Category: Opinion Piece

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Captain John Konrad Just Proved Our Point—From the Logistics Side

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

A few days ago, we published a piece about rust on Navy ships. Not because rust is the problem, but because rust is the symptom of something deeper: a governance system that doesn’t fund the unglamorous, essential work of maintaining a ready fleet.

Now Captain John Konrad has walked through the 2025 Military Sealift Command handbook page by page in a detailed podcast, and he’s telling the exact same story—from the other side of the hull.

What Konrad Found

Captain Konrad, founder of gCaptain and a licensed Master Mariner with decades at sea, attended the Surface Navy Association’s National Symposium and picked up what he calls “the most important book the Navy publishes every year”—the MSC handbook.

His conclusion after reviewing it: “We are completely unprepared for a war in the Pacific.”

Here’s what the handbook reveals:

$5 billion annual budget for Military Sealift Command—the organization responsible for 90% of everything the military moves overseas, including fuel, ammunition, food, and equipment for all services across all theaters worldwide.

As Konrad puts it bluntly: “Ships are expensive, people. Crewing ships are expensive. Maintaining ships are expensive. And you just can’t do it with a $5 billion budget.” That’s less than 0.5% of the $1.1 trillion defense budget to sustain the logistics backbone that enables everything else.

17 ships laid up—not because they’re broken, but because there aren’t enough licensed merchant mariners to crew them. The workforce crisis isn’t theoretical. It’s operational right now.

A command authority mismatch: MSC is a one or two-star command trying to support operations across all numbered fleets, which are three and four-star commands. When they compete for resources in Congress, they get outranked by everyone.

The Single Point of Failure Inventory

Konrad methodically documents what “running on fumes” actually looks like:

  • 1 Missile Range Instrumentation Ship (to track adversary weapons development)
  • 1 Advanced towed array surveillance ship
  • 1 Cable repair ship (for undersea cables carrying secure communications)
  • 1 Ballistic missile tracking ship
  • 1 Navigation test support ship
  • 4 Ocean surveillance ships (we had dozens during the Cold War to track Soviet submarines)
  • 4 Submarine support ships (submarines can’t safely enter or leave port without them)
  • 4 New John Lewis-class replenishment oilers—with only one or two actually deployed due to environmental scrubber requirements making them too tall to fit under 70% of bridges

The oiler situation is particularly critical. As Konrad notes, a former Commandant of the Merchant Marine wrote that we’re 100 tankers short of minimum requirements to fuel the fleet in a Pacific campaign.

This Is the Same Story We’ve Been Telling

In our earlier post on rust, we made a simple point: rust isn’t a Navy problem. It’s an American one.

We showed this governance chain:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

When that chain breaks down, you get rust on deckplates. But as Konrad’s breakdown proves, you also get:

  • Ships that can’t deploy because bureaucracy matters more than mission
  • Mariners overworked to the point of tragedy (he references the officer who died by suicide aboard the USNS Amelia Earhart from stress and overwork)
  • Single ships doing missions that require dozens
  • A logistics fleet averaging 40 years old with no replacement plan adequate to requirements

The Governance Failure at Every LevelKonrad’s evidence maps directly to our framework:

National will: Americans support the Navy—surveys prove it. But they picture aircraft carriers and destroyers, not oilers and cable repair ships. They don’t know Military Sealift Command exists. They don’t understand that 90% of military logistics moves by ship, or that the Air Force’s entire airlift capacity is less than what China can fit on one modern container ship.

Budgets: When the public doesn’t understand what naval power requires, Congress doesn’t fund it. MSC gets 0.5% of the defense budget to do what Konrad calls “the most important mission” because logistics wins wars.

Priorities: MSC is outranked by every other command. When it’s time to fight for resources, they lose. The result is predictable: deferred maintenance, aging ships, no replacement pipeline, and a workforce crisis.

Behavior: With inadequate funding and low command priority, you get exactly what Konrad documents—ships laid up, mariners burned out, critical capabilities down to single digits, and new ships stuck pier-side because nobody fixed the bureaucratic tangles.

Readiness: We can move the fleet to the Pacific. But we can’t sustain them there. We can win the first battle, but we can’t win the campaign.

What “Lack of Support” Actually Means

This isn’t about public indifference. It’s about invisibility.

The American public sees:

  • Carriers launching jets (thrilling)
  • Destroyers shooting missiles (dramatic)
  • Submarines running silent (mysterious)

They don’t see:

  • The oiler keeping the carrier’s air wing flying
  • The dry cargo ship bringing ammunition to the destroyers
  • The cable repair ship maintaining secure communications
  • The ocean surveillance ship tracking enemy submarines before they become threats
  • The submarine tender ensuring boats can safely enter and leave port

What’s invisible doesn’t get funded.

This is why the governance failure at the top of the chain matters so much. If national will doesn’t include understanding what naval power actually requires, budgets will never prioritize the systems that make it work.

Naval Power Is Systems, Not Platforms

We’ve been making this point for months: naval power isn’t platforms. It’s systems.

You can have the most advanced destroyers and carriers in the world, but if you can’t fuel them at sea, resupply them with ammunition, track enemy submarines approaching your bases, repair undersea cables when they’re cut, or crew the ships you already have—then you don’t have naval power. You have expensive hulls that can’t sustain operations.

Konrad’s handbook walkthrough proves this from the logistics side. The platforms get the attention and the funding. The systems that enable them get $5 billion and a two-star admiral.

A Call to Action: DOD and Congress Must Act

We know from surveys that Americans support a strong Navy. They want us to be ready. But readiness isn’t just about how many ships we have—it’s about whether those ships can operate, sustain, and prevail in extended campaigns.

The Department of Defense must:

  • Elevate MSC to a three-star command so it has the authority to compete for resources
  • Fix bureaucratic tangles keeping new capabilities pier-side
  • Properly recognize civilian mariners to improve recruitment and retention
  • Stop treating logistics as an afterthought in force structure decisions

Congress must:

  • Fund MSC and the maritime industrial base at levels that match strategic requirements, not political convenience
  • Expand the Maritime Security Program, especially tankers
  • Invest in the mariner training pipeline and Strategic Sealift Officer program
  • Demand readiness reporting that focuses on systems and sustainability, not just platform counts

Acknowledging Captain Konrad’s Work

Captain Konrad has been a persistent, credible voice highlighting America’s maritime readiness crisis. Through gCaptain, his podcasts, and media appearances on NPR, BBC, the New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, he’s documented the decline of our merchant marine, the shipbuilding crisis, and strategic sealift challenges.

His latest breakdown of the MSC handbook is a public service. He’s showing Americans what their Navy actually depends on—and how fragile that foundation has become.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we’ve been making the case that rust is a symptom and the system is the cause. Konrad just proved it from the logistics side. His work validates our concerns and strengthens the case for urgent action.

The Bottom Line

Rust isn’t a deckplate problem. It’s a governance one.

Ships laid up for lack of crews isn’t a manning problem. It’s a governance one.

Oilers stuck pier-side because nobody fixed the bureaucracy isn’t a maintenance problem. It’s a governance one.

And a $5 billion budget for the logistics backbone that enables 90% of military power projection isn’t a budget problem—it’s a national priority failure.

Captain Konrad is right: we’re not ready for a sustained fight in the Pacific.

But the solution isn’t just to build more ships. It’s to fix the governance chain that determines whether we fund, crew, maintain, and deploy the capabilities we already need.

The American people support a strong Navy. Now we need DOD and Congress to match that support with the resources, priorities, and leadership that readiness actually requires.

Let’s roll.

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Rust, Readiness, and Reality: Why This Debate Matters to Every American

Why This Is Not a Navy Problem, but an American One

This essay explores why the current debate over rust and warfighting readiness is not an internal Navy issue, but a national one. The real problem is not cosmetic—it is systemic. Sailors are capable. The American public is supportive. What often fails is alignment upstream—where Congress, the Department of Defense, and senior leadership decide what gets funded, staffed, scheduled, and rewarded.

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

From the Founder

I served on a U.S. Navy destroyer in the 1970s. Some of the hardest-working, most capable people I’ve ever known wore Navy uniforms—officers and enlisted, engineers and operators, deckplate sailors and watchstanders. They weren’t lazy. They weren’t careless. And they weren’t disconnected from the mission.

They were doing the best they could inside a system that constantly forced tradeoffs.

That experience is why I’m paying close attention to the public debate about rust, preservation, and warfighting readiness. Because this is not a Navy culture fight. It’s not a generational fight. And it’s not an internal matter.

It’s a national readiness issue.

What Sparked This Debate

A recent article by LT Spike Dearing, published on the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), argued that today’s surface fleet is being inspected more for preservation than for warfighting. His point was not that preservation doesn’t matter—it absolutely does—but that what leaders choose to inspect shapes what sailors prioritize.

His concern is simple and serious: if warfighting performance is rarely inspected, it will inevitably become secondary.

The article prompted multiple responses in the CIMSEC comment section, including from naval historian and analyst Steven Wills, and was later republished on other defense platforms—signaling that its themes are resonating beyond its initial posting.

This is not a closed-door conversation. This is a public one—because the consequences of readiness, or the lack of it, do not stay inside the Navy.

What Steven Wills Gets Right

Steven Wills made an important point: corrosion is not cosmetic. Rust is not superficial. Preservation reflects discipline. And visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay.

He’s right.

Saltwater destroys steel. Systems fail. Neglect spreads. No serious warfighting force can afford to treat material condition as optional.

But this is where people often misframe the issue.

This is not a choice between paint and warfighting.

It is about whether the system enables both.

What LT Dearing Gets Right

LT Dearing is also right.

People respond rationally to what leaders inspect.

If leaders inspect surfaces, crews will optimize for surfaces. If leaders inspect tactics, crews will optimize for tactics.

That’s not laziness. That’s survival.

After the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, the Navy made fire safety non-negotiable. Inspections changed. Behavior changed. Training changed.

That’s how priorities shift.

Standards Matter — But Systems Decide Whether They Are Achievable

When defense analyst Brent Sadler says that a clean ship is a well-run ship and a combat-ready ship, he is pointing to something real: discipline, standards, and leadership signals matter. Order reflects process. Process reflects leadership. And leadership shapes behavior.

But that truth only holds when the system supporting those standards is aligned.

A ship can only be clean, disciplined, and well-run if crews are given the time, manpower, training windows, maintenance access, and parts availability needed to meet those standards. Without that support, expectations become performative instead of operational.

This is where the problem becomes systemic.

When standards are enforced without the resources to meet them, discipline turns into distortion. Crews are not failing — they are adapting. And adaptation is not weakness. It is rational behavior inside a misaligned system.

This is why this is not a deckplate problem.

This is a governance problem.

Who sets the priorities? Who controls the budgets? Who defines the metrics? Who decides what gets inspected, rewarded, and penalized?  Readiness is not free. It is built—or it is hollowed out—by budgets, manpower decisions, and time allocations.

Those decisions are made upstream.

Sadler’s point about cleanliness is not wrong — it is incomplete without a systems lens. A clean ship should reflect readiness. But that only works when leadership designs a system that makes real readiness possible, not just presentable.

This is why LT Spike Dearing’s argument about what leaders choose to inspect matters. And it is why Steven Wills is right to warn that visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay. Both are describing the same thing from different angles: signals versus systems.

Signals matter. But systems decide outcomes.

My Experience

When I served, my shipmates worked relentlessly. We fought corrosion while underway. We knew what mattered. But we also knew what inspectors looked for.

So when inspections came, we painted.

Not because we didn’t care about readiness. But because we cared about protecting our command inside the system.

And a lot has changed since the 1970s. The Navy is smaller now and stretched even further. The systems are more complex, the demands are higher, and many of the sailors and officers carrying this load today could be my children. In many cases, they may not even have the time to paint over rust—because they are busy keeping the ship running, the systems online, and the mission moving.

That doesn’t weaken this argument. It strengthens it.

That’s not moral failure.

That’s a warning sign.

Hardworking people will always try to do everything. When they can’t, they triage based on what leadership rewards.

This Is Not a Navy-Internal Problem

This is not about sailors. This is not about pride. This is not about tradition.

This is about alignment.

Sailors are capable. Sailors are disciplined. Sailors are supported by the American people.

What they often lack is consistent backing from those who control resources, manpower, time, and priorities.

Readiness is not a slogan. It’s a system.

And when that system is misaligned, people adapt.

Why Americans Should Care

The Navy does not exist for the Navy. It exists for the American people.

If we want deterrence, we must prepare seriously. If we want peace, we must be credible. If we want stability, we must invest in real readiness—not performative readiness.

You cannot paint your way to warfighting competence.

Implications for the Navy

This debate exposes a dangerous risk: a force that looks ready but is not consistently evaluated for the conditions it will actually face.

War does not care about inspections. Adversaries do not grade on appearance. And there are no do-overs.

Implications for Our Allies

Our allies don’t just watch our ships. They watch our seriousness.

Credibility comes from demonstrated competence under stress—not polish.

The Bottom Line

Preservation matters. Warfighting matters more. Both must be enabled.

This is not about rust. It is about readiness design.

Real readiness cannot be painted on.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Why Battleships Still Matter—Even If We Never Build One Again

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Naval historian Trent Hone recently published a thoughtful piece explaining why the U.S. Navy no longer builds battleships—and why, from a warfighting standpoint, it probably shouldn’t.

Hone’s argument is straightforward: the operational logic that once justified battleships has been obsolete for decades. Big guns gave way to aircraft. Aircraft gave way to missiles. Today’s naval combat rewards dispersion, networking, and numbers—not massive armored hulls.

That assessment is widely shared among naval professionals.

But Hone makes a second, more subtle point that deserves more attention: battleships have always carried symbolic power far beyond their military utility. They were never just weapons. They were national statements—about strength, reach, prestige, and ambition.

That symbolic role has not disappeared.

And that’s where the conversation gets interesting.

Two Serious Perspectives, One Shared Conclusion

Hone is a respected scholar and strategist. He holds the Marine Corps University Foundation Chair of Strategic Studies and has written extensively about how naval doctrine evolves with technology and threat environments. His view is clear: building a new battleship today would produce a smaller, less resilient, less lethal fleet than the alternatives.

Others, however, approach the issue from a different angle.

Defense analyst Brent Sadler, for example, has argued that what matters most is not any specific platform but the urgent need to rebuild American sea power at scale. His emphasis is on fleet size, industrial capacity, and the ability to sustain combat operations over time. For Sadler, bold ideas—even controversial ones—are useful if they force the public to confront how far the Navy has fallen behind its global responsibilities.

These two views may differ on specifics, but they converge on something essential:

America needs a stronger Navy.

Not symbolically. Not nostalgically. Structurally.

The Real Problem Isn’t Battleships—It’s Public Understanding

The deeper issue raised by this debate is not whether we should build a new class of battleships. It’s that the American public has lost touch with what sea power actually means.

Most Americans don’t see the Navy at work.
They don’t see trade routes.
They don’t see chokepoints.
They don’t see logistics.
They don’t see undersea cables.
They don’t see maintenance backlogs.
They don’t see shipyard fragility.
They don’t see attrition math.

But they do recognize symbols.

Battleships, like aircraft carriers, are easy to understand. They look powerful. They feel powerful. They communicate strength in a way spreadsheets and logistics diagrams do not.

That doesn’t make them good warfighting solutions—but it does make them powerful communication tools.

And the Navy has a communication problem.

A stronger Navy is not only a military challenge. It is a civic one—requiring public understanding, long-term commitment, and new thinking about how we fund and sustain national security.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy is not just a military force. It is the invisible foundation of modern American life.

It protects global trade.
It stabilizes energy flows.
It keeps shipping lanes open.
It reassures allies.
It deters coercion.
It underwrites economic stability.

When the Navy weakens, these systems become fragile.

That fragility doesn’t show up overnight—but it shows up eventually.

Implications for the Navy

Modern naval power is no longer about a few dominant platforms. It is about:

Numbers
Redundancy
Repairability
Sustainment
Resilience
Industrial depth
Networked operations

A stronger Navy is not just a bigger Navy—it is a Navy that can take losses and keep fighting.

That requires more ships, more shipyards, more trained sailors, and more public support.

Implications for Our Allies

Allies do not just look at U.S. statements. They look at U.S. capacity.

They ask:
Can America show up?
Can America stay?
Can America sustain?
Can America adapt?

A strong Navy reassures allies.
A hollow Navy invites testing.

Where We Stand

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we are not here to pick winners in platform debates. Reasonable people will disagree about hulls, missiles, drones, and fleet composition.

But most serious voices agree on one thing:

The Navy is stretched too thin.
The industrial base is fragile.
The fleet is too small for its mission set.
And the public does not understand what’s at stake.

That is the gap we exist to close.

Not through nostalgia.
Not through fear.
But through education.

Because a democracy cannot sustain a strong Navy if it does not understand why it needs one.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Venezuela Isn’t a Humanitarian Story. It’s a Power Story.

When Americans hear about Venezuela, they tend to think in humanitarian terms—migration, political repression, economic collapse. But that framing misses the point. Venezuela is not just a tragedy. It’s a test case for how power works in the modern world.

And power today is not primarily exercised by invading countries. It is exercised by controlling access.

Naval strategist Brent Sadler calls this naval statecraft: the use of maritime power not to occupy territory, but to shape outcomes by controlling sea lanes, ports, trade routes, and strategic flows.

That may sound academic. It isn’t.

Oil moves by tanker. Food moves by ship. Weapons move by ship. Data moves across undersea cables. Whoever controls maritime access controls leverage over markets, pricing, and political behavior.

That is why Venezuela matters.

The country holds the largest proven oil reserves on earth. Those reserves don’t just sit in the ground—they move through ports, shipping routes, refineries, and insurance markets. If you influence those arteries, you influence global energy prices.

This is how power works now.

China, Russia, and Iran understand this. That’s why they don’t primarily project influence through armies anymore. They do it through ports, infrastructure loans, logistics hubs, shipping contracts, and maritime footholds.

This isn’t ideological. It’s commercial.

It’s about controlling the plumbing of globalization.

Most Americans still think about war in 20th-century terms: tanks crossing borders, armies seizing capitals, long occupations. Iraq and Afghanistan showed us the limits of that model—astronomical cost, endless entanglement, poor return on investment.

Naval power offers a different approach.

You don’t need to own the house to control the driveway.

Naval statecraft lets a country shape outcomes without rebuilding foreign societies, policing local politics, or stationing troops for decades. It raises the cost of destabilizing behavior. It disrupts illicit flows. It protects trade. It limits rivals’ reach.

No nation-building.
No permanent occupation.
No trillion-dollar quagmires.

Just leverage.

That matters to Americans because the modern economy is maritime. Roughly 90% of global trade moves by sea. Energy markets are maritime. Supply chains are maritime. Even the internet relies on undersea cables.

When those systems destabilize, Americans feel it—in fuel prices, grocery bills, insurance costs, and lost jobs.

The Navy doesn’t just protect territory. It protects flows.

And flows are what modern economies run on.

The public debate still frames U.S. foreign policy as a binary choice: invade or disengage. But the events in Venezuela show that this is a false choice.

Naval statecraft offers a third option.

It allows the U.S. to protect its interests without trying to govern other nations. It shapes incentives instead of regimes. It deters without occupying.

It is not warmongering. It is cost control.

It is not militarism. It is market stability.

And it has domestic benefits.

A credible naval presence requires ships, ports, dry docks, logistics networks, and skilled labor. That means long-term industrial jobs, capital investment, and manufacturing capacity—things America has been hollowing out for decades.

Naval power is not just a security asset. It is an economic one.

When rival powers build ports in the Western Hemisphere, they aren’t doing charity work. They’re building leverage. They’re shaping future trade behavior. They’re embedding themselves into supply chains.

Naval statecraft is how you counter that without turning every dispute into a war.

It is power with restraint. It is influence without occupation. It is competition without catastrophe.

And it may be the most important strategic concept Americans have never been taught.

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Year-End Message: The Pentagon’s China Report and What It Means for 2025

The 2027 Countdown: What the Pentagon’s Delayed China Report Reveals

2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review Report Cover
Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Hello friends, and fellow supporters of America’s Navy. Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy.

On December 23rd, the Pentagon released its annual China Military Power Report. This assessment had been missing all year while Congress debated budgets. Now that it’s here, we understand the delay. The report contains the most direct warning yet: China expects to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan by the end of 2027. That’s less than three years away.

Why Taiwan Matters to You

As Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, wrote in TIME Magazine:

“Defending far-off Taiwan and our allies… is rooted in a practical, hard-nosed assessment of what is in Americans’ concrete economic and political interests. It is about defending Americans’ security, liberties, and prosperity from a very real, and in terms of China’s gigantic scale, unprecedented danger.”

Your Phone. Your Car. Your Hospital Equipment.

Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. A Chinese blockade or invasion would cost the global economy at least one trillion dollars per year.

What the Pentagon Report Reveals

  • Nuclear Expansion: Stockpile reached 600+ in 2024, on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030.
  • Space Surveillance: 359+ satellites now track U.S. ships in near real-time.
  • Cyber Weapons: Operations like Volt Typhoon have burrowed into U.S. power grids for wartime sabotage.
  • Taiwan Pressure: 3,067 air incursions in 2024—nearly double the previous year.

The Timeline Should Terrify You

The Western Pacific is becoming a “Kill Zone.” As one naval officer put it: “We no longer build the Navy the Navy needs. We build the Navy the accountants will tolerate.”

America is not outmatched; we are under-mobilized. The decisions we make in 2025 determine whether deterrence holds in 2027. Visit StrongerNavy.org to request your copy of our 2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review.

Thank you for caring about America’s maritime strength.

Fair winds and following seas,

Bill Cullifer
Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org

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Maritime Security and the Shifting Strategic Landscape: Why the Caribbean Still Matters

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

What held true in the 1970s when I served in the U.S. Navy remains true today: the sea—its lanes, chokepoints, and often hidden logistics networks—is where national power meets commerce and security. As founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I’ve watched the Caribbean region shift from a legacy theater of interdiction to something far more strategic and volatile. The United States must stay anchored to its enduring maritime interests, while soberly recognizing how the threat environment has evolved. The piece that follows lays out those stakes and changes in straightforward terms.

The security of the United States has always been tied to the sea. From the earliest days of the Republic, American prosperity has depended on open waterways, secure maritime trade routes, and the prevention of hostile powers establishing influence near U.S. shores. These principles are not abstractions. They are the foundation of American national strategy.

Recent naval actions in the Caribbean, including the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and the use of lethal force against suspected drug-trafficking vessels, have reopened a debate about the role of the U.S. Navy in the Western Hemisphere. Some see decisive action against destabilizing criminal networks. Others see a dangerous shift away from established maritime law and precedent.

This post does not seek to argue either side. Instead, it lays out the strategic facts that Americans must understand before forming an opinion.

I. Enduring U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere

For more than two centuries, American maritime strategy in the Caribbean has centered on three core objectives.

Freedom of Navigation
The Caribbean connects the Atlantic and Pacific trade systems. The majority of U.S. trade, energy transit, and commercial shipping depends on unobstructed access through these waters.

Security of Strategic Chokepoints
The Panama Canal remains a critical artery of global commerce. Any disruption—whether from instability, coercion, or foreign control—would have immediate and far-reaching economic consequences.

Prevention of Adversarial Influence Near U.S. Shores
From the Monroe Doctrine through the Cold War, American policy has consistently sought to prevent rival powers from establishing military or strategic footholds in the region. Today, this concern increasingly centers on the growing presence of the People’s Republic of China in ports, telecommunications, and financial networks throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Merchants Port now holds full ownership of Jamaica’s Kingston Freeport Terminal, one of the region’s key shipping hubs, and Beijing has invested billions in dual-use maritime infrastructure across the hemisphere.

These interests are longstanding. They are not partisan. They are structural.

II. The New Strategic Landscape: Crime, State Actors, and Maritime Security

What has changed is the nature of the threat.

The Synthetic Drug Crisis as a National Security Issue
The U.S. is experiencing a mass-casualty public-health emergency, with tens of thousands of deaths annually attributed to synthetic opioids. Major criminal organizations responsible for production and distribution have developed transnational financing, manufacturing, and logistics networks.

The China Connection
Multiple U.S. agencies have identified two critical dependencies.

Chemical Precursors and Equipment
Key components used to manufacture synthetic opioids are sourced overwhelmingly from Chinese firms.

Financial Networks
Laundering operations linked to PRC-based intermediaries move cartel funds through international markets at scale.

Strategic Presence in the Region
Simultaneously, the PRC has invested heavily in dual-use ports, intelligence-collection infrastructure, and economic footholds across the Caribbean and South America. By 2023, direct Chinese investment in island nations reached $3.3 billion, while infrastructure contracts totaled $32 billion.

As one recent illustrative example, the U.S. guided-missile destroyer USS Gravely docked in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 26 October 2025 as part of joint exercises with regional partners near Venezuela—a vivid symbol that U.S. maritime posture in the Caribbean is expanding from interdiction to forward presence.

The issue is no longer purely criminal. It is geopolitical.

III. The Question Before the Country: Method, Law, and Strategic Consequence

The central debate is not whether the United States should defend its interests in the region. It should and always has. The debate is how that defense should be conducted.

Argument for Military Kinetic Action
Supporters argue that the scale of the synthetic-drug crisis qualifies as a national-security threat, enabling the use of military force in self-defence. They contend that criminal networks operating with state-linked support may be treated under the laws of armed conflict.

Argument for Maintaining Traditional Maritime Law and Interdiction Precedent
Legal scholars and military ethicists warn that conducting lethal strikes against vessels without warning may erode long-standing maritime norms. Precedent matters. If the U.S. asserts the right to destroy vessels at sea based on national-security claims, adversaries could use the same justification in other contested waters—potentially including the South China Sea.

The strategic risk is that a short-term response to an urgent threat may weaken the very system of maritime stability the United States has spent generations defending.

Conclusion: The Need for Strategic Clarity

The United States cannot afford to lose stability, access, or influence in the Caribbean. The region matters today for the same reasons it mattered in 1823, 1947, and 1989: geography does not change. What has changed is the strategic environment, the nature of violence, and the actors capable of shaping the maritime domain.

As Americans, we now face a difficult question:
How do we defend our interests in the Western Hemisphere without undermining the maritime rules and partnerships that underpin global stability?

The answer requires seriousness, informed public understanding, and national unity.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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The Fork in the Sea

An Open Letter to Silicon Valley and the American People

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

If you’re confused by all this, you’re not alone. By “this,” I mean the tangle of headlines, policies, and talking points that have defined America’s relationship with China for the past decade — tariffs and trade wars, tech bans and chip controls, speeches about “decoupling,” and endless debates between the so-called hawks and doves in Washington. There’s a lot to unpack. The truth is, most Americans are burnt out. After years of rising prices, supply chain chaos, and political talk about tariffs and trade wars, people are tired of trying to figure out who’s right, who’s bluffing, and who’s actually working for them. They hear about new restrictions on chips, debates over TikTok, or tariffs on Chinese steel — but they don’t always see how any of it helps put food on the table or keeps the country safe.

Here’s the reality: for years, Washington and Wall Street were divided into two camps. The “China doves” believed that trade, investment, and partnership would bring peace—that if we did business together, China would grow more open and the world would grow more stable. The “China hawks”, on the other hand, warned that the Chinese Communist Party was using that same economic engagement to build leverage, dominate industry, and prepare for confrontation.

The tariffs you’ve heard about—the ones that started during the Trump administration and carried through in various forms—were part of that battle. They weren’t just about steel, aluminum, or semiconductors. They were about whether America would keep surrendering its manufacturing and shipbuilding capacity to a regime that has made no secret of its ambitions in the Pacific.

Most Americans didn’t pick a side. They were too busy working, paying taxes, and hoping someone in Washington would finally get it right. But the truth is, both parties let this happen. We were told that engagement meant peace—when in reality, it built dependency. And now, the same country we helped enrich is threatening our allies, our trade routes, and our future.

That’s why voices like Shyam Sankar’s matter. Over the past week, the Palantir CTO and Hudson Institute trustee laid out a hard truth that America can no longer ignore. In his essay “Why the China Doves Are Wrong,” he calls out a generation of business and technology leaders who misread Beijing’s intentions. These so-called “doves” believed engagement and profit could buy peace. They were wrong.

Sankar singles out Nvidia’s CEO, Jensen Huang, who recently said the future “doesn’t have to be all us or them; it could be us and them.” Sankar’s answer is clear: the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t believe that. Its rise depends on America’s decline—and our own money, technology, and industrial retreat helped make that possible.

He’s right. For decades, U.S. capital and know-how flowed into China, building the very industrial and military capacity that now threatens the free world. America’s overreliance on Chinese supply chains—from semiconductors to shipyards—has turned interdependence into a weapon aimed back at us.

Rebuilding our domestic base—our factories, shipyards, and maritime strength—isn’t nostalgia. It’s national security. Sankar’s warning echoes what many of us have been saying for years: hard power and industrial resilience are the foundation of peace.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we believe this isn’t just a policy debate. It’s a call to every citizen. This moment demands that Americans—not just policymakers—take responsibility, stand together, and act before it’s too late.

The Tide Is Turning

For years, Americans for a Stronger Navy has been saying what Shyam Sankar just put into print: we didn’t lose ground to China overnight—it happened one contract, one shipment, one investment at a time. When someone from inside Silicon Valley finally says it out loud, it means the conversation is shifting.

This isn’t about pointing fingers. It’s about facing facts. The same innovation hubs that built the digital future also hollowed out America’s industrial core. And now, even the insiders see it: the CCP isn’t looking for balance—it’s looking for dominance. Sankar’s words confirm what we’ve been warning all along.

Sankar didn’t pull punches. He wrote:

“The U.S. is partially to blame for turning China into a juggernaut. American companies have invested vast sums over decades to build China’s industrial base. … Chinese military contractors securitize weapons contracts in global capital markets, meaning that American pension funds and 401(k) investors have financed missiles aimed at U.S. ships.”

That’s the uncomfortable truth. We financed the very threat we now face. While many Americans were working hard and trusting their savings to grow, their own retirement dollars were indirectly funding China’s military expansion.

This isn’t a partisan issue or a Wall Street issue—it’s an American issue. And fixing it means facing it head-on.

Call to Silicon Valley and the Financial Sector

If there’s one thing Americans know how to do, it’s rebuild. We did it after the Great Depression, after World War II, and after every storm that’s hit this country. But this time, the rebuilding must start with those who helped hollow out the core—our own financial and tech elites.

Silicon Valley didn’t mean to weaken America. Wall Street didn’t set out to fund our rivals. But good intentions don’t excuse bad outcomes. The truth is, while innovators were chasing the next big breakthrough, and investors were chasing the next big return, our shipyards rusted, our supply chains moved offshore, and our industrial base became dependent on the very system now aligned against us.

That’s why this open letter isn’t just a warning—it’s an invitation. We need the same creativity, drive, and innovation that built the digital world to help rebuild the physical one. The next frontier isn’t in code; it’s in steel, in sensors, in shipyards, and in the men and women who keep the seas open and the nation free.

We’re calling on America’s tech and finance leaders to put their talent and capital back to work here at home—where it matters most. Invest in shipbuilding. Partner with maritime innovators. Reimagine logistics, automation, and infrastructure. Help America regain the ability to build, move, and defend.

Because the same companies that helped wire the world now have a moral obligation to help secure it. And if we do this right, we won’t just restore our strength—we’ll rebuild trust between Main Street, Wall Street, and the American people.

Closing: The Hard Truth and the Hope

The American people have every right to feel weary. We’ve been told for decades that global integration would make the world safer, that cheap goods would make us richer, and that innovation alone would keep us ahead. But somewhere along the way, we lost sight of something simple and sacred—the idea that America must be able to stand on her own.

Shyam Sankar reminded us that while our leaders talked about partnership, the Chinese Communist Party was planning for dominance. And he’s right—we built part of that machine. But now we have a chance to build something better: a stronger, more united, and more self-reliant America.

That’s why this isn’t just a letter to policymakers—it’s a letter to all of us. To the shipbuilder and the software engineer. To the machinist and the venture capitalist. To every citizen whose pension, paycheck, or passion helped shape this nation. The future of American power depends on our willingness to face what’s broken and fix it together.

Rebuilding our shipyards and restoring our maritime strength isn’t about preparing for war—it’s about securing peace. It’s about ensuring that no foreign power can hold our economy, our sailors, or our future hostage. It’s about remembering that deterrence isn’t aggression—it’s readiness.

So yes, Americans are tired. We’ve been misled, overextended, and divided. But fatigue is not failure—it’s a signal. A signal that it’s time to get serious, to get focused, and to get back to work.

That’s what Americans for a Stronger Navy stands for—peace through strength, transparency through accountability, and unity through shared responsibility. Together, we can rebuild the strength that keeps us free.

Let’s roll.

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An Open Letter to War on the Rocks: Protecting Supply Chains Starts with a Stronger Navy

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

To the Editor and Mr. Jesse Humpal,

Your recent commentary, “Supply Chains Are Critical Infrastructure. It’s Time U.S. Policy Caught Up,” correctly identifies supply chains as battlefields targeted by America’s rivals. But while you focus on new legislation and bureaucratic reforms, the real lesson of Maersk, Colonial Pipeline, and Nord Stream is not just a lack of resilience—it’s that corporate offshoring created a moral hazard. For decades, profits were privatized while risks were socialized. Now taxpayers are being asked to underwrite the fallout.

The True Cost of Externalized Risk
Maersk, Colonial Pipeline, and Nord Stream all exposed the same vulnerability: companies prioritized efficiency and profit over redundancy and security. When their fragility became a national crisis, it was the government—and by extension, the American taxpayer—that had to absorb the cost. Legislation like the CHIPS Act or a pharmaceutical reserve may help, but these measures are ultimately subsidies for corporate strategic failures.

The Navy as a Necessary Public Good
The U.S. government should not exist to de-risk private balance sheets. Its mission is to deter adversaries. And only the U.S. Navy has the reach, capability, and mandate to secure the sea lanes, ports, and subsea infrastructure that underpin 90 percent of global trade.

  • The inherent conflict of interest: CEOs answer to shareholders, not to national security.
  • The Navy as the ultimate hedge: no private firm will pay to safeguard global commerce; that burden falls on the fleet.
  • Deterrence through capability: a dominant Navy ensures freedom of navigation, secures subsea lifelines, and guarantees the supply lines needed for both commerce and force projection.

Congress Must Do More
Congress should pass the Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act, but it must not mistake legislation for deterrence. Protecting the arteries of our economy requires a stronger, larger, and better-resourced Navy. Anything less is subsidizing failure.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our mission is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

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250 Years of Standing Watch: A Destroyer Sailor’s Take on Why the Philippines Partnership Defines Our Future

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Somewhere in the South China Sea right now, a Filipino coast guard crew is preparing to head back to Second Thomas Shoal. They know what’s waiting—Chinese vessels that will shadow them, harass them, maybe hit them with water cannons or attempt to ram their boats.

They’re going anyway. They’re bringing supplies to their troops stationed on a rusting ship grounded on a reef that lies well within Philippine waters, recognized under international law.

They’re going because some things are worth standing up for. Because sovereignty matters. Because the rule of law at sea isn’t optional.

As the United States Navy marks its 250th anniversary, there’s no better example of why we exist than the U.S.–Philippine partnership—complicated, hard-won, and stronger than ever.

The Long Road to Partnership

Our relationship with the Philippines began painfully. After defeating Spain in 1898, America annexed the Philippines. Filipinos who had fought for independence resisted fiercely. The Philippine–American War was brutal—thousands of U.S. service members killed, tens of thousands of Filipino combatants lost, and many more civilians dead.

That legacy still shapes Filipino attitudes toward foreign military presence. Their wariness isn’t ingratitude—it’s rooted in history.

But World War II forged a different bond. Filipino and American forces fought side by side at Bataan and Corregidor. An estimated one million Filipino civilians died during the occupation. General MacArthur’s promise—“I shall return”— and the liberation that followed forged bonds in blood that endure.

After independence in 1946, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base became crown jewels of U.S. power in the Pacific. During Vietnam, Subic Bay handled over 200 ship visits a month. These bases were economic engines but also symbols of resentment. By 1992, rising nationalism and environmental damage forced the U.S. military to leave.

For two decades, the alliance drifted. Then China changed the equation.

What Brought Us Back

Beijing’s growing assertiveness—seizing Scarborough Shoal in 2012, building militarized artificial islands, and harassing Filipino fishermen—forced Manila to turn again to Washington.

The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) provided rotational access to Philippine bases without creating new U.S. installations—a distinction that matters for Filipino sovereignty. By 2023, the Philippines had opened nine EDCA sites, facing both Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Today, U.S. and Philippine forces conduct more than 500 joint activities each year. The Balikatan exercises now involve 14,000 troops in full-scale scenarios. New U.S. funding—$500 million in 2024—underscores how central this partnership has become.

The Risks We Should Acknowledge

No alliance is without risks.

The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty could pull the U.S. into conflict over reefs or shoals. Americans could find themselves at war in disputes they barely understand.

Some argue we should fix our own maintenance backlogs and shipbuilding delays before investing abroad. Others warn our expanded presence could accelerate Chinese militarization instead of deterring it. And Philippine politics—sometimes turbulent—carry reputational risk for the U.S.

These are real concerns. But the alternative—a South China Sea dominated by Beijing, where international law collapses and small democracies are swallowed by larger neighbors—is far more dangerous.

The Bigger Picture: China’s Campaign

The Philippines is not the issue—it’s the line in the sand. Incidents at Second Thomas Shoal are part of a systematic campaign of Chinese aggression.

  • Harassment of U.S. forces: Military lasers aimed at U.S. aircraft, fighters buzzing within feet of American planes, warships cutting across our destroyers.
  • Rapid naval buildup: The PLA Navy is on track to field over 395 ships by 2025—outnumbering our Navy in its own region.
  • Encirclement of Taiwan: Beijing rehearses blockades and missile strikes, preparing to coerce neighbors and challenge U.S. access.
  • Cyber warfare: Groups like Volt Typhoon have penetrated U.S. power grids, water systems, and telecom networks. These intrusions aren’t hypothetical—they’re pre-positioning for conflict.
  • Disinformation and espionage: From spy balloons to propaganda campaigns, Beijing is shaping the information battlefield.

The message is clear: this is not about a shoal, it’s about the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

Why Americans Should Care

  • Freedom of Navigation: Nearly a third of global trade flows through the South China Sea. If Beijing can dictate access there, every sea lane becomes vulnerable.
  • Economic Security: This isn’t just about faraway reefs. Those sea lanes carry the fuel that powers your car, the medicine in your cabinet, and the goods that stock your shelves. During COVID, Americans got a hard lesson in what happens when supply chains break—higher prices, empty shelves, and uncertainty.

If China controls those routes, disruption won’t be temporary. It would mean sustained leverage over the American economy: higher grocery and gas prices, layoffs in U.S. factories, and rising costs on everything from mortgages to credit cards.

Control of the South China Sea isn’t an abstract problem overseas. It’s leverage over the American economy—and your family’s budget.

  • Alliance Credibility: Our 1951 treaty with Manila sends a message to allies everywhere—do U.S. commitments mean anything?
  • Democratic Solidarity: Manila is modernizing, partnering with Japan and Australia, and standing up to pressure. Supporting them means supporting a network of democracies.

The Choice Ahead

For 250 years, the United States Navy has defended freedom of the seas. At its best, it has enabled smaller nations to prosper without massive militaries of their own.

Today, Filipino coast guard crews at Second Thomas Shoal embody the courage and loyalty of a steadfast ally. They aren’t backing down, even when outnumbered.

The question is whether America will do the same.

As we celebrate our Navy’s 250th anniversary, we face a choice:
Do we stand with democracies under pressure?
Do we defend international law at sea?
Do we maintain a Navy strong enough to prevent wars rather than fight them?

I know my answer. It’s why I write. It’s why Americans for a Stronger Navy exists. Because a strong Navy is what allows the world to prosper under the rule of law—not the rule of the biggest bully.

Fair winds and following seas.

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While We Fight Each Other at Home, China Prepares — And Time Is Running Out

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

China set 2027 as their military readiness target – that’s 18 months away. Let me tell you something Americans need to hear, even if it makes you uncomfortable: China is laughing out loud and I can hear it from here, and they’re squeezing harder every day.

I’m not being dramatic. I’m being honest. As a former Navy sailor who spent his civilian career in telecom and web technologies, I understand both the military realities and the technological dependencies that have put us in this position. After two years of research—cross-checking military testimony, intelligence reports, and independent defense analyses—I can tell you we’re running out of time to fix this mess.

The Brutal Truth About 2027

China has set a goal to be militarily ready for war with the United States by 2027. That’s not some distant threat—that’s 18 months away. While we’ve been arguing about what he said and she said etc, they’ve been building the world’s largest navy and positioning themselves to strangle us economically, electronically and militarily.

Here’s what keeps me up at night: they don’t need to sink our ships to defeat us. They can just stop selling us the parts to build new ones.

How China is putting on the squeeze

They Control What We Need to Fight
Rare earth minerals for our missile guidance systems? China controls 80% of global processing.

Semiconductors for our weapons platforms? We outsourced that to Asia decades ago.

Critical components for naval systems? Good luck building ships without Chinese suppliers.

They Own Our Information Flow

TikTok shapes what our kids think about America and China

They manufacture the phones and devices we use to communicate

Their algorithms determine what information Americans see about military threats

They Hold Our Economy Hostage

Wall Street pension funds are invested in Chinese markets

Silicon Valley’s revenue depends on Chinese manufacturing and consumers
 Our entire supply chain runs through Chinese factories

The Kicker? The same Silicon Valley companies that handed China our technological advantages now control how Americans get information. Try posting about Chinese military threats on Facebook—watch your reach get throttled. Discuss naval readiness on social media—suddenly you’re “violating community standards.”

They don’t just have us by the blank—they’re controlling the conversation about it.

Don’t Take My Word For It — Listen to the Experts

Over the past 24 months, Americans for a Stronger Navy has been mapping a story few citizens have ever been shown: how China’s campaign against the United States unfolded, who knew what and when, and what it will take to pull back from the brink. We didn’t start with opinions — we started with evidence. Here’s what the experts have been saying for years, and how their warnings fit together.

Strategic Intent and Military Buildup

Admiral James Lyons Jr., former commander of the Pacific Fleet, went on Fox News in 2013 and said what few in Washington wanted to hear: “We’re in our second Cold War with another communist totalitarian regime.” He warned that China has “built the navy specifically to go against the United States Navy” and that their anti-ship ballistic missiles are “not geared to go against the Bangladesh navy.” When a fleet commander speaks that bluntly on national television, that’s not politics — that’s professional judgment.

Brigadier General Douglas P. Wickert has shown how far that judgment has proven correct. In the Gobi Desert, China has built full-scale mock-ups of Taiwan’s Taichung International Airport and a “one-for-one silhouette of the Ford-class aircraft carrier” for target practice. They are not hiding their intentions. They are practicing to sink our ships and invade our allies.

The scale of China’s buildup is staggering: “They have 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States in terms of shipyard infrastructure and potential output.. “Just one shipyard in China last year alone, in 2024, built more tonnage of ships than the U.S. did since the end of World War II.” One shipyard outproduced our entire nation’s post-WWII shipbuilding in a single year.

👉 Subscribe and Follow Along
This is just Part 1 of a three-part series. In Part 2: Political Warfare and the Silent Invasion, I’ll break down how China’s campaign has already reached into our own institutions — through espionage, influence operations, and economic coercion.

Key Takeaway: The fight isn’t just “over there.” It’s already here, shaping what Americans see, hear, and believe.

Don’t miss it — subscribe and follow the series at StrongerNavy.org.