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NAVSEA: The Navy’s Unsung Problem Solvers

Why the organization everyone loves to criticize is actually implementing the solutions research says work

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

As founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I’ve spent the last couple of years trying to help Americans understand why ships, shipyards, maintenance, and industrial capacity matter. I’ve written about rust and readiness, shipbuilding delays, logistics shortfalls, and why design choices can make replacement and repair painfully slow.

Coming from the tech sector in the 1990s, I thought I understood organizational complexity. I’d seen enterprise software projects involving dozens of stakeholders, competing departments, entrenched interests, and billion-dollar budgets. I understood how egos, biases, and financial incentives complicate even straightforward objectives.

Then I started studying how the Navy actually builds and maintains ships.

Building rockets is complex. Building naval warships makes rocket science look straightforward by comparison. SpaceX has one customer, one set of requirements, and Elon Musk making final decisions. Naval shipbuilding? Dozens of organizations, hundreds of contractors, thousands of specialized workers, decade-long timelines, competing requirements from multiple stakeholders, physical irreversibility of design decisions, Congressional funding cycles that change annually, acquisition regulations written over decades, technical standards that must account for 30-year service lives, and operational demands that shift with geopolitical reality—all coordinated through a system most Americans have never heard of.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

If you want to understand why the Navy struggles to build, fix, modernize, and field ships at the pace today’s threats require, you need to understand NAVSEA. And to keep this fair and grounded, we should also look at what independent watchdogs and researchers have reported over the years.

NAVSEA is the Navy’s engineering and ship sustainment backbone. It provides the technical standards, oversight, and support that make shipbuilding, modernization, and maintenance possible. If the Navy were a body, NAVSEA would be the circulatory system—not glamorous, but absolutely essential for life.

NAVSEA has become Washington’s favorite punching bag. Recent headlines tell the story: a Government Accountability Office report revealing $1.84 billion wasted on cruiser modernization, maintenance delays plaguing the fleet, acquisition timelines stretching into decades, and contractor quality failures that forced expensive rework. Critics paint NAVSEA as a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering ships on time or on budget—the personification of everything broken in defense acquisition.

But here’s what the critics miss: NAVSEA doesn’t build ships. NAVSEA doesn’t fund programs. NAVSEA doesn’t set operational requirements.

What NAVSEA does is provide the technical backbone that makes an impossibly complex system function at all. They’re trying to coordinate dozens of organizations with competing interests, conflicting incentives, different accountability

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

If you want to understand why the Navy struggles to build, fix, modernize, and field ships at the pace today’s threats require, you need to understand NAVSEA. And to keep this fair and grounded, we should also look at what independent watchdogs and researchers have reported over the years.

NAVSEA is the Navy’s engineering and ship sustainment backbone. It provides the technical standards, oversight, and support that make shipbuilding, modernization, and maintenance possible. If the Navy were a body, NAVSEA would be the circulatory system not glamorous, but absolutely essential for life.

NAVSEA has become Washington’s favorite punching bag. Recent headlines tell the story: a Government Accountability Office report revealing $1.84 billion wasted on cruiser modernization, maintenance delays plaguing the fleet, acquisition timelines stretching into decades, and contractor quality failures that forced expensive rework. Critics paint NAVSEA as a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering ships on time or on budgets the personification of everything broken in defense acquisition.

But here’s what the critics miss: NAVSEA isn’t the source of the Navy’s readiness crisis. They’re the people actually trying to fix it.

The problems NAVSEA faces today deferred maintenance, inadequate shipyard capacity, antiquated acquisition processes, workforce shortages, supply chain fragility weren’t created in the last five years. They’re the accumulated debt of decades of underinvestment and poor policy choices. NAVSEA inherited a broken system and has been methodically rebuilding it while simultaneously keeping the current fleet operational during a period of unprecedented strategic pressure.

As the professionals inside NAVSEA know from hard experience, this work happens where strategy collides with physics and time. They’re doing extraordinary work inside a system carrying more demand than its capacity and processes can reliably support.

That’s not failure. That’s heroism under impossible conditions.

Before we judge too harshly, Americans deserve to understand what NAVSEA actually does, where it came from, why large defense projects typically fail, and why the scale of today’s challenge shouldn’t be confused with the quality of the response.

A History Lesson: 230 Years of Keeping Ships Ready

The Beginning: Commodore John Barry and the Foundation (1794)

NAVSEA’s lineage extends back to June 14, 1794, when President George Washington gave Commodore John Barry, the Irish-born naval hero who held Commission Number One in the United States Navy a seemingly impossible assignment: build America’s first frigates and ensure “all business harmonized and conformed to the public’s interest.”

Barry had distinguished himself during the Revolutionary War, capturing the first British warship taken in combat and commanding the frigate Alliance in the final naval engagement of the war. Now Washington tasked him with something harder than fighting: creating the systems, standards, and oversight needed to build a navy from nothing.

Barry supervised construction of the frigate USS United States, which launched on May 10, 1797. More importantly, he established the principle that would define NAVSEA’s mission for the next two centuries: technical excellence in service of national defense, with accountability to the American people for every dollar spent and every ship delivered.

The Bureau System: Organizing for Industrial War (1842-1966)

The informal arrangements that worked for Barry became inadequate as the Navy grew. In 1842, Congress abolished the ineffective Board of Navy Commissioners and created the Bureau System specialized administrative units to manage the increasingly complex work of designing, building, and maintaining warships.

Initially, five bureaus divided responsibility: Construction, Equipment and Repair; Ordnance and Hydrography; Provisions and Clothing; Medicine and Surgery; and Yards and Docks. Over time, this evolved into separate bureaus for Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering (later the Bureau of Engineering), Equipment, and Ordnance.

By World War I, this system managed a dramatic expansion. The Bureau of Engineering alone oversaw the fleet’s growth from 350 ships to nearly 2,000 by mid-1918, including all propulsion, communications, and electrical systems. The Bureau of Construction and Repair handled hull design and structural work.

But World War II exposed fatal flaws in this divided authority. In 1939, the Navy discovered that new Sims-class destroyers were dangerously top-heavy because the Bureau of Engineering had underestimated machinery weight and the Bureau of Construction and Repair lacked authority to catch the error during design. When separate organizations controlled different aspects of the same ship, nobody owned the complete integration.

The Bureau of Ships: Integration Under Pressure (1940-1966)

On June 20, 1940 with war clearly approaching Congress merged the Bureau of Construction and Repair with the Bureau of Engineering to create the Bureau of Ships (BuShips). The new bureau would control everything related to ship design, construction, conversion, maintenance, and repair from a single unified command.

Timing mattered. BuShips immediately faced the Fiscal Year 1940 naval procurement plan: 11 aircraft carriers, nine battleships, six large cruisers, 57 other cruisers, 95 destroyers, 73 submarines, and dozens of auxiliary vessels. Then Pearl Harbor turned ambitious plans into desperate necessity.

During World War II, BuShips delivered over 7,000 vessels nearly 1,200 major warships including battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. They pioneered radar integration, advanced damage control systems, and amphibious warfare craft. They managed four naval shipyards, coordinated hundreds of private contractors, and solved unprecedented logistics challenges while maintaining the fleet in combat.

The postwar period brought new challenges: nuclear propulsion, guided missiles, advanced electronics, and the Cold War submarine arms race. BuShips managed development of USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, which demonstrated the technology’s strategic potential by steaming 62,000 miles on its initial reactor core and completing the first underwater transit of the North Pole in 1958. The bureau then scaled nuclear propulsion to ballistic missile submarines, creating the sea-based deterrent that remains the most survivable leg of America’s nuclear triad.

Systems Commands: McNamara’s Reorganization (1966-1974)

By the mid-1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pushed for centralized management to control rising costs and complexity. The traditional bureau system, rooted in 19th-century administrative thinking, seemed inefficient for managing advanced weapons systems that integrated multiple technologies.

On March 9, 1966, DoD abolished BuShips and created the Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS), adopting a systems engineering approach that emphasized integration across technical disciplines. On July 1, 1974, NAVSHIPS merged with the Naval Ordnance Systems Command to form the Naval Sea Systems Command NAVSEA.

The new organization combined responsibility for ships, submarines, combat systems, and weapons into a single command. NAVSEA would engineer, build, buy, and maintain the fleet. It inherited four shipyards, ten warfare centers, and a global network of maintenance facilities. It became the Navy’s largest systems command, eventually managing nearly $30 billion annually roughly one-quarter of the entire Navy budget.

The Essential Continuity

From Commodore Barry in 1794 to Vice Admiral Downey today, the mission remains fundamentally unchanged: deliver warships that work, maintain the fleet so it can fight, and ensure every dollar spent serves the national defense.

What has changed is scale and complexity. Barry supervised construction of a few frigates. Today’s NAVSEA manages 150 acquisition programs simultaneously, maintains a fleet of over 200 ships and submarines, operates four massive shipyards, coordinates work across hundreds of contractors, and keeps the world’s most technologically sophisticated naval force operational in every ocean.

The criticism NAVSEA faces today isn’t new either. Every generation has complained about maintenance delays, cost overruns, and acquisition timelines. What’s different now is the consequences of failure and the impossibly narrow margin for error.

Why Large Projects Fail: Lessons from Research

Before examining NAVSEA’s current challenges, we need to understand what research tells us about why large, complex projects typically fail. This context is essential for evaluating NAVSEA’s performance fairly.

The Megaproject Failure Rate

Oxford University’s Bent Flyvbjerg has compiled the world’s largest database on megaproject performance 16,000 projects from 136 countries spanning infrastructure, defense, IT, and construction. Working with New York-based writer Dan Gardner, Flyvbjerg distilled this research into How Big Things Get Done, published in 2023. The results are sobering.

Only 8.5% of megaprojects meet their cost and schedule targets. Just 0.5% also satisfy their benefit goals. As Flyvbjerg writes, “Most big projects are not merely at risk of not delivering as promised. Nor are they only at risk of going seriously wrong. They are at risk of going disastrously wrong.”

Naval shipbuilding and maintenance programs are textbook megaprojects technically complex, politically visible, spanning multiple years, involving numerous contractors, requiring specialized workforces, and operating under intense scrutiny. They face all the pathologies Flyvbjerg identifies.

The Root Causes: Human Nature and System Design

Flyvbjerg traces megaproject failures to several interconnected factors:

Irrepressible optimism. Project leaders consistently underestimate costs, timelines, and technical challenges. This isn’t dishonesty it’s human nature. We want to believe our plans will work. We discount risks. We assume everything will go smoothly.

Political expediency. Projects get approved based on optimistic projections because realistic estimates would kill political support. Once committed, stakeholders have incentives to downplay problems until they become undeniable.

Poor planning. Projects start without sufficient detail. As Flyvbjerg notes, the Sydney Opera House became notorious for delays and cost overruns because it began construction based on “sketchy designs.” In contrast, Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum Bilbao succeeded through “meticulous, iterative development.”

Adding requirements. Every stakeholder wants their priorities incorporated. Each addition seems reasonable in isolation. Collectively, they drive cost growth and schedule delays. Nobody owns the integration.

Inadequate capacity. Projects assume resources, workers, facilities, materials will be available when needed. Reality proves otherwise. Workforce gaps emerge. Supply chains fail. Facilities need repair.

What Actually Works: The Solutions

Flyvbjerg’s research identifies characteristics common to successful megaprojects:

Empirical planning using reference-class forecasting. Instead of building plans from the ground up based on optimistic assumptions, examine historical data from similar projects. Use actual performance data to forecast realistic timelines and costs. Flyvbjerg developed this technique for the British government; it’s now used in multiple countries.

Iterative development. Test ideas early. Learn from small failures. Refine designs before committing to full-scale production. Pixar’s Oscar-winning director Pete Docter describes his animation process as requiring “an insane amount of work as constant iteration and testing. But it produces better outcomes.

Modularity. Flyvbjerg found that solar, wind, thermal power plants, electricity transmission, and highway projects “do not have considerable risk of going disastrously wrong” because “they are all modular to a considerable degree, some extremely so.” Modular designs allow parallel work streams, reduce integration risk, and enable faster problem-solving.

Accumulated experience. Organizations that repeatedly execute similar projects get better at them. They develop expertise, refine processes, and build institutional knowledge. One-off unique projects are inherently riskier.

Realistic timelines with adequate planning windows. Contractors need time to secure materials, hire workers, and coordinate subcontractors before work begins. Compressed planning periods guarantee problems.

The NAVSEA Connection

Every principle Flyvbjerg identifies applies directly to naval acquisition and maintenance:

  • The cruiser modernization failure? Classic megaproject pathology poor planning, unplanned work, contractor quality issues, and optimistic timelines.
  • Maintenance delays? Insufficient planning windows, unrealistic schedules, capacity constraints.
  • Acquisition taking 10+ years? Complex requirements, inadequate iteration, trying to incorporate everything upfront.

But here’s the critical insight: NAVSEA’s recent reforms align almost perfectly with what research says actually works.

They’re using empirical data (reference-class forecasting) through Perform to Plan initiatives. They’re extending planning windows from 60 to 228 days. They’re adopting modularity with containerized payloads on FF(X). They’re pursuing “build, learn, evolve” iterative approaches instead of trying to perfect designs upfront.

NAVSEA is implementing the solutions that megaproject research validates. The question is whether they’ll get the sustained support, resources, and realistic expectations needed to make those reforms work.

The Current Reality: Fixing Decades of Deferred Maintenance

The Inherited Crisis

When Vice Admiral William Galinis took command of NAVSEA in June 2020, he inherited a readiness catastrophe years in the making. In Fiscal Year 2019, ships collectively overran their planned maintenance schedules by more than 7,000 days. Carriers and submarines were staying in maintenance availabilities 30-40% longer than planned. The maintenance backlog was crushing fleet readiness, forcing longer deployments and creating a vicious cycle where rushed operations led to more maintenance problems.

Fortunately, we don’t have to rely on anecdotes. Independent watchdogs have documented these problems extensively:

Government Accountability Office findings:

  • GAO found that over an extended period, the Navy was unable to begin or complete most attack submarine maintenance periods on time, resulting in significant lost operational days (GAO-19-229).
  • The majority of aircraft carrier and submarine maintenance periods between 2015 and 2019 were completed late, with primary causes being unplanned work discovered after planning began and workforce capacity constraints (GAO-20-588).
  • In 2025, GAO emphasized that shipbuilding and repair capacity itself is a strategic constraint, calling for a more coherent long-term industrial base approach to support the fleet the Navy says it needs (GAO-25-106286).

RAND assessments:

  • RAND research highlights that maintenance capacity is a long-term structural issue that cannot be corrected quickly, with public shipyard capacity identified as a limiting factor for submarine and carrier availability (RAND RR1951).

Navy acknowledgment:

  • USNI News reported that Navy leaders acknowledged that only a small percentage of attack submarines completed maintenance on time over a ten-year period, even as operational demand increased.

The root causes ran deep:

Inadequate shipyard capacity. America’s four naval shipyards Portsmouth, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound had been chronically underfunded for decades. Facilities were antiquated. Dry docks needed repair. Cranes were obsolete. The physical infrastructure couldn’t support efficient work.

Workforce shortages. The skilled trades that keep ships operational welders, pipefitters, electricians, machinists were in desperately short supply. Years of hiring freezes had created a demographic cliff. Experienced workers were retiring faster than new workers could be trained.

Poor planning. The Navy awarded maintenance contracts only 60 days before work was scheduled to begin far too late for contractors to secure materials, hire workers, or plan efficiently. Contracts often started without complete work packages, guaranteeing unplanned growth work that blew schedules.

Supply chain failures. Critical parts weren’t arriving when needed. Ships sat idle waiting for components. Nobody was coordinating material delivery across the enterprise.

Unrealistic schedules. Maintenance durations were based on optimistic assumptions rather than empirical data. Ships were consistently planned for availabilities shorter than they actually needed, creating the appearance of delays that were really planning failures.

This wasn’t NAVSEA’s fault. This was the bill coming due for decades of decisions made by Congress, administrations, and Navy leadership that prioritized new procurement over maintenance, allowed shipyards to deteriorate, and failed to invest in workforce development.

The NAVSEA Response: Data-Driven Reform

Rather than making excuses, NAVSEA leadership got to work. They implemented a series of interconnected reforms designed to address each element of the maintenance crisis:

Perform to Plan (P2P). NAVSEA conducted detailed analysis of what actually happened during maintenance availabilities versus what was planned. They examined every step: work package development, execution planning, material delivery, testing requirements, contractor performance. The data revealed systematic planning failures availabilities were being planned too short based on outdated assumptions.

The solution wasn’t to lower standards or move goalposts. It was to reset maintenance duration baselines using empirical data about how long complex work actually takes. New baselines created realistic schedules that contractors could execute.

The results were dramatic. By Fiscal Year 2020, total maintenance delays dropped from 7,000 days to approximately 1,100 days. Measured against the new realistic baselines, that represented an 80% reduction in delays. Even measured against the old optimistic baselines, delays dropped 40%.

Contracting Reform. NAVSEA extended contract award timelines from 60 days to 120 days before maintenance start, then pushed toward 180 days. Rear Admiral Andrew Biehn, NAVSEA’s director of surface ship maintenance, explained that industry had been clear: “60 days was not enough time to plan and prepare for a successful maintenance period.”

In 2026, NAVSEA awarded a maintenance contract for the amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima 228 days ahead of times”nearly eight months for the contractor to order materials, hire workers, and coordinate with subcontractors.

Longer planning windows created predictability. Contractors could maintain stable workforces. Suppliers could plan material delivery. The entire ecosystem became more efficient.

Material Management. NAVSEA stood up a dedicated Material Management Group with a single mission: ensure all materials needed for a maintenance availability arrive at the shipyard by day one of the work period. No more ships sitting idle waiting for parts. No more scrambling to source critical components mid-availability.

This required intense coordination across supply chains, better forecasting of material needs, earlier ordering of long-lead items, and tighter integration between maintenance planning and logistics.

Workforce Development. NAVSEA hired thousands of new workers for the naval shipyards. They invested in training programs to develop skilled trades, partnered with community colleges and trade schools, and created apprenticeship programs to transfer knowledge from experienced workers to new hires.

This wasn’t quick. Training a journeyman shipyard worker takes years. But NAVSEA understood that long-term readiness required long-term investment in people.

Unplanned Work Reduction. Growth work unplanned maintenance discovered after an availability begins was a major driver of delays. NAVSEA worked to stabilize class maintenance plans, pushing more routine work into “directed work” categories that could be planned in advance. They scheduled activities most likely to generate growth work—like tank inspections early in availabilities so discoveries could be incorporated into the plan.

The goal was to minimize surprises through better forecasting and more thorough advance planning.

Current Status: Real Progress Under Pressure

At the Surface Navy Association symposium in January 2026, Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, Commander of Naval Surface Forces, outlined continued progress: “On-time completion remains our number one goal as we drive towards zero days of maintenance delay.”

Vice Admiral James Downey, NAVSEA’s current commander, reported that 90 ships are under contract for construction, 57 are actively under construction, and 52 ships are in maintenance availabilities. Keeping those maintenance periods on schedule is NAVSEA’s top priority.

Rear Admiral Dan Lannamann, who runs the Navy Regional Maintenance Centers, acknowledged the challenge honestly: “I got 41 percent [on-time completion], so we missed the mark. We reset the mark for this year. I’m looking at north of 60 percent, and I’m on plan to make that.”

That’s the right approach: set ambitious goals, measure performance honestly, adjust based on results, and keep pushing forward. NAVSEA isn’t claiming victory. They’re showing their work and committing to improvement.

Addressing the Legitimate Criticisms

The Cruiser Modernization Failure

The GAO report on cruiser modernization is damning, and NAVSEA deserves criticism for significant failures. The Navy planned to modernize 11 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, extending their service life by five years and upgrading combat capability. The program became a $3.7 billion disaster. Only three cruisers will complete modernization, none will gain the intended five years of service life, and $1.84 billion was wasted on four cruisers that were divested before deploying.

The failures included:

  • Poor planning leading to 9,000 contract changes
  • Contractor performance issues and quality problems (such as the botched sonar dome work on USS Vicksburg)
  • Weak oversight and reluctance to use monetary penalties
  • Failure to identify root causes or develop prevention strategies

This was a significant acquisition failure, and the GAO correctly identified systemic problems that must be fixed before future modernization efforts.

But here’s the important context: NAVSEA acknowledged the problems, is conducting root cause analysis, and is applying lessons learned to the next major surface ship modernization effort 23 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The question isn’t whether NAVSEA made mistakes with cruiser modernization. They clearly did. The question is whether they’re learning from those mistakes and implementing better processes.

The early evidence suggests they are. The destroyer modernization program is incorporating improved planning processes, more realistic schedule baselines, and better quality control measures. NAVSEA is being held accountable for past failures while working to prevent future ones.

Acquisition Timelines

Critics rightly point out that NAVSEA acquisition programs take 10+ years to field capability. By the time ships are delivered, the strategic environment has evolved and technology has advanced. As one Navy leader noted, it’s like “fielding a 2015 iPhone today already obsolete on arrival.”

This is a real problem, but it’s not primarily NAVSEA’s fault. The acquisition system is designed for risk reduction rather than speed. Complex requirements processes allow every stakeholder to add requirements, increasing cost and delaying delivery. Acquisition regulations slow decision-making. Testing requirements are thorough but time-consuming.

NAVSEA operates within the constraints of federal acquisition law, DoD regulations, and Navy requirements processes. They can advocate for reform, implement process improvements where they have authority, and try to accelerate timelines. But they can’t unilaterally override the legal and regulatory framework Congress and DoD have created.

The recent announcement of FF(X) the Navy’s new frigate program based on a proven Coast Guard design shows NAVSEA learning from past mistakes. Chris Miller, Executive Director at NAVSEA, emphasized a “design that is producible, it has been proven, it is operationally in use today, and it will evolve.” The approach prioritizes getting ships into production quickly, then evolving capability over time through modular containerized payloads.

That’s the right philosophy: field capability fast, then improve it incrementally. It’s a significant departure from past programs that tried to incorporate every possible requirement upfront.

Bureaucratic Processes

Yes, NAVSEA is a large bureaucracy with 84,000 personnel, nine directorates, eight affiliated Program Executive Offices, and a budget approaching $30 billion. Complex organizations develop complex processes. Some of those processes are valuable ensuring safety, maintaining technical standards, managing risk. Some are unnecessary bureaucracy that slows things down.

The challenge is distinguishing between essential process and wasteful bureaucracy. NAVSEA has been working to streamline operations, eliminate redundant approvals, and empower decision-making at lower levels. But this is genuinely difficult work that requires balancing speed with safety, innovation with standards, and delegation with accountability.

Anyone who has worked in a large organization knows that reforming bureaucratic processes is harder than criticizing them.

Why NAVSEA Matters: The Unglamorous Work of Maritime Power

They Turn Policy into Hardware

Every naval strategy document, every force structure assessment, every geopolitical analysis ultimately depends on one thing: ships that work. NAVSEA is where strategy meets reality.

When the 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes “First Island Chain denial defense,” NAVSEA is responsible for delivering the submarines, destroyers, and combat systems that make that strategy viable. When Navy leadership commits to 80% of ships being deployable at any given time, NAVSEA is responsible for the maintenance performance that achieves that readiness.

The National Commission on the Future of the Navy can recommend force structure changes. The CNO can publish new operational concepts. Congress can authorize new ship construction. But none of it matters without NAVSEA doing the unglamorous work of engineering systems, managing contracts, supervising construction, training workers, and fixing broken ships.

They Manage Impossible Tradeoffs

NAVSEA operates under contradictory demands:

  • Keep the current fleet operational while building the future fleet
  • Maintain aging ships past their design service life while investing in new construction
  • Move fast to meet urgent threats while ensuring ships are safe and effective
  • Manage cost while meeting expanding requirements
  • Take acceptable risk without catastrophic failures

Every decision involves tradeoffs. Extend maintenance contracts to give contractors more planning time? That delays ship availability. Accelerate new construction? That stresses the industrial base. Prioritize nuclear work? That means surface ships wait longer. Fund facility upgrades at public yards? That’s money not available for procurement.

NAVSEA leadership makes these tradeoffs every day, often with incomplete information, under intense pressure, with billions of dollars and potentially lives at stake. It’s easy to criticize specific decisions in hindsight. It’s much harder to make better decisions in real time.

They Build National Capacity

NAVSEA’s mission extends beyond today’s fleet to building the industrial capacity America needs for tomorrow’s challenges. That means:

  • Investing in shipyard modernization even when those facilities won’t generate returns for decades
  • Training workers who might spend entire careers maintaining ships
  • Developing domestic suppliers for critical components
  • Maintaining technical expertise in specialized fields
  • Preserving institutional knowledge about complex systems

These long-term investments don’t generate headlines. They don’t produce quick wins. But they’re essential for sustained maritime power.

When Vice Admiral Downey reports 90 ships under construction contract and 57 actively being built, that represents years of NAVSEA work managing industrial capacity, negotiating contracts, coordinating suppliers, and solving technical problems most Americans never hear about.

They Carry the Weight of Institutional Memory

NAVSEA maintains continuity through strategic transitions, political changes, and shifting priorities. They remember what worked during the Reagan-era naval expansion. They carry lessons learned from the post-Cold War drawdown. They apply hard-won knowledge from decades of maintaining nuclear-powered vessels.

When new leadership arrives with new ideas, NAVSEA provides the institutional ballast that prevents dramatic swings between extremes. They explain why certain technical standards exist, what happened when past programs cut corners, and which shortcuts lead to catastrophic failures.

This conservative instinct can seem like resistance to change. Sometimes it is. But often it’s the voice of experience preventing repeated mistakes.

What NAVSEA Needs: Support, Not Just Criticism

Legislative Authority for Acquisition Reform

NAVSEA has identified acquisition processes that slow capability delivery. They’ve proposed reforms. But many changes require legislative action that only Congress can provide.

The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act included provisions for expedited technology qualification processes. That helps, but more comprehensive acquisition reform is needed:

  • Delegating more decision authority to program managers
  • Streamlining requirements processes
  • Reforming testing protocols to enable faster iteration
  • Creating exemptions for proven commercial technologies

Congress needs to give NAVSEA the authority to move faster while maintaining appropriate oversight.

Sustained Funding for Shipyard Modernization

America’s four naval shipyards need billions in infrastructure investment: new dry docks, modern cranes, upgraded facilities, environmental improvements. These investments take years to design and decades to recoup. They’re perfect targets for budget cuts because the consequences won’t appear immediately.

But without modern shipyards, NAVSEA cannot maintain readiness. Period.

Vice Admiral Moore noted in 2016 that private shipyards like Newport News have invested heavily in their physical plants while public yards have been neglected. NAVSEA needs Congress and Navy leadership to make the business case for MILCON funding and stick with those investments over multiple budget cycles.

Workforce Development Support

Training skilled shipyard workers requires partnerships with community colleges, trade schools, and apprenticeship programs. NAVSEA needs support from federal, state, and local governments to:

  • Fund training programs
  • Provide housing assistance in expensive shipyard communities
  • Offer tax incentives for workers entering skilled trades
  • Create pathways from military service to civilian shipyard careers

The workforce crisis won’t be solved by NAVSEA alone. It requires a national commitment to rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base.

Realistic Expectations

Most importantly, NAVSEA needs Americans to understand that fixing decades of deferred maintenance and underinvestment takes time. Maintenance delays won’t disappear overnight. Acquisition timelines won’t collapse to 18 months. Industrial capacity won’t triple in two years.

Progress is happening. Delays are declining. Planning is improving. But the work is difficult, the challenges are real, and setbacks are inevitable.

NAVSEA deserves credit for confronting these problems honestly, implementing data-driven reforms, and making measurable progress under extraordinary pressure. They deserve support, not just criticism.

Conclusion: The Builders, Not the Critics

Americans for a Stronger Navy exists to advocate for the naval power America needs to secure its economic prosperity and defend its interests. We’re builders, not critics. We focus on implementation mechanisms, not just policy positions.

That’s why we defend NAVSEA.

The men and women of NAVSEA are doing the hardest work in naval policy: turning strategic concepts into operational capability. They’re managing the impossible tradeoffs inherent in maintaining today’s fleet while building tomorrow’s. They’re learning from failures, implementing reforms grounded in what research tells us actually works, and making measurable progress.

NAVSEA’s reforms align with proven megaproject success principles:

  • Using empirical data for planning (Flyvbjerg’s reference-class forecasting) → Perform to Plan
  • Extending planning windows → 60 to 228 days for contract awards
  • Pursuing modularity → Containerized payloads on FF(X)
  • Iterative development “Build, learn, evolve” philosophy
  • Building accumulated experience training thousands of new shipyard workers

Are they perfect? No. Should they be held accountable for failures like cruiser modernization? Absolutely. Do acquisition processes need reform? Without question.

But the fundamental criticism of NAVSEA that they’re a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering results is wrong. NAVSEA has reduced maintenance delays by 80%, extended contract planning windows from 60 to 228 days, hired thousands of new shipyard workers, stood up dedicated material management groups, and delivered 90 ships under construction contracts while maintaining over 200 ships and submarines.

That’s not failure. That’s competent management under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

This is bigger than the Navy. It is a national industrial and governance challenge.

You cannot surge ships. You cannot surge shipyards. You cannot surge skilled engineers and nuclear-qualified trades overnight. Naval power is built years, often decades, before it is needed. Deterrence depends on industrial reality, not speeches. When maintenance runs late, fewer ships are available for training, presence, and crisis response. That affects America’s leverage and our allies’ confidence.

When Commodore John Barry accepted his commission from President Washington in 1797, he established a standard: deliver ships that work, ensure all business serves the public interest, and do it with integrity. NAVSEA has upheld that standard for 230 years through wars hot and cold, through periods of expansion and drawdown, through technological revolutions from sail to steam to nuclear power.

They deserve our support as they confront the most challenging period in American naval history since World War II. The criticism will continue some of it deserved. But Americans should understand who’s actually doing the work of keeping the fleet ready.

It’s the 84,000 people of NAVSEA. Give them the resources, authority, and realistic expectations they need to succeed.

Americans cannot support what they do not understand. NAVSEA is not a political talking point. It is where naval power becomes real, or fails to. If you want a Stronger Navy, you need to understand NAVSEA and support the industrial strength that makes NAVSEA’s mission achievable.

The security of our maritime commons depends on it.

This article is part of Americans for a Stronger Navy’s “Charting the Course: Voices That Matter” ongoing series educational initiative breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Learn more at StrongerNavy.org.

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Fighting Invisible Threats: How Navy Medicine is Leading the Charge Against Superbugs

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

While we focus on ship counts, readiness percentages, and hull maintenance, there’s another critical battle being fought in Navy Medicine laboratories that directly impacts our fleet’s combat power: the fight against antibiotic-resistant bacteria.

The Naval Medical Research Command (NMRC) just completed a six-year research program that could revolutionize how we protect our sailors and Marines from one of the most insidious threats they face—bacterial infections that laugh at our best antibiotics.

The Invisible Enemy

Here’s the reality: our warfighters aren’t just exposed to enemy fire. They face bacteria through combat injuries, deployments to overseas locations, and the close-quarters environment of shipboard life. And increasingly, these bacteria are resistant to the antibiotics we’ve relied on for decades.

Four bacterial villains are the focus: Acinetobacter baumannii (nicknamed “Iraqibacter” from the early Iraq war days), Klebsiella pneumoniae, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Staphylococcus aureus. All can cause fevers, fatigue, swelling—and in severe cases, death.

When a sailor or Marine is fighting a multidrug-resistant infection, they’re not mission-ready. They’re not protecting their shipmates. They’re fighting for their life.

The Navy’s Secret Weapon: Bacteriophages

Navy Medicine Research & Development has a solution that sounds like science fiction but is brilliantly simple: use viruses that naturally hunt and kill bacteria.

Bacteriophages—or phages—are viruses that target specific bacteria with surgical precision. Unlike antibiotics that carpet-bomb your body’s bacterial ecosystem (killing both good and bad bacteria), phages are smart weapons. They go after only the harmful bacteria you want eliminated.

Over six years of focused research funded by Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDRMP), NMRC has developed approximately 2,500 phage cocktails. Think of these as personalized medicine—specific combinations designed to attack specific bacterial threats.

From Wastewater to Warfighter

The collection process is global and fascinating. Navy researchers harvest phages from wastewater—bogs, sewers, rivers—across multiple continents. These microscopic hunters are everywhere. In fact, if you strung together all the phages on Earth, they could wrap around the Milky Way Galaxy three times.

Each collected phage goes through rigorous purification and characterization. As Dr. Biswajit Biswas, chief of NMRC’s Bacteriophage Science Division, explains: “We collect these phages, purify them and grow them in large quantities. Then, we extract DNA, sequence its genome and analyze the phage very carefully to understand if it carries any toxins, since we cannot push something in the human systems if the phage carries toxins.”

This is meticulous work. This is Navy excellence.

Proof of Concept: The Tom Patterson Story

In 2015, NMRC achieved something historic. Dr. Tom Patterson fell critically ill from Acinetobacter baumannii, slipped into a coma, and remained ill through multiple treatments. Nothing worked. Until he was administered an NMRC-developed phage cocktail intravenously.

He survived.

As Dr. Biswas notes: “It should be understood that before Tom Patterson’s case, nobody used phage to treat systemic bacterial infection in the United States.”

NMRC didn’t just save a life. They opened a door.

Why This Matters for Naval Readiness

Commander Mark Simons, director of NMRC’s Infectious Diseases Directorate, gets straight to the point: “Navy and Marine Corps warfighters are often first to the fight as expeditionary units, and thus will experience early casualties in a potentially prolonged-care setting. This will require novel antimicrobial countermeasures to be used early and throughout the continuum of care to treat antibiotic-resistant infections which are rising globally and highly prevalent in developing countries and high-conflict regions.”

Read that again. First to the fight. Early casualties. Prolonged-care settings.

When we deploy our carriers to the Indo-Pacific, when we send Marines into contested environments, when we operate in regions where medical evacuation isn’t guaranteed—our people need every medical advantage we can give them.

A sailor fighting a superbug infection can’t stand watch. A Marine with a resistant wound infection can’t complete the mission. Medical readiness is operational readiness.

Joint Innovation at Its Best

This research demonstrates something we don’t celebrate enough: when Navy Medicine and Army Medicine researchers work together with focused priorities, incredible things happen. NMRC collaborated seamlessly with Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.

WRAIR’s Forward Labs collected phages in Thailand, Kenya, and Georgia. Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU) SOUTH provided phage isolates from South America. This global network, coordinated across services, created a phage library that will serve warfighters for years to come.

This is how you build combat advantage.

Next Mission: FDA Approval

NMRC’s next objective is clear: Investigational New Drug applications with the FDA to move the most promising cocktails into phase one safety and immune response studies.

“Navy Medicine R&D is a leader in bacteriophage research so that we can bring this promising technology to clinicians and corpsman to improve battlefield survival for Sailors and Marines,” Commander Simons states.

That’s the goal. Not publications. Not academic prestige. Battlefield survival..

The Bigger Picture

We talk often about the “hollow Navy” of the 1970s—rusting ships, deferred maintenance, degraded readiness. But readiness isn’t just hull numbers and operating budgets. It’s whether our people can fight and survive when called upon.

This bacteriophage research represents the same commitment to readiness that we demand in ship maintenance, training, and logistics. It’s the Navy refusing to accept that warfighters should die from infections we could prevent or treat.

It’s innovation driven by mission necessity.

It’s medical capability that directly enables combat power.

It’s the kind of work that happens when national will, proper funding, and talented professionals align toward a clear objective: keeping our sailors and Marines ready, healthy, and lethal.

What This Teaches Us

For 250 years, Navy Medicine has delivered healthcare to warfighters “on, below, and above the sea and ashore.” This bacteriophage research continues that legacy with 21st-century tools.

But it also demonstrates something broader about naval strength: readiness is a system. Every piece matters. From hull coatings that prevent rust to phage cocktails that prevent death from resistant bacteria, it all connects.

When we advocate for a stronger Navy, we’re advocating for all of it. The ships, yes. But also the medicine, the logistics, the training, the innovation, the global partnerships that make American naval power possible.

NMRC and its partner commands have shown what’s possible when the mission is clear and the resources are provided. They’ve built a library of 2,500 phage cocktails, established processes that could save countless lives, and positioned the U.S. military to lead in a crucial medical technology.

That’s not just good science. That’s good strategy.

That’s a stronger Navy.

FREDERICK, Md. (April 11, 2025) Researchers with Biological Defense Research Directorate (BDRD), pose for a group photo after conducting bacteriophage therapy research to combat multidrug resistant bacteria that could impact warfighter readiness. Phages are viruses that target and kill antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Navy Medicine Research & Development (NMR&D) is engaged in bacteriophage therapy research to protect the warfighter from these threats, keeping U.S. forces ready and lethal. NMRC, headquarters of NMR&D, is engaged in a broad spectrum of activity from basic science in the laboratory to field studies in austere and remote areas of the world to investigations in operational environments. In support of Navy, Marine Corps and joint U.S. warfighter health, readiness and lethality, researchers study infectious diseases, biological warfare detection and defense, combat casualty care, environmental health concerns, aerospace and undersea medicine, operational mission support and epidemiology. For 250 years, Navy Medicine, represented by more than 44,000 highly-trained military and civilian healthcare professionals, has delivered quality healthcare and enduring expeditionary medical support to the warfighter on, below, and above the sea and ashore. 

Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for the transparent reporting, proper resourcing, and strategic innovation necessary to maintain U.S. naval superiority. Medical readiness is operational readiness. Support the sailors and Marines who stand the watch.

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The Next War Will Be Won by the Bench, Not the Starting Lineup

Abstract

As I continue to learn from naval professionals, analysts, and thoughtful voices like CDR Salamander, Brent Sadler, and Steven Wills, one reality keeps coming into sharper focus: wars between major powers are not decided by what we start with, but by what we can replace after the fighting begins. Many of our most advanced systems today are designed in ways that make rapid replacement, repair, and adaptation extremely difficult. This is not simply a funding or acquisition issue — it is a design, industrial, and national alignment issue. Understanding this is essential if Americans are to understand what true naval power requires in the 21st century.

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

As I continue this journey with Americans for a Stronger Navy, I find myself learning as much as I am advocating.

One of the most valuable parts of this work has been listening to and reading professionals like CDR Salamander, retired U.S. Navy Commander and widely read naval commentator; Brent Sadler, Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at The Heritage Foundation and former U.S. Navy submariner; and Dr. Steven Wills, naval historian and former U.S. Navy officer, who are describing a reality that should concern every American — not just those in uniform or working in the defense industry.

Here’s the light-bulb moment. Imagine two football teams. One starts the game with the best players in the league — faster, stronger, more skilled. The other starts with good players, but has a deep bench. When players get hurt, they substitute quickly. When equipment breaks, they replace it. When fatigue sets in, they rotate fresh players onto the field. By the fourth quarter, the first team is exhausted, short-handed, and can’t keep up. The second team wins.

Wars between major powers work the same way. It’s not the starting lineup that decides the outcome. It’s the depth of the bench.

Today, we have an impressive starting lineup. What professionals like Salamander, Sadler, and Wills are warning us about is the size of our bench.

That was true in World War II. It is proving true in Ukraine today. And it will be true in any future conflict in the Pacific.

Here’s the uncomfortable part: many of the systems we build today are extraordinarily capable — but they are not designed to be built, repaired, or replenished at wartime scale.

The Lesson We Forgot from World War II

In World War II, America did not win because our tanks, ships, and aircraft were perfect. We won because they were designed to be built in massive numbers by the factories we already had. Design matched industrial strength. Throughput, not elegance, won the war.

What CDR Salamander Is Warning Us About

“In a fight defined by attrition, adaptation, and industrial endurance, the winning systems will not be the perfect ones on paper but the ones that can be produced, replaced, and improved the fastest.”

Brent Sadler and Maritime Statecraft

Sadler calls this maritime statecraft — naval power tied directly to shipyards, logistics, trade, workforce, and industry.

Steven Wills and the Structural Slide

Wills shows this is a structural capacity problem, not a readiness statistic.

What This Means for Middle America

Factories, trades, ports, shipyards — naval power begins in American towns long before a ship leaves port.

How We Got Here — The Quiet Erosion of Industrial Depth

This didn’t happen overnight. Industrial redundancy gave way to efficiency. What was once economic change is now understood as national security fragility.

Maritime Commerce — The Part Most Americans Never See

Over 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. Naval strength protects American prosperity.

How the Country Benefits

Stable supply chains, energy security, jobs, reliable trade, and deterrence.

The Good News

The good news is this: America has solved this problem before. In the 1930s, we did not yet have the industrial capacity that would later win World War II. What we had first was understanding. Once Americans understood what was required, industry, workforce, and national focus followed. We are at a similar moment now.

Why Americans Should Care

If war comes in the Pacific, it will not be decided in the first month. It will be decided in month six by who can replace losses fastest.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Captain John Konrad Just Proved Our Point—From the Logistics Side

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

A few days ago, we published a piece about rust on Navy ships. Not because rust is the problem, but because rust is the symptom of something deeper: a governance system that doesn’t fund the unglamorous, essential work of maintaining a ready fleet.

Now Captain John Konrad has walked through the 2025 Military Sealift Command handbook page by page in a detailed podcast, and he’s telling the exact same story—from the other side of the hull.

What Konrad Found

Captain Konrad, founder of gCaptain and a licensed Master Mariner with decades at sea, attended the Surface Navy Association’s National Symposium and picked up what he calls “the most important book the Navy publishes every year”—the MSC handbook.

His conclusion after reviewing it: “We are completely unprepared for a war in the Pacific.”

Here’s what the handbook reveals:

$5 billion annual budget for Military Sealift Command—the organization responsible for 90% of everything the military moves overseas, including fuel, ammunition, food, and equipment for all services across all theaters worldwide.

As Konrad puts it bluntly: “Ships are expensive, people. Crewing ships are expensive. Maintaining ships are expensive. And you just can’t do it with a $5 billion budget.” That’s less than 0.5% of the $1.1 trillion defense budget to sustain the logistics backbone that enables everything else.

17 ships laid up—not because they’re broken, but because there aren’t enough licensed merchant mariners to crew them. The workforce crisis isn’t theoretical. It’s operational right now.

A command authority mismatch: MSC is a one or two-star command trying to support operations across all numbered fleets, which are three and four-star commands. When they compete for resources in Congress, they get outranked by everyone.

The Single Point of Failure Inventory

Konrad methodically documents what “running on fumes” actually looks like:

  • 1 Missile Range Instrumentation Ship (to track adversary weapons development)
  • 1 Advanced towed array surveillance ship
  • 1 Cable repair ship (for undersea cables carrying secure communications)
  • 1 Ballistic missile tracking ship
  • 1 Navigation test support ship
  • 4 Ocean surveillance ships (we had dozens during the Cold War to track Soviet submarines)
  • 4 Submarine support ships (submarines can’t safely enter or leave port without them)
  • 4 New John Lewis-class replenishment oilers—with only one or two actually deployed due to environmental scrubber requirements making them too tall to fit under 70% of bridges

The oiler situation is particularly critical. As Konrad notes, a former Commandant of the Merchant Marine wrote that we’re 100 tankers short of minimum requirements to fuel the fleet in a Pacific campaign.

This Is the Same Story We’ve Been Telling

In our earlier post on rust, we made a simple point: rust isn’t a Navy problem. It’s an American one.

We showed this governance chain:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

When that chain breaks down, you get rust on deckplates. But as Konrad’s breakdown proves, you also get:

  • Ships that can’t deploy because bureaucracy matters more than mission
  • Mariners overworked to the point of tragedy (he references the officer who died by suicide aboard the USNS Amelia Earhart from stress and overwork)
  • Single ships doing missions that require dozens
  • A logistics fleet averaging 40 years old with no replacement plan adequate to requirements

The Governance Failure at Every LevelKonrad’s evidence maps directly to our framework:

National will: Americans support the Navy—surveys prove it. But they picture aircraft carriers and destroyers, not oilers and cable repair ships. They don’t know Military Sealift Command exists. They don’t understand that 90% of military logistics moves by ship, or that the Air Force’s entire airlift capacity is less than what China can fit on one modern container ship.

Budgets: When the public doesn’t understand what naval power requires, Congress doesn’t fund it. MSC gets 0.5% of the defense budget to do what Konrad calls “the most important mission” because logistics wins wars.

Priorities: MSC is outranked by every other command. When it’s time to fight for resources, they lose. The result is predictable: deferred maintenance, aging ships, no replacement pipeline, and a workforce crisis.

Behavior: With inadequate funding and low command priority, you get exactly what Konrad documents—ships laid up, mariners burned out, critical capabilities down to single digits, and new ships stuck pier-side because nobody fixed the bureaucratic tangles.

Readiness: We can move the fleet to the Pacific. But we can’t sustain them there. We can win the first battle, but we can’t win the campaign.

What “Lack of Support” Actually Means

This isn’t about public indifference. It’s about invisibility.

The American public sees:

  • Carriers launching jets (thrilling)
  • Destroyers shooting missiles (dramatic)
  • Submarines running silent (mysterious)

They don’t see:

  • The oiler keeping the carrier’s air wing flying
  • The dry cargo ship bringing ammunition to the destroyers
  • The cable repair ship maintaining secure communications
  • The ocean surveillance ship tracking enemy submarines before they become threats
  • The submarine tender ensuring boats can safely enter and leave port

What’s invisible doesn’t get funded.

This is why the governance failure at the top of the chain matters so much. If national will doesn’t include understanding what naval power actually requires, budgets will never prioritize the systems that make it work.

Naval Power Is Systems, Not Platforms

We’ve been making this point for months: naval power isn’t platforms. It’s systems.

You can have the most advanced destroyers and carriers in the world, but if you can’t fuel them at sea, resupply them with ammunition, track enemy submarines approaching your bases, repair undersea cables when they’re cut, or crew the ships you already have—then you don’t have naval power. You have expensive hulls that can’t sustain operations.

Konrad’s handbook walkthrough proves this from the logistics side. The platforms get the attention and the funding. The systems that enable them get $5 billion and a two-star admiral.

A Call to Action: DOD and Congress Must Act

We know from surveys that Americans support a strong Navy. They want us to be ready. But readiness isn’t just about how many ships we have—it’s about whether those ships can operate, sustain, and prevail in extended campaigns.

The Department of Defense must:

  • Elevate MSC to a three-star command so it has the authority to compete for resources
  • Fix bureaucratic tangles keeping new capabilities pier-side
  • Properly recognize civilian mariners to improve recruitment and retention
  • Stop treating logistics as an afterthought in force structure decisions

Congress must:

  • Fund MSC and the maritime industrial base at levels that match strategic requirements, not political convenience
  • Expand the Maritime Security Program, especially tankers
  • Invest in the mariner training pipeline and Strategic Sealift Officer program
  • Demand readiness reporting that focuses on systems and sustainability, not just platform counts

Acknowledging Captain Konrad’s Work

Captain Konrad has been a persistent, credible voice highlighting America’s maritime readiness crisis. Through gCaptain, his podcasts, and media appearances on NPR, BBC, the New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, he’s documented the decline of our merchant marine, the shipbuilding crisis, and strategic sealift challenges.

His latest breakdown of the MSC handbook is a public service. He’s showing Americans what their Navy actually depends on—and how fragile that foundation has become.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we’ve been making the case that rust is a symptom and the system is the cause. Konrad just proved it from the logistics side. His work validates our concerns and strengthens the case for urgent action.

The Bottom Line

Rust isn’t a deckplate problem. It’s a governance one.

Ships laid up for lack of crews isn’t a manning problem. It’s a governance one.

Oilers stuck pier-side because nobody fixed the bureaucracy isn’t a maintenance problem. It’s a governance one.

And a $5 billion budget for the logistics backbone that enables 90% of military power projection isn’t a budget problem—it’s a national priority failure.

Captain Konrad is right: we’re not ready for a sustained fight in the Pacific.

But the solution isn’t just to build more ships. It’s to fix the governance chain that determines whether we fund, crew, maintain, and deploy the capabilities we already need.

The American people support a strong Navy. Now we need DOD and Congress to match that support with the resources, priorities, and leadership that readiness actually requires.

Let’s roll.

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Welcome Home, Captain Scheurich: A 57-Year Watch Ends

This week, one of our own — Captain Thomas Edwin Scheurich Sr., a U.S. Navy aviator from Norfolk, Nebraska — finally returns home after more than five decades listed as missing in action. On November 14, 2025, he will be laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors

The End of a Long Wait

For 57 years, Captain Scheurich’s name stood among the missing. A dedicated Naval Aviator, he was lost on a night mission over Vietnam on March 1, 1968. For over half a century, his family waited, remembered, and honored his memory with unwavering strength.

The notification this past May that his remains had been identified brought not just closure, but the sacred opportunity to welcome him home with the honor he has always deserved—a moment for the nation to formally thank a hero.

The Price of Freedom

Captain Scheurich represents the very best of naval service: courage under fire, dedication to mission, and unwavering commitment to shipmates and country. He flew into harm’s way, fully aware of the risks involved.

At just 34 years old, he gave everything. He never came home to see his children grow, to meet his grandchildren, to build boats or play his banjo in the years that should have been his. He made the ultimate sacrifice for the liberties we enjoy today.

To the Scheurich Family: We Never Forgot
To the Scheurich family: your father, grandfather, and loved one embodied the warrior spirit that has protected this nation for generations. His sacrifice was not in vain. Because of sailors like Captain Scheurich, America remained free. And because of families like yours, who carried on with grace and strength, we never forgot what was owed to those who did not return.

As we work every day to ensure today’s Navy has the resources, readiness, and support it needs, we are constantly reminded why this mission matters:

  • It matters because of sailors like Captain Scheurich.
  • It matters because the watch must continue.
  • It matters because freedom is never free—it is earned by those willing to stand in the gap.

Welcome home, Captain Scheurich. Your courage endures. Your sacrifice will never be forgotten.Fair winds and following seas, sir.
With profound respect and gratitude,
Americans for a Stronger Navy

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The Fork in the Sea

An Open Letter to Silicon Valley and the American People

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

If you’re confused by all this, you’re not alone. By “this,” I mean the tangle of headlines, policies, and talking points that have defined America’s relationship with China for the past decade — tariffs and trade wars, tech bans and chip controls, speeches about “decoupling,” and endless debates between the so-called hawks and doves in Washington. There’s a lot to unpack. The truth is, most Americans are burnt out. After years of rising prices, supply chain chaos, and political talk about tariffs and trade wars, people are tired of trying to figure out who’s right, who’s bluffing, and who’s actually working for them. They hear about new restrictions on chips, debates over TikTok, or tariffs on Chinese steel — but they don’t always see how any of it helps put food on the table or keeps the country safe.

Here’s the reality: for years, Washington and Wall Street were divided into two camps. The “China doves” believed that trade, investment, and partnership would bring peace—that if we did business together, China would grow more open and the world would grow more stable. The “China hawks”, on the other hand, warned that the Chinese Communist Party was using that same economic engagement to build leverage, dominate industry, and prepare for confrontation.

The tariffs you’ve heard about—the ones that started during the Trump administration and carried through in various forms—were part of that battle. They weren’t just about steel, aluminum, or semiconductors. They were about whether America would keep surrendering its manufacturing and shipbuilding capacity to a regime that has made no secret of its ambitions in the Pacific.

Most Americans didn’t pick a side. They were too busy working, paying taxes, and hoping someone in Washington would finally get it right. But the truth is, both parties let this happen. We were told that engagement meant peace—when in reality, it built dependency. And now, the same country we helped enrich is threatening our allies, our trade routes, and our future.

That’s why voices like Shyam Sankar’s matter. Over the past week, the Palantir CTO and Hudson Institute trustee laid out a hard truth that America can no longer ignore. In his essay “Why the China Doves Are Wrong,” he calls out a generation of business and technology leaders who misread Beijing’s intentions. These so-called “doves” believed engagement and profit could buy peace. They were wrong.

Sankar singles out Nvidia’s CEO, Jensen Huang, who recently said the future “doesn’t have to be all us or them; it could be us and them.” Sankar’s answer is clear: the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t believe that. Its rise depends on America’s decline—and our own money, technology, and industrial retreat helped make that possible.

He’s right. For decades, U.S. capital and know-how flowed into China, building the very industrial and military capacity that now threatens the free world. America’s overreliance on Chinese supply chains—from semiconductors to shipyards—has turned interdependence into a weapon aimed back at us.

Rebuilding our domestic base—our factories, shipyards, and maritime strength—isn’t nostalgia. It’s national security. Sankar’s warning echoes what many of us have been saying for years: hard power and industrial resilience are the foundation of peace.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we believe this isn’t just a policy debate. It’s a call to every citizen. This moment demands that Americans—not just policymakers—take responsibility, stand together, and act before it’s too late.

The Tide Is Turning

For years, Americans for a Stronger Navy has been saying what Shyam Sankar just put into print: we didn’t lose ground to China overnight—it happened one contract, one shipment, one investment at a time. When someone from inside Silicon Valley finally says it out loud, it means the conversation is shifting.

This isn’t about pointing fingers. It’s about facing facts. The same innovation hubs that built the digital future also hollowed out America’s industrial core. And now, even the insiders see it: the CCP isn’t looking for balance—it’s looking for dominance. Sankar’s words confirm what we’ve been warning all along.

Sankar didn’t pull punches. He wrote:

“The U.S. is partially to blame for turning China into a juggernaut. American companies have invested vast sums over decades to build China’s industrial base. … Chinese military contractors securitize weapons contracts in global capital markets, meaning that American pension funds and 401(k) investors have financed missiles aimed at U.S. ships.”

That’s the uncomfortable truth. We financed the very threat we now face. While many Americans were working hard and trusting their savings to grow, their own retirement dollars were indirectly funding China’s military expansion.

This isn’t a partisan issue or a Wall Street issue—it’s an American issue. And fixing it means facing it head-on.

Call to Silicon Valley and the Financial Sector

If there’s one thing Americans know how to do, it’s rebuild. We did it after the Great Depression, after World War II, and after every storm that’s hit this country. But this time, the rebuilding must start with those who helped hollow out the core—our own financial and tech elites.

Silicon Valley didn’t mean to weaken America. Wall Street didn’t set out to fund our rivals. But good intentions don’t excuse bad outcomes. The truth is, while innovators were chasing the next big breakthrough, and investors were chasing the next big return, our shipyards rusted, our supply chains moved offshore, and our industrial base became dependent on the very system now aligned against us.

That’s why this open letter isn’t just a warning—it’s an invitation. We need the same creativity, drive, and innovation that built the digital world to help rebuild the physical one. The next frontier isn’t in code; it’s in steel, in sensors, in shipyards, and in the men and women who keep the seas open and the nation free.

We’re calling on America’s tech and finance leaders to put their talent and capital back to work here at home—where it matters most. Invest in shipbuilding. Partner with maritime innovators. Reimagine logistics, automation, and infrastructure. Help America regain the ability to build, move, and defend.

Because the same companies that helped wire the world now have a moral obligation to help secure it. And if we do this right, we won’t just restore our strength—we’ll rebuild trust between Main Street, Wall Street, and the American people.

Closing: The Hard Truth and the Hope

The American people have every right to feel weary. We’ve been told for decades that global integration would make the world safer, that cheap goods would make us richer, and that innovation alone would keep us ahead. But somewhere along the way, we lost sight of something simple and sacred—the idea that America must be able to stand on her own.

Shyam Sankar reminded us that while our leaders talked about partnership, the Chinese Communist Party was planning for dominance. And he’s right—we built part of that machine. But now we have a chance to build something better: a stronger, more united, and more self-reliant America.

That’s why this isn’t just a letter to policymakers—it’s a letter to all of us. To the shipbuilder and the software engineer. To the machinist and the venture capitalist. To every citizen whose pension, paycheck, or passion helped shape this nation. The future of American power depends on our willingness to face what’s broken and fix it together.

Rebuilding our shipyards and restoring our maritime strength isn’t about preparing for war—it’s about securing peace. It’s about ensuring that no foreign power can hold our economy, our sailors, or our future hostage. It’s about remembering that deterrence isn’t aggression—it’s readiness.

So yes, Americans are tired. We’ve been misled, overextended, and divided. But fatigue is not failure—it’s a signal. A signal that it’s time to get serious, to get focused, and to get back to work.

That’s what Americans for a Stronger Navy stands for—peace through strength, transparency through accountability, and unity through shared responsibility. Together, we can rebuild the strength that keeps us free.

Let’s roll.

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Americans for a Stronger Navy Response to Battle of Savo Island Anniversary

Chart of the disposition of ships the night of 8 August
Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

On this solemn anniversary of the Battle of Savo Island, Americans for a Stronger Navy joins our Australian allies in remembering the courage and sacrifice of those who gave their lives in the dark waters off Guadalcanal on August 9, 1942.

The loss of HMAS Canberra and her 84 brave sailors, alongside over 900 American naval personnel, represents more than numbers—it represents the ultimate sacrifice made by free nations standing together against tyranny. This battle, while tactically a defeat, demonstrated the unbreakable bond between Australian and American naval forces that continues to secure the Pacific today.

The lessons of Savo Island—the critical importance of naval readiness, advanced training, and technological superiority—remain as relevant now as they were 82 years ago. As we face new challenges in the Pacific, from contested sea lanes to emerging threats, we honor these fallen heroes by ensuring our Navy maintains the strength, capability, and resolve they died defending.

Their sacrifice reminds us that freedom of navigation and maritime security are not abstract concepts, but principles worth defending with our lives. Today, as then, a strong Navy remains America’s first line of defense and our greatest tool for preserving peace through strength.

We stand with Australia in remembering these heroes and recommit ourselves to the naval strength that protects both our nations.

A Salute to Those Who Remember

To all who pause today to honor these fallen sailors—veterans, families, historians, students, and citizens both American and Australian—thank you. Your remembrance keeps their sacrifice alive and their lessons relevant. Whether you’re a descendant of a Savo Island survivor, a naval history enthusiast, or simply someone who understands that freedom isn’t free, your attention to this anniversary matters.

Special recognition goes to our Australian friends, military historians, naval societies, and educators who ensure these stories continue to be told. In an age of shortened attention spans, those who preserve and share naval history perform a vital service to both our nations.

Why Average Americans Should Care About the Battle of Savo Island

Economic Security The Pacific carries over $1.4 trillion in annual trade vital to American prosperity. These are the same trade routes where sailors died in 1942. Today, 40% of America’s imports cross these waters, along with critical shipping lanes for oil, gas, and renewable energy components that power our economy.

Historical Lessons for Today Savo Island showed the cost of being caught unprepared—a lesson directly applicable to current Pacific tensions. The battle demonstrated why strong allies like Australia are essential to American security, and how technological superiority matters. Japanese superiority in night-fighting capabilities led to their victory; today’s tech gaps could prove equally costly.

Personal Connection Many American families have ancestors who served in the Pacific Theater. Understanding what military service truly costs helps inform decisions about defense spending and foreign policy. The battle reminds us that the freedoms Americans enjoy came at tremendous cost and weren’t guaranteed by geography alone.

Current Relevance The same strategic waterways remain crucial to American interests today. Modern tensions in the South China Sea echo the naval competition of WWII, and historical battles like Savo Island inform current debates about naval funding and capabilities.

Strengthening Allied Partnerships

The Battle of Savo Island reminds us that America’s security depends not just on our own naval strength, but on the strength of our alliances. Today, this means:

The AUKUS Partnership with Australia and the UK builds on the naval cooperation forged in battles like Savo Island, sharing submarine technology that strengthens all three nations. Joint training exercises with Australian, Japanese, and other Pacific allies ensure we won’t repeat the communication failures of 1942 that contributed to the defeat.

Shared intelligence networks and integrated defense relationships born from WWII sacrifices now provide early warning and coordinated responses to regional threats. Allied shipbuilding and defense manufacturing strengthen both nations’ naval capabilities, creating an industrial base that supports deterrence.

The Battle of Savo Island isn’t just history—it’s a reminder that American prosperity and security depend on naval strength and strong alliances. The sailors who died there died protecting the world we live in today. Their legacy lives on not just in our memory, but in the enduring partnerships their sacrifice helped forge.

If we want peace, we must master this new domain.

It’s time to embrace it. It’s time to invest. It’s time to lead.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter—a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Memorial Day Tribute: Rediscovering USS F-1’s Centennial Sacrifice

USS F-1’s

A Century-Old Tragedy Resurfaces Under the Waves

On December 17, 1917, the U.S. submarine USS F-1 was lost during a routine training exercise off the coast of San Diego, claiming the lives of 19 shipmates when it collided with another vessel and sank beneath the waves (CBS News, @EconomicTimes).

Cutting-Edge Technology Illuminates the Deep

This Memorial Day, unprecedented high-definition imagery of the F-1’s final resting place—more than 1,300 feet below the surface—has been released, thanks to a collaborative deep-sea expedition using WHOI’s human-occupied vehicle Alvin and the autonomous vehicle Sentry, alongside advanced sonar and photogrammetric surveys (Live Science, Phys.org).

Why Americans Should Care

USS F-1’s

Each Memorial Day, we honor those who paid the ultimate price. The rediscovery of USS F-1 reminds us that—even after a century—our nation remains committed to remembering and learning from the sacrifices of our naval service members. Their stories are woven into the fabric of American resilience, inspiring future generations to uphold the freedoms they defended.

Implications for the Navy

Documenting century-old wrecks reinforces the Navy’s dedication to preserving its heritage and honoring fallen shipmates. These expeditions not only advance undersea research and technology but also strengthen esprit de corps by connecting today’s sailors with the service and sacrifice of those who came before (CBS News, GreekReporter.com).

Implications for Our Allies

Such deep-sea collaborations—uniting WHOI, the U.S. Navy, and federal science agencies—highlight the value of joint research efforts. By sharing technology and expertise, we and our partners enhance maritime domain awareness and build a legacy of mutual respect in exploring and safeguarding the ocean’s depths (CBS News, Phys.org).

A Call to Remember

This Memorial Day, let us pause to honor the 19 souls of USS F-1 and all U.S. naval personnel who have fallen in service to our country. Their courage beneath the waves continues to guide and inspire our mission above them.

The Lost Souls of USS F-1

  • John Robert Belt, Seaman
  • Frank Matthew Bernard, Machinist’s Mate, 2nd class
  • William Lester Cartwright, Seaman
  • Harry Le Roy Corson, Chief Electrician’s Mate (G)
  • James Goonan, Chief Gunners’ Mate
  • Simon Greenberg, Electrician’s Mate, 1st class
  • Edward Emerson Hall, Machinist’s Mate, 1st class
  • Lyman Frederick Lovely, Machinist’s Mate, 2nd class
  • Ralph Edgar McCluer, Electrician’s Mate, 2nd class (G)
  • Duncan Archie McRae, Electrician’s Mate, 1st class
  • John Peter Albert Messang, Chief Machinist’s Mate
  • Grover Edwin Metz, Machinist’s Mate, 2nd class
  • Ray Elsworth Scott, Electrician’s Mate, 1st class
  • Elbert Peshine Smith, Machinist’s Mate, 2nd class
  • Guy Raymond Stewart, Chief Machinist’s Mate
  • Dudley Stough, Chief Gunner’s Mate (T)
  • Charles Fridley Vincent, Electrician’s Mate, 2nd class (G)
  • Thomas Alfred Walsh, Machinist’s Mate, 1st class
  • Clyde William Wyatt, Machinist’s Mate, 1st class

A Prayer for Our Fallen Shipmates

Let us bow our heads. O Lord, we honor these 19 brave souls who gave their lives beneath the waves. Grant them eternal rest in Your boundless mercy. Comfort their families and shipmates who carry their memory forward. May their sacrifice never be forgotten, and may we, strengthened by their courage, walk in the path of duty and devotion. Amen.

A Call to Remember

This Memorial Day, let us pause to honor the crew of USS F-1 and all U.S. naval personnel who have fallen in service to our nation. Their courage beneath the waves continues to guide and inspire our mission above them.

To learn more about U.S. naval history and join a community dedicated to honoring service and strengthening America’s maritime future, sign up for the Americans for a Stronger Navy Educational Series at StrongerNavy.org.

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Honoring Vietnam Veterans: Especially Those Who Served in the U.S. Navy

A Tribute to the Blue Water, Brown Water Navy – and Our POWs | March 29

As we mark this solemn and significant moment of remembrance, Americans for a Stronger Navy extends heartfelt gratitude to all who served during the Vietnam War—especially those in the U.S. Navy. Whether you were steaming offshore on a destroyer, carrier, or support ship, or navigating the dangerous inland waterways of the Mekong Delta, your courage and commitment mattered. You stood watch in some of the most complex and grueling conditions in modern warfare.

The Navy’s Role in Vietnam

The Navy’s role in Vietnam was extensive and essential. From launching air strikes from carriers during Rolling Thunder and Linebacker, to conducting coastal bombardments and halting enemy supply lines through Operation Market Time, the Navy was always on the front line. In the rivers and canals of the Delta, sailors in Task Forces 115, 116, and 117 faced ambushes and booby traps daily as they fought to secure the waterways in what became known as the “Brown Water Navy.”

Among those who served with distinction was the USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7). During the first three months of 1967, she cruised the South China Sea and Gulf of Tonkin, performing search and rescue missions and pounding enemy coastal positions in support of ground operations. Throughout the war, Henry B. Wilson served as plane guard for carriers on Yankee Station, participated in Sea Dragon operations, and provided naval gunfire support.

In April 1975, she took part in Operation Eagle Pull, assisting in the evacuation of Phnom Penh during its fall to the Khmer Rouge. Just weeks later, she was on the front lines again for Operation Frequent Wind, helping evacuate South Vietnam during its final collapse. Her role included drawing enemy fire away from the ships loading evacuees—demonstrating extraordinary bravery. In May 1975, she was also one of the lead ships in the dramatic rescue operation of the hijacked SS Mayaguez in Cambodian waters.

Why America Should Care

Today, many Americans may not know that 1.8 million Sailors served in Southeast Asia during the war. They may not realize that 95% of supplies reached Vietnam by sea, or that Navy Seabees built the logistical lifelines that made the war effort possible. And perhaps most importantly, many don’t know that over 1,600 Navy personnel lost their lives, thousands more were wounded—and some were taken as prisoners of war.

We especially honor those who endured captivity, often under brutal conditions, refusing to break and continuing to serve their country with dignity and resolve. Their courage is a testament to the strength of the human spirit and the values we hold dear.

We care because these men and women served their country without question—even when the country questioned the war. They are part of the fabric of American history and the foundation of our maritime security.

A Personal Note of Gratitude

As a former sailor on the USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7), I want to give a special shout-out to my shipmates that served during Vietnam and beyond. Our service mattered, and it still does.

I also want to honor my older brother, Chuck. He volunteered in 1968 as a U.S. Army photographer. Wounded in combat and granted a pass to come home, he made the extraordinary choice to go back—to help his buddies. Many of them never made it back. Chuck did, but not before being called a “baby killer” by his own countrymen—while still in bandages from his first Purple Heart. Still, he went back and served his country the best he could. RIP, brother. That’s the kind of quiet heroism that deserves recognition.

Never Forgotten

On behalf of Americans for a Stronger Navy, we say thank you. To the Blue Water sailors who braved open seas, the Brown Water warriors who navigated narrow rivers under fire, the POWs who endured unthinkable hardship, and the crew of the USS Henry B. Wilson—you made history. And to those like many of my shipmates and my brother Chuck, who showed what real duty looks like, your service continues to inspire.

Let’s remember them not just on designated days, but every day.

Learn more, get involved, and stand with us at StrongerNavy.org.