, everyone involved must choose whether to respond or concede. That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.
Let’s roll.

September 15, 2025September 15, 2025

China’s Fortress in the Sea: Why Subi Reef Should Alarm Every American

A Satellite Snapshot of Aggression

New satellite images released this month show just how far China has gone to entrench itself militarily in the South China Sea. On Subi Reef—a once-submerged shoal that lies far outside China’s legal maritime claims—Beijing has built a full-blown fortress.

We’re talking about:

A 10,000-foot runway capable of launching fighter jets and bombers
Radar domes, missile systems, and hardened aircraft shelters
A deepwater port designed to host military resupply and forward-deployed forces
Communications and surveillance arrays capable of watching everything from the Philippines to Vietnam

This is no routine development. It’s an armed island outpost, built in defiance of international law, smack in the middle of one of the world’s most vital shipping corridors.

Why Americans Should Care

Some may look at this and think: “So what? That’s half a world away.”
But here’s why it matters:

Trade flows through here. Over 30% of the world’s maritime trade—around $3.5 trillion annually—transits the South China Sea. That includes oil, food, tech, and the microchips in your phone.
Allies are at risk. The Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, is within spitting distance of Subi Reef. China has already harassed Filipino vessels near Thitu Island, which lies just 12 nautical miles away.
The U.S. Navy is being challenged. These island bases are not for defense. They’re forward-operating platforms designed to deny access to American forces, intimidate our allies, and project Chinese power deep into the Pacific.

This isn’t just regional bullying—it’s strategic dominance by cement and steel.

What the U.S. Navy Is Up Against

Back in 2015, President Xi Jinping told President Obama he wouldn’t militarize these reefs. Less than a decade later, that pledge lies in ruins, just like China’s empty promises to Hong Kong.

The satellite photos don’t lie.
China is building fortresses.
We’re arguing about ship counts.

Former U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral John Aquilino said it plainly:

“They can fly fighters, bombers, plus all those offensive capabilities of missile systems. They threaten all nations who operate in the vicinity and all the international sea and airspace.”

This is a new kind of warfighting posture—a blend of gray-zone tactics, artificial island militarization, and legal warfare.

Implications for the Navy

Our Navy doesn’t just need to “keep pace”—it needs to regain strategic initiative in this critical region. That means:

Maintaining a strong forward-deployed presence
Supporting allied maritime forces with training, resources, and joint patrols
Investing in new platforms, undersea warfare, and AI-driven ISR
Holding the line on freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to demonstrate resolve

These reefs aren’t about fishing rights—they’re about who controls Asia’s future.

Implications for Our Allies

Beijing’s message is clear: “We’re not leaving. What are you going to do about it?”
If we abandon the rules of the sea, smaller nations like Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines will be forced to bow—or arm themselves.

In the vacuum of leadership, fear grows.
But if the U.S. Navy stands strong—with support from the American people—freedom still has a fighting chance.

Final Thought

Subi Reef isn’t just an island. It’s a symbol.
A symbol of what happens when unchecked ambition meets apathy.

Americans must understand: this matters. It’s not just about China.
It’s about supply chains. Peace. Power. Stability. Your economic future.

Let’s wake up—before the tides turn too far against us.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

September 12, 2025September 12, 2025

A Clear Pretext for Occupation: Philippines Pushes Back on China’s Nature Reserve Claim

Philippine Officials Raise the Alarm
Top Philippine defense and maritime officials have condemned China’s recent declaration of a “nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal, calling it a “clear pretext for occupation.” This bold response comes in reaction to Beijing’s move to designate the disputed shoal—known locally as Bajo de Masinloc and internationally ruled to be within the Philippine EEZ—as a Chinese national marine reserve.

Philippine officials aren’t mincing words. Former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio, former Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, and Coast Guard Commodore Jay Tarriela are among those warning that the “reserve” designation masks a broader strategy: to lock down access, increase Chinese presence, and project power deep into Southeast Asia’s maritime heart.

Part 1 — Broken Promises and Growing Risks
In 2012, after a tense naval standoff, the U.S. brokered a deal: both China and the Philippines would withdraw their ships from Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines complied. China didn’t. The U.S. didn’t press the issue. The result? Beijing solidified its control and sent a message that international mediation wouldn’t be enforced.

Part 2 — International Law Ignored
In 2016, an international tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines, stating clearly that China had no legal claim to Scarborough Shoal. Beijing ignored the decision, accelerating militarization and disrupting Filipino fishing. Once again, global rule of law was challenged—and left unenforced.

Part 3 — The “Nature Reserve” Play
Now, in 2025, China has unveiled a new maneuver: using environmental language to advance military and political objectives. The creation of the “Huangyan Island National Nature Reserve” is being widely viewed as part of a creeping campaign to normalize Chinese administrative control.

Despite the label, this is not about conservation. China has repeatedly blocked Filipino fishermen, driven out environmental research vessels, and deployed maritime militia under the radar. Calling this a “preserve” is like calling a fortress a flower garden.

Why Americans Should Care

Strategic Sea Lanes: The South China Sea is a maritime superhighway. If China controls it, they can control access to vital markets and resources.
U.S. Credibility Is on the Line: American influence is measured by what we protect—not just what we promise.
Civic Responsibility: Understanding how foreign policy, trade, and defense intersect isn’t just for experts. It’s for every American who relies on secure energy, stable prices, and a functioning global order.
Environmental Lawfare: Americans should be wary of tactics that exploit noble causes—like conservation—to advance authoritarian control.

Implications for the Navy
The U.S. Navy has long played a vital role in ensuring freedom of navigation and stabilizing flashpoints. But gray zone tactics like these require more than just ships—they require intelligence, strategy, and public support. The Navy cannot succeed without a civilian base that understands the stakes.

Implications for Our Allies
This isn’t just a Philippine problem. What happens at Scarborough sends ripples across the Pacific. Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, Australia—all are watching to see whether the U.S. will back its allies when it counts. So are our adversaries.

Call to Action
The future of maritime freedom—and American leadership—may hinge on places like Scarborough Shoal. When China tests the limits, Americans need to respond—not just with ships, but with awareness and resolve.

Let’s roll.

September 11, 2025September 11, 2025

U.S. Marines Expand Presence on Strategic Pacific Islands

Overview
The United States is increasing its forward military presence near China by deploying Marine forces aboard the expeditionary sea base ship USS Miguel Keith. This afloat platform extends the reach of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), based in northern Australia, across the contested island chains of the western Pacific. This move underscores Washington’s commitment to countering Beijing’s growing influence and military footprint in the Indo-Pacific.

The Island Chain Strategy
At the heart of this deployment lies the U.S. island chain strategy: three north-south defensive lines stretching across the Pacific. By leveraging allied territory and naval access points, the U.S. can project power, deter aggression, and defend against potential Chinese military action. The second island chain, where the USS Miguel Keith is homeported in Saipan, plays a pivotal role in supporting operations deeper into the Pacific.

Why This Matters
Operating from a sea base offers the Marines flexibility and unpredictability. Unlike fixed land bases, the Miguel Keith allows U.S. forces to maneuver rapidly across archipelagic terrain and forward locations ashore, complicating adversary planning. This is especially important at a time when Chinese forces are building out anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to push U.S. forces farther from contested waters.

Recent Exercises
The deployment follows recent exercises across the first and second island chains:

Exercise Alon 25 in the Philippines (August 15–29).
Exercise Super Garuda Shield 25 in Indonesia (August 25–September 4).

These multinational drills reinforced cooperation with allies, improved readiness, and signaled a unified front in the region.

Implications for the Navy
The Navy’s role in enabling sea-based expeditionary operations is central. With amphibious ships like the USS New Orleans temporarily out of service due to fire damage, expeditionary sea bases provide a critical stopgap. They allow Marines and sailors to continue distributed operations, demonstrating the Navy’s adaptability in keeping forward presence credible.

Implications for Our Allies
For Australia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, U.S. deployments reinforce security guarantees. The Marines’ message, as articulated by Colonel Jason Armas, was clear: America and its allies “stand ready to maneuver, sustain and fight as one force.” This is reassurance at a time of rising Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and beyond.

Why Americans Should Care
This is not simply a faraway deployment. The Pacific is a lifeline for U.S. trade, energy, and global communications infrastructure. Securing these waters ensures that Americans at home continue to benefit from stable supply chains and open sea lanes. A failure to hold the line in the Pacific would ripple into our economy and national security alike.

Closing Call
As the U.S. strengthens its presence in the Indo-Pacific, the question is not whether we can afford to maintain this posture, but whether we can afford not to. A stronger Navy and Marine Corps presence ensures deterrence, protects trade, and preserves peace.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

September 9, 2025September 9, 2025

Broken Promises and Growing Risks: The Scarborough Standoff Reignites

How a 2012 Diplomatic Misfire Sparked a Decade of Chinese Defiance

The Current Flashpoint

Scarborough Shoal is back in the headlines — and with it, so are the warnings.

In September 2025, a Chinese vessel rammed a Philippine resupply boat near the shoal. In response, the U.S. Navy sailed a destroyer directly through the contested waters. The confrontation was brief, but the message was unmistakable: tensions are rising, and the risks are multiplying.

For many Americans, this reef barely registers. But this isn’t just a dust-up between distant nations. It’s a test of American resolve — and a moment that traces directly back to 2012.

2012: A Standoff Mishandled

That year, China and the Philippines faced off at Scarborough Shoal in a tense maritime standoff over fishing rights and territorial claims. The United States stepped in as a broker, aiming to de-escalate. Both nations were expected to withdraw their vessels.

Only one did.

The Philippines pulled back. China did not. And the United States — despite brokering the deal — failed to enforce the agreement or respond meaningfully.

To this day, Chinese ships remain at Scarborough Shoal, effectively taking control. This incident became a turning point in Beijing’s maritime aggression — and a chilling message to U.S. allies in Asia.

Why It Mattered Then — And Still Does

The 2012 failure sent a signal: U.S. guarantees could be questioned.

Philippine public trust eroded. Within a few years, President Duterte pivoted toward China, prioritizing economic deals over alignment with the U.S.

Meanwhile, China accelerated its militarization of the South China Sea — building artificial islands, expanding its maritime militia, and flexing its growing naval power.

What started as a fishing rights dispute became a global credibility crisis.

Now, a Decade Later…

Today’s confrontation is more than a replay. It’s a test of whether the U.S. has learned anything since 2012.

This time, the U.S. Navy showed up. But questions linger:

Will American resolve hold under pressure?
Can alliances like AUKUS and the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty deter escalation?
And do Americans even understand how this reef connects to larger global stakes?

We’ve been here before. We got it wrong then. The consequences are still unfolding.

Why Americans Should Care

Scarborough Shoal isn’t just a reef. It’s a litmus test — for American credibility, regional stability, and the rule of law at sea.

If the U.S. fails to hold the line here, what message does that send to Taiwan, our allies, or our adversaries?

This series breaks it down in plain language — so Americans understand what’s at stake before it’s too late.

What’s Next in the Series

In the next post, we’ll dive into the 2016 international tribunal ruling, how China ignored it, and why this defiance matters not just for the Philippines, but for the future of international order.

Missed the first post? Read it here.

Join the Mission

This post is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter, our national education initiative.

We’re connecting the dots between today’s maritime flashpoints and tomorrow’s strategic risks — and making the case for a stronger Navy, an informed public, and a unified voice.

Visit StrongerNavy.org to follow the series and learn more.

Let’s roll.

September 9, 2025September 9, 2025

Allies, Scale, and America’s Navy: A Conversation We Can’t Delay

U.S. and allied navies sailing in formation

Introduction

Giving Credit Where It’s Due
Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi recently argued in the New York Times that America alone cannot match China’s growing scale — economically, technologically, or militarily — and that our strength depends on “allied scale.” They are right to say this out loud, and they deserve credit for raising the issue. Campbell has long been a voice for rebalancing U.S. strategy toward Asia, and Doshi has studied China’s grand strategy in depth. Their track records show they’ve been sounding the alarm.

Why We’re in This Position
It’s fair to ask: if they saw this coming, why didn’t America adjust sooner? The truth is, Campbell and Doshi were not sitting in the chairs with the ultimate levers. Campbell’s call for a pivot to Asia faced headwinds from wars in the Middle East and competing budget priorities. Doshi, until recently, was in academia, warning of China’s rise but without a policymaker’s authority. They were raising the right concerns, but Washington’s attention was elsewhere. That’s not about pinning blame on individuals — it’s about recognizing how easy it is for America to be distracted.

The Larger Point
The conversation they are starting in public now is one America needs to have candidly. China’s scale in shipbuilding, technology, and manufacturing is a strategic challenge unlike any we have faced before. Campbell and Doshi are right that alliances matter — losing India, Japan, or Europe to Chinese influence would change the balance overnight. But alliances alone aren’t enough. America must also invest in its own naval strength and rebuild the industrial base that sustains it.

My Role in This Conversation
I am two years into this effort with Americans for a Stronger Navy. My job is not to dictate policy but to help Americans understand the facts. It is up to the American people to decide. What I can do is publish what’s happening, provide context, and advocate on behalf of my shipmates — so that when the time comes, they have the resources they need, where and when they need them.

Why Americans Should Care
If we don’t get this right, it’s not only the Navy that will feel the consequences. Our supply chains, our economy, and our security all ride on free and open seas. Campbell and Doshi are right to remind us that “quantity has a quality all its own.” China has the quantity. America must respond with both quality and scale — and it will take both allies abroad and buy-in at home to meet that challenge.