Category: Capitol Hill Watch

Capitol Hill is the seat of the U.S. government, home to the domed United States Capitol, Senate, Houses of Representatives and the neoclassical Supreme Court. Capitol Hill Watch covers the news, current and pending legislation of interest to the Americans for a Stronger Navy.

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Fighter Pilot’s Three Answers —Matthew “Whiz” Buckley

America at Sea: Matthew “Whiz” Buckley

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

Matthew “Whiz” Buckley flew the F/A-18 Hornet for the U.S. Navy for about 15 years. He graduated from the Navy Fighter Weapons School adversary program, flew combat sorties over southern Iraq in support of Operation Southern Watch, deployed aboard USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Kitty Hawk, and was mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. After a stint on Wall Street, he founded the No Fallen Heroes Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to ending veteran suicide [1].

He answers like a fighter pilot: direct, fast, and with no wasted motion.

What’s Working: Forward Presence

For Buckley, the answer starts with the oldest question in American crisis management: when something goes wrong in the world, the first thing a president asks is where’s the nearest carrier?

He tells the story on a friend, Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine, an F-16 pilot Buckley has known for decades. Whenever something happens, Buckley says, even an Air Force fighter pilot has to ask where the boats are: the carriers, the subs, the nearest strike group, the nearest Marine Expeditionary Unit.

“What’s working with the Navy is being forward deployed, projecting our power on 75% of this planet, which obviously is water. When we can put four and a half acres of sovereign U.S. territory off somebody’s coast, it allows us to project power and get the job done.”

The Biggest Barrier: Deployments That Wear Out Ships, Aircraft, and People

The same forward presence that works is also the barrier. Deployments are getting longer, and they are combat deployments. Carriers have been dodging missiles, and an F/A-18 went over the side of a carrier during hard maneuvering to evade hostile fire [2].

“Literally every landing I had in the F-18 Hornet was a car crash. It’s the equivalent force. So we’re beating up the airplanes, we’re beating up the boats, and we’re beating up the people, and you can only do that for so long.”

His prescription is plain: more carriers, more air wings, more ships. And he takes the threat at its word. He points to the 2027 date for the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan, a timeline U.S. intelligence officials have said Xi Jinping set for his military [3].

“The threat ain’t getting less, it’s getting more. We’re really putting our Navy and Marine Corps team to a lot of stress right now. And I think our leaders need to address that.”

Fix One Thing: Peace First, Then Overwhelming Force

Asked what he would fix first if he were king for a day, Buckley starts somewhere unexpected: there wouldn’t be any wars. He says he never served with anyone who wanted to go kill people, and he paraphrases General Douglas MacArthur’s observation that the soldier, above all others, prays for peace because he must bear the deepest wounds of war.

But the world has people who wish America harm. If the nation has to fight, he says, it should fight to end the war quickly. He contrasts the grinding war in Ukraine and 20 years in Afghanistan and Iraq with the Powell and Schwarzkopf doctrine of overwhelming force.

“If I were king for a day, I’d want peace. But if we get pushed to the point of having to use force, overwhelming massive firepower. And that’s where a strong Navy is going to come in.”

Where to Learn More

Buckley’s passion today is the No Fallen Heroes Foundation. More than five years ago, he traveled to Mexico with Marcus Luttrell, the Navy SEAL and author of Lone Survivor, for psychedelic-assisted therapy that he says saved and changed his life. In April 2026, he and Luttrell were in the Oval Office when President Trump signed an executive order directing federal agencies to accelerate research and review of psychedelic treatments for PTSD and other conditions affecting veterans [4].

The foundation gives grants to veterans and their families. And Buckley closes with a personal offer:

“If you’re a veteran and you’re not in a good place, man, I’m available 24/7. I’m here for you. Healing is possible. There is a way out.”

Learn more at NoFallenHeroes.com and WhizBuckley.com [1][5].

If you are a veteran in crisis, or worried about one, call or text the Veterans Crisis Line: dial 988, then press 1 [6].

The Takeaway

Buckley’s three answers make one argument. Forward presence is what America’s Navy does best, and it is wearing out the ships, aircraft, and sailors who provide it. The fix is a Navy big enough to stay forward without breaking, strong enough that adversaries never test it, and decisive enough to end a fight quickly if they do.

He also brings something no other guest has: a reminder that the people who serve carry the cost long after they come home. A stronger Navy means taking care of them too.

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About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

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About the Guest

Matthew “Whiz” Buckley flew the F/A-18 Hornet for the U.S. Navy for about 15 years. A graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School adversary program, he flew combat sorties over southern Iraq in support of Operation Southern Watch, deployed aboard USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Kitty Hawk, and was mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. He is the founder of the No Fallen Heroes Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to ending veteran suicide.

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References

[1] No Fallen Heroes Foundation: https://nofallenheroes.com
[2] In April 2025, an F/A-18E Super Hornet and its tow tractor were lost overboard from USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea when the carrier turned hard to evade Houthi fire. Both crew members survived.
[3] In February 2023, CIA Director William Burns said U.S. intelligence indicated Xi Jinping had instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, while noting that this did not mean Xi had decided to do so.
[4] The White House, “President Trump’s Landmark Order Advances Breakthrough Mental Health Treatments — Delivering New Hope to Veterans,” April 20, 2026. The executive order was signed April 18, 2026.
[5] Matthew “Whiz” Buckley: https://whizbuckley.com
[6] Veterans Crisis Line: https://www.veteranscrisisline.net

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Strategy First — Dr. Steven Wills

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

Our guest is Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist at the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy and a senior advisor to Americans for a Stronger Navy [1][2]. Steve served 20 years as a Navy surface warfare officer, including as executive officer of a mine countermeasures ship, before earning a PhD in military history. He is the author of Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning and, with former Navy Secretary John Lehman, Where Are the Carriers? [1]

Question 1: What’s working now?

Steve sees more interest in shipbuilding than at any time in the last 25 years. There is bipartisan, bicameral interest in the SHIPS for America Act and in the President’s Maritime Action Plan, and voices across Washington and the country are saying the same thing: we don’t build enough ships.

He thinks COVID was the wake-up call. People found out their toilet paper and frozen fish came from somewhere else, on a ship, and that very few ships fly the American flag. Meanwhile the Navy went from close to 600 ships at the end of the Cold War to fewer than 300 today, despite a 355-ship goal on the books for a decade.

“There is really a significant interest in fixing the maritime industrial base in this country. And I’m very heartened by that. Good time for all of us to throw in and try and make that work better.”

Question 2: What are the barriers?

Steve sorts them into three kinds: structural, cultural and economic.

Structural. Warships are funded one year at a time. A program might get full funding one year and less the next, and Congress has run on continuing resolutions “forever,” which means last year’s funding for this year’s problems. For 35 to 40 years after the Cold War, there was also no threat at sea to rally around. The Navy became a supporting force for wars in Southwest Asia. The rise of China’s navy has changed that, and he sees the Navy reworking its acquisition processes in response.

Cultural. “We told people to go away from the trades. We said everybody should go to college.” Now the country needs those tradespeople more than ever if it wants to bring basic industries home.

Economic. The industry has shrunk, so ships cost more to build. They are also far more complex than the ships of the 1990s, which calls for new technology, new workers and new ways of building.

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Steve’s answer is a maritime strategy, like the one the Navy had in the 1980s under President Reagan, led by Navy Secretary John Lehman and the admirals of that era.

“It really said, this is what the Navy is gonna do in peace and war. And here’s exactly the fleet that you need to accomplish these missions. We had that very well defined. We don’t have that as much now.”

For anyone who wants to dig deeper, he points to two Center for Maritime Strategy publications, both free online:

Returning from Ebb Tide: Renewing the United States Commercial Maritime Enterprise [3], which Steve edited, covers how America used to build ships and how it got away from that. It includes ideas from contributors including Capt. Brent Sadler, a section on Military Sealift Command as the backstop for a country that “always plays an away game,” and a section on recruiting, training and keeping mariners, written by California maritime academy instructors.

Pier Review: Leveraging the Allied Maritime Industrial Base for U.S. Shipbuilding [4] comes from visits to shipyards in South Korea, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Canada. The point, he says, is not to build American ships overseas. It is to learn what allies do well and apply it at home.

The takeaway

Steve sees a rare moment of national attention on shipbuilding, and real barriers in budgets, workforce and cost. His first fix is the one that ties the rest together: a clear strategy that says what the Navy must do and what fleet it takes to do it. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy of the Navy League of the United States and a senior advisor to Americans for a Stronger Navy. He served 20 years as an active-duty Navy officer, retiring in 2010, with sea tours on small and medium surface combatants, including as executive officer of a mine countermeasures ship, and shore tours at the Defense Intelligence Agency and NATO commands in Naples, Italy. He holds a bachelor’s in history from Miami University, a master’s in national security studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and a master’s and PhD in military history from Ohio University. He is the author of Strategy Shelved (Naval Institute Press, 2021) and co-author, with John Lehman, of Where Are the Carriers? (2021) [1][2].

References

[1] Center for Maritime Strategy, “Dr. Steven Wills.” https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/experts/dr-steven-wills/
[2] Americans for a Stronger Navy, “Steven Wills, Senior Advisor.” https://strongernavy.org/steven-wills/
[3] Center for Maritime Strategy, Returning from Ebb Tide: Renewing the United States Commercial Maritime Enterprise. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org
[4] Center for Maritime Strategy, Pier Review: Leveraging the Allied Maritime Industrial Base for U.S. Shipbuilding. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/pier-review/

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Free trade isn’t free — CAPT Bill Hamblet

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

Our guest is CAPT Bill Hamblet, USN (Ret.), Editor-in-Chief of Proceedings, the U.S. Naval Institute’s flagship magazine [1][2]. He spent nearly 30 years as a Navy intelligence officer, serving with an F/A-18 squadron, a SEAL team, a carrier air wing and a carrier strike group. Ashore, he served as naval attaché to Russia, led the China Division at the Joint Intelligence Operations Center in the Pacific, and was in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, where he helped lead the initial intelligence response [1]. His views here are his own, not those of the Naval Institute.

Question 1: What’s working now?

Bill starts with the people. Carrier strike groups, destroyers and logistics ships have been deploying for 10, 11 and even 12 months at a time over the past year or two, with one or two port visits or none at all. He calls that unheard of since the Vietnam War. The fleet has run combat operations, blockades, strike warfare and mine warfare at the end of long supply lines.

He points to Operation Epic Fury, when Fifth Fleet’s headquarters in Bahrain, also a key logistics hub, was lost on day two. The fleet adapted and kept its carrier strike groups armed, fueled and on station.

“For any graybeards or veterans out there who want to say that today’s sailors are just a bunch of snowflakes, I would challenge you to go on a 9, 10, 11, 12 month deployment with 0, 1, 2 port visits.”

He is just as clear that this pace can’t last. Navy leaders, including Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle, have been saying the fleet will need a reset after being “ridden hard and put away wet” [3]. But credit goes where it is due: the sailors and officers of today’s fleet “have performed magnificently.”

Question 2: What are the barriers?

Bill names two. The first is that America took sea power for granted after the Cold War, and that cut across both parties. The Navy shrank from almost 600 ships in 1988 to fewer than 300 today. As he puts it, borrowing a line he has heard from others, we are running an 11-carrier Navy in a 15- or 17-carrier world.

Open sea lanes, he reminds us, were never a given. They were bought and guaranteed by the U.S. Navy and its closest allies in World War II, then patrolled through the Cold War. The Reagan buildup toward a 600-ship Navy helped defeat the Soviet Union. Then the country drifted.

“Free trade isn’t free. Its price is a strong Navy working in concert with strong like-minded allies to keep global sea lines open and protected.”

The second barrier is that the government has been a bad customer. Budgets fluctuated, requirements and designs changed, and the Navy tried to do too much with the lead ships of several classes. Building carriers, destroyers and submarines takes heavy capital and a large skilled workforce. Telling a builder like Huntington Ingalls or General Dynamics Electric Boat “five, no two, no one, and four in three years” is, in his words, hell on those companies and their workers.

“It’s really important that Congress, the Department of Defense and the Navy specifically send consistent demand signals, pass budgets on time and minimize change orders.”

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Bill’s answer starts with the public. Americans need to understand that China, and to a lesser extent Russia, Iran and North Korea, are already at war with us in the gray zone, below the threshold of open conflict, while preparing to fight if they must. China’s navy already outnumbers ours in ships, and he expects it to pass us in total tonnage within about five years.

“They’re putting new ships in the water like dumplings in the soup.”

During the Cold War, he says, most Americans understood we were in a long game with a serious adversary: the space race, the military buildup, NATO and the defense of Western Europe. We need to get back on that footing and understand what China wants the world to look like by mid-century.

“Without a strong Navy, nothing the United States wants to accomplish is possible. If our citizens and their elected leaders understood that we’re in a serious contest, and that naval power were key to their security, key to their way of life, I think appropriate strategy and investment would follow.”

More from the conversation

After the three questions, we kept talking, and Bill added a few points worth sharing.

“The strongest military in the world.” Presidents of both parties, he noted, routinely tell military audiences that America has the strongest military in the world. Repeated often enough, that message tells the public there is nothing to worry about. When he tells family that naval power is not trending well, the answer he sometimes gets is, “I saw Top Gun: Maverick. Looked pretty good.”

What a broken demand signal costs. On a tour of General Dynamics Electric Boat, he was told that during the 1980s buildup the U.S. was buying about four and a half submarines a year, and Electric Boat had about 26,000 workers. After the Cold War, orders fell to roughly one submarine in five years and the workforce fell to about 6,000. A decade later, when the Navy wanted one Virginia-class boat a year again, the yards struggled to deliver, and they still are.

Too much on one hull. He pointed to the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the Ford-class carrier as examples of packing too many new technologies onto a single class at once.

A book to read. He recommended Arthur Herman’s Freedom’s Forge, which tells how industrialists like William Knudsen and Henry J. Kaiser turned American industry toward war production before and during World War II, and why the companies doing that work had to be able to turn a profit [4].

The takeaway

Bill sees a fleet performing remarkably under heavy strain, and a country that forgot sea power has to be paid for. His fixes run from Washington to the kitchen table: steady demand signals and on-time budgets for the builders, and a public that understands the contest we are in. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

CAPT Bill Hamblet, USN (Ret.), is Executive Vice President for Periodicals and Editor-in-Chief of Proceedings at the U.S. Naval Institute, which he joined in 2016 as deputy editor-in-chief. A 1987 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he served nearly 30 years as a Navy intelligence officer, including tours with an F/A-18 squadron, a SEAL team, a carrier air wing and a carrier strike group, on the Joint Staff J-2, as naval attaché to Russia, as head of the China Division at the Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific, and at the National Counterterrorism Center. He holds a master’s in national resource strategy from the Eisenhower School at National Defense University [1].

References

[1] U.S. Naval Institute, “CAPT Bill Hamblet, USN (Ret.).” https://www.usni.org/about-us/executive-staff/capt-bill-hamblet-usn-ret
[2] U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings
[3] USNI News, “New CNO Caudle Calls for New Fleet Design in First Speech,” August 25, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/08/25/new-cno-caudle-calls-for-new-fleet-design-in-first-speech
[4] Arthur Herman, Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II (Random House, 2012).

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Steady Orders, Steady Yards — Michael Roberts

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix firstOur guest is Mike Roberts, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology and a nonresident senior fellow with the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy [1][2]. Before Hudson, Mike spent decades inside the American maritime industry. He was general counsel and senior vice president of government relations at Crowley, and he served as president and chairman of the American Maritime Partnership [1][2]. He works from Jacksonville, Florida, and has spent the last few years talking with members of Congress from both parties about how America gets back into the business of building and sailing its own ships.

Question 1: What’s working now?

Mike starts with something easy to overlook: the country is waking up. For decades, he says, Americans have had “sea blindness.” Most people didn’t know where their stuff comes from or why the commercial maritime industry matters, and had at best a vague idea of why the Navy matters. “That is changing,” he says. “The good news is it’s changing. The bad news is it’s changing because there’s a real reason for that.”

He points to three things that are working.

A serious bill in front of Congress. The SHIPS for America Act is bipartisan and bicameral, with support in both the House and the Senate. Mike calls it what would be “the most consequential legislation since 1936,” the year of the Merchant Marine Act. More than 100 lawmakers are now pushing to include it in this year’s defense bill [4].

Trade tools are in play. The Section 301 case at the U.S. Trade Representative put fees on Chinese-built and Chinese-owned ships calling at U.S. ports. The investigation began under the Biden administration, and the Trump administration imposed the fees in 2025. They were suspended for a year in November 2025 under a U.S.-China trade deal, and USTR has proposed extending the pause to January 2027 [5]. “We’ll see where that goes,” Mike says, “but at least that’s in play.”

Private capital is leaning in. The poster child is Hanwha, the Korean shipbuilder that bought Philly Shipyard [6]. Fincantieri owns the Marinette yard in Wisconsin, and other allied shipbuilders are looking at U.S. partnerships because Washington is signaling that real investment may pay off.

“We are well ahead of where we were in terms of an understanding of the need to move forward. And that’s encouraging.”

Question 2: What are the barriers?

The big-picture barrier, Mike says, is a mindset stuck in the 1990s, and it cuts across both parties. In his view, progressives struggle to accept that America has real enemies, while conservatives cling to the idea that the market will solve every problem. Both views made sense for most of a generation, from about 1990 to 2015. “But they leave us very vulnerable,” he says. “We have real enemies, and they are playing a totally different game than we’re playing when it comes to free trade and economics.”

The specific barrier is the lack of a consistent source of demand to build commercial ships in U.S. shipyards and sail them under the U.S. flag. He is not talking about Navy or Coast Guard ships, where demand is way up. He means cargo ships, whose buyers have no reason to be loyal to American yards and buy Chinese ships because that’s where they get the best deal.

Growing that commercial base matters for two reasons. It would diversify and grow the shipbuilding industrial base, meaning the workforce, the facilities and the supplier base, using commercial dollars on top of government dollars. And a larger U.S.-flag fleet gives the Pentagon more ships and more skilled American mariners to keep troops supplied in a conflict. It’s the same dual-use idea America has relied on before.

So where does the demand come from? The domestic Jones Act market is small, about a hundred self-propelled cargo ships, with limited room to grow. The international market is huge, around 60,000 ships, by Mike’s count. But U.S. costs run two to three times China’s before you count Chinese subsidies. American workers have options and need decent pay to work in a shipyard or spend months at sea. Chinese steel is heavily subsidized and costs roughly half as much as American steel. Even Korea, he notes, gets a large share of its steel and components from China.

Mike offers two cautions. First, cutting regulation won’t close the gap. “I have fought unnecessary regulation my whole career,” he says, but the idea that we can make up much ground on China that way “is not remotely realistic.” Second, innovation alone won’t get us back in the game. China builds far more ships than we do – almost 300 for every one of ours (corrected from the 75-to-1 estimate mentioned in the video).  And China has more industrial robots than the rest of the world combined. “We can’t expect to lead in shipbuilding if we’re not actually building ships.”

“Shipyards don’t invest in capacity or in upgrades for episodic, ship-by-ship procurement. They do that when they can see a 10-to-15-year production horizon with a lot of contractual certainty.”

Everything tried over the last 50 years, from the Maritime Security Program to Title XI loan guarantees to cargo preference, has been piecemeal. Each program is modest, and none is guaranteed to continue. Meanwhile, Mike says, China holds 75 percent or more of new ship orders, close to 90 percent for some ship types like VLCC supertankers.

“They see decades of guaranteed demand. Our shipyards see appropriation cycles.”

Question 3: What would you fix first?

Mike’s answer is specific: pass and fund the Strategic Commercial Fleet program in the SHIPS for America Act [3][7]. “It’s the one piece of the SHIPS Act that creates sustained demand,” he says: 250 U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged ships over 15 years. Shipyards would get the demand signal, plan against it and innovate.

He likes many other parts of the bill, like rejuvenating Kings Point and the state maritime academies, and grants for shipyards to upgrade. But his test for any provision is how many commercial ships it actually gets built and flagged in the United States. “If we don’t have demand for the ships, there won’t be jobs for the people when they graduate,” he says, and the grant money won’t be used without customers.

The ships in the program would sign emergency preparedness agreements, a national security commitment. Mike says commercial freight revenue would cover roughly half the cost, about a dollar for every federal dollar, and that includes money from Chinese exporters. “It’s not a subsidy program. It’s an industrial policy program that’s disciplined by a competitive bidding process.” The federal share is meant to be covered by trade-related fees through the Maritime Security Trust Fund. He puts the cost at about $1.8 billion a year gross, or $1.3 billion net after savings, such as replacing part of the aging Ready Reserve Force. That fleet keeps about 40 ships, many of them 45-year-old steamships, in storage.

“In federal budget terms, it’s a rounding error. In maritime terms, it will rebuild the industry.”

“If we don’t act on it in this Congress, we’ll be having the same conversation five years from now, and we’ll have an even bigger hole to fill.”

The takeaway

Mike sees real progress: a public waking up, a bipartisan bill, trade tools in play and private money coming in. His core point is simple, though. Shipyards build to steady demand. Training programs, grants and regulatory fixes help, but they don’t put orders on the books. For Mike, the Strategic Commercial Fleet is the piece that does, and the time to act is this Congress. As always, these are the guest’s views, and featuring them is not an endorsement. What do you think?

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

About the Guest

Michael G. Roberts is a Senior Fellow with the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology and a nonresident senior fellow with the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy. His work focuses on policy affecting the American commercial maritime industry in light of competition with China. He joined Hudson in 2022 after a decades-long career in the maritime industry, including service as general counsel, board secretary and senior vice president of government relations at Crowley, and as president and chairman of the American Maritime Partnership. With Bryan Clark, he co-authored the Hudson report Shoring Up the Foundation: Affordable Approaches to Improve US and Allied Shipbuilding and Ship Repair [1][2][8].

References

[1] Hudson Institute, “Michael Roberts.” https://hudson.org/experts/1427-michael-roberts

[2] Center for Maritime Strategy, “Michael Roberts.” https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/experts/michael-roberts/

[3] Michael Roberts, “The Strategic Commercial Fleet Program: How America Rebuilds Its Maritime Industry,” Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/strategic-commercial-fleet-program-how-america-rebuilds-its-maritime-industry-michael-roberts

[4] gCaptain, “More Than 100 Lawmakers Push to Include SHIPS for America Act in Defense Bill,” October 29, 2026. https://gcaptain.com/more-than-100-lawmakers-push-to-include-ships-for-america-act-in-defense-bill/

[5] Holland & Knight, “USTR Proposes 2-Month Extension of Suspension of Section 301 Actions,” October 2026. https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/10/ustr-proposes-2-month-extension-of-suspension-of-section-301

[6] gCaptain, “Hanwha Completes $100M Acquisition of Philly Shipyard, Marking First Korean Shipbuilder in U.S.” https://gcaptain.com/hanwha-completes-100m-acquisition-of-philly-shipyard-marking-first-korean-shipbuilder-in-u-s/

[7] FreightWaves, “Updated Shipping Bill Calls for 250-Vessel US Cargo Fleet.” https://www.freightwaves.com/news/updated-shipping-bill-calls-for-250-vessel-us-cargo-fleet

[8] Midrats, “Improving US & Allied Shipbuilding & Repair, with Michael Roberts & Bryan Clark.” https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/improving-us-and-allied-shipbuilding

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Rust, Mines, and Shipyards — CDR Stephen Phillips

Rust, Mines, and Shipyards

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

CDR Stephen Phillips, USNR (Ret.), PhD, brings an unusual combination of operational experience and historical scholarship to the America at Sea conversation. He is the producer and host of Preble Hall, the Naval History podcast of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum, and Talk a Little, Learn a Lot, the podcast of the American Society of Naval Engineers [1][2]. A 1992 Naval Academy graduate, he served as a Surface Warfare Officer aboard USS Harlan County (LST-1196) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), then lateral transferred to Explosive Ordnance Disposal before completing a career in the Naval Reserves in 2012.

His PhD dissertation at King’s College London became the book A Poisoned Chalice: The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988, published in April 2026 [3]. That background — practitioner turned historian — gives his answers here a depth that connects what happened in the Gulf four decades ago to what the Navy must do today.

What’s Working: Mine Warfare Deserves Renewed Emphasis

Phillips frames his answer through the lens of Operation Earnest Will — the 1987–88 U.S. Navy convoy escort mission in the Persian Gulf that he calls “the precursor to all of our conflict in the Gulf.”

Iran’s mine warfare campaign successfully denied areas of the sea around the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy responded by attacking mine layers and clearing the strait. Phillips sees that chapter as proof that mine countermeasures (MCM) matter — and as a warning about what happens when emphasis fades.

“I want mine warfare to experience renewed emphasis. I think that we should set a goal of getting out of the classic cycle in which mine warfare eventually starts to atrophy.”

He calls for reestablishing Mine Warfare Command and notes that the MCM community “has been in the vanguard of developing unmanned platforms with the mantra of get the sailor out of the minefield.” He wants that momentum to continue through unmanned undersea and surface vessels — alongside the Navy’s broader unmanned push [4].

Phillips also reminds us not to overlook offensive mine warfare, pointing to Operation Starvation (the WWII B-29 mining campaign against Japan) and Operation Pocket Money (the 1972 mining of Haiphong Harbor) as precedents worth studying [5][6].

The Biggest Barrier: A Lack of Shipyards

Phillips states the barrier plainly: the nation needs more ships, and the greatest obstacle to getting them is a lack of shipyards.

“Some should be traditional like the next destroyer or frigate. Some should be transformational like the ESBs or unmanned platforms. And some need to be a modern interpretation of a legacy platform — like hospital ships, or ships for deep salvage so that we can fight battles on the seabed.”

His prescription is a mix: commercial shipyards adding production lines for naval vessels, venture capital to build new shipyards from the ground up, and public shipyards taking on shipbuilding alongside their repair work.

He draws a parallel to the automotive and space industries, which have seen technology-driven transformation in recent years. “It’s just time for the maritime realm to catch up.”

And he paraphrases VADM David Lewis, president of the American Society of Naval Engineers:

“There’s a lot of engineers currently in the education pipeline — in fields they think are focusing on something else. Mechanical engineering. Computer science. AI. They’re going to find themselves in the naval engineering or maritime engineering realm. In other words, they’re in maritime building. They just don’t know it yet.”

Fix One Thing: Rust

If he could fix one thing, Phillips would fix the material condition of the fleet. He calls rust “the broken window policing of the fleet’s readiness” — a small visible failure that signals deeper problems.

He tells two sea stories to make his point.

The first is about ship design. As First Lieutenant aboard San Jacinto in the Mediterranean, he watched his crew vacuum and mop water off the deck while a French frigate across the pier had sailors relaxing under an awning. Why? The French ship had a cambered deck — the water drained itself.

“We were going through all of this effort to get water off of our decks while they had a camber deck and the water was just gently draining right over the side.”

The second is about investment. His brother served as an exchange officer on a Dutch frigate. Phillips went aboard expecting a new ship. It wasn’t — it was mid-career. But it looked brand new because the Dutch apply high-quality coatings and paints in the shipyard, and the crew focuses on cleanliness rather than constantly fighting corrosion.

“Our Navy has maintained our ships with economical paint and coatings, with a crew sized to constantly maintain material condition. This was eroded by minimal manning and now longer periods at sea.”

His proposal: take a page from the Dutch and deliver ships with the highest quality paints and coatings, then reapply them whenever the ship goes into an availability. Take a page from the French and design decks that drain themselves. And consider dedicated shore-based teams that address material condition issues in home port during off-cycle time.

The Takeaway

Phillips connects three threads that don’t often appear in the same conversation: the enduring relevance of mine warfare, the urgent need for more shipyards, and the hidden cost of neglecting ship maintenance. His perspective — shaped by service in the Gulf, years of historical research, and deep ties to the naval engineering community — argues that rebuilding at sea is not just about counting hulls. It’s about the industrial base, the technology, and the daily decisions that determine whether a ship is ready to fight.

“I have high hopes for the future of the maritime industry and for the United States Navy. These solutions are out there. I’m glad that we’re talking about them. We will get there. God bless our Navy.”

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About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

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About the Guest

CDR Stephen Phillips, USNR (Ret.), PhD, is a 1992 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He served as a Surface Warfare Officer and Explosive Ordnance Disposal officer, completing his career in the Naval Reserves in 2012. He holds a PhD from King’s College London and is the author of A Poisoned Chalice: The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988. He produces and hosts Preble Hall, the Naval History podcast of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum, and Talk a Little, Learn a Lot, the podcast of the American Society of Naval Engineers.

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References

[1] Preble Hall podcast, U.S. Naval Academy Museum: https://www.usna.edu/Museum/PrebleHall/
[2] Talk a Little, Learn a Lot podcast, American Society of Naval Engineers: https://talk-a-little-learn-a-lot.transistor.fm/
[3] Stephen P. Phillips, A Poisoned Chalice: The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 (Potomac Books 2026).
[4] Mine Countermeasures and unmanned naval systems: the Navy’s Mine Warfare Command (historically, Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command) has led development of unmanned MCM platforms.
[5] Operation Starvation: the 1945 B-29 aerial mining campaign that laid over 12,000 mines in Japanese home waters, sinking or damaging more tonnage than any other naval operation in the Pacific.
[6] Operation Pocket Money: the 1972 aerial mining of Haiphong Harbor, North Vietnam, which effectively closed the port to enemy shipping.

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America at Sea: CDR Jim McLaughlin on Steady Demand, Fixed-Price Contracts and Rebuilding the Fleet

Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Today we hear from Commander Jim McLaughlin, U.S. Navy. He is a graduate of the California Maritime Academy, worked as a junior project manager at General Dynamics NASSCO, sailed as a licensed merchant mariner on offshore supply vessels in the Gulf, and now serves as an active-duty Navy commander. His views are his own and not those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of War or the U.S. government. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d fix first.

What we heard

Why it matters: “The health of the merchant marine and the United States Navy are indissolubly linked.” A strong merchant fleet and shipbuilding base are what make a strong, affordable Navy possible, and what keep the country supplied in a crisis.

What’s working: The push to re-industrialize America, and joint ventures between American and foreign shipbuilders, like Hanwha and Philly Shipyard. “American shipbuilding still uses 1980s know-how and 1940s infrastructure.”

The biggest barrier: Economic competitiveness. Most of the world’s merchant fleets, he says, are not free-market businesses but state-run cartels that depend on subsidies.

Fix first: Consistent demand for ships. He lays out a detailed plan: a 10-year build plan funded up front, starting with Military Sealift Command, whose ships average more than 40 years old; training pipelines for mariners and shipbuilders; a 20-year average fleet age; and fixed-price contracts instead of cost-plus.

“Steady, predictable orders are the lifeblood of the industry.”

Full transcript

Lightly edited for clarity.

Bill Cullifer: Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy. Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. We’ve got a great lineup this week, and a big thank you and a shout-out to everyone who’s taking part. Today we hear from Commander Jim McLaughlin, a Cal Maritime grad who has worked in a shipyard, sailed as a merchant mariner, and now serves as an active-duty Navy commander. His views are his own. If you find this worthwhile, please like and share it. Commander Jim McLaughlin, over to you.

Introduction

Jim McLaughlin: Hello, my name is Jim McLaughlin. I’m a commander in the United States Navy. I previously had command of USS Canberra (LCS 30), where I participated in Operation Epic Fury and the ensuing blockade. I’m currently in command of USS Jackson (LCS 6), and I hold a B.S. in Marine Engineering Technology from the California Maritime Academy. Before my naval service, I worked as a junior project manager at General Dynamics NASSCO and as a licensed merchant mariner aboard offshore support vessels in the Gulf of America. The opinions expressed here are my own and not the opinions of the United States Navy, the Department of War or the government of the United States.

For the general public, I think the main question we need to ask and answer is: why does America need to grow the merchant marine and shipbuilding sectors? We need to grow them to ensure we have, and can afford, the world’s strongest Navy, and that in times of war or crisis we can move the materials required to sustain our armed forces and our economy. The health of the merchant marine and the United States Navy are indissolubly linked. It’s very hard to have a healthy Navy without a healthy merchant fleet and shipbuilding industry.

Question 1: What’s working right now that we should do more of?

Jim McLaughlin: At a macro level, the push to re-industrialize America is probably the most important thing required to expand the merchant and naval fleets. As we’ve seen with the Chinese, you can’t be competent in naval construction unless you’re competent in commercial construction, and you can’t be competent in commercial construction unless your nation has a large and competent manufacturing base.

At a micro level, joint ventures such as the one between the Hanwha Group and Philly Shipyard must be expanded. To a large degree, American shipbuilding still uses 1980s know-how and 1940s infrastructure. The only way we’re going to modernize quickly is by partnering with firms that excel at modern ship construction, and by offering monetary incentives to expand and upgrade shipbuilding infrastructure.

“American shipbuilding still uses 1980s know-how and 1940s infrastructure.”

Question 2: What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?

Jim McLaughlin: The single largest barrier is economic competitiveness. Unfortunately, most of the world’s merchant fleets are not true private, free-market enterprises. They’re state-run cartels. They’re not inherently profitable, and they rely heavily on state subsidies to build and operate ships. The American government will have to provide some degree of subsidy to incentivize investment in the industry.

Question 3: If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

Jim McLaughlin: There’s a lot more than one thing that needs to be fixed, but the main thing I would do is ensure consistent demand for ships, to achieve consistent investment in shipbuilding. The government is the only customer capable of doing this. If Congress were to commit to and fund a set number of orders over the next decade, it would result in a healthy shipbuilding ecosystem.

As always, the devil’s in the details. Here’s how I would lay out my plan.

Congress should commit to a 10-year build plan. Congress should also appropriate all the funds required to execute that plan in year one, meaning all the money is allocated and sitting in an account, ready to be spent over the course of 10 years. That ensures a steady flow of orders that aren’t subject to annual wrangling over funding.

I would start by expanding the Military Sealift Command fleet. The average age of MSC ships is over 40 years, and the fleet is far too small for a major peer-on-peer conflict. Logistics ships are also generally easier to build than warships. As the industry gains proficiency building logistics ships, it can apply that proficiency to building warships.

I would incentivize private construction of commercial vessels through favorable government lending or construction subsidies.

We also need to address the personnel side, because without sailors and welders, a ship and a shipyard are pretty useless. I would start a reserve officer training corps for Military Sealift Command. To grow the cadre of merchant mariners, MSC or the Maritime Administration should offer scholarships to students at maritime colleges, on the condition that once they’re licensed, they work four years for MSC or aboard another privately operated American vessel. Kings Point, the federal maritime academy, already works this way, and it could be expanded to the state maritime academies.

I would also streamline the process for upgrading a merchant mariner’s license and eliminate unneeded requirements. On a personal note, I let my own license expire some years ago. I reported a minor case of sleep apnea to the Coast Guard, and they sent mountains of paperwork requesting sleep studies and physicals. At the time I was on active duty and fully fit for the Navy, and I simply didn’t have time to deal with it, so I let my license lapse.

I would also grow the cadre of shipbuilders by offering similar scholarships for students to attend trade schools, with an obligation to work a set number of years at a public or private shipyard.

I would commit to maintaining a set fleet size for the Navy, MSC and the merchant fleet. And I would commit in law to maintaining a 20-year average fleet age for both MSC and the Navy. Those two steps would ensure the construction of new vessels and a steady improvement in shipbuilding infrastructure. Steady, predictable orders are the lifeblood of the industry. We must avoid a feast-and-famine environment like the 1940s, when we crash-built thousands of ships in a few short years and then sharply cut orders for decades afterward.

“We must avoid a feast-and-famine environment like the 1940s.”

Finally, the vast majority of government ship purchases need to be fixed-price contracts instead of cost-plus contracts. Under cost-plus, contractors bill the government for their costs and then get an agreed profit based on a set percentage of those costs. The higher the costs, the higher the profit. That’s exactly the kind of incentive we don’t want. We want builders to be efficient and to keep improving their infrastructure and skills, and the way to do that is consistent orders over a long period at fixed unit prices. A fixed-price contract sets what the customer will pay per unit, and the contractor has to build below that price to make a profit. Fixed prices plus the certainty of steady orders push contractors to innovate, upgrade equipment and upskill employees to increase their margins. Over time, that results in a healthy, competent shipbuilding sector that produces more ships of higher quality, and eventually at a lower unit cost.

Once again, the opinions expressed are my own, not the opinions of the United States Navy, the Department of War or the government of the United States. Thank you.

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own and do not represent the U.S. Navy or the Department of War. Featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

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John Konrad: From the Bronx to the Bridge

America at Sea: Voices That Matter

Capt. John Konrad grew up in the Bronx in the early 1980s, when the city was close to bankrupt and whole blocks were burning. Then his dad took him to Fleet Week. He saw sailors in white uniforms walk off a Navy ship and decided right there that he was going to sea. He went to SUNY Maritime College at Fort Schuyler, worked his way up to captain on large ships, and then founded gCaptain, which has become one of the most widely read maritime and naval news sites in the world.

We asked him the same three questions we ask every voice in this series: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d fix first. His answers covered a hollowed-out federal maritime agency, a fight at the UN over a shipping carbon tax, and a sailor in camouflage that his son mistook for a soldier.

What’s working?

John Konrad: We get into the doom and gloom because so much is broken in the American maritime space, but people don’t realize how much we really have going for us. I’m not just talking about being by far the largest economy in the world, the tech and knowledge leader, having reserve currency status and the most powerful military. I’m talking about real, fundamental maritime strengths. We have the best Navy, the best Coast Guard and the best merchant marine in the world.

Our maritime education system is really strong. About 10 years ago we put serious investment into new training ships for the maritime academies [1]. Go into any shipyard in the United States, any policy meeting on maritime issues, any maritime convention around the world, and you’re going to find graduates of one of the six state maritime academies, the federal academy at Kings Point, or the Naval Academy. You’ll find West Point grads who went into Army watercraft, Air Force Academy grads in logistics at TRANSCOM, and Coast Guard Academy graduates everywhere.

Go into any shipyard globally. I worked for a year and a half at the most impressive shipyard in the world, Samsung Heavy Industries in Geoje, and there are Americans from the American Bureau of Shipping everywhere. Go into any major Chinese shipyard and you’ll find ABS inspectors helping with the plans. Unfortunately, we probably helped them a little too much and transferred the technology.

“When we say the Koreans outbuild us, yes. But the technical expertise is here.”

The largest floating facility ever built, Shell’s Prelude, was built in Korea [2] and cost about as much as an aircraft carrier. The project manager for that project was in Houston. A lot of the naval architecture and design was done at Shell in Houston. We have a seat at the International Maritime Organization. The United States is underfunded and we have a lot of problems, but we have a lot to bring to the table, and people tend to forget that.

What’s the biggest barrier?

John Konrad: There’s a great book, The Abandoned Ocean, about how we abandoned our leading role [3]. After World War II we had the largest merchant marine by far, and it has steadily declined. We haven’t had a coordinated maritime policy since the Nixon administration [4].

We do so much helping our allies, helping Chinese shipyards and helping the International Maritime Organization in London that we forgot we have to stop and help ourselves. When we pushed back on the IMO’s carbon tax, there was huge pushback from the rest of the world. Do you not care about the environment? Yes, we do. But the U.S. merchant marine has only about 86 ships in international service, and those rules were going to hurt us. Our merchant marine is critical to the Navy’s logistics. People in the administration were willing to make a deal: let our fleet take a pass and you can carry on. The answer was absolutely not, and it turned into a confrontation [5].

“It doesn’t have to be like this. We can’t come in at the last minute.”

Almost every other nation has a dedicated ambassador to the IMO. We don’t. Up to World War II we had a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy, who also looked after the Coast Guard and the merchant marine. Truman consolidated it all into the Department of Defense, and we lost that ocean representation.

I’m a merchant marine officer. We fall under the Maritime Administration at the Department of Transportation, a sister agency of the FAA. Once upon a time MARAD was larger and more influential than the FAA. Today the FAA has over 40,000 employees. MARAD has about 800 [6], and more than half of them work at Kings Point. So you have a few hundred people trying to manage an enormous policy agenda and coordinate with the Navy, the Coast Guard, NOAA, Interior, Energy and State. They ignore a lot of their duties because they don’t have the manpower. When someone like me pushes the Secretary of the Navy to call MARAD, because shipbuilding is in their charter, they very often drop the ball.

We don’t need 40,000 people. Maybe 5,000 would be good. Or we take liaison officers from the Navy, NOAA and the State Department and at least temporarily staff MARAD so we can start knocking out the agenda. We have the Maritime Action Plan [7], the Navy shipbuilding plan and new guidance at the UN. Carlos Del Toro did a great job as Secretary of the Navy in the previous administration.

“We’ve got this momentum, but no ability to execute.”

What would you fix first?

John Konrad: We have a Secretary of the Interior. We should have a Secretary of the Oceans, someone who also oversees the Army Corps of Engineers. We have the best waterways in the world and one person should manage all of it. More immediately, I would absolutely appoint an ambassador to the International Maritime Organization to coordinate our response, and maybe that ambassador answers to the Secretary of Maritime.

But I go back to Andrew Lambert’s book on seapower states [8]. Look at England at the height of its empire, or at the countries that do things well now. The Dutch are the best at salvage and dredging, and for decades they’ve printed baseball cards of their tugboat and salvage captains. Korea is extremely proud of its shipyards. It’s in the DNA of the society.

In America we venerate our generals. Everyone talks about Marshall and the Marshall Plan. But Marshall wasn’t the head of the military in World War II. Admiral William Leahy was, as chief of staff to the commander in chief [9]. I’ve asked very senior leaders at the Pentagon who was in charge of the military in World War II. They’ll say Marshall, some will say King, some will say FDR. We’ve written Leahy out of the history books.

“I want to see our sailors wearing sailor uniforms, not camo.”

Today our Navy sailors wear camouflage. I pointed one out to my son Jack, and he said, “That’s not a Navy sailor, Dad. That’s an Army guy.” I love the Army and I support the Army. But what are we doing to get kids excited? What are we doing to teach our maritime history and promote the merchant marine?

Many of our viewers have kids or grandkids in high school. Did you know you can go to Kings Point tuition-free [10]? Or go to a state maritime academy, like I did, join the New York Air National Guard, which will pay for college, and after graduation go merchant marine, Air Force, Navy or Army. You can join Military Sealift Command and make over $200,000 a year supporting our military around the world. It’s an incredible opportunity, and young people don’t even know it exists. When I told people I was going to Fort Schuyler, they said, “What’s that? Never heard of it.”

Now maritime stories are headlines every week: shadow tankers off Venezuela and Iran, the Black Sea with Russia. The system is under strain and we have to buttress it, and not just with money. In France, people follow ocean sailing the way we follow baseball. They made Bernard Moitessier, a Golden Globe sailor from the 1960s, a national hero [11]. I want our kids out sailing in Optimist dinghies. I want movies and TV shows about sailors. We’re an island nation with the best rivers, oceans, harbors and bays in the world.

“I want Americans to know this is your birthright.”

Closing

John Konrad: Thank you for having me, and thank you for honoring our forgotten service, the U.S. Merchant Marine.

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a proposal is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

References

[1] Maritime Executive, “First U.S. Training Ship Empire State Is Delivered to MARAD” (National Security Multi-Mission Vessel program). https://maritime-executive.com/article/first-u-s-training-ship-empire-state-is-delivered-to-marad

[2] Guinness World Records, “Largest floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform” (Shell Prelude). https://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/113449-largest-floating-liquified-national-gas-flng-platform

[3] Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy (University of South Carolina Press, 2000). https://uscpress.com/The-Abandoned-Ocean

[4] Merchant Marine Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-469, signed by President Nixon. Discussed in Gibson and Donovan, above.

[5] gCaptain, “IMO Delays Adoption of Global Shipping Carbon Tax by One Year After U.S. Pressure Campaign,” October 17, 2025. https://gcaptain.com/imo-delays-adoption-of-global-shipping-carbon-tax-by-one-year-after-u-s-pressure-campaign

[6] U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Maritime Administration: Actions Needed to Address Workforce Challenges,” GAO-25-107460, February 13, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-25-107460

[7] Holland & Knight, “White House Releases America’s Maritime Action Plan,” February 2026. https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/02/white-house-releases-americas-maritime-action-plan

[8] Andrew Lambert, Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World (Yale University Press, 2018).

[9] Phillips Payson O’Brien, The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff (Dutton, 2019). https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/548325/the-second-most-powerful-man-in-the-world-by-phillips-payson-obrien/

[10] U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. https://www.usmma.edu

[11] Bernard Moitessier, 1968 Sunday Times Golden Globe Race. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Moitessier

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America at Sea: Glenn Mallo on People, Ownership and Results Over Effort

Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Today we hear from Glenn Mallo, Command Master Chief, U.S. Navy (Ret.). He came up through the Navy’s nuclear power program and spent most of his career aboard aircraft carriers and with forward-deployed naval forces. Today he works in the defense industrial base, so he sees the same problems from the other side. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d fix first.

What we heard

What’s working: People. Sailors, shipbuilders, engineers, tradespeople and government civilians deliver when they are trained, mentored and led. New technology helps, but “we need people to know how to put it to work.”

The biggest barrier: A system that separates responsibility, authority, incentives and consequences. Workforce, supply chain and infrastructure problems are real, but leaders also have to ask which contracting practices and management incentives let those problems persist.

“A for effort, but D minus for results. The system has got to stop measuring effort as though it was readiness.”

Fix first: Ownership of delivery. Try many approaches, fail fast, learn fast, and hold leaders accountable for results without lowering standards. He welcomed the “First Breakfast” approach to working with industry [1], a play on the 1993 “Last Supper” that set off defense industry consolidation [2].

New to the Last Supper and the First Breakfast? Read our explainer: [LINK TO FIRST BREAKFAST POST]

Full transcript

Lightly edited for clarity.

Bill Cullifer: Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy. Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Yesterday we heard from a merchant mariner about the people who sail our ships. Today, a retired Command Master Chief on the people who build them, fix them and crew them. Two different worlds, same message: you can’t rebuild America at sea without the people. And as he puts it, effort isn’t the same as results. Glenn Mallo, over to you.

Introduction

Glenn Mallo: Thanks, Bill. Thank you so much for this opportunity. I’m humbled and honored to join you in this conversation.

I’m Glenn Mallo, a retired United States Navy Command Master Chief. I spent most of my career serving aboard aircraft carriers and with forward-deployed naval forces. I started in the Navy’s nuclear power program and had the privilege of serving in engineering, shipyard, industrial and training environments.

As I got more senior in the Navy, I was privileged to be selected for senior enlisted assignments. I served aboard the USS Ronald Reagan pre-commissioning unit, the carrier USS Enterprise, and the USS George Washington twice: once here in Norfolk, Virginia, and again when she was forward-deployed in Yokosuka, Japan. I also had the great honor of leading the chiefs mess aboard the USS Carl Vinson during the carrier’s refueling and complex overhaul.

Now I work in the defense industrial base, where I see the other side. The same foundational principles apply, and that reinforces what I strongly believe: America’s maritime strength depends not just on our ships, but on our sailors and the industrial base that supports and sustains the whole ecosystem.

Question 1: What’s working right now that we should do more of?

Glenn Mallo: I’d start with our people. And truly, it’s not just the sailors. As I alluded to in my intro, it’s everybody: our civilian counterparts, now that I’m on the commercial side, as well as our government people who make everything work.

Having spent much of my career aboard aircraft carriers and with forward-deployed naval forces, I know what American sailors can accomplish when they are properly trained, mentored and led. I believe that same concept extends to our shipbuilders, our engineers, technicians and tradespeople, and the government civilians who support the whole ecosystem.

One thing the Navy taught me is that we have got to invest in our people. Coming up through the nuclear power training pipeline, where high standards, technical competence and accountability were not optional, I learned that we have to train people, invest in mentoring and equipping them, and set them up for success. We’d all be surprised by what they can deliver.

In naval nuclear power, we were trained to understand our systems, take ownership of our responsibilities and operate safely under demanding conditions. We need more of that across the maritime industrial base. Set up apprenticeships and technical education. Get the senior folks to provide mentorship and opportunities for young Americans, so they can see and believe that they can build meaningful careers in this industry.

I am encouraged by the advances in robotics, advanced systems and autonomy, and by different approaches to shipbuilding and maintenance, like Korean shipbuilders coming here to work with us. Those are novel concepts. But technology, in my humble opinion, is not the answer by itself. We need people who know how to put it to work.

Leadership matters too. Throughout my career I learned that you cannot lead from behind a desk. Our leaders have got to get out where the work happens, understand the challenges and take care of the people. With good people, the right training, leadership and the mission, we’re going to be amazed at what our people can deliver.

Question 2: What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?

Glenn Mallo: I think the biggest barrier is really the system. Right now, in my opinion, it separates responsibility, authority, incentives and consequences.

I’ve heard the workforce shortages, the supply chain problems and the aging infrastructure described eloquently many times. Those deserve attention. But we also need to ask leadership what decisions, contracting practices and management incentives are allowing those problems to persist. I’ve read about the Last Supper, and now I’m very excited about the First Breakfast.

We cannot keep asking the waterfront to overcome the instability and friction created upstream from the deck plates. More money and more technology will not deliver their full value if we do not address the root causes. The underlying execution system has got to change.

The standard should be operational results. I’ve seen it, and you know it, Bill. We have to deliver qualified components, build and repair ships, and deliver on time. And the Navy has to have sailors ready to operate them. Not just activity that looks like progress.

Across the seven chiefs messes where I served as command master chief, I’m guilty of giving a performance assessment that said, “A for effort, but D minus for results.” Effort matters. But in my experience, effort alone did not mean we had accomplished the mission.

“The system has got to stop measuring effort as though it was readiness.”

Question 3: If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

Glenn Mallo: I’d continue with what we’re doing right now. I’m excited about the First Breakfast approach. One thing I would emphasize is that there are many different solutions, and I’m all in on that. Let’s experiment and try them all. It’s not going to be one size fits all, where somebody says, “This is what we’ve got to do. Contract it this way.” We have to try them all.

Most importantly, though, we have to fix the ownership of delivery. It’s results, not excuses. Leadership matters a lot. Marshal all those different ideas, run them through experimentation, then tweak. If we don’t see the right results, let’s try something else. We have to do that fast. We should not be afraid to fail, as long as we fail fast, learn from it and turn it around quickly.

I keep going back to my naval nuclear power experience, where quality, safety and accountability are not in conflict. They’re inseparable. And when I had the opportunity to lead sailors, we had to take care of them and set them up for success.

In the world we’re in right now, with leadership taking charge and a maritime czar who will marshal all this and be accountable for the results, I think the same principles I’ve seen apply directly to rebuilding America at sea. Give capable people room to work, remove the obstacles, and hold leaders accountable for results.

We cannot lower our standards. Fail fast, fail often and learn, yes, but that means we get better and apply those lessons. We’ve been repeating the same lessons. It’s time to look at the results, ask what we haven’t been doing correctly, and get it done.

“Clear ownership, disciplined execution, measurable results. That’s where I believe we should start. It’s fixing the system.”

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

References

[1] Josh Kirshner and Jonathan Green, “The ‘Last Supper’ era is over — it’s time for the ‘First Breakfast’,” Breaking Defense, December 2024. https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/the-last-supper-era-is-over-its-time-for-the-first-breakfast/

[2] “Last Supper (defense industry),” Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Last_Supper_(defense_industry)

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America at Sea: Nick Littlepage on Mariners, Build Cycles and the Supply Side of Shipbuilding

Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Today we hear from Nick Littlepage, a former merchant marine engineer and a 2008 graduate of the California Maritime Academy. He spent 13 years at sea, rising from third assistant engineer to first assistant engineer, mostly on Jones Act tankers with a few years on foreign-flagged oil and gas vessels. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d fix first.

What we heard

What’s working: More people are speaking up for the maritime industry, and that is driving legislation like the SHIPS for America Act. He points to the Maritime Security Program, the Tanker Security Program and the Cable Security Fleet as proof that targeted commercial programs work, and to the brown-water fleet of tugs, barges and supply boats, whose yards keep delivering steadily and cost-effectively.

The biggest barrier: “Out of sight, out of mind.” Beyond that, shipbuilding costs, a commercial build cycle that comes only every 10 to 20 years so yards can’t keep their crews and expertise between orders, and a shortage of mariners as shoreside pay catches up.

“Every new construction project feels like starting from scratch, leading to costly layoffs and lost expertise.”

Fix first: Revisit maritime policy using real data on what works and what doesn’t. He lays out his own four-pillar proposal, the Maritime Infrastructure Resilience Act (MIRA), which he says is aimed at the supply side, where the SHIPS Act focuses on demand.

Full transcript

Lightly edited for clarity.

Bill Cullifer: Hello, Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy. Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. We’ve got a great lineup this week. This series is the platform for voices across the maritime world, including ones that don’t always agree with each other, or with us for that matter. That’s the point. Today we hear from Nick Littlepage, a Cal Maritime grad who spent 13 years in engine rooms, mostly on Jones Act tankers, and worked his way up to first assistant engineer. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d fix first. Nick, over to you.

Introduction

Nick Littlepage: Hello, my name is Nick Littlepage. I’m a former merchant marine engineer and a graduate of the California Maritime Academy, class of 2008.

I come from the commercial side of the industry. I spent 13 years working on a variety of vessels, starting as a third assistant engineer and eventually reaching the rank of first assistant engineer. I spent most of my time sailing on Jones Act tankers, with a couple of years on foreign-flagged oil and gas vessels. That gave me experience on a variety of ships and exposure to how things operate under different flag registries.

Even though I’m now in power generation, I’m a big supporter of a strong merchant marine, which is key to maritime sovereignty and a foundation for a powerful Navy. The recent Jones Act waivers rekindled my passion and made me realize I needed to voice my support much louder.

Connecting with Clay Wirsing and his U.S. Maritime Action platform opened up my world to how much support is growing in the maritime sector. Huge thanks to Bill at Americans for a Stronger Navy for creating the America at Sea campaign, a platform for anyone to voice their support for the maritime industry.

Question 1: What’s working right now that we should do more of?

Nick Littlepage: The number of people who have spoken out in support is growing. These are people willing to take the criticism that comes with being at the forefront of a movement. That leads to conversations and exposes this little-known industry to the general public. It has led to legislation such as the SHIPS Act, which is a comprehensive reform of our maritime policy.

Other areas where we’re succeeding are the Maritime Security Program, the Tanker Security Program and the Cable Security Fleet. We’ve been maintaining them by cycling in newer tonnage to replace older tonnage. The Tanker Security Program is relatively new, and Congress’s recent authorization to double the fleet to 20 vessels proves that targeted commercial mechanisms work.

The brown-water fleet is an often overlooked sector of the maritime industry. It makes up the largest part of the U.S.-flag fleet, including tugboats, barges, supply boats and many other small craft. Those yards consistently meet the steady demand for smaller vessels while staying cost-effective.

Question 2: What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?

Nick Littlepage: The first big barrier is the out-of-sight, out-of-mind approach to America’s maritime policy. It has historically been this way until something major happens and the country gets caught with its proverbial pants down. It wasn’t until the last 15 years that people really knew much about America’s maritime sector. Ironically, the maritime industry is a massive jobs multiplier that few people know about.

Shipbuilding costs, to me, are one of the biggest barriers to rebuilding America at sea. As much of a Jones Act supporter as I am, it’s hard to face the evidence that the commercial fleet has been slowly declining. The double-edged sword of the Jones Act has been the protected market, where the few shipyards understand there is a commercial build cycle every 10 to 20 years because U.S. shipping companies have to come to them. Coupled with less advanced, smaller-footprint shipyards, you end up with expensive ships that are delivered slowly.

This compounds because demand isn’t steady. Domestic shipyards can’t bridge build cycles, so every new construction project feels like starting from scratch, leading to costly layoffs and lost expertise.

The lack of qualified mariners is another big issue for all U.S. shipping companies. Shoreside wages have caught up, and shoreside jobs often have greater growth potential and better benefits, even compared to the maritime unions. Often the raises don’t reflect the sacrifice of being away for six to eight months. That makes it hard not only to attract a workforce but to retain one.

“The raises don’t reflect the sacrifice of being away for six to eight months.”

Question 3: If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

Nick Littlepage: The first thing I would fix is that we need to start revisiting our maritime policies, with actual data on what is working and what isn’t. We need to modernize what isn’t working to reflect global changes in supply lines and the industrial ecosystem.

I personally developed a four-pillar proposal called the Maritime Infrastructure Resilience Act, or MIRA. It’s designed to be a pragmatic combination of ideas that are out of the box and controversial to both Jones Act purists and Jones Act abolitionists. The goal of MIRA is to refine the supply side of the industry to attract private capital without direct cash government subsidies. Where the SHIPS Act focuses on demand, MIRA focuses on making American shipbuilding economically viable, so that vessels get built to fulfill that demand.

I believe many of the problems facing the commercial maritime industry can be addressed through MIRA. The highlights include:

Using techniques such as distributed manufacturing for shipbuilding, much like the airline industry, to scale the fleet in a timelier manner.

Creating a foreign-built ratio system, where one domestic build allows one foreign-built sister vessel into the Jones Act trade, under very tight structural safeguards.

Federal tax exemptions for mariners who work on U.S.-flag vessels in commercial trade, to attract and retain a workforce.

And finally, accelerated tax write-offs for companies that build ships in the United States or do their maintenance, repair and overhaul work in U.S. shipyards or lay berths. The idea is to create a circular shipbuilding ecosystem.

Closing

Nick Littlepage: Throughout history, people coming together for a common cause have often brought about very positive change. In this instance, we’ve been presented an opportunity to have our collective voices heard, with not just critiques but realistic solutions. Together, we will see legislation take shape that will usher the United States into regaining its maritime sovereignty.

“Not just critiques but realistic solutions.”

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own, and featuring a proposal is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

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America at Sea: Clay Wirsing on Momentum, Shipyard Capacity and Building What We Know

America at Sea: Voices That Matter continues with Clay Wirsing, founder of U.S. Maritime Action. Clay started his career as a welding engineer at Newport News Shipbuilding. He answers the same three questions we ask everyone, from the shipyard floor up.

New to the SHIPS for America Act? Clay gets into the details, so you may want to start with our plain-English primer.

Join the conversation. Reply to the post above on X and tell us what’s working, what’s in the way, and what you’d fix first.

What we heard

What’s working: momentum. Clay sees real energy behind the SHIPS for America Act and more public attention to maritime policy than ever. He calls it “an overwhelmingly positive bill for the maritime industry.”

What’s in the way: shipyard capacity. Clay walks through j JM mmthree parts of the bill and asks whether our yards can deliver. The cargo rules for government cargo, imports from China and LNG exports would each call for more U.S. ships than today’s yards can build quickly. The yards that build commercial ships produce about five ships a year at peak, many are tied up with government work, and there’s already a shortage of welders and other tradesmen.

“I like the initiative behind this. I think it’s just getting a little bit ahead of ourselves.” — Clay Wirsing

What he’d fix first: start with what we know how to build. Begin with standard tankers, container ships and bulk carriers, including bulk carriers to secure supply chains like rare earth elements, before moving to complex LNG carriers. Phase the government cargo requirement in, at something like 75 to 90 percent, as the fleet grows.

The long view. China revisits its maritime policy every five to ten years. The United States hasn’t made a major update since the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. “It’s long overdue,” Clay says, and the work shouldn’t stop with one bill.

The three questions

1. What’s working right now that we should do more of?
2. What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?
3. If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

Transcript

Lightly edited for readability.

Bill Cullifer: Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy. Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Today we hear from Clay Wirsing, founder of U.S. Maritime Action in San Diego. He started his career on the shipyard floor in Newport News, Virginia. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d like to fix first. Clay, over to you.

Introduction

Clay Wirsing: My name is Clay Wirsing. I started off as a welding engineer back in 2017 at Newport News Shipbuilding. At the time I really didn’t have any idea what the global situation was with shipbuilding or maritime. And I can remember about a year after I started, some high-level officials from the Navy came in and talked to us about speeding up the pace of our shipyard in order to compete with China. That was kind of my first introduction to how far we’ve fallen behind as a maritime nation, especially in shipbuilding.

Unfortunately, not a lot has changed since then in terms of actual shipbuilding capacity, but we do now see a ton of momentum, which has been great to see, with the SHIPS for America Act, and a lot more public recognition of what’s going on. And so I just want to continue to contribute to that, and hope to see more people join the movement and let our politicians know that maritime is an important space for both our economy and national defense, and we need to have the right laws and policies that allow us to succeed in that domain.

What’s working right now that we should do more of?

I love the momentum that’s being built up behind the SHIPS for America Act. It’s great to see that there’s a lot of attention to our maritime policy and laws, and that’s becoming more recognized by the public. And I think we need to just continue to join that discussion and get as many people involved, to let our politicians know that maritime policy is an important part of our country.

The SHIPS for America Act is an overwhelmingly positive bill for the maritime industry. I think there are some little tweaks that I would urge our politicians to consider, to better suit the needs of our maritime industry and also have realistic policy.

What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?

In section 412 of the bill, there is a mandate for 100% U.S. government cargo preference going to U.S.-flag ships. I think this is a great initiative, but we might be a little bit ahead of ourselves just because of the small size of the U.S. fleet. If we increase this more modestly, to something like 75% or even 90%, then it does give us a little bit of flexibility when we don’t have U.S. ships available to take our government cargoes. And I think that’s something we could revisit down the line. Assuming our fleet does grow, we will be able to have 100% government cargo preference in the future.

Section 415 mandates that within 15 years, 10% of all cargo imported from China to the U.S. will be carried on U.S.-flagged vessels. Currently there are about a million TEU, twenty-foot equivalent containers, shipped from China to the U.S. each year. We’re only carrying about 2 to 3% of that trade currently, and that’s all through Matson’s CLX line. So to carry 10% of that trade, I think we’re looking at either 10 very large ships or around 50 container ships. And the shipyards we have doing commercial work right now aren’t really large enough to build these huge container ships. It’ll basically lead to a point where we need to build a lot of ships in a very short amount of time, which I don’t think is realistic. Again, I like the initiative behind this. I think it’s just getting a little bit ahead of ourselves.

Another section that might be problematic is section 420, which requires that 15% of total seaborne LNG exports be carried on U.S.-flag vessels by 2043. This is going to require somewhere between 15 and 25 LNG ships, depending on their size. LNG ships these days are quite large. They’re actually much bigger than the ships currently built at General Dynamics NASSCO or Hanwha Philly Shipyard, and those shipyards are building about five ships per year in total at their peak capacity. We currently see a lot of these shipyards tied up with government contracts, so I don’t think there’s a lot of capacity to take on LNG work. On top of that, LNG vessels are pretty complex to build, especially their containment tanks. And we already have shortages of welders and other tradesmen, which will make it difficult to build these in a cost- and time-effective manner.

If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

I think it would be better to start off with a more reasonable ship type, things that we’ve already built: standard oil tankers, container ships, or maybe even a simple ship type like bulk carriers to secure our rare earth elements or other parts of our supply chain, rather than going straight for the complex LNG vessels. Again, I like the sentiment behind this. I just think we’re not quite where we need to be with yard capacity to pull off some of the shipbuilding requirements laid out in this bill.

A lot of countries, especially China, are revisiting their maritime policy every five years, maybe a decade or so. The U.S. hasn’t really had a major effort in revisiting or revising its policy since the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. So it’s long overdue. I hope to see some bills like the SHIPS for America Act come through and pass in Congress, and then, not only that, but as we continue to move forward as a nation, that we continually revisit these issues and make sure that our maritime laws and policies are appropriate for the conditions we face in our current period.

While we argue, China plans. It’s time we started building.

Americans for a Stronger Navy is a nonpartisan not for proft organization.