The Arctic is a New Front Line: Senator Sullivan is Right, and We Need a Stronger Navy Now

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer
Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) recently highlighted a critical shift in global geopolitics: the Arctic is no longer a distant, icy frontier—it is a burgeoning front line. As Russia and China actively challenge American interests in the High North, the urgency that Americans for a Stronger Navy has long advocated is now more apparent than ever.

A recent Wall Street Journal report detailed a chilling technological milestone: Chinese research submarines have successfully navigated thousands of feet beneath the Arctic ice for the first time. This is far more than a scientific expedition; it is a clear military and commercial signal. As Senator Sullivan warns, these “incursions” test our defenses. In the eyes of authoritarian regimes, the only language that resonates is power.

Projecting Power in the Arctic

Senator Sullivan identifies several pillars critical to securing our northern flank:

  • Accelerated Icebreaker Production: Our current fleet is woefully inadequate compared to Russia’s. Establishing a persistent presence requires homeporting new, capable icebreakers directly in Alaska.
  • Enhanced Missile Defense: Strengthening Alaska’s defense infrastructure is vital to protecting the homeland from trans-polar threats.
  • Energy Dominance: Unleashing Alaskan energy resources is a matter of national security, reducing dependence on foreign adversaries.
  • Strategic Infrastructure: Developing Adak and Nome into robust operational hubs ensures our forces have the reach to project power throughout the Arctic.

Our Call to Action

We fully endorse the Senator’s call to “keep the pedal to the metal.” However, true Arctic security requires a Stronger Navy fully integrated with the Coast Guard’s mission. To secure the High North, we must:

  • Close the Icebreaker Gap: We need a sustained shipbuilding plan that delivers Polar Security Cutters on schedule while exploring advanced naval platforms for icy environments.
  • Invest in Undersea Domain Awareness: The breakthrough in Chinese submarine capabilities demands a sophisticated response in undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
  • Strengthen Arctic Logistics: Our fleet needs resilient, forward-operating bases like Nome to maintain a 24/7 deterrent posture.

The Arctic is a vital theater for global trade and strategic maneuver. Senator Sullivan is providing the leadership Alaska—and the nation—needs. Americans for a Stronger Navy stands ready to advocate for the maritime power necessary to ensure “Peace through Strength” extends to the High North.

NAVSEA: The Navy’s Unsung Problem Solvers

Why the organization everyone loves to criticize is actually implementing the solutions research says work

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

As founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I’ve spent the last couple of years trying to help Americans understand why ships, shipyards, maintenance, and industrial capacity matter. I’ve written about rust and readiness, shipbuilding delays, logistics shortfalls, and why design choices can make replacement and repair painfully slow.

Coming from the tech sector in the 1990s, I thought I understood organizational complexity. I’d seen enterprise software projects involving dozens of stakeholders, competing departments, entrenched interests, and billion-dollar budgets. I understood how egos, biases, and financial incentives complicate even straightforward objectives.

Then I started studying how the Navy actually builds and maintains ships.

Building rockets is complex. Building naval warships makes rocket science look straightforward by comparison. SpaceX has one customer, one set of requirements, and Elon Musk making final decisions. Naval shipbuilding? Dozens of organizations, hundreds of contractors, thousands of specialized workers, decade-long timelines, competing requirements from multiple stakeholders, physical irreversibility of design decisions, Congressional funding cycles that change annually, acquisition regulations written over decades, technical standards that must account for 30-year service lives, and operational demands that shift with geopolitical reality—all coordinated through a system most Americans have never heard of.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

If you want to understand why the Navy struggles to build, fix, modernize, and field ships at the pace today’s threats require, you need to understand NAVSEA. And to keep this fair and grounded, we should also look at what independent watchdogs and researchers have reported over the years.

NAVSEA is the Navy’s engineering and ship sustainment backbone. It provides the technical standards, oversight, and support that make shipbuilding, modernization, and maintenance possible. If the Navy were a body, NAVSEA would be the circulatory system—not glamorous, but absolutely essential for life.

NAVSEA has become Washington’s favorite punching bag. Recent headlines tell the story: a Government Accountability Office report revealing $1.84 billion wasted on cruiser modernization, maintenance delays plaguing the fleet, acquisition timelines stretching into decades, and contractor quality failures that forced expensive rework. Critics paint NAVSEA as a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering ships on time or on budget—the personification of everything broken in defense acquisition.

But here’s what the critics miss: NAVSEA doesn’t build ships. NAVSEA doesn’t fund programs. NAVSEA doesn’t set operational requirements.

What NAVSEA does is provide the technical backbone that makes an impossibly complex system function at all. They’re trying to coordinate dozens of organizations with competing interests, conflicting incentives, different accountability

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

If you want to understand why the Navy struggles to build, fix, modernize, and field ships at the pace today’s threats require, you need to understand NAVSEA. And to keep this fair and grounded, we should also look at what independent watchdogs and researchers have reported over the years.

NAVSEA is the Navy’s engineering and ship sustainment backbone. It provides the technical standards, oversight, and support that make shipbuilding, modernization, and maintenance possible. If the Navy were a body, NAVSEA would be the circulatory system not glamorous, but absolutely essential for life.

NAVSEA has become Washington’s favorite punching bag. Recent headlines tell the story: a Government Accountability Office report revealing $1.84 billion wasted on cruiser modernization, maintenance delays plaguing the fleet, acquisition timelines stretching into decades, and contractor quality failures that forced expensive rework. Critics paint NAVSEA as a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering ships on time or on budgets the personification of everything broken in defense acquisition.

But here’s what the critics miss: NAVSEA isn’t the source of the Navy’s readiness crisis. They’re the people actually trying to fix it.

The problems NAVSEA faces today deferred maintenance, inadequate shipyard capacity, antiquated acquisition processes, workforce shortages, supply chain fragility weren’t created in the last five years. They’re the accumulated debt of decades of underinvestment and poor policy choices. NAVSEA inherited a broken system and has been methodically rebuilding it while simultaneously keeping the current fleet operational during a period of unprecedented strategic pressure.

As the professionals inside NAVSEA know from hard experience, this work happens where strategy collides with physics and time. They’re doing extraordinary work inside a system carrying more demand than its capacity and processes can reliably support.

That’s not failure. That’s heroism under impossible conditions.

Before we judge too harshly, Americans deserve to understand what NAVSEA actually does, where it came from, why large defense projects typically fail, and why the scale of today’s challenge shouldn’t be confused with the quality of the response.

A History Lesson: 230 Years of Keeping Ships Ready

The Beginning: Commodore John Barry and the Foundation (1794)

NAVSEA’s lineage extends back to June 14, 1794, when President George Washington gave Commodore John Barry, the Irish-born naval hero who held Commission Number One in the United States Navy a seemingly impossible assignment: build America’s first frigates and ensure “all business harmonized and conformed to the public’s interest.”

Barry had distinguished himself during the Revolutionary War, capturing the first British warship taken in combat and commanding the frigate Alliance in the final naval engagement of the war. Now Washington tasked him with something harder than fighting: creating the systems, standards, and oversight needed to build a navy from nothing.

Barry supervised construction of the frigate USS United States, which launched on May 10, 1797. More importantly, he established the principle that would define NAVSEA’s mission for the next two centuries: technical excellence in service of national defense, with accountability to the American people for every dollar spent and every ship delivered.

The Bureau System: Organizing for Industrial War (1842-1966)

The informal arrangements that worked for Barry became inadequate as the Navy grew. In 1842, Congress abolished the ineffective Board of Navy Commissioners and created the Bureau System specialized administrative units to manage the increasingly complex work of designing, building, and maintaining warships.

Initially, five bureaus divided responsibility: Construction, Equipment and Repair; Ordnance and Hydrography; Provisions and Clothing; Medicine and Surgery; and Yards and Docks. Over time, this evolved into separate bureaus for Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering (later the Bureau of Engineering), Equipment, and Ordnance.

By World War I, this system managed a dramatic expansion. The Bureau of Engineering alone oversaw the fleet’s growth from 350 ships to nearly 2,000 by mid-1918, including all propulsion, communications, and electrical systems. The Bureau of Construction and Repair handled hull design and structural work.

But World War II exposed fatal flaws in this divided authority. In 1939, the Navy discovered that new Sims-class destroyers were dangerously top-heavy because the Bureau of Engineering had underestimated machinery weight and the Bureau of Construction and Repair lacked authority to catch the error during design. When separate organizations controlled different aspects of the same ship, nobody owned the complete integration.

The Bureau of Ships: Integration Under Pressure (1940-1966)

On June 20, 1940 with war clearly approaching Congress merged the Bureau of Construction and Repair with the Bureau of Engineering to create the Bureau of Ships (BuShips). The new bureau would control everything related to ship design, construction, conversion, maintenance, and repair from a single unified command.

Timing mattered. BuShips immediately faced the Fiscal Year 1940 naval procurement plan: 11 aircraft carriers, nine battleships, six large cruisers, 57 other cruisers, 95 destroyers, 73 submarines, and dozens of auxiliary vessels. Then Pearl Harbor turned ambitious plans into desperate necessity.

During World War II, BuShips delivered over 7,000 vessels nearly 1,200 major warships including battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. They pioneered radar integration, advanced damage control systems, and amphibious warfare craft. They managed four naval shipyards, coordinated hundreds of private contractors, and solved unprecedented logistics challenges while maintaining the fleet in combat.

The postwar period brought new challenges: nuclear propulsion, guided missiles, advanced electronics, and the Cold War submarine arms race. BuShips managed development of USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, which demonstrated the technology’s strategic potential by steaming 62,000 miles on its initial reactor core and completing the first underwater transit of the North Pole in 1958. The bureau then scaled nuclear propulsion to ballistic missile submarines, creating the sea-based deterrent that remains the most survivable leg of America’s nuclear triad.

Systems Commands: McNamara’s Reorganization (1966-1974)

By the mid-1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pushed for centralized management to control rising costs and complexity. The traditional bureau system, rooted in 19th-century administrative thinking, seemed inefficient for managing advanced weapons systems that integrated multiple technologies.

On March 9, 1966, DoD abolished BuShips and created the Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS), adopting a systems engineering approach that emphasized integration across technical disciplines. On July 1, 1974, NAVSHIPS merged with the Naval Ordnance Systems Command to form the Naval Sea Systems Command NAVSEA.

The new organization combined responsibility for ships, submarines, combat systems, and weapons into a single command. NAVSEA would engineer, build, buy, and maintain the fleet. It inherited four shipyards, ten warfare centers, and a global network of maintenance facilities. It became the Navy’s largest systems command, eventually managing nearly $30 billion annually roughly one-quarter of the entire Navy budget.

The Essential Continuity

From Commodore Barry in 1794 to Vice Admiral Downey today, the mission remains fundamentally unchanged: deliver warships that work, maintain the fleet so it can fight, and ensure every dollar spent serves the national defense.

What has changed is scale and complexity. Barry supervised construction of a few frigates. Today’s NAVSEA manages 150 acquisition programs simultaneously, maintains a fleet of over 200 ships and submarines, operates four massive shipyards, coordinates work across hundreds of contractors, and keeps the world’s most technologically sophisticated naval force operational in every ocean.

The criticism NAVSEA faces today isn’t new either. Every generation has complained about maintenance delays, cost overruns, and acquisition timelines. What’s different now is the consequences of failure and the impossibly narrow margin for error.

Why Large Projects Fail: Lessons from Research

Before examining NAVSEA’s current challenges, we need to understand what research tells us about why large, complex projects typically fail. This context is essential for evaluating NAVSEA’s performance fairly.

The Megaproject Failure Rate

Oxford University’s Bent Flyvbjerg has compiled the world’s largest database on megaproject performance 16,000 projects from 136 countries spanning infrastructure, defense, IT, and construction. Working with New York-based writer Dan Gardner, Flyvbjerg distilled this research into How Big Things Get Done, published in 2023. The results are sobering.

Only 8.5% of megaprojects meet their cost and schedule targets. Just 0.5% also satisfy their benefit goals. As Flyvbjerg writes, “Most big projects are not merely at risk of not delivering as promised. Nor are they only at risk of going seriously wrong. They are at risk of going disastrously wrong.”

Naval shipbuilding and maintenance programs are textbook megaprojects technically complex, politically visible, spanning multiple years, involving numerous contractors, requiring specialized workforces, and operating under intense scrutiny. They face all the pathologies Flyvbjerg identifies.

The Root Causes: Human Nature and System Design

Flyvbjerg traces megaproject failures to several interconnected factors:

Irrepressible optimism. Project leaders consistently underestimate costs, timelines, and technical challenges. This isn’t dishonesty it’s human nature. We want to believe our plans will work. We discount risks. We assume everything will go smoothly.

Political expediency. Projects get approved based on optimistic projections because realistic estimates would kill political support. Once committed, stakeholders have incentives to downplay problems until they become undeniable.

Poor planning. Projects start without sufficient detail. As Flyvbjerg notes, the Sydney Opera House became notorious for delays and cost overruns because it began construction based on “sketchy designs.” In contrast, Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum Bilbao succeeded through “meticulous, iterative development.”

Adding requirements. Every stakeholder wants their priorities incorporated. Each addition seems reasonable in isolation. Collectively, they drive cost growth and schedule delays. Nobody owns the integration.

Inadequate capacity. Projects assume resources, workers, facilities, materials will be available when needed. Reality proves otherwise. Workforce gaps emerge. Supply chains fail. Facilities need repair.

What Actually Works: The Solutions

Flyvbjerg’s research identifies characteristics common to successful megaprojects:

Empirical planning using reference-class forecasting. Instead of building plans from the ground up based on optimistic assumptions, examine historical data from similar projects. Use actual performance data to forecast realistic timelines and costs. Flyvbjerg developed this technique for the British government; it’s now used in multiple countries.

Iterative development. Test ideas early. Learn from small failures. Refine designs before committing to full-scale production. Pixar’s Oscar-winning director Pete Docter describes his animation process as requiring “an insane amount of work as constant iteration and testing. But it produces better outcomes.

Modularity. Flyvbjerg found that solar, wind, thermal power plants, electricity transmission, and highway projects “do not have considerable risk of going disastrously wrong” because “they are all modular to a considerable degree, some extremely so.” Modular designs allow parallel work streams, reduce integration risk, and enable faster problem-solving.

Accumulated experience. Organizations that repeatedly execute similar projects get better at them. They develop expertise, refine processes, and build institutional knowledge. One-off unique projects are inherently riskier.

Realistic timelines with adequate planning windows. Contractors need time to secure materials, hire workers, and coordinate subcontractors before work begins. Compressed planning periods guarantee problems.

The NAVSEA Connection

Every principle Flyvbjerg identifies applies directly to naval acquisition and maintenance:

  • The cruiser modernization failure? Classic megaproject pathology poor planning, unplanned work, contractor quality issues, and optimistic timelines.
  • Maintenance delays? Insufficient planning windows, unrealistic schedules, capacity constraints.
  • Acquisition taking 10+ years? Complex requirements, inadequate iteration, trying to incorporate everything upfront.

But here’s the critical insight: NAVSEA’s recent reforms align almost perfectly with what research says actually works.

They’re using empirical data (reference-class forecasting) through Perform to Plan initiatives. They’re extending planning windows from 60 to 228 days. They’re adopting modularity with containerized payloads on FF(X). They’re pursuing “build, learn, evolve” iterative approaches instead of trying to perfect designs upfront.

NAVSEA is implementing the solutions that megaproject research validates. The question is whether they’ll get the sustained support, resources, and realistic expectations needed to make those reforms work.

The Current Reality: Fixing Decades of Deferred Maintenance

The Inherited Crisis

When Vice Admiral William Galinis took command of NAVSEA in June 2020, he inherited a readiness catastrophe years in the making. In Fiscal Year 2019, ships collectively overran their planned maintenance schedules by more than 7,000 days. Carriers and submarines were staying in maintenance availabilities 30-40% longer than planned. The maintenance backlog was crushing fleet readiness, forcing longer deployments and creating a vicious cycle where rushed operations led to more maintenance problems.

Fortunately, we don’t have to rely on anecdotes. Independent watchdogs have documented these problems extensively:

Government Accountability Office findings:

  • GAO found that over an extended period, the Navy was unable to begin or complete most attack submarine maintenance periods on time, resulting in significant lost operational days (GAO-19-229).
  • The majority of aircraft carrier and submarine maintenance periods between 2015 and 2019 were completed late, with primary causes being unplanned work discovered after planning began and workforce capacity constraints (GAO-20-588).
  • In 2025, GAO emphasized that shipbuilding and repair capacity itself is a strategic constraint, calling for a more coherent long-term industrial base approach to support the fleet the Navy says it needs (GAO-25-106286).

RAND assessments:

  • RAND research highlights that maintenance capacity is a long-term structural issue that cannot be corrected quickly, with public shipyard capacity identified as a limiting factor for submarine and carrier availability (RAND RR1951).

Navy acknowledgment:

  • USNI News reported that Navy leaders acknowledged that only a small percentage of attack submarines completed maintenance on time over a ten-year period, even as operational demand increased.

The root causes ran deep:

Inadequate shipyard capacity. America’s four naval shipyards Portsmouth, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound had been chronically underfunded for decades. Facilities were antiquated. Dry docks needed repair. Cranes were obsolete. The physical infrastructure couldn’t support efficient work.

Workforce shortages. The skilled trades that keep ships operational welders, pipefitters, electricians, machinists were in desperately short supply. Years of hiring freezes had created a demographic cliff. Experienced workers were retiring faster than new workers could be trained.

Poor planning. The Navy awarded maintenance contracts only 60 days before work was scheduled to begin far too late for contractors to secure materials, hire workers, or plan efficiently. Contracts often started without complete work packages, guaranteeing unplanned growth work that blew schedules.

Supply chain failures. Critical parts weren’t arriving when needed. Ships sat idle waiting for components. Nobody was coordinating material delivery across the enterprise.

Unrealistic schedules. Maintenance durations were based on optimistic assumptions rather than empirical data. Ships were consistently planned for availabilities shorter than they actually needed, creating the appearance of delays that were really planning failures.

This wasn’t NAVSEA’s fault. This was the bill coming due for decades of decisions made by Congress, administrations, and Navy leadership that prioritized new procurement over maintenance, allowed shipyards to deteriorate, and failed to invest in workforce development.

The NAVSEA Response: Data-Driven Reform

Rather than making excuses, NAVSEA leadership got to work. They implemented a series of interconnected reforms designed to address each element of the maintenance crisis:

Perform to Plan (P2P). NAVSEA conducted detailed analysis of what actually happened during maintenance availabilities versus what was planned. They examined every step: work package development, execution planning, material delivery, testing requirements, contractor performance. The data revealed systematic planning failures availabilities were being planned too short based on outdated assumptions.

The solution wasn’t to lower standards or move goalposts. It was to reset maintenance duration baselines using empirical data about how long complex work actually takes. New baselines created realistic schedules that contractors could execute.

The results were dramatic. By Fiscal Year 2020, total maintenance delays dropped from 7,000 days to approximately 1,100 days. Measured against the new realistic baselines, that represented an 80% reduction in delays. Even measured against the old optimistic baselines, delays dropped 40%.

Contracting Reform. NAVSEA extended contract award timelines from 60 days to 120 days before maintenance start, then pushed toward 180 days. Rear Admiral Andrew Biehn, NAVSEA’s director of surface ship maintenance, explained that industry had been clear: “60 days was not enough time to plan and prepare for a successful maintenance period.”

In 2026, NAVSEA awarded a maintenance contract for the amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima 228 days ahead of times”nearly eight months for the contractor to order materials, hire workers, and coordinate with subcontractors.

Longer planning windows created predictability. Contractors could maintain stable workforces. Suppliers could plan material delivery. The entire ecosystem became more efficient.

Material Management. NAVSEA stood up a dedicated Material Management Group with a single mission: ensure all materials needed for a maintenance availability arrive at the shipyard by day one of the work period. No more ships sitting idle waiting for parts. No more scrambling to source critical components mid-availability.

This required intense coordination across supply chains, better forecasting of material needs, earlier ordering of long-lead items, and tighter integration between maintenance planning and logistics.

Workforce Development. NAVSEA hired thousands of new workers for the naval shipyards. They invested in training programs to develop skilled trades, partnered with community colleges and trade schools, and created apprenticeship programs to transfer knowledge from experienced workers to new hires.

This wasn’t quick. Training a journeyman shipyard worker takes years. But NAVSEA understood that long-term readiness required long-term investment in people.

Unplanned Work Reduction. Growth work unplanned maintenance discovered after an availability begins was a major driver of delays. NAVSEA worked to stabilize class maintenance plans, pushing more routine work into “directed work” categories that could be planned in advance. They scheduled activities most likely to generate growth work—like tank inspections early in availabilities so discoveries could be incorporated into the plan.

The goal was to minimize surprises through better forecasting and more thorough advance planning.

Current Status: Real Progress Under Pressure

At the Surface Navy Association symposium in January 2026, Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, Commander of Naval Surface Forces, outlined continued progress: “On-time completion remains our number one goal as we drive towards zero days of maintenance delay.”

Vice Admiral James Downey, NAVSEA’s current commander, reported that 90 ships are under contract for construction, 57 are actively under construction, and 52 ships are in maintenance availabilities. Keeping those maintenance periods on schedule is NAVSEA’s top priority.

Rear Admiral Dan Lannamann, who runs the Navy Regional Maintenance Centers, acknowledged the challenge honestly: “I got 41 percent [on-time completion], so we missed the mark. We reset the mark for this year. I’m looking at north of 60 percent, and I’m on plan to make that.”

That’s the right approach: set ambitious goals, measure performance honestly, adjust based on results, and keep pushing forward. NAVSEA isn’t claiming victory. They’re showing their work and committing to improvement.

Addressing the Legitimate Criticisms

The Cruiser Modernization Failure

The GAO report on cruiser modernization is damning, and NAVSEA deserves criticism for significant failures. The Navy planned to modernize 11 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, extending their service life by five years and upgrading combat capability. The program became a $3.7 billion disaster. Only three cruisers will complete modernization, none will gain the intended five years of service life, and $1.84 billion was wasted on four cruisers that were divested before deploying.

The failures included:

  • Poor planning leading to 9,000 contract changes
  • Contractor performance issues and quality problems (such as the botched sonar dome work on USS Vicksburg)
  • Weak oversight and reluctance to use monetary penalties
  • Failure to identify root causes or develop prevention strategies

This was a significant acquisition failure, and the GAO correctly identified systemic problems that must be fixed before future modernization efforts.

But here’s the important context: NAVSEA acknowledged the problems, is conducting root cause analysis, and is applying lessons learned to the next major surface ship modernization effort 23 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The question isn’t whether NAVSEA made mistakes with cruiser modernization. They clearly did. The question is whether they’re learning from those mistakes and implementing better processes.

The early evidence suggests they are. The destroyer modernization program is incorporating improved planning processes, more realistic schedule baselines, and better quality control measures. NAVSEA is being held accountable for past failures while working to prevent future ones.

Acquisition Timelines

Critics rightly point out that NAVSEA acquisition programs take 10+ years to field capability. By the time ships are delivered, the strategic environment has evolved and technology has advanced. As one Navy leader noted, it’s like “fielding a 2015 iPhone today already obsolete on arrival.”

This is a real problem, but it’s not primarily NAVSEA’s fault. The acquisition system is designed for risk reduction rather than speed. Complex requirements processes allow every stakeholder to add requirements, increasing cost and delaying delivery. Acquisition regulations slow decision-making. Testing requirements are thorough but time-consuming.

NAVSEA operates within the constraints of federal acquisition law, DoD regulations, and Navy requirements processes. They can advocate for reform, implement process improvements where they have authority, and try to accelerate timelines. But they can’t unilaterally override the legal and regulatory framework Congress and DoD have created.

The recent announcement of FF(X) the Navy’s new frigate program based on a proven Coast Guard design shows NAVSEA learning from past mistakes. Chris Miller, Executive Director at NAVSEA, emphasized a “design that is producible, it has been proven, it is operationally in use today, and it will evolve.” The approach prioritizes getting ships into production quickly, then evolving capability over time through modular containerized payloads.

That’s the right philosophy: field capability fast, then improve it incrementally. It’s a significant departure from past programs that tried to incorporate every possible requirement upfront.

Bureaucratic Processes

Yes, NAVSEA is a large bureaucracy with 84,000 personnel, nine directorates, eight affiliated Program Executive Offices, and a budget approaching $30 billion. Complex organizations develop complex processes. Some of those processes are valuable ensuring safety, maintaining technical standards, managing risk. Some are unnecessary bureaucracy that slows things down.

The challenge is distinguishing between essential process and wasteful bureaucracy. NAVSEA has been working to streamline operations, eliminate redundant approvals, and empower decision-making at lower levels. But this is genuinely difficult work that requires balancing speed with safety, innovation with standards, and delegation with accountability.

Anyone who has worked in a large organization knows that reforming bureaucratic processes is harder than criticizing them.

Why NAVSEA Matters: The Unglamorous Work of Maritime Power

They Turn Policy into Hardware

Every naval strategy document, every force structure assessment, every geopolitical analysis ultimately depends on one thing: ships that work. NAVSEA is where strategy meets reality.

When the 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes “First Island Chain denial defense,” NAVSEA is responsible for delivering the submarines, destroyers, and combat systems that make that strategy viable. When Navy leadership commits to 80% of ships being deployable at any given time, NAVSEA is responsible for the maintenance performance that achieves that readiness.

The National Commission on the Future of the Navy can recommend force structure changes. The CNO can publish new operational concepts. Congress can authorize new ship construction. But none of it matters without NAVSEA doing the unglamorous work of engineering systems, managing contracts, supervising construction, training workers, and fixing broken ships.

They Manage Impossible Tradeoffs

NAVSEA operates under contradictory demands:

  • Keep the current fleet operational while building the future fleet
  • Maintain aging ships past their design service life while investing in new construction
  • Move fast to meet urgent threats while ensuring ships are safe and effective
  • Manage cost while meeting expanding requirements
  • Take acceptable risk without catastrophic failures

Every decision involves tradeoffs. Extend maintenance contracts to give contractors more planning time? That delays ship availability. Accelerate new construction? That stresses the industrial base. Prioritize nuclear work? That means surface ships wait longer. Fund facility upgrades at public yards? That’s money not available for procurement.

NAVSEA leadership makes these tradeoffs every day, often with incomplete information, under intense pressure, with billions of dollars and potentially lives at stake. It’s easy to criticize specific decisions in hindsight. It’s much harder to make better decisions in real time.

They Build National Capacity

NAVSEA’s mission extends beyond today’s fleet to building the industrial capacity America needs for tomorrow’s challenges. That means:

  • Investing in shipyard modernization even when those facilities won’t generate returns for decades
  • Training workers who might spend entire careers maintaining ships
  • Developing domestic suppliers for critical components
  • Maintaining technical expertise in specialized fields
  • Preserving institutional knowledge about complex systems

These long-term investments don’t generate headlines. They don’t produce quick wins. But they’re essential for sustained maritime power.

When Vice Admiral Downey reports 90 ships under construction contract and 57 actively being built, that represents years of NAVSEA work managing industrial capacity, negotiating contracts, coordinating suppliers, and solving technical problems most Americans never hear about.

They Carry the Weight of Institutional Memory

NAVSEA maintains continuity through strategic transitions, political changes, and shifting priorities. They remember what worked during the Reagan-era naval expansion. They carry lessons learned from the post-Cold War drawdown. They apply hard-won knowledge from decades of maintaining nuclear-powered vessels.

When new leadership arrives with new ideas, NAVSEA provides the institutional ballast that prevents dramatic swings between extremes. They explain why certain technical standards exist, what happened when past programs cut corners, and which shortcuts lead to catastrophic failures.

This conservative instinct can seem like resistance to change. Sometimes it is. But often it’s the voice of experience preventing repeated mistakes.

What NAVSEA Needs: Support, Not Just Criticism

Legislative Authority for Acquisition Reform

NAVSEA has identified acquisition processes that slow capability delivery. They’ve proposed reforms. But many changes require legislative action that only Congress can provide.

The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act included provisions for expedited technology qualification processes. That helps, but more comprehensive acquisition reform is needed:

  • Delegating more decision authority to program managers
  • Streamlining requirements processes
  • Reforming testing protocols to enable faster iteration
  • Creating exemptions for proven commercial technologies

Congress needs to give NAVSEA the authority to move faster while maintaining appropriate oversight.

Sustained Funding for Shipyard Modernization

America’s four naval shipyards need billions in infrastructure investment: new dry docks, modern cranes, upgraded facilities, environmental improvements. These investments take years to design and decades to recoup. They’re perfect targets for budget cuts because the consequences won’t appear immediately.

But without modern shipyards, NAVSEA cannot maintain readiness. Period.

Vice Admiral Moore noted in 2016 that private shipyards like Newport News have invested heavily in their physical plants while public yards have been neglected. NAVSEA needs Congress and Navy leadership to make the business case for MILCON funding and stick with those investments over multiple budget cycles.

Workforce Development Support

Training skilled shipyard workers requires partnerships with community colleges, trade schools, and apprenticeship programs. NAVSEA needs support from federal, state, and local governments to:

  • Fund training programs
  • Provide housing assistance in expensive shipyard communities
  • Offer tax incentives for workers entering skilled trades
  • Create pathways from military service to civilian shipyard careers

The workforce crisis won’t be solved by NAVSEA alone. It requires a national commitment to rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base.

Realistic Expectations

Most importantly, NAVSEA needs Americans to understand that fixing decades of deferred maintenance and underinvestment takes time. Maintenance delays won’t disappear overnight. Acquisition timelines won’t collapse to 18 months. Industrial capacity won’t triple in two years.

Progress is happening. Delays are declining. Planning is improving. But the work is difficult, the challenges are real, and setbacks are inevitable.

NAVSEA deserves credit for confronting these problems honestly, implementing data-driven reforms, and making measurable progress under extraordinary pressure. They deserve support, not just criticism.

Conclusion: The Builders, Not the Critics

Americans for a Stronger Navy exists to advocate for the naval power America needs to secure its economic prosperity and defend its interests. We’re builders, not critics. We focus on implementation mechanisms, not just policy positions.

That’s why we defend NAVSEA.

The men and women of NAVSEA are doing the hardest work in naval policy: turning strategic concepts into operational capability. They’re managing the impossible tradeoffs inherent in maintaining today’s fleet while building tomorrow’s. They’re learning from failures, implementing reforms grounded in what research tells us actually works, and making measurable progress.

NAVSEA’s reforms align with proven megaproject success principles:

  • Using empirical data for planning (Flyvbjerg’s reference-class forecasting) → Perform to Plan
  • Extending planning windows → 60 to 228 days for contract awards
  • Pursuing modularity → Containerized payloads on FF(X)
  • Iterative development “Build, learn, evolve” philosophy
  • Building accumulated experience training thousands of new shipyard workers

Are they perfect? No. Should they be held accountable for failures like cruiser modernization? Absolutely. Do acquisition processes need reform? Without question.

But the fundamental criticism of NAVSEA that they’re a bloated bureaucracy incapable of delivering results is wrong. NAVSEA has reduced maintenance delays by 80%, extended contract planning windows from 60 to 228 days, hired thousands of new shipyard workers, stood up dedicated material management groups, and delivered 90 ships under construction contracts while maintaining over 200 ships and submarines.

That’s not failure. That’s competent management under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

This is bigger than the Navy. It is a national industrial and governance challenge.

You cannot surge ships. You cannot surge shipyards. You cannot surge skilled engineers and nuclear-qualified trades overnight. Naval power is built years, often decades, before it is needed. Deterrence depends on industrial reality, not speeches. When maintenance runs late, fewer ships are available for training, presence, and crisis response. That affects America’s leverage and our allies’ confidence.

When Commodore John Barry accepted his commission from President Washington in 1797, he established a standard: deliver ships that work, ensure all business serves the public interest, and do it with integrity. NAVSEA has upheld that standard for 230 years through wars hot and cold, through periods of expansion and drawdown, through technological revolutions from sail to steam to nuclear power.

They deserve our support as they confront the most challenging period in American naval history since World War II. The criticism will continue some of it deserved. But Americans should understand who’s actually doing the work of keeping the fleet ready.

It’s the 84,000 people of NAVSEA. Give them the resources, authority, and realistic expectations they need to succeed.

Americans cannot support what they do not understand. NAVSEA is not a political talking point. It is where naval power becomes real, or fails to. If you want a Stronger Navy, you need to understand NAVSEA and support the industrial strength that makes NAVSEA’s mission achievable.

The security of our maritime commons depends on it.

This article is part of Americans for a Stronger Navy’s “Charting the Course: Voices That Matter” ongoing series educational initiative breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Learn more at StrongerNavy.org.

China’s “Floating Great Wall” Just Rehearsed a Sea-Lane Blockade — And Most Americans Didn’t Notice

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This wasn’t a military drill. It was lawfare, logistics warfare, and supply-chain coercion in plain sight.

In late December and again in January, thousands of Chinese “fishing vessels” formed long, coordinated lines and rectangles across major shipping lanes in the East China Sea near Taiwan. Cargo ships were forced to zigzag through the formation. AIS signals were active. The message was visible to the world.

These were not fishing expeditions.

They were rehearsals.

And they revealed something most Americans never think about: control of sea lanes doesn’t require missiles or warships. It can be done with civilian hulls, legal ambiguity, and scale.

China’s maritime militia — civilian fishing vessels operating under military direction — just demonstrated how to create a floating wall across global commerce.

What Happened — And Why It Matters

China assembled formations of up to 2,000 vessels stretching for hundreds of miles. Analysts noted the precision, coordination, and positioning near critical routes. Many of these boats are part of a maritime militia that operates alongside the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Liberation Army Navy, often blurring the line between civilian and military activity.

Under international maritime law, warships must “give way” to vessels engaged in fishing. That legal protection becomes a weapon when the “fishing fleet” is massed, directed, and used for coercion.

This is lawfare at sea.

No shots fired. No war declared. But commercial traffic disrupted, insurance risk raised, and a Navy forced into hesitation by the rules it respects.

Why Americans Should Care

More than one-third of global trade transits the waters around Taiwan and the East and South China Seas. The goods on American shelves, the energy markets we depend on, the components in our technology supply chains all pass through sea lanes like these.

China just practiced how to slow shipping without firing a shot, raise costs for global commerce, create economic pressure on rivals, complicate lawful naval responses, and establish coercive control over maritime arteries.

This is not about Taiwan alone.

This is about the arteries of the global economy.

Implications for the Navy

The United States Navy is built to deter fleets, submarines, missiles, and aircraft. But this tactic targets something different: the legal and operational space between peace and war.

A destroyer captain facing 2,000 “fishing boats” cannot treat them like warships. A collision becomes an international incident. Determining which vessels are legitimate military targets becomes nearly impossible in real time.

China understands this.

And they are practicing it in daylight.

Implications for Our Allies

This tactic has already been used against the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in the South China Sea. It pressures smaller nations to back down without Beijing ever crossing the threshold into open conflict.

For allies who rely on these sea lanes such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners, this is a preview of how maritime coercion can be applied gradually, persistently, and legally ambiguously.

The Industrial Reality Behind the Strategy

China can do this because it possesses the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet, tens of thousands of industrial vessels that can be mobilized at scale.

The United States cannot.

This is not simply a Navy gap. It is an American maritime industrial gap.

Civilian maritime capacity, shipbuilding, port infrastructure, and merchant marine strength are not side issues. They are central to national security in an era where civilian hulls can be weaponized for state power.

The Real Headline

China just demonstrated it can interfere with the sea lanes that feed the American economy using fishing boats.

That should get our attention.

Because naval strength is not just about ships with guns. It is about protecting the lawful flow of commerce across oceans that most Americans never see but depend on every day.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

China’s Fishing Fleet Isn’t Just About Fish — It’s About Power

Over the past several years, hundreds — sometimes thousands — of Chinese fishing vessels have been observed assembling in concentrated groups across the South China Sea, the Western Pacific, and even far beyond Asia. At first glance, it looks like industrial fishing on a massive scale.

But this story isn’t really about fish.

It’s about state power, maritime control, and what happens when economic activity and national strategy blur at sea.

What’s Actually Happening

China operates the largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world, numbering in the thousands of vessels. Many of these ships operate far from China’s coast, often for months at a time, supported by at-sea logistics ships that refuel and resupply them.

Satellite imagery and maritime tracking data have repeatedly shown large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels assembling in coordinated formations, sometimes near disputed waters or critical sea lanes.

This isn’t random.

These fleets move, loiter, disperse, and regroup in ways that mirror organized maritime behavior, not independent commercial fishing.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans don’t think about fishing fleets as a national security issue — but they should.

  • These vessels strip global fish stocks, threatening food security for developing nations and destabilizing regional economies.
  • They operate in areas where the U.S. Navy and allied navies must already maintain freedom of navigation.
  • They complicate maritime awareness — overwhelming sensors, patrols, and coast guards simply by their sheer numbers.

When hundreds of ships show up in one place, they change the facts on the water without firing a shot.

That matters to global trade, stability, and ultimately American prosperity.

The Gray Zone at Sea

China’s fishing fleet often operates in what strategists call the “gray zone” — the space between peace and conflict.

These vessels are nominally civilian, but many:

  • Receive state subsidies
  • Share information with maritime authorities
  • Operate alongside coast guard and naval units
  • Assert presence in disputed waters without overt military force

This creates plausible deniability while advancing national objectives.

It’s influence without invasion.

Implications for the U.S. Navy

Every large-scale fleet operating overseas demands attention, monitoring, and resources.

That means:

  • More patrols
  • More intelligence collection
  • More strain on an already stretched Navy and Coast Guard
  • More coordination with allies who face the same challenge

The U.S. Navy isn’t just deterring warships anymore — it’s managing mass maritime pressure created by civilian fleets backed by state power.

This Isn’t About Hating China — It’s About Seeing Clearly

This isn’t anti-China rhetoric. It’s pro-reality.

If you ever doubted China’s long-term maritime intentions, the scale and coordination of these fishing fleets should give you pause. Nations don’t build and sustain fleets of this size accidentally. They do it because the sea matters — economically, strategically, and politically.

Ignoring that reality doesn’t make it go away.

What Comes Next

The real question isn’t whether China will continue expanding its maritime reach — it will.

The question is whether Americans understand:

  • Why the Navy matters beyond wartime
  • Why sea control protects everyday life
  • Why economic power and maritime power are inseparable

That understanding is what ultimately determines whether the U.S. can respond smartly, calmly, and effectively.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.
Let’s roll.


The Critical Window: Why Decisions Made in 2026-2027 Will Determine America’s Naval Power in the 2030s


Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

There’s a concept every naval planner understands but few Americans realize – one that I’ve come to appreciate over time: the decisions we make today about shipbuilding, maintenance, and industrial capacity don’t affect today’s Navy – they determine what Navy we’ll have seven to ten years from now.

This creates what I call the Critical Window – a concept familiar to anyone who’s managed large-scale projects. It’s that narrow period when decisions made now lock in outcomes years down the line. For shipbuilding, budget decisions, industrial investments, and strategic commitments made in 2026-2027 will directly shape our naval capabilities in the 2030s.

After this window closes, the die is cast. The industrial base will be committed. The budgets will be locked in. The ships – or the absence of ships – will be determined by choices we’re making right now.

Why 2026-2027 Is The Critical Window

The mathematics of naval construction are unforgiving:

  • Attack submarines take 7-8 years from contract award to delivery. A Virginia-class submarine ordered in FY2027 enters the fleet in 2034-2035.
  • Surface combatants take 4-5 years to build. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer funded in FY2027 delivers in 2031-2032.
  • Shipyard expansions take 3-4 years to become operational. Capacity investments made in FY2027 start producing results in 2030-2031.
  • Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines require 7+ years and are consuming enormous portions of the shipbuilding budget through the end of this decade.

This isn’t abstract policy planning – it’s industrial reality. You cannot surge naval capability. You cannot speed up physics, metallurgy, or the skilled workforce required to build nuclear-powered warships.

Several factors converge to make 2026-2027 uniquely consequential:

  • The Big Beautiful Bill Timeline: The $150 billion defense investment passed in July 2025 is one-time funding available through 2029. By 2027, Congress must decide whether to sustain these investments with recurring appropriations or let them lapse.
  • The 2030s Capability Gap: Multiple studies project the Navy falling below required force structure in the early 2030s as older ships retire faster than new ones are built.
  • The China Pacing Challenge: China’s shipbuilding capacity far exceeds America’s. The gap between their naval growth and ours widens with each passing year we fail to accelerate production.
  • The Commission Opportunity: The National Commission on the Future of the Navy becomes operational in 2026. This represents a once-in-a-generation chance to reshape naval policy.

Looking Through The Binoculars: What We See In The 2030s

What you see depends entirely on decisions being made right now. If we maintain the current trajectory, the total battle force will decline by 2030, and the attack submarine fleet will reach minimum viable numbers by 2032. By 2035, China’s navy will be substantially larger, exploiting our constrained shipbuilding.

If we use the Critical Window wisely, shipyard expansions funded in 2026-2027 will come online by 2030. Accelerated production will begin delivering boats by 2032, and industrial base investments will enable us to match strategic requirements by 2035.

What The Critical Window Requires

Using this window effectively demands moving beyond one-time supplemental funding to sustained, recurring appropriations. The Big Beautiful Bill provided a down payment, but the FY2027 and FY2028 budgets must demonstrate a commitment to sustaining those investments. We also need acquisition reform to reduce the time from budget authorization to ship delivery and alternative funding mechanisms to supplement traditional appropriations.

From Experience: The Hollow Navy and The Reagan Response

I served during the 1970s hollow Navy – ships that couldn’t deploy and maintenance deferred. I also witnessed the Reagan administration’s response: a commitment to rebuild the Navy to 600 ships. That wasn’t just rhetoric – it was budget authority and political will sustained across multiple cycles. We face the same choice now. The 1980s rebuild succeeded because leaders recognized their Critical Window. We must do the same.

What You Can Do During The Critical Window

For veterans and advocates, understand that your voice matters most during the budget markup season. For policymakers, recognize that today’s choices have 10-year consequences. For concerned citizens, ask candidates about their plans for sustaining naval investment. Peace through strength requires backing rhetoric with budget authority.

The Bottom Line

The Critical Window of 2026-2027 is closing. We cannot change the physics of shipbuilding, but we can recognize this moment for what it is. The decisions made in the next 18 months will determine what Navy America has in the 2030s.

Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for naval transparency, readiness, and strategic policy development. Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

Follow the Commission: National Commission on the Future of the Navy

The Critical Window is now. The time to act is today.

Greenland, the GIUK Gap, and Why Geography Still Rules Naval Strategy

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Why a narrow stretch of ocean between three landmasses has shaped 80 years of naval strategy — and why Americans need to understand it now

Introduction

A recent debate centered on whether China or Russia pose an imminent military threat to Greenland. The answer from intelligence sources appears to be no. But that answer, while technically correct, misses the deeper strategic point that has guided U.S. thinking for over two centuries.

The real issue is not invasion.
The real issue is strategic positioning in geography that matters to naval power.

Greenland sits in one of the most important pieces of maritime real estate on the planet. And the United States has understood that for a very long time.

The GIUK Gap: A Naval Choke Point Since World War II

Greenland forms the western anchor of what naval strategists call the GIUK Gap — the sea space between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom.

This is not a modern concept. During World War II and throughout the Cold War, this gap was the primary maritime passage between the Russian Northern Fleet and the Atlantic Ocean. Soviet submarines had to pass through this space to threaten U.S. and NATO shipping lanes.

The U.S. and NATO built an entire system of surveillance, patrols, air bases, and anti-submarine warfare doctrine around this geography. This was one of the most heavily monitored naval regions on earth for decades.

That geography has not changed.

What has changed is public memory of why it mattered.

Greenland and the U.S. Military Presence

The United States has maintained a military presence in Greenland since World War II. Today, Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) remains a critical U.S. installation for:

  • Missile warning
  • Space surveillance
  • Arctic operations
  • Early warning radar coverage of the North Atlantic and polar approaches

This is not symbolic. It is operationally significant to U.S. homeland defense and NATO maritime awareness.

The Monroe Doctrine and Western Hemisphere Strategy

In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine established a foundational principle of U.S. strategy:

Foreign powers establishing strategic footholds in the Western Hemisphere is a U.S. security concern — even if that presence appears commercial or political rather than military.

This was never about invasion. It was about presence.

Because presence becomes leverage.

That thinking has guided U.S. behavior for 200 years across the Caribbean, South America, Central America, and the Arctic.

Greenland fits squarely into that tradition.

China’s Pattern of Strategic Positioning

There is no evidence China plans to invade Greenland. But there is extensive documentation of China’s interest in:

  • Arctic shipping routes as ice recedes
  • Rare earth and mineral projects in Greenland
  • Financing infrastructure projects, including attempted airport construction
  • Expanding its presence in Arctic research and commercial ventures

This pattern is not unique to Greenland. Similar approaches have been seen in Africa, the Pacific Islands, South America, and Australia.

The pattern is not military. It is long-term positioning.

That is what concerns strategists, not headlines.

Why This Matters to Naval Strategy

Naval strategy is built around geography, choke points, and access.

Greenland is not important because of its population or economy. It is important because of where it sits on the map.

Control and awareness of the GIUK Gap means control and awareness of submarine movement between the Arctic and the Atlantic. That has been true for 80 years.

It is still true today.

Why This Is Urgent Now

Three developments make Greenland’s strategic position more critical today than at any point since the Cold War:

1. Arctic ice recession is opening new shipping routes and resource access, increasing activity in waters the U.S. has monitored for decades.

2. Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has returned to Cold War levels, but U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities have atrophied.

3. China’s systematic positioning in Arctic governance, research, and commercial ventures is establishing presence before the U.S. fully recognizes the competition.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy faces its smallest fleet since 1916 and readiness challenges that limit sustained presence in multiple regions simultaneously.

The stake is not hypothetical: If the U.S. cannot maintain awareness and presence in the GIUK Gap, it cannot guarantee:

  • Protection of transatlantic commerce that underpins the American economy
  • Early warning of submarine-launched threats to the homeland
  • Credible deterrence that prevents crises from starting

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans think of naval strength as ships and aircraft carriers. Few think about the map.

But naval power is first and foremost about geography.

The sea lanes that carry global trade, energy supplies, and military movement pass through predictable choke points. Greenland anchors one of them.

Understanding this is key to understanding why the United States watches foreign interest in Greenland closely — not because of paranoia, but because of history.

Implications for the Navy

For the U.S. Navy and NATO maritime forces, Greenland and the GIUK Gap remain central to:

  • Monitoring Russian submarine activity
  • Securing North Atlantic shipping lanes
  • Maintaining Arctic awareness as access increases
  • Supporting homeland and allied defense from the maritime domain

This is classic naval statecraft.

Implications for Our Allies

Denmark, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Canada, and NATO partners all share an interest in maintaining control and awareness of this region.

Greenland is not just a U.S. concern. It is a NATO maritime concern.

The Real Debate

The debate is not about whether China or Russia plan to invade Greenland.

It is about whether we recognize the long pattern of strategic positioning that great powers use long before conflict.

Geography doesn’t change. Neither does its importance to naval strategy.

Understanding Geography Is Just The Beginning

Greenland matters because of where it sits on the map. But knowing why geography matters doesn’t answer the harder questions:

How did the U.S. Navy — which once dominated these waters without question — reach a point where we’re debating our ability to maintain presence in strategically vital regions?

What decisions, what budget choices, what policy shifts brought us here?

And most importantly: what must happen next?

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. We connect the dots between geography, strategy, budgets, readiness, and national will. Our goal is simple: educate the public on the fundamentals of naval power so Americans understand what’s at stake — and what it will take to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

Open Letter to PM Starmer: Security Gaps in the UK-Mauritius Chagos Agreement

Diego Garcia represents the cornerstone of American naval power in the Indian Ocean—a facility that enables critical operations from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The recently signed UK-Mauritius agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, while intended to resolve a long-standing legal dispute, introduces serious security vulnerabilities that could compromise this vital base. After extensive review of the agreement, parliamentary documents, and expert analysis, Americans for a Stronger Navy has drafted an open letter to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer outlining our concerns and requesting strengthening of security provisions before final ratification. We publish this letter in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized the Special Relationship between our nations.

Key Concerns Raised:

Chinese Influence Risk: Mauritius maintains extensive economic ties with China, creating potential vectors for Beijing to establish surveillance capabilities on islands adjacent to Diego Garcia. The agreement’s prohibitions on foreign military presence may not cover civilian-flagged intelligence operations.

Weakened Control Structure: The transformation from British sovereign territory to a complex lease arrangement (UK leasing from Mauritius, US operating through UK) introduces political and legal vulnerabilities. American naval operations now depend on the stability of agreements between three parties rather than operating on secure sovereign territory.

Insufficient Security Guarantees: The agreement lacks robust enforcement mechanisms to prevent hostile powers from accessing outer islands for monitoring or influence operations. Ambiguities in defining prohibited activities could be exploited by adversaries operating under civilian cover.

Political Uncertainty: Changes in Mauritian government leadership create long-term risks. The current government has already ordered an independent review, and future administrations spanning the 99-year lease period may face economic pressure from China to renegotiate or modify terms.

What We Request:

  • Explicit provisions prohibiting Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on outer islands with clear enforcement
  • Joint UK-US monitoring and patrol authority across the archipelago
  • Automatic termination clauses if security provisions are violated
  • U.S. participation as a treaty party or guarantor for direct legal standing
  • Enhanced parliamentary scrutiny before final ratification

The Bottom Line: Diego Garcia’s strategic value has never been higher as great power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific. While we respect the UK’s efforts to address the historical injustice to the Chagossian people, justice and security need not be mutually exclusive. We urge strengthening this agreement before ratification to ensure this critical base remains secure for generations to come.


AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE KEIR STARMER MP
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Agreement

From: Americans for a Stronger Navy
January 21, 2026

Dear Prime Minister,

We write to you as fellow guardians of the free world, united by history, shared values, and an unbreakable commitment to democratic liberty. The Special Relationship between our nations has been forged in the crucible of two world wars, sustained through the Cold War, and renewed in our common struggle against terrorism and authoritarianism. It is precisely because of this deep bond that we feel compelled to address our serious concerns regarding the recently signed agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

This letter is written not in criticism, but in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized Anglo-American relations. We believe the current agreement, while well-intentioned, poses risks to our shared security interests that must be addressed before ratification becomes irreversible.

THE STAKES ARE HIGHER THAN EVER

Diego Garcia is not merely a military installation—it is the keystone of Western power projection in the Indian Ocean. From this small atoll, our nations have:

  • Defeated terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Iraq
  • Countered Iranian aggression and Houthi attacks on international shipping
  • Protected vital sea lanes carrying half the world’s containerized cargo
  • Maintained stability in a region increasingly contested by China’s expanding naval presence

Today, as China constructs military facilities across the South China Sea, as Russia threatens European security, and as Iran destabilizes the Middle East, the strategic value of Diego Garcia has never been greater. Yet at this critical juncture, the agreement with Mauritius introduces vulnerabilities that our adversaries will certainly seek to exploit.

OUR CONCERNS AS ALLIES

1. The Shadow of Chinese Influence

Mauritius, a small island nation, has become deeply economically dependent on China. Chinese investment pervades Mauritian infrastructure—ports, telecommunications, energy. This is not coincidence; it is the systematic implementation of Beijing’s strategy to gain leverage over nations along critical maritime routes.

We must ask: What guarantees exist that a future Mauritian government, facing economic pressure from Beijing, will not grant China “civilian” access to the outer islands? What prevents the establishment of “research stations,” “telecommunications facilities,” or “environmental monitoring posts” that serve as covers for signals intelligence operations?

The agreement’s language prohibiting foreign armed forces is insufficient. China has mastered the art of military operations under civilian guise. Islands merely miles from Diego Garcia could become surveillance platforms monitoring every ship, submarine, and aircraft movement—intelligence that would be instantly shared with Russia, Iran, and other adversaries.

2. From Sovereignty to Lease: A Dangerous Transformation

For decades, Diego Garcia operated on British sovereign territory. This provided legal certainty and operational security. Now, under the new arrangement, the United Kingdom must lease Diego Garcia from Mauritius at a cost of $136 million annually—and the United States operates at Diego Garcia under a further sublease arrangement with the UK.

This creates a cascading dependency. American naval operations now rest upon:

  • British adherence to the lease terms
  • Mauritian governments honoring their predecessors’ commitments
  • Both nations resisting external pressure to renegotiate or restrict operations

History teaches us that 99-year leases are not permanent. China’s 99-year lease of Hong Kong ended in humiliation for the West. We cannot allow Diego Garcia to follow the same path.

3. Political Instability and Long-Term Uncertainty

The current Mauritian government has already ordered an independent review of the agreement negotiated by its predecessor. Opposition parties criticize the deal. Future elections will bring new leaders with new priorities, new pressures, and potentially new patrons.

Over 99 years, Mauritius will see dozens of governments. Can we truly be confident that all of them will prioritize Western security interests over economic inducements from Beijing? The agreement provides insufficient mechanisms to prevent a future Mauritian government from effectively weaponizing the lease against Allied interests.

4. Legal and Historical Justice vs. Strategic Reality

We understand the moral arguments underlying this agreement. The forced removal of the Chagossians was a grave injustice that demands acknowledgment and remedy. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion and UN General Assembly resolutions created legal and political pressure.

But we must also recognize that international law is not self-executing and that advisory opinions do not carry binding force. The United Kingdom acted under the legitimate belief that resolving this dispute was necessary—yet in doing so, it may have exchanged one set of problems for far graver ones.

Justice for the Chagossians and security for the free world are not mutually exclusive. Better solutions existed—and may still exist—that address historical wrongs without compromising the strategic foundation of Indo-Pacific security.

WHAT WE ASK OF YOUR GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister, we do not ask the United Kingdom to repudiate this agreement outright. We recognize that your government has acted in good faith, seeking to resolve a complex legal and moral situation. What we ask is that, before final ratification, you consider strengthening the agreement to address the security vulnerabilities we have identified.

Specifically, we respectfully urge:

For Your Government:

  • Negotiate explicit provisions prohibiting any Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on the outer islands, with clear enforcement mechanisms
  • Establish joint UK-US monitoring and patrol of the archipelago with authority to prevent unauthorized activities
  • Include automatic termination clauses if Mauritius violates security provisions or grants access to adversary nations
  • Secure American participation as a treaty party or guarantor, giving the United States direct legal standing

For Parliament:

  • Conduct thorough scrutiny of the agreement’s security implications before ratification
  • Demand full transparency regarding payment terms and any side agreements with Mauritius
  • Require regular reporting to Parliament on compliance with security provisions

For the British People:

  • Recognize that Diego Garcia represents not just American interests, but British interests and the interests of the entire free world. This is not a matter of American imperialism—it is a matter of collective defense of the international order that has brought unprecedented prosperity and peace.

THE WAY FORWARD: PARTNERSHIP, NOT DIVISION

Some will say we are being alarmist. They will argue that Mauritius is a democracy, that China’s influence is exaggerated, that the 99-year lease provides sufficient security. We respectfully but firmly disagree.

In 1997, many believed Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” would endure. In the early 2000s, few imagined China would militarize the South China Sea. In 2014, the West was shocked when Russia annexed Crimea. Again and again, we have learned that authoritarian powers exploit every opening, every ambiguity, every moment of Western inattention.

We cannot afford such complacency at Diego Garcia. The Indo-Pacific theater is where the fate of the 21st century will be decided. Chinese naval expansion, the militarization of artificial islands, aggressive territorial claims, and economic coercion of smaller nations—all of this points to a future where freedom of navigation and the rule of law are under assault.

Diego Garcia is our insurance policy against that future. It must remain invulnerable, legally secure, and operationally unrestricted. The current agreement, as written, does not provide these assurances.

A CALL TO ACTION

Prime Minister, we urge you to pause, reconsider, and strengthen this agreement before it becomes irreversible. History will not judge kindly those who prioritized legal formalism over strategic necessity at such a critical moment.

To the British people: Understand that your government is making a decision with consequences that will echo for generations. Diego Garcia is not a relic of empire to be shed in pursuit of moral absolution. It is a shield protecting your nation, our nation, and the free world from those who would overthrow the international order.

To our American leaders: Stand with our British allies, but make clear that we cannot accept an arrangement that compromises the security foundation of our Indo-Pacific strategy. If necessary, pursue alternative arrangements that preserve American access to Diego Garcia under conditions we can trust.

The United States and United Kingdom have stood together through our darkest hours. We fought side by side against fascism, communism, and terrorism. That partnership endures because we share not just interests but values—democracy, liberty, and the rule of law.

Today, we face new threats from authoritarian powers who respect only strength and exploit every weakness. The Chagos agreement, in its current form, creates weakness where we desperately need strength. We can do better. We must do better.

We write not as adversaries, but as friends. Not to divide, but to unite. Not to criticize, but to protect that which we have built together and must defend together.

The Special Relationship demands nothing less than total candor. In that spirit, we ask: strengthen this agreement, secure Diego Garcia, and ensure that the beacon of freedom in the Indian Ocean continues to shine brightly for generations to come.

Respectfully and in friendship,

Americans for a Stronger Navy

On behalf of Americans who cherish the Special Relationship
and recognize that our security is inseparable from yours


Contact:
Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org
StrongerNavy.org/blog

The Silent Guardians: Why the US Navy’s New Unmanned Fleet is a Game-Changer

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

As the founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, my mission is to advocate for the naval power our nation needs to secure its interests, project influence, and deter aggression in an increasingly complex world. For too long, discussions about naval strength have focused almost exclusively on traditional, crewed warships. While these mighty vessels remain the backbone of our fleet, a silent revolution is underway—one that promises to redefine naval warfare as we know it.

More Than Just Boats: The Brains Behind the Brawn

What makes these vessels so transformative isn’t just their ability to operate without a crew, but the sophisticated artificial intelligence that empowers them. Both the Sea Hunter and Seahawk were designed and built by Leidos, and they are powered by an advanced software ecosystem called LAVA (Leidos Autonomous Vessel Architecture).

Forget remote-control toys; LAVA provides true mission autonomy:

  • Self-Correction & Resilience: If a system fails or damage occurs, LAVA can reconfigure its mission in real-time. It’s like having a captain who can rewrite the playbook mid-battle without human intervention.
  • Intelligent Navigation: LAVA constantly processes data from radar, lidar, AIS, and cameras to execute collision avoidance maneuvers in full compliance with international “Rules of the Road” (COLREGS).
  • Modular Versatility: The same “brain” can be installed across a wide range of vessels, from high-speed interceptors to specialized sub-hunters.

A Fleet of Ghost Ships: The Strategic Advantages

  • Persistence & Endurance: Without a crew, these ships can operate for extended periods without the need for rotation or resupply.
  • Reduced Risk to Personnel: Deploying unmanned vessels for dangerous missions like anti-submarine warfare (ASW) preserves our most valuable asset: our sailors.
  • Cost-Effectiveness: Long-term operational costs are significantly lower than traditional warships, offering an affordable way to expand global presence.
  • Scalability & Swarming: LAVA enables “swarms” of USVs to coordinate and search vast ocean areas for threats simultaneously.

Looking Ahead: The Future is Unmanned

The US Navy’s commitment is clear. With an expansion from just four small USVs to hundreds projected within a single year, the shift is undeniable. The Seahawk and Sea Hunter have already logged over 140,000 autonomous nautical miles—more than five times the Earth’s circumference.

For Americans for a Stronger Navy, this represents a crucial step forward. Investing in these innovative, autonomous systems ensures that our Navy remains at the forefront of global naval power, ready to face the challenges of tomorrow’s maritime domain with unparalleled strength.

Join the Mission for a Modern Fleet

The transition to an autonomous-integrated fleet is a generational shift that requires steady advocacy and public support. At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we are dedicated to ensuring our sailors have the most advanced technology on the planet to keep our seas free and our nation secure.

Support our efforts today:

  • Stay Informed: Subscribe to our newsletter for deep dives into naval tech like LAVA and the Ghost Fleet.
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China’s New Invasion Barges Reveal a Bigger Truth About Modern Power

Chinese Shuiqiao-class invasion barges

What Just Happened

Between January 11 and 15, 2026, China deployed three newly built Shuiqiao-class invasion barges to Nansan Island in the South China Sea. These are not ordinary ships. They are mobile, self-deploying logistics platforms designed to create instant docks, temporary ports, and heavy equipment offload points where no infrastructure exists.

Each barge can drive into shallow water, jack itself above the surface, and deploy roadway systems that turn open coastline into a functioning logistics hub.

This is not experimentation. This is rehearsal.

China is practicing how to build ports on demand.

Why This Is Different

Most people imagine amphibious invasions as waves of troops and armored vehicles storming beaches.

That image is outdated.

Modern war is won by logistics.

Fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, medical care, maintenance, and the continuous movement of people and equipment matter more than the first landing. Whoever sustains operations longest wins.

These barges are not weapons.
They are infrastructure.

And infrastructure is what makes everything else possible.

By deploying these platforms, China is demonstrating its ability to:

  • Create instant ports
  • Establish temporary logistics hubs
  • Sustain forces across islands
  • Operate without fixed bases
  • Support heavy equipment transfers
  • Expand control incrementally

This is how power is consolidated in the 21st century.

My Commentary

If you once doubted China’s intentions, think again.

This is not defensive infrastructure. This is not routine maritime development. This is not a commercial experiment.

This is about control.

This is about reach.

This is about being able to move, land, supply, reinforce, and sustain military forces wherever and whenever they choose.

You don’t build mobile ports unless you intend to use them.

This is not about one island.
This is about a system.

Why Americans Should Care

Naval power is not a platform.
It is a system.

Ships, ports, logistics, repair facilities, supply chains, workforce, industrial capacity, and governance all matter.

China understands this.

That’s why it is investing in portable infrastructure, modular logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities—while the United States struggles with:

  • Aging sealift
  • Fragile port security
  • Long shipyard delays
  • Limited surge capacity
  • Shrinking industrial depth
  • Vulnerable maritime infrastructure

Power today is not just about firepower.

It is about who can show up, stay, and sustain.

China is building that capability deliberately.

What This Signals About China’s Strategy

This development aligns with a broader pattern:

  • Artificial islands
  • Dual-use ports
  • Civil-military fusion
  • Expeditionary logistics
  • Rapid infrastructure construction
  • Maritime normalization

China is not just building ships.

It is building the scaffolding of dominance.

And it is doing so quietly, persistently, and methodically.

This is how territorial control is modernized.

This Is a Governance Issue, Not Just a Military One

Military capability does not appear by accident.

It is built through alignment:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

China is aligning all five.

The United States is not.

We debate platforms.
They build systems.

We argue procurement.
They build logistics.

We delay shipyards.
They build mobile ports.

This is not about spending more.
It is about thinking differently.

What Must Change

America must stop treating naval strength as a niche defense topic.

It is economic security.
It is supply chain security.
It is alliance credibility.
It is deterrence.
It is peace.

If we fail to understand how power is now constructed, we will lose it without a single dramatic moment.

That is the real danger.

Not invasion headlines.
Not dramatic conflict.

But quiet displacement.

Closing

China just showed us something important.

Not with missiles.
Not with warships.
But with infrastructure.

And that should worry anyone who believes in a free, open, and stable maritime world.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.


Venezuela Isn’t a Humanitarian Story. It’s a Power Story.


When Americans hear about Venezuela, they tend to think in humanitarian terms—migration, political repression, economic collapse. But that framing misses the point. Venezuela is not just a tragedy. It’s a test case for how power works in the modern world.

And power today is not primarily exercised by invading countries. It is exercised by controlling access.

Naval strategist Brent Sadler calls this naval statecraft: the use of maritime power not to occupy territory, but to shape outcomes by controlling sea lanes, ports, trade routes, and strategic flows.

That may sound academic. It isn’t.

Oil moves by tanker. Food moves by ship. Weapons move by ship. Data moves across undersea cables. Whoever controls maritime access controls leverage over markets, pricing, and political behavior.

That is why Venezuela matters.

The country holds the largest proven oil reserves on earth. Those reserves don’t just sit in the ground—they move through ports, shipping routes, refineries, and insurance markets. If you influence those arteries, you influence global energy prices.

This is how power works now.

China, Russia, and Iran understand this. That’s why they don’t primarily project influence through armies anymore. They do it through ports, infrastructure loans, logistics hubs, shipping contracts, and maritime footholds.

This isn’t ideological. It’s commercial.

It’s about controlling the plumbing of globalization.

Most Americans still think about war in 20th-century terms: tanks crossing borders, armies seizing capitals, long occupations. Iraq and Afghanistan showed us the limits of that model—astronomical cost, endless entanglement, poor return on investment.

Naval power offers a different approach.

You don’t need to own the house to control the driveway.

Naval statecraft lets a country shape outcomes without rebuilding foreign societies, policing local politics, or stationing troops for decades. It raises the cost of destabilizing behavior. It disrupts illicit flows. It protects trade. It limits rivals’ reach.

No nation-building.
No permanent occupation.
No trillion-dollar quagmires.

Just leverage.

That matters to Americans because the modern economy is maritime. Roughly 90% of global trade moves by sea. Energy markets are maritime. Supply chains are maritime. Even the internet relies on undersea cables.

When those systems destabilize, Americans feel it—in fuel prices, grocery bills, insurance costs, and lost jobs.

The Navy doesn’t just protect territory. It protects flows.

And flows are what modern economies run on.

The public debate still frames U.S. foreign policy as a binary choice: invade or disengage. But the events in Venezuela show that this is a false choice.

Naval statecraft offers a third option.

It allows the U.S. to protect its interests without trying to govern other nations. It shapes incentives instead of regimes. It deters without occupying.

It is not warmongering. It is cost control.

It is not militarism. It is market stability.

And it has domestic benefits.

A credible naval presence requires ships, ports, dry docks, logistics networks, and skilled labor. That means long-term industrial jobs, capital investment, and manufacturing capacity—things America has been hollowing out for decades.

Naval power is not just a security asset. It is an economic one.

When rival powers build ports in the Western Hemisphere, they aren’t doing charity work. They’re building leverage. They’re shaping future trade behavior. They’re embedding themselves into supply chains.

Naval statecraft is how you counter that without turning every dispute into a war.

It is power with restraint. It is influence without occupation. It is competition without catastrophe.

And it may be the most important strategic concept Americans have never been taught.