Capitol Hill Watch Archives - Americans for a Stronger Navy

April 7, 2026April 7, 2026

The Golden Fleet Needs a Funding Engine. We Built One.

Brent Sadler at The Heritage Foundation just published one of the most comprehensive naval shipbuilding blueprints in recent memory. The 40-page Special Report, To Build the Golden Fleet, released March 25, 2026, is required reading for anyone serious about what it will actually take to rebuild American sea power. We’ve read every page. Sadler gets it right.

But the report has a gap. And we’ve spent two and a half years building the mechanism to fill it.

First, the numbers that should stop every American cold.

As of March 2026, China’s fleet stands at 474 warships. Ours stands at 291. Since September 2016 — when Congress set a goal of 355 ships — China’s fleet has grown by more than 100 warships. We added 17. [1]

The 2016 Force Structure Assessment identified the real requirement as 459 warships. Budget pressure compressed that to 355. And 325 ships was assessed as “maximum acceptable risk” — a floor, not a goal. We are operating below that floor today.

Submarine production currently runs at 1.1 boats per year. The requirement is 2.33 per year — and above 3.0 per year once AUKUS demand kicks in. [1]

Secretary Phelan has said 250,000 new shipyard workers will be needed over the next decade. And according to the Navy’s own acquisition executive, 50 to 60 percent of new industrial base hires quit within their first year. [1]

There are eight U.S. shipyards capable of building vessels over 400 feet in length. Eight. For a nation that needs to build a generational fleet larger than the Reagan-era 600-ship buildup.

These are not advocacy numbers. These are Sadler’s numbers, sourced from the Pentagon, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Navy’s own planning documents.

What the Golden Fleet Report Gets Right

Sadler’s blueprint is built around two simultaneous imperatives that most naval commentary treats as separate problems. He holds them together correctly.

The first is getting firepower to sea now. The bridge fleet — largely unmanned platforms deploying existing weapons like Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 missiles, built faster at smaller shipyards — addresses the 2027 Davidson Window without waiting for the industrial base to catch up. The USV Ranger’s successful SM-6 launch in September 2021 is the proof of concept. This is executable today.

The second is the generational industrial revival. New public shipyards in the Pacific. Design sprint teams collocated with shipbuilders. Vessel Construction Manager models that consolidate accountability. Modular construction techniques. Robotic welding systems that South Korean and Japanese shipyards have shown increase productivity by 20 percent. Block buys that give industry the funding predictability to invest in workforce and infrastructure rather than managing quarter-to-quarter. [1]

Sadler is particularly sharp on a point that rarely gets named directly: budgets must not predetermine the size or delivery schedule of the Golden Fleet. The threat informs the requirement. The requirement informs the budget. Not the other way around. Budget-led planning is how we got from a real requirement of 459 ships to a compromise of 355 to an actual fleet of 291 — while China added 100 warships.

The Gap the Report Doesn’t Fill

Sadler calls for novel contracting mechanisms — specifically SAWS, the Shipyard Accountability and Workforce Support contracting approach — matched with reformed tax structures that incentivize capital investment in shipbuilding capacity over pleasing Wall Street. He calls for a Naval Act with block buy authority. He calls for a fifth public shipyard in the Pacific at an estimated cost of $20 billion, with Congress appropriating initial funding now. [1]

These are the right prescriptions. But they share a structural dependency that the report doesn’t fully resolve: they all require sustained, predictable, mandatory funding that the annual appropriations process has consistently failed to deliver.

The White House Maritime Action Plan, released February 13, 2026, directed OMB to propose a legislative mechanism for a Maritime Security Trust Fund — a dedicated, mandatory funding stream. The directive was clear. The mechanism was left unspecified.

That mechanism is the Strategic SEAS Act.

The Funding Engine

The Strategic SEAS Act — the Shipbuilding Economic Acceleration and Security Act — proposes a sector-based defense reinvestment framework. Companies whose global operations depend on the maritime security the U.S. Navy provides contribute to a Maritime Security Trust Fund dedicated to shipbuilding capacity, fleet expansion, and maritime workforce development.

The logic is direct. American technology, developed with public investment and deployed at global scale, enabled the commercial operations that now depend on open sea lanes. China’s own shipbuilding capacity — the one producing more tonnage annually than the entire U.S. fleet — relies on logistics networks and advanced manufacturing that trace lineage to American innovation. The companies that benefit most from maritime security should have a structural stake in sustaining it.

This is not a new tax. It is a reinvestment framework — the same principle Sadler invokes when he calls for incentive structures that reward capital investment in shipbuilding over short-term financial returns.

The SEAS Act provides what SAWS and block buys cannot provide on their own: a funding stream that does not depend on annual appropriations decisions, does not compete with other defense priorities in the FYDP, and does not evaporate when political priorities shift between administrations.

Sadler’s Golden Fleet blueprint is the architecture. The SEAS Act is the funding engine that makes it executable across budget cycles.

The full framework has been published by the Center for Maritime Strategy as “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy.” [2]

One More Data Point Worth Naming

In the comments section of Sadler’s September 2025 Washington Times piece, a reader identifying himself as the leader of the 2016 Force Structure Assessment study team wrote the following:

“I led the study team that developed the 2016 force structure assessment and just wanted to point out that the different numbers were based on assessed risk. CNO chose the 355-ship force that we assessed as ‘moderate risk’ while the 459 was minimal risk. We even had a 325-ship ‘maximum acceptable risk’ — which should say something about our current force level.”

Read that carefully. Three hundred twenty-five ships was the floor — the maximum acceptable risk threshold established by the people who ran the assessment. We have 291. We are not below the goal. We are below the floor.

That is not a readiness problem. That is a national security emergency dressed in budget language.

What Comes Next

Secretary of the Navy John Phelan confirmed this week that the Golden Fleet is no longer a blueprint — it is an active program. In a public statement, Phelan outlined decisive action already underway: canceled programs not delivering results, new Portfolio Acquisition Executives with accountability for integrated capabilities, a Rapid Capabilities Office to accelerate technology delivery, and Ship OS now scaled to two major shipbuilders, four public shipyards, and 100 suppliers. Most significantly for the funding argument, Phelan stated plainly that “the era of free money is over — industry now has skin in the game and investing in their own expansion.” That is the SEAS Act’s core logic stated from the highest level of Navy civilian leadership. The reinvestment principle is no longer outside advocacy. It is official policy direction waiting for a legislative mechanism.

The Golden Fleet details will emerge in the coming days as the Navy’s budget and 30-year shipbuilding plan follow the report. Sadler’s three metrics for judging whether it’s worthy remain the right standard: firepower to sea, new operational concepts to deter China, and maritime industrial revival.

The third metric — industrial revival — cannot be sustained by legislative authorization alone. It requires a funding architecture that outlasts administrations and survives budget cycles. The SEAS Act is that architecture.

Americans for a Stronger Navy has been building toward this moment for two and a half years. Eight hundred published posts. A nonpartisan record. A framework developed in consultation with naval policy experts, constitutional scholars, and defense industry stakeholders.

The blueprint exists. The funding mechanism exists. What remains is the political will to connect them.

That is what we are working on. And we are not going anywhere.

References

[1] Brent Sadler, “To Build the Golden Fleet,” The Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 328, March 25, 2026. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/build-the-golden-fleet

[2] Bill Cullifer, “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy: The Strategic SEAS Act and Industrial Base Competition,” Center for Maritime Strategy, 2026. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/defense-reinvestment-as-naval-strategy-the-strategic-seas-act-and-industrial-base-competition/

[3] White House Maritime Action Plan, February 13, 2026.

Bill Cullifer is the founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy and a former blue-water destroyer sailor who served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7). StrongerNavy.org.

March 8, 2026March 8, 2026

Understanding the U.S. Navy’s Industrial Challenge

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered (Part 1 of 8)

I served as a blue-water destroyer sailor in the 1970s, and like many veterans, I’ve spent the years since trying to understand how America maintains the naval strength that protects our country, our allies, and the global sea lanes we all depend on.

The charts and analysis below help tell part of that story.

This article is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter, our ongoing educational series exploring the future of American sea power and the policies, people, and industrial strength that sustain the U.S. Navy.

If you’re new to the series, you can start with the introduction here:
Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

This article also launches a focused 8-part series within Charting the Course examining some of the most important questions facing the Navy today — from shipbuilding capacity and fleet readiness to workforce challenges and the future of maritime deterrence.

We’re calling it The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

For most Americans, the Navy is something we think about only in moments of crisis. A conflict erupts, a carrier group deploys, or a headline mentions tensions in the Pacific or the Middle East.

But the strength of the U.S. Navy is not decided during those moments. It is determined years — sometimes decades — earlier in shipyards, classrooms, industrial plants, research labs, and congressional hearings.

Today the United States faces serious questions about shipbuilding capacity, industrial readiness, and long-term naval strategy. China is building ships at a pace the world has not seen in generations. Russia continues to challenge Western stability at sea. Critical maritime infrastructure and supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

And yet many Americans remain understandably disconnected from the decisions shaping the future of our fleet.

The strength of the U.S. Navy is determined long before ships sail into crisis—it is built in shipyards, sustained by skilled workers, and shaped by decisions made years earlier in industry, technology, and national policy.

Why Americans Should Care

America is, and has always been, a maritime nation.

Nearly 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. The global economy depends on secure shipping lanes. Energy markets, supply chains, and the stability of democratic alliances all rely on freedom of navigation.

The U.S. Navy has quietly safeguarded those sea lanes for generations.

But maintaining that advantage requires more than ships — it requires people, industry, technology, and public understanding.

Chart: Global Operational Demand on the U.S. Navy

This Heritage Foundation chart illustrates the geographic reach of U.S. naval operations across multiple regions. Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups are routinely deployed worldwide, highlighting the constant global demand placed on the fleet.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Over the coming weeks, this series will explore several critical questions about the future of U.S. sea power.

Can America rebuild the shipbuilding capacity required to compete in a new era of great power competition?

Do we have enough skilled workers — engineers, welders, and naval architects — to sustain fleet growth?

How serious is the maintenance backlog affecting submarines and surface ships?

Are current procurement processes helping or hurting the Navy’s ability to modernize?

How should the United States balance aircraft carriers, submarines, uncrewed systems, and logistics platforms?

What role do civilian shipyards and maritime infrastructure play in national security?

Can the United States scale submarine production fast enough to match emerging threats?

And perhaps most importantly: how do we ensure the American public remains engaged in decisions that affect the future of the fleet?

These are not partisan questions. They are national questions.

Understanding the Industrial Challenge

Much of the discussion about naval power focuses on ships already at sea. But the true story begins on land — in America’s shipyards and industrial base.

Chart: Age Distribution of Chinese and U.S. Naval Fleets

This chart compares the age distribution of Chinese and U.S. naval fleets. China’s fleet contains a larger number of relatively new ships, reflecting rapid shipbuilding expansion in recent years.

China now possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding industry by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, American shipyards face workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and unpredictable funding cycles.

Chart: U.S. Navy Ships Nearing or Exceeding Service Life

This chart shows the growing number of U.S. Navy ships approaching — or exceeding — their expected service life, placing additional strain on fleet readiness and modernization timelines.

The Human Factor

Ships and technology matter — but ultimately the Navy is built on people.

From sailors standing watch at sea tonight to the skilled workers building submarines and carriers at home, the strength of the fleet depends on the dedication and expertise of thousands of Americans.

Implications for Our Allies

America does not operate alone at sea.

Alliances with countries such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners form a critical part of global maritime stability.

These partnerships reinforce an important truth: deterrence is strongest when democracies stand together.

Public Engagement Matters

The U.S. Navy ultimately belongs to the American people.

Yet the complexity of defense planning can make it difficult for citizens to understand how decisions about shipbuilding, budgets, and strategy affect national security.

That is one of the reasons we created StrongerNavy.org.

Our goal is simple: help Americans better understand the challenges facing the fleet, the industrial base that supports it, and the people who serve at sea and in shipyards across the country.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered — Series Guide

Part 1 – Understanding the Industrial Challenge (this article)

Part 2 – Can America Rebuild Shipbuilding Capacity?

Part 3 – The Submarine Production Challenge

Part 4 – Maintenance and Fleet Readiness

Part 5 – Workforce and the Maritime Industrial Base

Part 6 – The Role of Allies in Sea Power

Part 7 – Procurement, Policy, and the Future Fleet

Part 8 – Why Public Engagement Matters

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing
educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next.

Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

March 4, 2026March 5, 2026

Strait of Hormuz: The Facts, The Warning, and What America Can Do

Special Report | March 5, 2026

Cutting through the noise on the world’s most critical waterway — and why this moment calls for resolve, not panic.

There is a lot of noise right now about the Strait of Hormuz. Some of it is accurate. Some of it is not. All of it is loud. Before you form an opinion about what this crisis means — and what America should do about it — you deserve the facts, stated plainly, without an agenda.

That is what we do at StrongerNavy.org. Plain language. Verified facts. No spin.

What Is Actually Happening

The Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide waterway on Iran’s southern border — is the single maritime exit for the Persian Gulf. Every barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Iran that leaves by sea passes through this one gap. It carries 20% of the world’s oil and a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas. There is no alternative route. Ships that cannot use the strait must sail around the southern tip of Africa — adding two to three weeks to every voyage.

Since February 28, that strait has been effectively closed to nearly all commercial shipping. Let’s be precise about what that means.

It is legally open. The U.S. Central Command has confirmed the strait “remains open to international navigation.” Iran has not formally closed an international waterway — it cannot under maritime law.

It is operationally closed. Ship traffic is down 94%, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center. The world’s largest shipping companies — Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, CMA CGM — have all suspended transits. Approximately 750 ships are caught in or around the strait, unable to move.

The reason ships stopped is not Iran’s navy. It is marine insurance. A European regulatory framework called Solvency 2 requires insurers to hold capital sufficient for a once-in-200-year loss event at all times. When conflict escalated, insurers recalculated their exposure overnight. Cancelling war risk coverage takes seven days. Raising new capital takes months. The math was simple — and 90% of the world’s commercial fleet lost its coverage. As maritime historian Sal Mercogliano put it plainly on March 4: “It’s not the Iranians closing the strait. The decision was made by the shipping companies.”

Iran’s weapon is not its fleet. It is economic fear. And it has worked — for now.

What It Tells Us

None of this should be a surprise. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has been documented for decades. Naval planners have war-gamed this scenario repeatedly. The question was never whether it could happen. The question was whether America would be ready when it did.

On March 3, President Trump ordered the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide government war risk insurance for all maritime trade in the Gulf — effective immediately, at what he described as “a very reasonable price.” It was the right instinct. Private insurers had fled the market overnight, and the insurance gap — not Iranian guns — was what stopped the ships.

Whether it moves the needle remains to be seen. The shipping industry has signaled the offer may not be sufficient to restore confidence on its own. And if vessels are damaged, American taxpayers could face a bill in the hundreds of millions — potentially billions. The commitment is real. The details are still emerging.

On March 4, President Trump pledged the U.S. Navy would escort commercial tankers through the strait. Within hours, Lloyd’s List reported the Navy had privately told shipping industry leaders it does not currently have sufficient assets to fulfill that commitment. Approximately 125 ships transit the strait daily under normal conditions. The U.S. has roughly eight guided-missile destroyers and three Littoral Combat Ships in the region. As Mercogliano noted: “This is nowhere near enough assets. They just do not have the assets to do it.”

There are no frigates available — because the U.S. has not yet built a replacement frigate. The Littoral Combat Ships present cannot reliably provide air defense against drones and missiles, as the Red Sea campaign demonstrated. And even as U.S. forces degrade Iran’s conventional navy — including the March 4 torpedo sinking of the Iranian corvette IRS Dena, the first U.S. submarine sinking of a warship since World War II — the asymmetric threat remains. Drones, mines, and fast boats do not require a functioning navy. The Houthis proved that. The Ukrainians proved that in the Black Sea.

We also do not know the full readiness picture of the ships operating in the Gulf tonight — because the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey readiness reports have been classified since 2008. The American public cannot independently verify whether those vessels are fully mission-capable. That is unacceptable. #FreeTheData

The gap between the President’s public commitment and the Navy’s private assessment is not a failure of this administration alone. It is the accumulated result of a generation of deferred shipbuilding, underfunded shipyards, and what we have long called seablindness — America’s institutional tendency to underinvest in naval power during periods of relative peace, then scramble when a crisis arrives.

You cannot build a destroyer in a crisis. The fleet available tonight was determined by decisions made — and deferred — over the past decade.

We Have Been Here Before

I want to say something that tends to get lost in the noise: America has fixed this before.

I served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s. That was the hollow Navy — undermanned, underfunded, demoralized after Vietnam, outpaced by a Soviet fleet that was growing faster than ours. The readiness gap then was real. The threat was real. The concern among those of us who served was real.

And then America came together and fixed it.

The Reagan-era naval buildup — driven by bipartisan recognition that sea power was not optional for a global superpower — took a Navy that could barely sustain itself and rebuilt it into the 600-ship force that helped end the Cold War without firing a single shot at its primary adversary. It did not happen because of panic. It happened because enough Americans, in and out of uniform, looked at the problem clearly and decided the answer was investment, not retreat.

That is the moment we are in again. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not the end of the story. It is the alarm clock.

What America Does Now

The framework for action already exists. The President signed Executive Order 14269 restoring America’s maritime dominance. The Maritime Action Plan, released in February 2026, identified exactly the investments needed — shipbuilding capacity, workforce development, industrial base expansion, a Maritime Security Trust Fund with dedicated funding. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is preparing public hearings in Q2 2026. The SHIPS for America Act has bipartisan support in Congress.

The architecture is there. What has been missing is national will — the public demand that elected representatives treat naval power as the non-negotiable strategic necessity it is.

That is what StrongerNavy.org exists to build. Not alarm. Not partisanship. Not finger-pointing. A clear-eyed, evidence-based, nonpartisan case that a strong Navy is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It is an American issue — as fundamental to our security and prosperity as any question before the country today.

The Strait of Hormuz will reopen. Insurance markets will recalibrate. Ships will move again. But the underlying readiness gap — the shipyard capacity shortfall, the escort deficit, the classified readiness reports, the two-theater question that nobody in Washington wants to answer plainly — will still be there the morning after.

The question is whether this crisis produces the national conversation that leads to real investment, or whether we absorb the shock, breathe a sigh of relief, and go back to sleep.

America does not have to choose seablindness. We chose our way into this. We can choose our way out.

“The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.” — John F. Kennedy

The sun is not shining right now. But when it does — and it will — let’s make sure we remember what this week felt like. And build accordingly.

Stay Informed. Stay Engaged.

StrongerNavy.org has been covering the naval readiness gap for over two years — plain language, verified facts, no spin. If this post was useful, share it with someone who needs to understand what is at stake. And follow our ongoing coverage as this crisis develops.

This is America’s wake-up call. What we do with it is up to us.

February 25, 2026February 25, 2026

The Conversation Is Shifting on Sea Power — Now Americans Must Engage

Something important is happening.

For years, maritime decline has been treated as a niche issue — something for defense insiders, shipyard executives, or Navy circles to debate quietly. That is beginning to change.

Recently, Senator Todd Young published, in American Affairs Journal a thoughtful piece arguing that rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base is essential to both economic strength and national security. He traced the issue back to the Revolution, through Mahan, and into the present-day competition with China.

That matters.

Not because of who wrote it. But because of what it signals.

Maritime Power Is Back in the Conversation

For decades, America has allowed its commercial fleet to shrink. Shipyards have closed. Skilled labor has aged out. Foreign-flagged vessels now move the overwhelming majority of our trade.

Meanwhile, China designated shipbuilding a strategic industry and built accordingly.

This is not about panic. It is about arithmetic.

Eighty percent of global trade moves by sea. Most of America’s trade does too. If we cannot build, repair, and crew ships at scale, we are strategically exposed — economically and militarily.

The encouraging sign is that leaders are once again speaking openly about maritime strength.

That is progress.

Policy Is Necessary — But Not Sufficient

Legislation like the proposed SHIPS Act is an important step. Tax incentives, regulatory reform, maritime academy modernization — these are serious proposals.

But here is the harder truth:

Industrial revival cannot be sustained by legislation alone.

Shipbuilding capacity requires:

Workforce development
Steel production
Port modernization
Cybersecurity resilience
Long-term capital investment
And, above all, public understanding

Without public buy-in, even well-crafted policy fades with political cycles.

This Is Not a Coastal Issue

One of the most overlooked truths in this debate is that maritime strength touches every American.

Indiana steel feeds shipyards.
Midwestern grain moves to global markets by sea.
Energy exports rely on tankers.
Supply chains run through ports.

Sea power is not about nostalgia. It is about jobs, commerce, resilience, and deterrence.

When ships deploy longer because the fleet is too small…
When maintenance backlogs grow…
When sealift capacity shrinks…

Those are not abstract statistics. They are signs of strain in a system Americans depend on every day.

Civic Engagement Is the Missing Ingredient

We can debate fleet numbers. We can debate funding mechanisms. We can debate industrial policy.

But unless Americans understand why this matters — and choose to participate in the conversation — nothing lasting will change.

Rebuilding sea power is not simply a government project. It is a civic project.

It requires voters who ask informed questions.
Taxpayers who demand accountability.
Educators who teach maritime history and strategy.
Industry leaders willing to invest long-term.

America’s maritime strength has always rested on the character and engagement of its people.

That spirit has not disappeared.

The conversation is shifting. That is a good sign.

Now the responsibility shifts to us.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

Read the full article here.

February 21, 2026February 21, 2026

Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

As a former blue water sailor and founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I learned early that naval strength is not defined by speeches or strategies alone. It is defined by readiness—by ships that work, sailors who are trained, and shipyards that can sustain them.

Over the past two years, through Americans for a Stronger Navy and StrongerNavy.org, I have worked to better understand the forces shaping the future of our Navy. What I have discovered is both reassuring and sobering.

Reassuring because the Navy’s leadership clearly understands the changing threat environment. Sobering because serious professionals—inside and outside the Navy—are actively debating how best to prepare for it.

This series is designed to help Americans understand that debate.

A Navy in Transition

The United States Navy is undergoing one of its most significant strategic transitions since the end of the Cold War. For decades, our Navy operated in an environment where it could project power with relative freedom. That era is over.

China now operates the world’s largest navy by ship count and continues expanding its industrial capacity at a pace unmatched in modern times. Russia remains a capable undersea competitor. Meanwhile, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and directed-energy weapons are changing how naval warfare may be conducted in the decades ahead.

The Navy’s leadership recognizes this reality. They are adapting strategy, exploring new technologies, and rethinking how naval forces will operate in the future. But within that effort, there are important and healthy debates—and Americans deserve to understand them.

Different Perspectives, Shared Purpose

Some leaders emphasize the continued importance of traditional crewed ships—destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers—as the backbone of naval power. Others emphasize the growing role unmanned systems may play in extending reach and enhancing survivability. Still others focus on the industrial foundation that makes both possible: shipyards, maintenance infrastructure, and workforce capacity.

These are not disagreements about the mission. They are discussions about how best to ensure the Navy remains ready, effective, and capable in a changing world. What unites these perspectives is a shared recognition that readiness requires sustained national support.

Ships must be built. Shipyards must be modernized. Sailors must be trained. Infrastructure must be maintained. None of this happens automatically.

Why Industrial Capacity Matters

One of the most important lessons from this work is that naval power is built on industrial strength. Strategy determines what the Navy needs to do. Industrial capacity determines whether it can do it.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), our public and private shipyards, and the skilled workforce that supports them form the foundation of naval readiness. Without their ability to build, maintain, and modernize ships, even the best strategy cannot succeed.

This is not a criticism. It is simply reality—and it is why public understanding matters. Americans deserve to know how their Navy works, what challenges it faces, and what is required to sustain it for future generations.

From Understanding to Sustained Support: The Strategic SEAS Act

Understanding the challenge is the first step. Sustaining readiness over time requires structural solutions.

That is why Americans for a Stronger Navy developed the Strategic SEAS Act—a framework designed to provide predictable, sustained funding for shipbuilding capacity, shipyard modernization, workforce development, and allied maritime infrastructure. Its purpose is straightforward: to help ensure that the Navy and the maritime industrial base have the long-term support necessary to meet national security requirements.

The Strategic SEAS Act complements legislative efforts like the SHIPS Act by addressing a critical question: how to provide sustained, reliable funding to support the Navy’s long-term readiness. Readiness is not built in a year. It is built over decades.

Why This Matters Now

The decisions being made today—about ships, shipyards, technology, workforce, and sustained funding—will define America’s naval strength for the next generation. These decisions are being made now, in budget cycles and legislative sessions that most Americans never see.

Meanwhile, serious questions are being raised by experienced naval professionals, defense analysts, and members of Congress about whether America’s shipbuilding capacity and industrial base can support the strategy at the pace required. Those questions deserve honest, public answers.

This series is intended to provide that clarity—directly, responsibly, and in plain English.

The Questions This Series Will Address

Among them:

• Are traditional ships like destroyers, submarines, and carriers still essential in the age of drones and autonomous systems?

• Can unmanned systems truly enhance naval power—or are they being asked to do too much, too soon?

• Is America’s shipbuilding and repair infrastructure strong enough to sustain the Navy the nation requires?

• What role does Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) play in ensuring readiness—and what challenges does it face?

• How does America’s shipbuilding capacity compare to China’s—and what does that mean strategically?

• Can the Navy realistically surge its fleet when needed?

• What role do Congress, industry, and the American people play in sustaining naval strength over time?

• And most importantly: what must be done—practically, responsibly, and sustainably—to ensure the United States Navy remains ready to protect American interests for decades to come?

These are not political questions. They are national questions. And Americans deserve clear, honest answers.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects far more than military interests. It safeguards global commerce, deters conflict, reassures allies, and protects the economic system Americans depend on every day. When the Navy is ready, it helps preserve peace through strength. When industrial capacity declines, readiness becomes harder to sustain.

The decisions being made today will shape America’s naval strength for decades to come. Americans deserve to understand those decisions.

What This 8-Part Series Will Explore

In the weeks ahead, this series will examine why traditional naval ships remain essential, how unmanned systems are changing naval operations, the critical role of NAVSEA and America’s shipyards, the industrial and workforce foundation behind naval readiness, how China and other nations are approaching maritime power, how naval strength is sustained over time, and what must be done to ensure continued readiness.

This is not about choosing sides in a debate. It is about understanding the full picture—because an informed public is essential to sustaining a strong Navy.

Let’s get to work.

February 19, 2026February 21, 2026

Protecting America’s Naval Edge

Protecting America’s Naval Edge
Strategic competition, documented technology theft, and military-linked research highlight why protecting America’s technological advantage is essential to maintaining naval superiority.

Abstract

Naval power in the 21st century is shaped as much by technological innovation as by fleet size. Strategic competitors are investing heavily in research, industrial capacity, and military modernization to close the technological gap with the United States. This article analyzes the implications of documented research security concerns, the role of military-linked academic institutions, and the broader strategic environment, and argues that preserving America’s technological advantage requires informed public engagement, policy alignment, and sustained national awareness.

Introduction

For decades, America’s naval superiority rested on more than ships—it rested on technological advantage. That advantage was built in American shipyards, laboratories, universities, and research institutions. Today, that technological edge is being challenged by strategic competitors who have invested heavily in naval expansion, industrial capacity, and military-relevant technologies. Increasingly, naval professionals, policymakers, and national security experts are raising concerns about how technological competition is unfolding—and how little public awareness exists about its implications. Some documented cases involving technology theft, undisclosed foreign military-linked affiliations, and strategic research competition have received only limited public attention. Americans deserve to understand what is happening, why it matters, and what it means for the future strength of the United States Navy.

Naval Power Begins Long Before a Ship Is Built

Every modern U.S. Navy platform depends on breakthroughs in science and engineering:

Nuclear engineering enables submarine propulsion and carrier endurance
Advanced materials determine hull strength, stealth, and survivability
Semiconductors power radar, communications, and weapons systems
Artificial intelligence and autonomy are reshaping the future of naval warfare

The future DDG(X) destroyer, unmanned naval systems, and next-generation submarines will rely heavily on research happening today in American universities, national laboratories, and federally funded programs.

These institutions are essential to national strength.

But the knowledge they produce exists in a world defined by strategic competition.

Documented Cases Show the Risk Is Real

Concerns about research security are not theoretical. Federal investigations and criminal prosecutions have confirmed cases involving the theft of sensitive technology, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and illegal transfer of research with national security implications.

In January 2026, a U.S. federal jury convicted a former Google engineer of stealing more than 2,000 confidential artificial intelligence and supercomputing files and transferring them to entities linked to China. These technologies have direct military and intelligence applications.

In 2021, Harvard University professor Charles Lieber was convicted for failing to disclose his financial relationship with China’s Thousand Talents Program while receiving U.S. federal research funding. Federal authorities determined he had concealed foreign financial ties tied to a Chinese state-affiliated university.

U.S. authorities have also prosecuted multiple export control violations and research-related concealment cases involving sensitive technologies, including advanced materials, computing, and engineering fields directly relevant to military capability.

The FBI has warned repeatedly that China operates one of the most extensive technology acquisition efforts in modern history, targeting critical research sectors tied to national defense.

These are documented cases—not speculation.

What the “Seven Sons” Represent

U.S. government reports and independent research institutions have identified a group of Chinese universities known as the “Seven Sons of National Defense” as central to China’s military research and development ecosystem. These institutions maintain deep ties to China’s defense industry and serve as primary training grounds for engineers and scientists supporting naval, aerospace, and weapons development.

China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy explicitly integrates civilian research with military advancement, accelerating defense capability development.

This structural integration differs fundamentally from the decentralized American system and highlights the importance of protecting the technological advantage that underpins U.S. naval superiority.

Why Americans Are Only Beginning to Hear This Story

Many of these cases involving technology theft, undisclosed affiliations, and research security concerns have been publicly reported—but rarely remain in the national spotlight long enough for Americans to see the broader pattern.

Through our China Watch coverage, Americans for a Stronger Navy has documented the larger strategic picture: rapid Chinese naval expansion, sustained investment in military-relevant technologies, and long-term efforts to close the technological and industrial gap with the United States.

This is not a moment for panic—but it is a moment for awareness.

Naval superiority depends on technological leadership. And technological leadership depends on national awareness.

Congress Recognized the Challenge — But the Debate Continues

In 2025, Congress passed the SAFE Research Act in the House of Representatives to strengthen transparency and accountability in federally funded research involving foreign adversary-linked institutions.

However, the provision was removed from the final National Defense Authorization Act after opposition from major academic organizations.

Organizations raising concerns included:

Association of American Universities (AAU)
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU)
American Physical Society (APS)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Asian American Scholar Forum (AASF)

These organizations warned the legislation could harm scientific collaboration, innovation, and America’s ability to attract global talent.

Their concerns reflect legitimate interests in preserving America’s research leadership.

At the same time, the strategic competition affecting naval power continues to accelerate.

Both realities exist.

Why This Matters to the Future of the U.S. Navy

Naval superiority is no longer determined solely by fleet size.

It depends on maintaining technological leadership in:

Nuclear propulsion
Artificial intelligence
Advanced materials
Autonomous systems
Sensors, communications, and computing

These technologies determine whether future American ships remain dominant—or vulnerable.

Shipbuilding matters. Industrial capacity matters. But technological leadership remains decisive.

If America protects its technological edge, it protects its naval advantage.

If it does not, ship numbers alone will not be enough.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects global trade, deters conflict, and secures the maritime foundation of the American economy.

Every American depends on maritime security.

But naval strength requires more than ships. It requires public awareness, industrial strength, and national alignment.

Americans cannot support what they do not understand.

That is why awareness matters.

Conclusion: A National Conversation Worth Having

America’s openness has fueled generations of innovation and built the most capable Navy in history.

But strategic competitors have studied our system, invested heavily, and worked deliberately to close the gap.

The question is not whether America should remain open.

The question is whether America will remain aware.

Naval superiority cannot be taken for granted. It must be protected—not just in shipyards, but in laboratories, in policy decisions, and in the national will of the American people.

Let’s roll.

January 17, 2026January 18, 2026

Rust, Readiness, and Reality: Why This Debate Matters to Every American

Why This Is Not a Navy Problem, but an American One

This essay explores why the current debate over rust and warfighting readiness is not an internal Navy issue, but a national one. The real problem is not cosmetic—it is systemic. Sailors are capable. The American public is supportive. What often fails is alignment upstream—where Congress, the Department of Defense, and senior leadership decide what gets funded, staffed, scheduled, and rewarded.

From the Founder

I served on a U.S. Navy destroyer in the 1970s. Some of the hardest-working, most capable people I’ve ever known wore Navy uniforms—officers and enlisted, engineers and operators, deckplate sailors and watchstanders. They weren’t lazy. They weren’t careless. And they weren’t disconnected from the mission.

They were doing the best they could inside a system that constantly forced tradeoffs.

That experience is why I’m paying close attention to the public debate about rust, preservation, and warfighting readiness. Because this is not a Navy culture fight. It’s not a generational fight. And it’s not an internal matter.

It’s a national readiness issue.

What Sparked This Debate

A recent article by LT Spike Dearing, published on the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), argued that today’s surface fleet is being inspected more for preservation than for warfighting. His point was not that preservation doesn’t matter—it absolutely does—but that what leaders choose to inspect shapes what sailors prioritize.

His concern is simple and serious: if warfighting performance is rarely inspected, it will inevitably become secondary.

The article prompted multiple responses in the CIMSEC comment section, including from naval historian and analyst Steven Wills, and was later republished on other defense platforms—signaling that its themes are resonating beyond its initial posting.

This is not a closed-door conversation. This is a public one—because the consequences of readiness, or the lack of it, do not stay inside the Navy.

What Steven Wills Gets Right

Steven Wills made an important point: corrosion is not cosmetic. Rust is not superficial. Preservation reflects discipline. And visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay.

He’s right.

Saltwater destroys steel. Systems fail. Neglect spreads. No serious warfighting force can afford to treat material condition as optional.

But this is where people often misframe the issue.

This is not a choice between paint and warfighting.

It is about whether the system enables both.

What LT Dearing Gets Right

LT Dearing is also right.

People respond rationally to what leaders inspect.

If leaders inspect surfaces, crews will optimize for surfaces. If leaders inspect tactics, crews will optimize for tactics.

That’s not laziness. That’s survival.

After the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, the Navy made fire safety non-negotiable. Inspections changed. Behavior changed. Training changed.

That’s how priorities shift.

Standards Matter — But Systems Decide Whether They Are Achievable

When defense analyst Brent Sadler says that a clean ship is a well-run ship and a combat-ready ship, he is pointing to something real: discipline, standards, and leadership signals matter. Order reflects process. Process reflects leadership. And leadership shapes behavior.

But that truth only holds when the system supporting those standards is aligned.

A ship can only be clean, disciplined, and well-run if crews are given the time, manpower, training windows, maintenance access, and parts availability needed to meet those standards. Without that support, expectations become performative instead of operational.

This is where the problem becomes systemic.

When standards are enforced without the resources to meet them, discipline turns into distortion. Crews are not failing — they are adapting. And adaptation is not weakness. It is rational behavior inside a misaligned system.

This is why this is not a deckplate problem.

This is a governance problem.

Who sets the priorities? Who controls the budgets? Who defines the metrics? Who decides what gets inspected, rewarded, and penalized? Readiness is not free. It is built—or it is hollowed out—by budgets, manpower decisions, and time allocations.

Those decisions are made upstream.

Sadler’s point about cleanliness is not wrong — it is incomplete without a systems lens. A clean ship should reflect readiness. But that only works when leadership designs a system that makes real readiness possible, not just presentable.

This is why LT Spike Dearing’s argument about what leaders choose to inspect matters. And it is why Steven Wills is right to warn that visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay. Both are describing the same thing from different angles: signals versus systems.

Signals matter. But systems decide outcomes.

My Experience

When I served, my shipmates worked relentlessly. We fought corrosion while underway. We knew what mattered. But we also knew what inspectors looked for.

So when inspections came, we painted.

Not because we didn’t care about readiness. But because we cared about protecting our command inside the system.

And a lot has changed since the 1970s. The Navy is smaller now and stretched even further. The systems are more complex, the demands are higher, and many of the sailors and officers carrying this load today could be my children. In many cases, they may not even have the time to paint over rust—because they are busy keeping the ship running, the systems online, and the mission moving.

That doesn’t weaken this argument. It strengthens it.

That’s not moral failure.

That’s a warning sign.

Hardworking people will always try to do everything. When they can’t, they triage based on what leadership rewards.

This Is Not a Navy-Internal Problem

This is not about sailors. This is not about pride. This is not about tradition.

This is about alignment.

Sailors are capable. Sailors are disciplined. Sailors are supported by the American people.

What they often lack is consistent backing from those who control resources, manpower, time, and priorities.

Readiness is not a slogan. It’s a system.

And when that system is misaligned, people adapt.

Why Americans Should Care

The Navy does not exist for the Navy. It exists for the American people.

If we want deterrence, we must prepare seriously. If we want peace, we must be credible. If we want stability, we must invest in real readiness—not performative readiness.

You cannot paint your way to warfighting competence.

Implications for the Navy

This debate exposes a dangerous risk: a force that looks ready but is not consistently evaluated for the conditions it will actually face.

War does not care about inspections. Adversaries do not grade on appearance. And there are no do-overs.

Implications for Our Allies

Our allies don’t just watch our ships. They watch our seriousness.

Credibility comes from demonstrated competence under stress—not polish.

The Bottom Line

Preservation matters. Warfighting matters more. Both must be enabled.

This is not about rust. It is about readiness design.

Real readiness cannot be painted on.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

January 7, 2026January 7, 2026

A Subscriber Asked: How Do the Jones Act, SHIPS Act, and Strategic Seas Act Actually Fit Together?

A reader recently reached out with a thoughtful question. After seeing renewed debate around the Jones Act — including critiques from respected analysts and commentators — they wanted to understand how that debate fits with our advocacy for the SHIPS Act and the recently proposed Strategic Seas Act.

It’s a fair question. And it reflects a broader challenge: America’s maritime conversation has become fragmented, emotional, and often disconnected from strategic reality.

Here’s the clearest way to understand it.

The Core Issue Isn’t One Law — It’s the System

America’s maritime problem did not emerge because of one bad law or one bad decision. It emerged because policy, industry, workforce, logistics, and security drifted out of alignment over decades.

The Jones Act, the SHIPS Act, and the Strategic Seas Act each address different layers of that system. Confusing them — or pitting them against one another — obscures the real challenge.

What the Jones Act Actually Does (and Does Not Do)

The Jones Act governs domestic coastwise and inland shipping — cargo moved between U.S. ports along rivers, coasts, and internal waterways.

Its intent is to preserve:

- A U.S. maritime workforce
- Domestic shipbuilding and repair capacity
- U.S. control over domestic trade routes

It does not regulate international or blue-water shipping.

Critics are right about one thing: the Jones Act did not prevent the collapse of America’s international commercial fleet. That collapse happened outside its scope — driven by tax policy, financing disadvantages, flag-of-convenience practices, and long-term neglect.

That critique is legitimate. But it’s also incomplete.

Why the Jones Act Debate Isn’t Decisive

For years, serious naval professionals and analysts have debated whether the Jones Act is a national security asset or a liability. That debate is not new, and it has often been conducted in good faith.

What has changed is the strategic environment.

Recent analysis has reminded us of a hard truth: wars at sea are wars of attrition. Losses come fast. Ships, crews, and shipyards lost early in a conflict cannot be replaced in time to affect the outcome.

That means no maritime policy — Jones Act included — can be judged solely by cost or efficiency in peacetime. The real question is whether the overall system can absorb loss and sustain combat before a war begins.

What the SHIPS Act Is Designed to Fix

The SHIPS Act addresses a failure the Jones Act was never designed to solve: the collapse of U.S.-flag international shipping and sealift capacity.

Its focus includes:

- Rebuilding a viable U.S.-flag fleet in international trade
- Expanding and stabilizing the pool of credentialed U.S. mariners
- Strengthening sealift capacity the Navy depends on in wartim
- Restoring American relevance in global maritime commerce

This is where America’s absence has become a strategic vulnerability — and where reform is long overdue.

Why We Proposed the Strategic Seas Act

Even rebuilding ships and mariners is no longer enough.

Modern global commerce and advanced technologies create maritime security risks at scale — from congested sea lanes and port dependencies to undersea cables and logistics chokepoints. When those risks materialize, the burden falls almost entirely on the U.S. Navy and the American taxpayer.

The Strategic Seas Act starts from a simple principle: strategic risk should be managed and shared, not externalized.

It focuses on:

- Accountability for maritime risk creation
- Protection of ports, shipyards, sea lanes, and undersea infrastructure
- Aligning commercial innovation with maritime and naval security
- Closing the gap between private gain and public security cost

This is not about shipping rates. It’s about national responsibility in a contested maritime world.

Why We Don’t Lead With the Jones Act Debate

The Jones Act debate often becomes ideological. The most urgent maritime failures today are strategic and systemic.

Our priority is:

- Whether America can move and sustain forces at scale
- Whether we have the mariners to crew ships in crisis
- Whether our industrial base can repair and regenerate under pressure
- Whether commercial success carries shared security responsibility

That doesn’t make the Jones Act irrelevant. It makes it one part of a much larger system.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans never see ships — but their food, fuel, medicine, data, and livelihoods move by sea. When maritime policy fails, the consequences show up quietly: fragile supply chains, higher prices, longer crises, and greater military risk.

Maritime strength is not abstract. It shapes daily life.

Implications for the Navy

The Navy cannot surge ships, mariners, or shipyards after a war starts. Civilian maritime capacity is not separate from naval readiness — it underpins it. Planning without industrial and workforce reality invites failure.

Implications for Our Allies

Allies measure credibility by endurance. A stronger U.S. maritime system reduces dangerous dependence on adversaries and turns alliances into real, usable capacity — not just promises.

Closing Thought

The real question isn’t whether one maritime law should be defended or repealed.

The question is whether the United States intends to remain a serious maritime nation — prepared before the first shot is fired, not scrambling after ships are lost.

Let’s roll.

January 4, 2026January 5, 2026

Listening to Americans on Naval Power and the Industrial Base

Americans Support a Strong Navy — and Expect Readiness to Match

While public debate and media commentary continue, Americans for a Stronger Navy looks under the hood — at what Americans are actually saying and feeling when asked directly about naval strength and readiness.

The 2025 Reagan National Defense Survey offers a rare opportunity to move past headlines and examine public sentiment itself. Rather than reacting to daily news cycles, this analysis focuses on the underlying signals Americans are sending about national security, deterrence, and the role of naval power in an increasingly uncertain world.

What Americans Are Saying

The survey shows strong and durable support for military strength. Eighty-seven percent of Americans believe military superiority matters, and seventy-one percent believe global peace depends on American strength. A majority believe the United States maintains superiority at sea.

Naval power remains central to how Americans think about deterrence, stability, and global leadership. This support is not tied to a single region or conflict. It reflects a broader expectation that the United States should retain the capability to protect its interests, allies, and maritime commerce.

The Confidence Gap

Alongside that support, the data reveals unease. Only forty-nine percent of Americans believe the U.S. military could win a major war overseas, and just forty-five percent believe it can effectively deter foreign aggression.

This gap does not reflect opposition to the military. It reflects concern about whether readiness, capacity, and sustainability are keeping pace with the responsibilities Americans expect the Navy to carry. The difference between support and confidence is one of the most important signals in the survey.

Capacity Matters — and Americans Know It

Two findings stand out. Sixty-eight percent of Americans support increased investment in shipbuilding and manufacturing. Ninety-four percent believe the United States needs greater domestic manufacturing capacity.

Americans appear to understand something fundamental: naval strength is not defined solely by ships at sea, but by the industrial systems that build, repair, crew, and sustain them over time. Shipyards, skilled workers, suppliers, dry docks, and logistics networks are not abstract concepts. They are the difference between plans on paper and forces that are ready when needed.

What the Survey Reveals About Deterrence

The survey also sheds light on how Americans view deterrence in practice, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

When asked about Taiwan, seventy-seven percent of Americans say it is important for the United States to help defend the island against Chinese aggression. If China were to invade Taiwan, sixty percent say they would support committing U.S. forces to Taiwan’s defense, up from forty-eight percent the prior year. Majorities also support additional measures designed to deter aggression and strengthen regional stability, including deploying more U.S. military assets to the region, sending additional military equipment to Taiwan, imposing economic sanctions, and establishing air and maritime control measures.

These responses do not reflect a desire for conflict. They reflect an expectation that deterrence must be credible. Americans appear to understand that commitments only matter if the United States has the capacity to back them up.

Deterrence at sea is not abstract. It depends on available ships, trained crews, maintained platforms, secure logistics, and resilient industrial support. When Americans express support for defending allies and preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific, they are implicitly expressing expectations about readiness — and about whether U.S. sailors have the tools they need to do their jobs effectively and safely.

From Public Sentiment to Public Support

Americans for a Stronger Navy is politically neutral. We do not support parties or candidates. But we are not neutral on readiness.

Our role is to articulate what Americans are saying and feeling — and, when appropriate, to state clearly when legislation aligns with those expressed expectations.

Based on the survey data and the readiness challenges it highlights, Americans for a Stronger Navy supports the SHIPS for America Act. This support is grounded in alignment, not politics.

Why We Support the SHIPS Act

The SHIPS for America Act does not dictate naval strategy or force employment. Its relevance lies in strengthening the foundations naval readiness depends on.

It addresses shipbuilding and repair capacity by expanding and stabilizing the yards that build and maintain naval vessels. It supports maritime workforce development by growing the skilled labor base the Navy cannot surge in a crisis. It strengthens industrial resilience and surge capacity by reinforcing the commercial and auxiliary maritime sector that supports naval logistics and sealift. And it promotes long-term sustainability by reducing boom-and-bust cycles that drive cost overruns, schedule delays, and readiness shortfalls.

What This Endorsement Is — and Is Not

Our support for the SHIPS Act is not partisan. It does not imply endorsement of every provision, and it does not replace the need for oversight, accountability, or debate.

It reflects a judgment that strengthening the maritime industrial base aligns with what Americans are asking for — and is necessary to close the confidence gap the survey reveals. If Americans expect deterrence to be credible, then policy should strengthen the capacity that makes deterrence real.

The Signal Americans Are Sending

The survey does not prescribe policy, but it does define expectations.

Americans are saying they value naval strength, deterrence over conflict, readiness that matches responsibility, and domestic capacity that sustains credibility. When expectations and outcomes align, confidence grows. When they drift apart, trust erodes.

Our role is to surface that signal clearly. The data speaks. Alignment is the challenge.

December 24, 2025December 27, 2025

Year-End Message: The Pentagon’s China Report and What It Means for 2025

The 2027 Countdown: What the Pentagon’s Delayed China Report Reveals

2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review Report Cover

Hello friends, and fellow supporters of America’s Navy. Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy.

On December 23rd, the Pentagon released its annual China Military Power Report. This assessment had been missing all year while Congress debated budgets. Now that it’s here, we understand the delay. The report contains the most direct warning yet: China expects to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan by the end of 2027. That’s less than three years away.

Why Taiwan Matters to You

As Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, wrote in TIME Magazine:

“Defending far-off Taiwan and our allies… is rooted in a practical, hard-nosed assessment of what is in Americans’ concrete economic and political interests. It is about defending Americans’ security, liberties, and prosperity from a very real, and in terms of China’s gigantic scale, unprecedented danger.”

Your Phone. Your Car. Your Hospital Equipment.

Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. A Chinese blockade or invasion would cost the global economy at least one trillion dollars per year.

What the Pentagon Report Reveals

Nuclear Expansion: Stockpile reached 600+ in 2024, on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030.
Space Surveillance: 359+ satellites now track U.S. ships in near real-time.
Cyber Weapons: Operations like Volt Typhoon have burrowed into U.S. power grids for wartime sabotage.
Taiwan Pressure: 3,067 air incursions in 2024—nearly double the previous year.

The Timeline Should Terrify You

The Western Pacific is becoming a “Kill Zone.” As one naval officer put it: “We no longer build the Navy the Navy needs. We build the Navy the accountants will tolerate.”

America is not outmatched; we are under-mobilized. The decisions we make in 2025 determine whether deterrence holds in 2027. Visit StrongerNavy.org to request your copy of our 2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review.

Thank you for caring about America’s maritime strength.

Fair winds and following seas,

Bill Cullifer
Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org