Welcome back to Fleet Forward: Charting Tomorrow’s Navy, a podcast series that explores the challenges and opportunities facing the US Navy in the 21st century.
With this series, inspired by our shared values and patriotic spirit, we aim to complement our upcoming December podcast series ‘Charting the Course: Navigating the Future of American Naval Power’
In the previous episode, we introduced the series and explained why we decided to create it. We also discussed the format and the content of the series, and how we hope to provide you with insightful and informative analysis and commentary on the issues and trends that shape the Navy’s present and future.
The Budgetary Challenge of Naval Shipbuilding
In this episode, we will focus on one of the most important and contentious issues facing the Navy: the budgetary challenge of naval shipbuilding. How much does it cost to build a Navy? How do we balance the need for a larger and more capable fleet with the reality of fiscal constraints and competing priorities? How do we ensure that our naval force is ready and relevant for the 21st century?
These are some of the questions that we will explore in this episode, as we examine the Navy’s shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2024, which presents three alternatives for the future fleet, each with different costs and capabilities. We will also explore how the Congressional Budget Office and Brent Sadler have critiqued the Navy’s plan and offered alternative perspectives on how to optimize the Navy’s budget and capabilities. We will also delve into the stories and people behind the Navy’s shipbuilding strategies, and reflect on their implications for our national security, economic vitality, and our role on the global stage.
The Stakeholders and Perspectives of Naval Strategy
Today we ’ll not only delve into the Navy’s shipbuilding strategies but also the stories and people behind them, reflecting on our national security, economic vitality, and our role on the global stage.
Introduction
In this episode, we will examine the fiscal landscape of naval procurement, focusing on the budgetary challenges and trade-offs that the Navy faces in pursuing its shipbuilding plans. We will also explore how the CBO and Sandler have critiqued the Navy’s strategies and offered alternative perspectives on how to optimize the Navy’s budget and capabilities.
The Navy’s Shipbuilding Budget
The Navy’s shipbuilding budget is the primary source of funding for acquiring new ships and maintaining the existing fleet. The budget is determined by the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan, which outlines the desired size, composition, and capabilities of the future fleet, as well as the projected costs and schedules for each ship class. The plan is updated annually and submitted to Congress as part of the President’s budget request.
The current shipbuilding plan, released in December 2022, covers the period from 2023 to 2052 and aims to achieve a fleet of 355 ships by 2035 and 400 ships by 2052. The plan also introduces the DDG(X) program, which is intended to replace the aging Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with a more advanced and capable design. The plan estimates that the Navy will need an average of $33 billion per year (in 2022 dollars) for shipbuilding over the next 30 years, which is 50 percent more than the historical average of $22 billion per year over the past 30 years.
The CBO’s Analysis of the Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan
The CBO, an independent and nonpartisan agency that provides budgetary and economic analysis to Congress, has conducted a detailed assessment of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and its implications for the federal budget and the Navy’s capabilities. The CBO’s report, released in October 2023, raises several issues and challenges with the plan, such as:
• The plan’s cost estimates are optimistic and likely to increase over time, due to factors such as inflation, technical risks, and schedule delays. The CBO projects that the plan will actually cost an average of $40 billion per year (in 2022 dollars) for shipbuilding over the next 30 years, which is 21 percent more than the Navy’s estimate and 82 percent more than the historical average.
• The plan’s funding requirements are unsustainable and unrealistic, given the competing demands and constraints on the federal budget. The CBO estimates that the plan will consume an average of 13 percent of the total defense budget over the next 30 years, which is significantly higher than the historical average of 9 percent. The plan will also require increasing the Navy’s share of the defense budget from 28 percent in 2022 to 34 percent in 2052, which will likely entail reducing the funding for other military services or increasing the overall defense budget.
• The plan’s fleet size and composition goals are ambitious and questionable, given the operational and strategic environment. The CBO questions the rationale and feasibility of achieving a 400-ship fleet by 2052, which would be the largest fleet since the end of World War II. The CBO also suggests that the plan may not adequately account for the changing nature of naval warfare and the emergence of new threats and technologies, such as cyberattacks, hypersonic weapons, and unmanned systems.
The CBO’s report concludes that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is not a viable or effective strategy for meeting the nation’s naval needs and recommends that the Navy and Congress reconsider the plan’s assumptions, objectives, and priorities. The CBO also offers some alternative shipbuilding scenarios that would achieve different fleet sizes and compositions at lower costs than the Navy’s plan.
Sandler’s Critique of the Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan
Sandler, a former U.S. Naval Captain and author of U.S. Power in the 21st Century, has also published a blog post in November 2023, criticizing the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and proposing a different approach to naval strategy and shipbuilding. Sandler’s main arguments are:
• The Navy’s shipbuilding plan is based on a flawed and outdated paradigm of naval power, which emphasizes quantity over quality, platforms over payloads, and conventional over asymmetric warfare. Sandler argues that the Navy is stuck in a Cold War mentality and fails to adapt to the changing realities and challenges of the 21st century, such as the rise of China, the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and the diffusion of power and influence.
• The Navy’s shipbuilding plan is wasteful and inefficient, as it invests in expensive and vulnerable ships that are not suited for the current and future threat environment. Sandler singles out the DDG(X) program as an example of a misguided and unnecessary project, which he calls a “gold-plated boondoggle” that will cost billions of dollars and provide marginal benefits. Sandler contends that the DDG(X) is a redundant and obsolete design that will be outmatched by cheaper and more effective weapons and systems, such as missiles, drones, and submarines.
• The Navy’s shipbuilding plan is counterproductive and dangerous, as it provokes and escalates tensions with potential adversaries, especially China, and undermines the stability and security of the international order. Sandler warns that the Navy’s pursuit of a 400-ship fleet and the DDG(X) program will trigger a naval arms race and increase the risk of conflict and miscalculation in the Indo-Pacific region. Sandler also cautions that the Navy’s plan will alienate and weaken the U.S.’s allies and partners, who may not share the same vision or interests as the U.S. and may not be willing or able to contribute to the Navy’s ambitious and costly goals.
Sandler’s blog post concludes that the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is a strategic blunder and a fiscal disaster that will undermine the U.S.’s naval power and global leadership. Sandler advocates for a radical shift in the Navy’s mindset and approach, which he calls “smart power”. Sandler’s smart power concept is based on four principles:
• Quality over quantity: The Navy should focus on developing and acquiring fewer but more capable and versatile ships that can deliver multiple effects and missions across the spectrum of conflict.
• Payloads over platforms: The Navy should prioritize investing in and deploying advanced and adaptable weapons and systems, such as missiles, drones, and cyber capabilities, that can enhance the lethality and survivability of the existing and future fleet.
• Asymmetric over conventional warfare: The Navy should embrace and exploit the opportunities and advantages of asymmetric warfare, such as stealth, speed, deception, and innovation, that can offset and counter the A2/AD capabilities of potential adversaries.
• Cooperation over competition: The Navy should seek and strengthen cooperation and coordination with the U.S.’s allies and partners, as well as engage and deter potential adversaries, through diplomacy, deterrence, and dialogue, rather than confrontation, coercion, and conflict.
Conclusion
In this episode, we have explored the fiscal landscape of naval procurement and the budgetary challenges and trade-offs that the Navy faces in pursuing its shipbuilding plans. We have also examined how the CBO and Sandler have critiqued the Navy’s strategies and offered alternative perspectives on how to optimize the Navy’s budget and capabilities. In the next episode, we will delve into the technological advancements and design considerations in modern shipbuilding, with a spotlight on the DDG(X) program. Stay tuned for more insights and analyses on the Navy’s path forward.
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