Global News Watch Archives - Americans for a Stronger Navy

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026

The World’s Oil. One Navy Protects It. Who Else Is Paying?

“We strongly encourage other nations whose economies depend on the strait far more than ours to come and help us.”

Those are President Trump’s words. Not a think tank analyst. Not a naval advocacy group. The President of the United States, standing in the White House, publicly demanding that the nations who benefit most from American naval protection start paying their share.

He’s right. And there’s already a legal framework to make it happen.

The Strongly Worded Letter

On March 19, 2026, twenty nations issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Britain. France. Germany. Japan. South Korea. Canada. Twenty signatures. Strong language. Zero ships.

The statement expressed “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage.” France and Germany were more direct — any coalition would only form after a ceasefire. The German chancellor said he would only join a mission with an international legal mandate, and only after the fighting stopped.

Meanwhile, American sailors — some at sea more than 250 days — are doing it now.

This is not a new pattern. It is the defining pattern of post-Cold War burden-sharing. Allies sign statements. America sends ships. The bill goes to the American taxpayer.

What’s Actually at Stake

The Strait of Hormuz is not a regional waterway. It is the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. Roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes through it daily. Since Iran’s effective closure began on February 28, tanker traffic has dropped by approximately 70 percent. Over 150 ships anchored outside the strait rather than risk transit. Oil crossed $100 a barrel.

Then Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility — the world’s largest. QatarEnergy reported extensive damage. Their CEO said repairs would take three to five years. This is not a temporary disruption. The economic consequences will be measured in years, not weeks.

Who depends on that oil?

China imports approximately 11 million barrels per day through Gulf sea lanes secured by the U.S. Navy. India imports 5 million. Japan 3 million. South Korea 3 million. Europe 3 million. Japan gets 95 percent of its crude oil from the Gulf. South Korea is similarly dependent.

One navy keeps it flowing. Ours.

The Precedent Already Exists

This is not uncharted territory. The beneficiary-pays principle has been established twice in living memory.

In 1987, Kuwait paid the United States Navy to escort their tankers through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq tanker war. Operation Earnest Will established a clear precedent: nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of their commercial interests contribute to the cost of that protection.

In 1991, Japan paid $13 billion toward Operation Desert Storm. Japan did not send combat troops. Japan wrote a check. The Special Measures Agreement made the burden-sharing arrangement formal and documented.

The precedent exists. What is missing is a permanent, mandatory mechanism.

The Gap in the Framework

Every crisis produces a new round of negotiations, statements, and voluntary contributions — or the lack thereof. The 1987 model worked because Kuwait had a direct and immediate interest in the outcome. The 1991 model worked because Japan faced intense diplomatic pressure and the threat of real consequences.

Neither model is durable. Neither model is predictable. Neither model builds the naval industrial base that sustained forward presence requires.

The current Hormuz crisis will eventually resolve. The Iranian threat will recede, or be defeated, or be negotiated away. And when it does, the allied nations who signed that joint statement will declare victory, go home, and resume importing Gulf oil on America’s dime.

Until the next crisis. When the cycle repeats.

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

Americans for a Stronger Navy has proposed the Gulf Maritime Protection and Burden Sharing Act — the Gulf Act — as a permanent legislative solution to a permanent structural problem.

The Gulf Act establishes a mandatory burden-sharing mechanism requiring nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of Gulf sea lanes to contribute to the cost of that protection. It is grounded in the 1987 Earnest Will precedent and the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Special Measures model. It codifies what has previously been left to ad hoc diplomacy and presidential pressure.

The core principle is straightforward: if you benefit, you contribute.

This is not isolationism. It is not a withdrawal from global leadership. It is the application of a basic fairness principle that the American people already understand instinctively. You don’t get to import millions of barrels of oil through a strait secured by American sailors — some of whom haven’t seen their families in eight months — and sign a statement saying you’ll help out after the shooting stops.

The Window Is Now

President Trump has made burden-sharing a front-page issue. The Hormuz crisis has made the stakes visible to every American who has filled a gas tank in the last month. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is examining the structural questions underlying American naval power.

This is the moment to move from principle to legislation.

The strongly worded letter had twenty signatories. The Gulf Act needs one vote.

Learn more at StrongerNavyDotOrg.

References

[1] Axios, “Seven U.S. allies back potential Strait of Hormuz coalition,” March 19, 2026. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/19/strait-hormuz-coalition-allies-statement-uk

[2] Wikipedia, “2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis,” accessed March 24, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis

[3] Al Jazeera, “European nations, Japan to join ‘appropriate efforts’ to open Hormuz Strait,” March 19, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/19/european-nations-japan-to-join-appropriate-efforts-to-open-hormuz-strait

[4] Naval News, “The challenges of securing Hormuz as 6 nations issue joint statement,” March 2026. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/the-challenges-of-securing-hormuz-as-6-nations-issue-joint-statement/

[5] GOV.UK, “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz,” March 19, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-kingdom-france-germany-italy-the-netherlands-and-japan-on-the-strait-of-hormuz-19-march-2026

[6] Operation Earnest Will / Special Measures Agreement, 1987. Historical record.

[7] Desert Shield/Desert Storm burden-sharing agreements, Japan Special Measures, 1991. Historical record.

March 23, 2026March 23, 2026

The Five-Day Reprieve: Fleet Strain and Diplomatic High-Stakes in the Gulf

1. The “Five-Day Reprieve”: Trump Postpones Strikes
In a major de-escalation move today, President Donald Trump announced a five-day extension on his deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Citing “very good and productive” conversations involving intermediaries, the President has instructed the Department of War to postpone planned strikes on Iranian power plants and civilian energy infrastructure.

* The Market Reaction: Global oil prices dropped nearly 10% following the announcement as markets reacted to the potential for a “total resolution” of hostilities.
* The Catch: The President noted that the pause is “subject to the success” of ongoing meetings throughout the week.

2. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Sabotage Investigation
The USS Gerald R. Ford arrived at Souda Bay, Crete, today for emergency repairs. However, the focus has shifted from a simple fire to a formal criminal inquiry.
* The Investigation: Investigators are formally examining whether the 30-hour laundry room fire on March 12 was an act of internal sabotage. One theory suggests industrial dryers were intentionally overloaded to trigger the blaze.
* Crew Impact: The fire destroyed the ship’s laundry capability and displaced over 600 sailors from their berths. To provide relief, the Navy successfully airlifted 1,000 mattresses from the future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79).

3. Long-Range Escalation: Diego Garcia Targeted
Over the weekend (March 21), Iran demonstrated a previously unrevealed long-range capability by firing two ballistic missiles at the joint U.S.-U.K. base at Diego Garcia.
* The Defense: The strike covered a distance of approximately 2,500 miles (4,000 km), double Iran’s previously claimed 2,000 km limit. One missile failed mid-flight, and the second was successfully intercepted by a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer.
* Significance: This marks Iran’s first operational use of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), confirming they can now reach high-value U.S. logistics hubs far outside the Middle East.

4. “Lightning Carrier” Arrival: USS Tripoli (LHA 7)
The amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are expected to take up station in the North Arabian Sea within the next 24 hours.
* The Mission: Carrying over 2,200 Marines and F-35B stealth fighters, the Tripoli provides a flexible “raid” capability. Despite the diplomatic pause, this force is positioned to forcefully reopen the Strait or conduct maritime interdictions if negotiations fail.

5. Shipbuilding & Fleet Renewal
* USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124): The Navy’s newest Arleigh Burke-class destroyer arrived at its homeport in Norfolk on March 20. It is officially scheduled for commissioning on April 11, 2026.
* Budget Boost: Congress has finalized a $27.2 billion shipbuilding budget for FY2026—a $6.5 billion increase over initial requests—to fund 17 new ships, including a Columbia-class ballistic missile sub and two Virginia-class attack subs.

March 20, 2026March 20, 2026

Mission: General David Petraeus on the Conflict in Iran

Bill Cullifer, Founder — Bill Cullifer, Founde

Why This Matters: The High Stakes for American Seapower

As we watch the events unfold in the Persian Gulf, many Americans are asking: Why should we care? For the team here at StrongerNavy.org, the answer is clear. This isn’t just a regional skirmish; it is a stress test for the very foundation of global commerce and the U.S. Navy’s role as its guardian.

The Chokepoint of the World: The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical energy artery. Roughly 20% of global oil and LNG pass through here. A threat to this “chokepoint” is a direct threat to your gas prices and home heating bills.
A New Era of Naval Warfare: Our Navy is facing a “swarm” threat of low-cost drones. The challenge is “missile math”—defending against a $20,000 drone without exhausting million-dollar interceptors.
The Cost of Deterrence: With munitions costs hitting $6 billion in the first week, we see exactly why a properly funded, technologically superior Navy is the only way to prevent wider aggression.

The Interview: Objective Analysis in a Complex War

In what I consider to be one of the most objective and hard-hitting interviews on the current conflict, Katie Couric sat down with General David Petraeus to dissect the joint U.S.-Israeli operations. Couric asked the tough questions about shifting goals, while Petraeus provided a masterclass in strategic analysis.

The Rationale: Why Now?

General Petraeus identified two primary triggers for the timing of this operation:

Missile Reconstitution: Israel observed Iran rapidly rebuilding its missile program. The “missile math”—the ratio of launchers to interceptors—was becoming “uncomfortable.”
Fleeting Intelligence: The U.S. gained “exquisite intelligence” on the patterns of the Supreme Leader. The administration struck in broad daylight to capitalize on this window.

Naval Neutralization: “Giving Them the Bottom Half”

The U.S. Navy has effectively erased Iran’s ability to project power at sea. The numbers are historic:

120+ Vessels Sunk or Damaged: Including the IRIS Soleimani and the Makran forward-base ship.
Submarine Force Eradicated: All 11 Iranian submarines, including midget Ghadir-class mine-layers, are reported neutralized.
Carrier Power: The USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln are leading the charge, proving American steel remains the ultimate deterrent.

📊 QUICK STATS SIDEBAR: The Naval Front

Iranian Vessels Sunk/Damaged: 120+
Submarine Capability: 0 (Total Neutralization)
Missile Launch Reduction: 90% Decrease since Week 1
U.S. Carrier Presence: 2 Strike Groups (Ford & Lincoln)
Munitions Cost (Week 1): $6 Billion

The “Pottery Barn” Rule

Couric asked the poignant question regarding the “Pottery Barn Rule”—if you break it, you own it. Petraeus offered a sobering distinction: without boots on the ground, the U.S. doesn’t “own” the aftermath. “The Iranians own it,” he noted, while acknowledging that we may be “revisiting this periodically” if a new agreement isn’t reached.

Watch the full interview below to see General Petraeus navigate these complex waters.

Bill
Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org

March 15, 2026March 15, 2026

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

The Navy needs money. Taxpayers are tapped out. So where does the funding come from?

That is not a rhetorical question. It is the defining challenge of American naval policy in 2026. The fleet is shrinking. Shipyards are strained. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year. And the American taxpayer — already carrying an unsustainable fiscal burden — cannot be the answer to every problem.

But there is an answer. It just requires asking who else benefits from American naval power — and whether they are paying their share.

The United States Navy keeps the Persian Gulf open. Every tanker that transits the Strait of Hormuz does so because American sailors, American ships, and American taxpayers back the deterrent that makes it possible.

Japan imports it. South Korea imports it. Germany imports it. The economic engines of our closest allies run on Gulf-sourced petroleum — secured by a Navy they do not fund.

That is not an alliance. That is a subsidy.

We’ve Seen This Before

This is not a new problem. In 1987, Iran began attacking tankers in the Persian Gulf. The Reagan administration launched Operation Earnest Will — the largest naval convoy operation since World War II — reflagging Kuwaiti tankers as American vessels and providing direct Navy escort through waters Japan depended on for survival.

Congress noticed. If the U.S. Navy was protecting Japan’s oil supply, Japan should help pay for it. The pressure produced the first formal Special Measures Agreement in 1987, requiring Japan to contribute to the cost of U.S. forces providing that protection. The principle was established: beneficiaries of U.S. naval protection should contribute to it.

That agreement has been renewed and expanded ever since. The precedent has held for nearly four decades.

The Gap Has Grown

What was true in 1987 is more true today. Gulf oil revenues exceed $350 billion annually. The nations collecting that revenue — and the allies consuming it — benefit from sea lanes the U.S. Navy patrols at a cost of billions per year.

The Navy keeps the sea lanes open. The beneficiaries collect the profits.

Meanwhile, the Navy that provides this service is smaller, older, and more strained than at any point in recent memory. Shipyards are at capacity. The fleet is shrinking. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year.

Allies reliant on Gulf energy are not being asked to share that burden in proportion to their dependence on it.

The Gulf Act: Applying an Established Principle

The Gulf Act is the logical extension of the 1987 burden-sharing framework to the present day. The concept is straightforward: nations that depend on Gulf energy security — and the sea lane access that makes it possible — should contribute meaningfully to the naval forces that provide it.

This is not a radical idea. It is the application of a 35-year-old precedent to a threat environment that has grown more complex, not less.

The mechanisms can take multiple forms — direct contributions to naval operations, minesweeper deployments, escort ship commitments, or financial contributions to a dedicated naval modernization account. The form matters less than the principle: if you benefit, you contribute.

A Note on Why We’re There

Some will argue that the United States has multiple reasons for maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf — and they are right. Security commitments to allies in the region, Iranian nuclear ambitions, freedom of navigation as a global principle, and counterterrorism interests all play a role. The Gulf Act does not dispute any of that.

But those reasons are a separate question from this one: who should pay for the benefit they receive?

The two questions are separable. In 1987, the U.S. had multiple reasons for being in the Gulf too — and Congress still established that Japan, as the primary beneficiary of tanker protection, should contribute to its cost. The Gulf Act asks the same narrow, defensible question: if your economy depends on sea lanes the U.S. Navy keeps open, what is your fair share of that bill?

This is not about relitigating American strategy. It is about making sure the nations that benefit most are not free-riding on the nations that bear the cost.

The SEAS Act Connection

Regular readers will recognize the parallel. The Strategic SEAS Act applies the same beneficiary-pays doctrine to U.S. corporations with significant China operations — companies that helped build the industrial base now threatening American naval superiority should help fund the response.

The Gulf Act and the SEAS Act are two applications of the same governing principle:

Those who extract value from American naval protection should share the cost of providing it.

Whether the beneficiary is an allied nation importing Gulf oil or a Fortune 500 company running supply chains through Chinese ports, the logic does not change.

The Cost of Doing Nothing

If the burden-sharing argument sounds abstract, consider what is happening right now in the Persian Gulf.

According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate cited by Defense One on March 12, 2026, the first 100 hours of Operation Epic Fury cost approximately $3.7 billion — roughly $891 million per day. Air defense munitions costs alone ranged from $1.2 billion to $3.7 billion. [2]

The cost asymmetry is stark. Iran’s Shahed drones cost around $30,000 each. The missiles used to shoot them down — AIM-120s at $1 million, PAC-3 interceptors at $4 million — cost orders of magnitude more. As one defense analyst put it: every cheap drone that forces the U.S. to fire an expensive interceptor is a win for Iran. [2]

Six U.S. soldiers were killed at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, when an Iranian drone evaded air defenses. Three F-15E Strike Eagles were lost in a friendly fire incident over Kuwait. [2]

Meanwhile, the nations whose energy supplies depend on the Gulf’s sea lanes — Japan, South Korea, Germany — are not bearing these costs. The American taxpayer is.

That is the externality the Gulf Act is designed to correct.

The Question Sadler Asked

Captain Brent Sadler of the Heritage Foundation recently raised this directly in the context of a potential Gulf convoy mission, asking whether it was time for allies dependent on Gulf petroleum to contribute escort ships and minesweepers. [1]

The answer is yes. It has always been yes. The 1987 precedent proved it was politically achievable. The current fiscal and force structure reality — and the live situation unfolding today in the Strait of Hormuz — makes it urgent.

The Navy cannot be the world’s free security service while simultaneously being asked to compete with a Chinese fleet building ships at a rate that dwarfs American production. Something has to give — or someone else has to contribute.

What Comes Next

Americans for a Stronger Navy will be developing the Gulf Act framework in the coming months, including burden-sharing models, historical precedents, and legislative pathways. This post is the opening argument.

If you agree that nations benefiting from American naval protection should help fund it, share this post. The conversation Sadler started on X deserves a longer answer than a tweet.

The sea lanes don’t protect themselves.

— Bill Cullifer, Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

References

[1] Brent D. Sadler (@brentdsadler), X (formerly Twitter), March 11, 2026. Captain Sadler serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

[2] Thomas Novelly, “Fighter jets are downing Iranian drones—a dangerous, expensive mission,” Defense One, March 12, 2026. Cost figures sourced from CSIS estimate and Forecast International report cited therein.

March 9, 2026March 9, 2026

The Old Guard Departs, The New Tech Arrives:

The Mine countermeasure ship USS Avenger (MCM 1) “Old Gaurd” heads out for decommision.

The New Guard: Independence-class LCS as a ‘Mother Ship’

The transition to the Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) represents a fundamental shift in naval doctrine. As seen in recent operations, vessels like the USS Canberra (LCS 30) utilize their massive mission bays and stern launch capabilities to act as a command hub for uncrewed systems.

Independence-class LCS deploying surface assets from the mission bay.

Technical Deep Dive: The AN/AQS-20 Sonar

Central to the new MCM Mission Package is the AN/AQS-20 sonar set. Unlike the legacy hull-mounted systems on the Avenger ships, this towed array uses five separate sonar arrays to detect and classify mines in a single pass, providing 3D bottom mapping with high-resolution clarity.

The AN/AQS-20 sonar being prepared for deployment.

A Strategic Evolution

By moving the primary sensors and sweep systems off the manned ship and onto uncrewed platforms, the Navy significantly reduces the risk to sailors. These autonomous systems can operate closer to the threat while the “Mother Ship” remains at a safe standoff distance, ensuring our sea lanes remain open through advanced technology rather than wooden hulls.

Technical Spotlight: AN/AQS-20C Specifications

Sensors: 5 Sonars (including Synthetic Aperture) + Laser Imaging
Range: Full water column (Seafloor to Surface) in one pass
Intelligence: Automated Target Recognition (ATR)
Platforms: Independence-class LCS / CUSV / MH-60S Helicopter

March 8, 2026March 8, 2026

Understanding the U.S. Navy’s Industrial Challenge

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered (Part 1 of 8)

I served as a blue-water destroyer sailor in the 1970s, and like many veterans, I’ve spent the years since trying to understand how America maintains the naval strength that protects our country, our allies, and the global sea lanes we all depend on.

The charts and analysis below help tell part of that story.

This article is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter, our ongoing educational series exploring the future of American sea power and the policies, people, and industrial strength that sustain the U.S. Navy.

If you’re new to the series, you can start with the introduction here:
Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

This article also launches a focused 8-part series within Charting the Course examining some of the most important questions facing the Navy today — from shipbuilding capacity and fleet readiness to workforce challenges and the future of maritime deterrence.

We’re calling it The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

For most Americans, the Navy is something we think about only in moments of crisis. A conflict erupts, a carrier group deploys, or a headline mentions tensions in the Pacific or the Middle East.

But the strength of the U.S. Navy is not decided during those moments. It is determined years — sometimes decades — earlier in shipyards, classrooms, industrial plants, research labs, and congressional hearings.

Today the United States faces serious questions about shipbuilding capacity, industrial readiness, and long-term naval strategy. China is building ships at a pace the world has not seen in generations. Russia continues to challenge Western stability at sea. Critical maritime infrastructure and supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

And yet many Americans remain understandably disconnected from the decisions shaping the future of our fleet.

The strength of the U.S. Navy is determined long before ships sail into crisis—it is built in shipyards, sustained by skilled workers, and shaped by decisions made years earlier in industry, technology, and national policy.

Why Americans Should Care

America is, and has always been, a maritime nation.

Nearly 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. The global economy depends on secure shipping lanes. Energy markets, supply chains, and the stability of democratic alliances all rely on freedom of navigation.

The U.S. Navy has quietly safeguarded those sea lanes for generations.

But maintaining that advantage requires more than ships — it requires people, industry, technology, and public understanding.

Chart: Global Operational Demand on the U.S. Navy

This Heritage Foundation chart illustrates the geographic reach of U.S. naval operations across multiple regions. Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups are routinely deployed worldwide, highlighting the constant global demand placed on the fleet.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Over the coming weeks, this series will explore several critical questions about the future of U.S. sea power.

Can America rebuild the shipbuilding capacity required to compete in a new era of great power competition?

Do we have enough skilled workers — engineers, welders, and naval architects — to sustain fleet growth?

How serious is the maintenance backlog affecting submarines and surface ships?

Are current procurement processes helping or hurting the Navy’s ability to modernize?

How should the United States balance aircraft carriers, submarines, uncrewed systems, and logistics platforms?

What role do civilian shipyards and maritime infrastructure play in national security?

Can the United States scale submarine production fast enough to match emerging threats?

And perhaps most importantly: how do we ensure the American public remains engaged in decisions that affect the future of the fleet?

These are not partisan questions. They are national questions.

Understanding the Industrial Challenge

Much of the discussion about naval power focuses on ships already at sea. But the true story begins on land — in America’s shipyards and industrial base.

Chart: Age Distribution of Chinese and U.S. Naval Fleets

This chart compares the age distribution of Chinese and U.S. naval fleets. China’s fleet contains a larger number of relatively new ships, reflecting rapid shipbuilding expansion in recent years.

China now possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding industry by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, American shipyards face workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and unpredictable funding cycles.

Chart: U.S. Navy Ships Nearing or Exceeding Service Life

This chart shows the growing number of U.S. Navy ships approaching — or exceeding — their expected service life, placing additional strain on fleet readiness and modernization timelines.

The Human Factor

Ships and technology matter — but ultimately the Navy is built on people.

From sailors standing watch at sea tonight to the skilled workers building submarines and carriers at home, the strength of the fleet depends on the dedication and expertise of thousands of Americans.

Implications for Our Allies

America does not operate alone at sea.

Alliances with countries such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners form a critical part of global maritime stability.

These partnerships reinforce an important truth: deterrence is strongest when democracies stand together.

Public Engagement Matters

The U.S. Navy ultimately belongs to the American people.

Yet the complexity of defense planning can make it difficult for citizens to understand how decisions about shipbuilding, budgets, and strategy affect national security.

That is one of the reasons we created StrongerNavy.org.

Our goal is simple: help Americans better understand the challenges facing the fleet, the industrial base that supports it, and the people who serve at sea and in shipyards across the country.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered — Series Guide

Part 1 – Understanding the Industrial Challenge (this article)

Part 2 – Can America Rebuild Shipbuilding Capacity?

Part 3 – The Submarine Production Challenge

Part 4 – Maintenance and Fleet Readiness

Part 5 – Workforce and the Maritime Industrial Base

Part 6 – The Role of Allies in Sea Power

Part 7 – Procurement, Policy, and the Future Fleet

Part 8 – Why Public Engagement Matters

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing
educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next.

Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

March 4, 2026March 5, 2026

Strait of Hormuz: The Facts, The Warning, and What America Can Do

Special Report | March 5, 2026

Cutting through the noise on the world’s most critical waterway — and why this moment calls for resolve, not panic.

There is a lot of noise right now about the Strait of Hormuz. Some of it is accurate. Some of it is not. All of it is loud. Before you form an opinion about what this crisis means — and what America should do about it — you deserve the facts, stated plainly, without an agenda.

That is what we do at StrongerNavy.org. Plain language. Verified facts. No spin.

What Is Actually Happening

The Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide waterway on Iran’s southern border — is the single maritime exit for the Persian Gulf. Every barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Iran that leaves by sea passes through this one gap. It carries 20% of the world’s oil and a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas. There is no alternative route. Ships that cannot use the strait must sail around the southern tip of Africa — adding two to three weeks to every voyage.

Since February 28, that strait has been effectively closed to nearly all commercial shipping. Let’s be precise about what that means.

It is legally open. The U.S. Central Command has confirmed the strait “remains open to international navigation.” Iran has not formally closed an international waterway — it cannot under maritime law.

It is operationally closed. Ship traffic is down 94%, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center. The world’s largest shipping companies — Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, CMA CGM — have all suspended transits. Approximately 750 ships are caught in or around the strait, unable to move.

The reason ships stopped is not Iran’s navy. It is marine insurance. A European regulatory framework called Solvency 2 requires insurers to hold capital sufficient for a once-in-200-year loss event at all times. When conflict escalated, insurers recalculated their exposure overnight. Cancelling war risk coverage takes seven days. Raising new capital takes months. The math was simple — and 90% of the world’s commercial fleet lost its coverage. As maritime historian Sal Mercogliano put it plainly on March 4: “It’s not the Iranians closing the strait. The decision was made by the shipping companies.”

Iran’s weapon is not its fleet. It is economic fear. And it has worked — for now.

What It Tells Us

None of this should be a surprise. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has been documented for decades. Naval planners have war-gamed this scenario repeatedly. The question was never whether it could happen. The question was whether America would be ready when it did.

On March 3, President Trump ordered the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide government war risk insurance for all maritime trade in the Gulf — effective immediately, at what he described as “a very reasonable price.” It was the right instinct. Private insurers had fled the market overnight, and the insurance gap — not Iranian guns — was what stopped the ships.

Whether it moves the needle remains to be seen. The shipping industry has signaled the offer may not be sufficient to restore confidence on its own. And if vessels are damaged, American taxpayers could face a bill in the hundreds of millions — potentially billions. The commitment is real. The details are still emerging.

On March 4, President Trump pledged the U.S. Navy would escort commercial tankers through the strait. Within hours, Lloyd’s List reported the Navy had privately told shipping industry leaders it does not currently have sufficient assets to fulfill that commitment. Approximately 125 ships transit the strait daily under normal conditions. The U.S. has roughly eight guided-missile destroyers and three Littoral Combat Ships in the region. As Mercogliano noted: “This is nowhere near enough assets. They just do not have the assets to do it.”

There are no frigates available — because the U.S. has not yet built a replacement frigate. The Littoral Combat Ships present cannot reliably provide air defense against drones and missiles, as the Red Sea campaign demonstrated. And even as U.S. forces degrade Iran’s conventional navy — including the March 4 torpedo sinking of the Iranian corvette IRS Dena, the first U.S. submarine sinking of a warship since World War II — the asymmetric threat remains. Drones, mines, and fast boats do not require a functioning navy. The Houthis proved that. The Ukrainians proved that in the Black Sea.

We also do not know the full readiness picture of the ships operating in the Gulf tonight — because the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey readiness reports have been classified since 2008. The American public cannot independently verify whether those vessels are fully mission-capable. That is unacceptable. #FreeTheData

The gap between the President’s public commitment and the Navy’s private assessment is not a failure of this administration alone. It is the accumulated result of a generation of deferred shipbuilding, underfunded shipyards, and what we have long called seablindness — America’s institutional tendency to underinvest in naval power during periods of relative peace, then scramble when a crisis arrives.

You cannot build a destroyer in a crisis. The fleet available tonight was determined by decisions made — and deferred — over the past decade.

We Have Been Here Before

I want to say something that tends to get lost in the noise: America has fixed this before.

I served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s. That was the hollow Navy — undermanned, underfunded, demoralized after Vietnam, outpaced by a Soviet fleet that was growing faster than ours. The readiness gap then was real. The threat was real. The concern among those of us who served was real.

And then America came together and fixed it.

The Reagan-era naval buildup — driven by bipartisan recognition that sea power was not optional for a global superpower — took a Navy that could barely sustain itself and rebuilt it into the 600-ship force that helped end the Cold War without firing a single shot at its primary adversary. It did not happen because of panic. It happened because enough Americans, in and out of uniform, looked at the problem clearly and decided the answer was investment, not retreat.

That is the moment we are in again. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not the end of the story. It is the alarm clock.

What America Does Now

The framework for action already exists. The President signed Executive Order 14269 restoring America’s maritime dominance. The Maritime Action Plan, released in February 2026, identified exactly the investments needed — shipbuilding capacity, workforce development, industrial base expansion, a Maritime Security Trust Fund with dedicated funding. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is preparing public hearings in Q2 2026. The SHIPS for America Act has bipartisan support in Congress.

The architecture is there. What has been missing is national will — the public demand that elected representatives treat naval power as the non-negotiable strategic necessity it is.

That is what StrongerNavy.org exists to build. Not alarm. Not partisanship. Not finger-pointing. A clear-eyed, evidence-based, nonpartisan case that a strong Navy is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It is an American issue — as fundamental to our security and prosperity as any question before the country today.

The Strait of Hormuz will reopen. Insurance markets will recalibrate. Ships will move again. But the underlying readiness gap — the shipyard capacity shortfall, the escort deficit, the classified readiness reports, the two-theater question that nobody in Washington wants to answer plainly — will still be there the morning after.

The question is whether this crisis produces the national conversation that leads to real investment, or whether we absorb the shock, breathe a sigh of relief, and go back to sleep.

America does not have to choose seablindness. We chose our way into this. We can choose our way out.

“The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.” — John F. Kennedy

The sun is not shining right now. But when it does — and it will — let’s make sure we remember what this week felt like. And build accordingly.

Stay Informed. Stay Engaged.

StrongerNavy.org has been covering the naval readiness gap for over two years — plain language, verified facts, no spin. If this post was useful, share it with someone who needs to understand what is at stake. And follow our ongoing coverage as this crisis develops.

This is America’s wake-up call. What we do with it is up to us.

March 2, 2026March 2, 2026

When Navigation Becomes a Weapon

Strength at sea now includes protecting the invisible systems that guide global trade.

Electronic warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield. In the days following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, maritime intelligence firms reported that more than 1,100 ships operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz experienced GPS or AIS disruption. Vessels appeared inland on digital maps. Others showed strange circular patterns off the coasts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. Maritime officials described the risk level in the region as “critical.”

This is what modern conflict looks like.

Not just missiles. Not just drones.
Navigation. Commerce. Confidence.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime chokepoints on Earth. Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil moves through that narrow passage. When positioning systems degrade in such a congested, militarized waterway, the risk of collision, grounding, or miscalculation rises sharply. Add aerial threats and naval maneuvering to the equation, and degraded navigation becomes a risk amplifier.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans will never sail through the Strait of Hormuz. But they will feel the effects if shipping slows, insurance premiums spike, or energy markets react to instability. Maritime security is economic security. The sea lanes quietly underpin global supply chains, energy flows, and financial stability. When GPS signals flicker in a strategic chokepoint, markets notice.

Electronic interference aimed at navigation systems is not just a military tactic. It directly impacts civilian shipping. Tankers hesitate. Routes change. Traffic patterns compress. The cost of uncertainty ripples outward. In a globally connected economy, those ripples eventually reach American households.

For years, we have warned that maritime chokepoints are soft underbellies in a fragile system. This latest episode underscores that warning. The battlespace now includes the invisible infrastructure of positioning, navigation, and timing.

Implications for the Navy

When commerce comes under electronic pressure, the U.S. Navy becomes the stabilizer. Escort missions, presence operations, surveillance, and deterrence all require ships, crews, logistics depth, and technological resilience. Strength at sea is not abstract. It is measured in hulls, readiness, training, and industrial capacity.

Yet we continue to fund our maritime industrial base through unstable, year-to-year appropriations cycles. We debate ship counts while the underlying architecture remains fragile. Predictable investment is not about expansion for its own sake. It is about reducing systemic risk.

Electronic warfare against commercial shipping highlights the need for redundancy. Redundancy in fleet capacity. Redundancy in basing and logistics. Redundancy in navigation technologies. If GPS can be degraded in one of the world’s most vital trade routes, resilience cannot be optional.

The Case for Predictable Maritime Investment

This moment should not trigger panic. It should prompt clarity.

America’s maritime security underwrites global commerce. Yet the economic beneficiaries of secure sea lanes are not structurally aligned with long-term investment in the maritime industrial base. That mismatch creates vulnerability.

The Strategic Economic Alignment for the Maritime Industrial Base Act, the SEAS Act, is about architecture, not urgency. It seeks to create stability and predictability in funding so that shipyards, suppliers, and maritime infrastructure can plan for the long term. It recognizes that maritime security is foundational economic infrastructure.

If navigation becomes a weapon, then resilience becomes a responsibility.

Strength is built on redundancy. Stability is built on predictability. The events in the Strait of Hormuz are a reminder that modern conflict increasingly targets the connective tissue of commerce. We can either respond episodically, or we can build a durable framework that matches the strategic environment.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we believe the American people must understand what is at stake. The Navy belongs to the nation. Its readiness, its resilience, and its industrial foundation require public awareness and engagement.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

February 19, 2026February 21, 2026

Protecting America’s Naval Edge

Protecting America’s Naval Edge
Strategic competition, documented technology theft, and military-linked research highlight why protecting America’s technological advantage is essential to maintaining naval superiority.

Abstract

Naval power in the 21st century is shaped as much by technological innovation as by fleet size. Strategic competitors are investing heavily in research, industrial capacity, and military modernization to close the technological gap with the United States. This article analyzes the implications of documented research security concerns, the role of military-linked academic institutions, and the broader strategic environment, and argues that preserving America’s technological advantage requires informed public engagement, policy alignment, and sustained national awareness.

Introduction

For decades, America’s naval superiority rested on more than ships—it rested on technological advantage. That advantage was built in American shipyards, laboratories, universities, and research institutions. Today, that technological edge is being challenged by strategic competitors who have invested heavily in naval expansion, industrial capacity, and military-relevant technologies. Increasingly, naval professionals, policymakers, and national security experts are raising concerns about how technological competition is unfolding—and how little public awareness exists about its implications. Some documented cases involving technology theft, undisclosed foreign military-linked affiliations, and strategic research competition have received only limited public attention. Americans deserve to understand what is happening, why it matters, and what it means for the future strength of the United States Navy.

Naval Power Begins Long Before a Ship Is Built

Every modern U.S. Navy platform depends on breakthroughs in science and engineering:

Nuclear engineering enables submarine propulsion and carrier endurance
Advanced materials determine hull strength, stealth, and survivability
Semiconductors power radar, communications, and weapons systems
Artificial intelligence and autonomy are reshaping the future of naval warfare

The future DDG(X) destroyer, unmanned naval systems, and next-generation submarines will rely heavily on research happening today in American universities, national laboratories, and federally funded programs.

These institutions are essential to national strength.

But the knowledge they produce exists in a world defined by strategic competition.

Documented Cases Show the Risk Is Real

Concerns about research security are not theoretical. Federal investigations and criminal prosecutions have confirmed cases involving the theft of sensitive technology, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and illegal transfer of research with national security implications.

In January 2026, a U.S. federal jury convicted a former Google engineer of stealing more than 2,000 confidential artificial intelligence and supercomputing files and transferring them to entities linked to China. These technologies have direct military and intelligence applications.

In 2021, Harvard University professor Charles Lieber was convicted for failing to disclose his financial relationship with China’s Thousand Talents Program while receiving U.S. federal research funding. Federal authorities determined he had concealed foreign financial ties tied to a Chinese state-affiliated university.

U.S. authorities have also prosecuted multiple export control violations and research-related concealment cases involving sensitive technologies, including advanced materials, computing, and engineering fields directly relevant to military capability.

The FBI has warned repeatedly that China operates one of the most extensive technology acquisition efforts in modern history, targeting critical research sectors tied to national defense.

These are documented cases—not speculation.

What the “Seven Sons” Represent

U.S. government reports and independent research institutions have identified a group of Chinese universities known as the “Seven Sons of National Defense” as central to China’s military research and development ecosystem. These institutions maintain deep ties to China’s defense industry and serve as primary training grounds for engineers and scientists supporting naval, aerospace, and weapons development.

China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy explicitly integrates civilian research with military advancement, accelerating defense capability development.

This structural integration differs fundamentally from the decentralized American system and highlights the importance of protecting the technological advantage that underpins U.S. naval superiority.

Why Americans Are Only Beginning to Hear This Story

Many of these cases involving technology theft, undisclosed affiliations, and research security concerns have been publicly reported—but rarely remain in the national spotlight long enough for Americans to see the broader pattern.

Through our China Watch coverage, Americans for a Stronger Navy has documented the larger strategic picture: rapid Chinese naval expansion, sustained investment in military-relevant technologies, and long-term efforts to close the technological and industrial gap with the United States.

This is not a moment for panic—but it is a moment for awareness.

Naval superiority depends on technological leadership. And technological leadership depends on national awareness.

Congress Recognized the Challenge — But the Debate Continues

In 2025, Congress passed the SAFE Research Act in the House of Representatives to strengthen transparency and accountability in federally funded research involving foreign adversary-linked institutions.

However, the provision was removed from the final National Defense Authorization Act after opposition from major academic organizations.

Organizations raising concerns included:

Association of American Universities (AAU)
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU)
American Physical Society (APS)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Asian American Scholar Forum (AASF)

These organizations warned the legislation could harm scientific collaboration, innovation, and America’s ability to attract global talent.

Their concerns reflect legitimate interests in preserving America’s research leadership.

At the same time, the strategic competition affecting naval power continues to accelerate.

Both realities exist.

Why This Matters to the Future of the U.S. Navy

Naval superiority is no longer determined solely by fleet size.

It depends on maintaining technological leadership in:

Nuclear propulsion
Artificial intelligence
Advanced materials
Autonomous systems
Sensors, communications, and computing

These technologies determine whether future American ships remain dominant—or vulnerable.

Shipbuilding matters. Industrial capacity matters. But technological leadership remains decisive.

If America protects its technological edge, it protects its naval advantage.

If it does not, ship numbers alone will not be enough.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects global trade, deters conflict, and secures the maritime foundation of the American economy.

Every American depends on maritime security.

But naval strength requires more than ships. It requires public awareness, industrial strength, and national alignment.

Americans cannot support what they do not understand.

That is why awareness matters.

Conclusion: A National Conversation Worth Having

America’s openness has fueled generations of innovation and built the most capable Navy in history.

But strategic competitors have studied our system, invested heavily, and worked deliberately to close the gap.

The question is not whether America should remain open.

The question is whether America will remain aware.

Naval superiority cannot be taken for granted. It must be protected—not just in shipyards, but in laboratories, in policy decisions, and in the national will of the American people.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

February 14, 2026February 14, 2026

Lockheed Martin’s Lamprey: The “Hitchhiking” Sub Drone That Steals Power to Fight

Lockheed Martin has officially pulled back the curtain on a revolutionary piece of naval technology: the Lamprey Multi-Mission Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (AUV).
While the world focuses on high-speed drones, Lockheed is looking at persistence and endurance. Inspired by the natural world, the Lamprey isn’t just a drone; it’s a parasite—in the best way possible.

The Remora Strategy: Hitching a Ride
Named after the fish known for latching onto larger marine animals, the Lamprey drone solves the “energy gap” in undersea warfare. Typically, a small drone wastes most of its battery life just traveling to its mission area.

The Lamprey changes the game

Passive Transit: It attaches to the hull of a friendly ship or submarine using suction or a mechanical docking system.
Energy Harvesting: Instead of draining its batteries, it uses small onboard turbines (hydrogenerators) to harvest energy from the water flowing past the host vessel.
Arrive Fully Charged: By the time the host ship reaches the objective, the Lamprey detaches with 100% battery, ready for combat.
Modular Lethality: A 24-Cubic-Foot Payload
The Lamprey isn’t just a sensor; it’s a modular “Swiss Army knife” for the Navy. Built with an open architecture and a 24-cubic-foot internal payload bay, it can be swapped for various missions without a major redesign:
Anti-Submarine Warfare: Carrying lightweight torpedoes.
Electronic Warfare: Deploying acoustic decoys and intercepting signals.
Intelligence Gathering: Using deployable sensor arrays.
Aerial Dominance: It can be fitted with up to three retractable twin-tube launchers to deploy aerial drones from beneath the waves.
Distributed Warfare: The “Quiet” Threat
In a conflict, these drones are built for persistence. Multiple units can deploy at once, settle quietly on the seabed, and wait. They can sit silently for days or weeks, gathering data and relaying intelligence. When commanded, they shift from passive observers to active disruptors or strike platforms.
Status Check: Is Lamprey Mission-Ready?
While the technology is groundbreaking, it is important to distinguish between “unveiled” and “fully operational.” Based on recent developments in February 2026, here is the ground truth:
Advanced Prototyping: Lockheed Martin developed the Lamprey using internal research and development (IRAD) funds. This means they built it on their own initiative to prove the concept before seeking a formal government contract.
Proven at Sea: The drone has already undergone successful sea trials, validating its autonomous maneuvering and “hitchhiking” energy-harvesting capabilities in real-world conditions.
The “Product on the Shelf”: Lockheed has effectively “handed the keys” to the U.S. Navy. It is a mature system ready for immediate adoption, though it has not yet been designated as an official “Program of Record” for mass production.

The Lamprey addresses the biggest challenge in autonomous undersea systems: endurance. By turning friendly vessels into mobile charging stations, it trades raw speed for staying power.
In a battle space where hiding matters more than sprinting, the Lamprey is the future—quiet, modular, and already in position before the fight begins.