Author: Robert Luster

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The World’s Oil. One Navy Protects It. Who Else Is Paying?

“We strongly encourage other nations whose economies depend on the strait far more than ours to come and help us.”

Those are President Trump’s words. Not a think tank analyst. Not a naval advocacy group. The President of the United States, standing in the White House, publicly demanding that the nations who benefit most from American naval protection start paying their share.

He’s right. And there’s already a legal framework to make it happen.

The Strongly Worded Letter

On March 19, 2026, twenty nations issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Britain. France. Germany. Japan. South Korea. Canada. Twenty signatures. Strong language. Zero ships.

The statement expressed “readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage.” France and Germany were more direct — any coalition would only form after a ceasefire. The German chancellor said he would only join a mission with an international legal mandate, and only after the fighting stopped.

Meanwhile, American sailors — some at sea more than 250 days — are doing it now.

This is not a new pattern. It is the defining pattern of post-Cold War burden-sharing. Allies sign statements. America sends ships. The bill goes to the American taxpayer.

What’s Actually at Stake

The Strait of Hormuz is not a regional waterway. It is the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. Roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes through it daily. Since Iran’s effective closure began on February 28, tanker traffic has dropped by approximately 70 percent. Over 150 ships anchored outside the strait rather than risk transit. Oil crossed $100 a barrel.

Then Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility — the world’s largest. QatarEnergy reported extensive damage. Their CEO said repairs would take three to five years. This is not a temporary disruption. The economic consequences will be measured in years, not weeks.

Who depends on that oil?

China imports approximately 11 million barrels per day through Gulf sea lanes secured by the U.S. Navy. India imports 5 million. Japan 3 million. South Korea 3 million. Europe 3 million. Japan gets 95 percent of its crude oil from the Gulf. South Korea is similarly dependent.

One navy keeps it flowing. Ours.

The Precedent Already Exists

This is not uncharted territory. The beneficiary-pays principle has been established twice in living memory.

In 1987, Kuwait paid the United States Navy to escort their tankers through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq tanker war. Operation Earnest Will established a clear precedent: nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of their commercial interests contribute to the cost of that protection.

In 1991, Japan paid $13 billion toward Operation Desert Storm. Japan did not send combat troops. Japan wrote a check. The Special Measures Agreement made the burden-sharing arrangement formal and documented.

The precedent exists. What is missing is a permanent, mandatory mechanism.

The Gap in the Framework

Every crisis produces a new round of negotiations, statements, and voluntary contributions — or the lack thereof. The 1987 model worked because Kuwait had a direct and immediate interest in the outcome. The 1991 model worked because Japan faced intense diplomatic pressure and the threat of real consequences.

Neither model is durable. Neither model is predictable. Neither model builds the naval industrial base that sustained forward presence requires.

The current Hormuz crisis will eventually resolve. The Iranian threat will recede, or be defeated, or be negotiated away. And when it does, the allied nations who signed that joint statement will declare victory, go home, and resume importing Gulf oil on America’s dime.

Until the next crisis. When the cycle repeats.

The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

Americans for a Stronger Navy has proposed the Gulf Maritime Protection and Burden Sharing Act — the Gulf Act — as a permanent legislative solution to a permanent structural problem.

The Gulf Act establishes a mandatory burden-sharing mechanism requiring nations that benefit from U.S. naval protection of Gulf sea lanes to contribute to the cost of that protection. It is grounded in the 1987 Earnest Will precedent and the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Special Measures model. It codifies what has previously been left to ad hoc diplomacy and presidential pressure.

The core principle is straightforward: if you benefit, you contribute.

This is not isolationism. It is not a withdrawal from global leadership. It is the application of a basic fairness principle that the American people already understand instinctively. You don’t get to import millions of barrels of oil through a strait secured by American sailors — some of whom haven’t seen their families in eight months — and sign a statement saying you’ll help out after the shooting stops.

The Window Is Now

President Trump has made burden-sharing a front-page issue. The Hormuz crisis has made the stakes visible to every American who has filled a gas tank in the last month. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is examining the structural questions underlying American naval power.

This is the moment to move from principle to legislation.

The strongly worded letter had twenty signatories. The Gulf Act needs one vote.

Learn more at StrongerNavyDotOrg.

References

[1] Axios, “Seven U.S. allies back potential Strait of Hormuz coalition,” March 19, 2026. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/19/strait-hormuz-coalition-allies-statement-uk

[2] Wikipedia, “2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis,” accessed March 24, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis

[3] Al Jazeera, “European nations, Japan to join ‘appropriate efforts’ to open Hormuz Strait,” March 19, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/19/european-nations-japan-to-join-appropriate-efforts-to-open-hormuz-strait

[4] Naval News, “The challenges of securing Hormuz as 6 nations issue joint statement,” March 2026. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/the-challenges-of-securing-hormuz-as-6-nations-issue-joint-statement/

[5] GOV.UK, “Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz,” March 19, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-kingdom-france-germany-italy-the-netherlands-and-japan-on-the-strait-of-hormuz-19-march-2026

[6] Operation Earnest Will / Special Measures Agreement, 1987. Historical record.

[7] Desert Shield/Desert Storm burden-sharing agreements, Japan Special Measures, 1991. Historical record.

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The Five-Day Reprieve: Fleet Strain and Diplomatic High-Stakes in the Gulf


1. The “Five-Day Reprieve”: Trump Postpones Strikes
In a major de-escalation move today, President Donald Trump announced a five-day extension on his deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Citing “very good and productive” conversations involving intermediaries, the President has instructed the Department of War to postpone planned strikes on Iranian power plants and civilian energy infrastructure.

* The Market Reaction: Global oil prices dropped nearly 10% following the announcement as markets reacted to the potential for a “total resolution” of hostilities.
* The Catch: The President noted that the pause is “subject to the success” of ongoing meetings throughout the week.

2. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Sabotage Investigation
The USS Gerald R. Ford arrived at Souda Bay, Crete, today for emergency repairs. However, the focus has shifted from a simple fire to a formal criminal inquiry.
* The Investigation: Investigators are formally examining whether the 30-hour laundry room fire on March 12 was an act of internal sabotage. One theory suggests industrial dryers were intentionally overloaded to trigger the blaze.
* Crew Impact: The fire destroyed the ship’s laundry capability and displaced over 600 sailors from their berths. To provide relief, the Navy successfully airlifted 1,000 mattresses from the future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79).

3. Long-Range Escalation: Diego Garcia Targeted
Over the weekend (March 21), Iran demonstrated a previously unrevealed long-range capability by firing two ballistic missiles at the joint U.S.-U.K. base at Diego Garcia.
* The Defense: The strike covered a distance of approximately 2,500 miles (4,000 km), double Iran’s previously claimed 2,000 km limit. One missile failed mid-flight, and the second was successfully intercepted by a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer.
* Significance: This marks Iran’s first operational use of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), confirming they can now reach high-value U.S. logistics hubs far outside the Middle East.

4. “Lightning Carrier” Arrival: USS Tripoli (LHA 7)
The amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are expected to take up station in the North Arabian Sea within the next 24 hours.
* The Mission: Carrying over 2,200 Marines and F-35B stealth fighters, the Tripoli provides a flexible “raid” capability. Despite the diplomatic pause, this force is positioned to forcefully reopen the Strait or conduct maritime interdictions if negotiations fail.

5. Shipbuilding & Fleet Renewal
* USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124): The Navy’s newest Arleigh Burke-class destroyer arrived at its homeport in Norfolk on March 20. It is officially scheduled for commissioning on April 11, 2026.
* Budget Boost: Congress has finalized a $27.2 billion shipbuilding budget for FY2026—a $6.5 billion increase over initial requests—to fund 17 new ships, including a Columbia-class ballistic missile sub and two Virginia-class attack subs.

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The Gulf Act: If You Benefit, You Contribute

The Navy needs money. Taxpayers are tapped out. So where does the funding come from?

That is not a rhetorical question. It is the defining challenge of American naval policy in 2026. The fleet is shrinking. Shipyards are strained. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year. And the American taxpayer — already carrying an unsustainable fiscal burden — cannot be the answer to every problem.

But there is an answer. It just requires asking who else benefits from American naval power — and whether they are paying their share.

The United States Navy keeps the Persian Gulf open. Every tanker that transits the Strait of Hormuz does so because American sailors, American ships, and American taxpayers back the deterrent that makes it possible.

Japan imports it. South Korea imports it. Germany imports it. The economic engines of our closest allies run on Gulf-sourced petroleum — secured by a Navy they do not fund.

That is not an alliance. That is a subsidy.

We’ve Seen This Before

This is not a new problem. In 1987, Iran began attacking tankers in the Persian Gulf. The Reagan administration launched Operation Earnest Will — the largest naval convoy operation since World War II — reflagging Kuwaiti tankers as American vessels and providing direct Navy escort through waters Japan depended on for survival.

Congress noticed. If the U.S. Navy was protecting Japan’s oil supply, Japan should help pay for it. The pressure produced the first formal Special Measures Agreement in 1987, requiring Japan to contribute to the cost of U.S. forces providing that protection. The principle was established: beneficiaries of U.S. naval protection should contribute to it.

That agreement has been renewed and expanded ever since. The precedent has held for nearly four decades.

The Gap Has Grown

What was true in 1987 is more true today. Gulf oil revenues exceed $350 billion annually. The nations collecting that revenue — and the allies consuming it — benefit from sea lanes the U.S. Navy patrols at a cost of billions per year.

The Navy keeps the sea lanes open. The beneficiaries collect the profits.

Meanwhile, the Navy that provides this service is smaller, older, and more strained than at any point in recent memory. Shipyards are at capacity. The fleet is shrinking. The gap between what the Navy is asked to do and what it has the resources to do grows wider every year.

Allies reliant on Gulf energy are not being asked to share that burden in proportion to their dependence on it.

The Gulf Act: Applying an Established Principle

The Gulf Act is the logical extension of the 1987 burden-sharing framework to the present day. The concept is straightforward: nations that depend on Gulf energy security — and the sea lane access that makes it possible — should contribute meaningfully to the naval forces that provide it.

This is not a radical idea. It is the application of a 35-year-old precedent to a threat environment that has grown more complex, not less.

The mechanisms can take multiple forms — direct contributions to naval operations, minesweeper deployments, escort ship commitments, or financial contributions to a dedicated naval modernization account. The form matters less than the principle: if you benefit, you contribute.

A Note on Why We’re There

Some will argue that the United States has multiple reasons for maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf — and they are right. Security commitments to allies in the region, Iranian nuclear ambitions, freedom of navigation as a global principle, and counterterrorism interests all play a role. The Gulf Act does not dispute any of that.

But those reasons are a separate question from this one: who should pay for the benefit they receive?

The two questions are separable. In 1987, the U.S. had multiple reasons for being in the Gulf too — and Congress still established that Japan, as the primary beneficiary of tanker protection, should contribute to its cost. The Gulf Act asks the same narrow, defensible question: if your economy depends on sea lanes the U.S. Navy keeps open, what is your fair share of that bill?

This is not about relitigating American strategy. It is about making sure the nations that benefit most are not free-riding on the nations that bear the cost.

The SEAS Act Connection

Regular readers will recognize the parallel. The Strategic SEAS Act applies the same beneficiary-pays doctrine to U.S. corporations with significant China operations — companies that helped build the industrial base now threatening American naval superiority should help fund the response.

The Gulf Act and the SEAS Act are two applications of the same governing principle:

Those who extract value from American naval protection should share the cost of providing it.

Whether the beneficiary is an allied nation importing Gulf oil or a Fortune 500 company running supply chains through Chinese ports, the logic does not change.

The Cost of Doing Nothing

If the burden-sharing argument sounds abstract, consider what is happening right now in the Persian Gulf.

According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate cited by Defense One on March 12, 2026, the first 100 hours of Operation Epic Fury cost approximately $3.7 billion — roughly $891 million per day. Air defense munitions costs alone ranged from $1.2 billion to $3.7 billion. [2]

The cost asymmetry is stark. Iran’s Shahed drones cost around $30,000 each. The missiles used to shoot them down — AIM-120s at $1 million, PAC-3 interceptors at $4 million — cost orders of magnitude more. As one defense analyst put it: every cheap drone that forces the U.S. to fire an expensive interceptor is a win for Iran. [2]

Six U.S. soldiers were killed at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, when an Iranian drone evaded air defenses. Three F-15E Strike Eagles were lost in a friendly fire incident over Kuwait. [2]

Meanwhile, the nations whose energy supplies depend on the Gulf’s sea lanes — Japan, South Korea, Germany — are not bearing these costs. The American taxpayer is.

That is the externality the Gulf Act is designed to correct.

The Question Sadler Asked

Captain Brent Sadler of the Heritage Foundation recently raised this directly in the context of a potential Gulf convoy mission, asking whether it was time for allies dependent on Gulf petroleum to contribute escort ships and minesweepers. [1]

The answer is yes. It has always been yes. The 1987 precedent proved it was politically achievable. The current fiscal and force structure reality — and the live situation unfolding today in the Strait of Hormuz — makes it urgent.

The Navy cannot be the world’s free security service while simultaneously being asked to compete with a Chinese fleet building ships at a rate that dwarfs American production. Something has to give — or someone else has to contribute.

What Comes Next

Americans for a Stronger Navy will be developing the Gulf Act framework in the coming months, including burden-sharing models, historical precedents, and legislative pathways. This post is the opening argument.

If you agree that nations benefiting from American naval protection should help fund it, share this post. The conversation Sadler started on X deserves a longer answer than a tweet.

The sea lanes don’t protect themselves.

— Bill Cullifer, Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

References

[1] Brent D. Sadler (@brentdsadler), X (formerly Twitter), March 11, 2026. Captain Sadler serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

[2] Thomas Novelly, “Fighter jets are downing Iranian drones—a dangerous, expensive mission,” Defense One, March 12, 2026. Cost figures sourced from CSIS estimate and Forecast International report cited therein.

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The Old Guard Departs, The New Tech Arrives:

USS Avenger
The Mine countermeasure ship USS Avenger (MCM 1) “Old Gaurd” heads out for decommision.

The New Guard: Independence-class LCS as a ‘Mother Ship’

The transition to the Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) represents a fundamental shift in naval doctrine. As seen in recent operations, vessels like the USS Canberra (LCS 30) utilize their massive mission bays and stern launch capabilities to act as a command hub for uncrewed systems.

Independence Class LCSIndependence-class LCS deploying surface assets from the mission bay.

Technical Deep Dive: The AN/AQS-20 Sonar

Central to the new MCM Mission Package is the AN/AQS-20 sonar set. Unlike the legacy hull-mounted systems on the Avenger ships, this towed array uses five separate sonar arrays to detect and classify mines in a single pass, providing 3D bottom mapping with high-resolution clarity.

AN/AQS-20 SonarThe AN/AQS-20 sonar being prepared for deployment.

A Strategic Evolution

By moving the primary sensors and sweep systems off the manned ship and onto uncrewed platforms, the Navy significantly reduces the risk to sailors. These autonomous systems can operate closer to the threat while the “Mother Ship” remains at a safe standoff distance, ensuring our sea lanes remain open through advanced technology rather than wooden hulls.

Technical Spotlight: AN/AQS-20C Specifications

  • Sensors: 5 Sonars (including Synthetic Aperture) + Laser Imaging
  • Range: Full water column (Seafloor to Surface) in one pass
  • Intelligence: Automated Target Recognition (ATR)
  • Platforms: Independence-class LCS / CUSV / MH-60S Helicopter
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When Navigation Becomes a Weapon

Strength at sea now includes protecting the invisible systems that guide global trade.

Electronic warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield. In the days following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, maritime intelligence firms reported that more than 1,100 ships operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz experienced GPS or AIS disruption. Vessels appeared inland on digital maps. Others showed strange circular patterns off the coasts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. Maritime officials described the risk level in the region as “critical.”

This is what modern conflict looks like.

Not just missiles. Not just drones.
Navigation. Commerce. Confidence.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important maritime chokepoints on Earth. Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil moves through that narrow passage. When positioning systems degrade in such a congested, militarized waterway, the risk of collision, grounding, or miscalculation rises sharply. Add aerial threats and naval maneuvering to the equation, and degraded navigation becomes a risk amplifier.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans will never sail through the Strait of Hormuz. But they will feel the effects if shipping slows, insurance premiums spike, or energy markets react to instability. Maritime security is economic security. The sea lanes quietly underpin global supply chains, energy flows, and financial stability. When GPS signals flicker in a strategic chokepoint, markets notice.

Electronic interference aimed at navigation systems is not just a military tactic. It directly impacts civilian shipping. Tankers hesitate. Routes change. Traffic patterns compress. The cost of uncertainty ripples outward. In a globally connected economy, those ripples eventually reach American households.

For years, we have warned that maritime chokepoints are soft underbellies in a fragile system. This latest episode underscores that warning. The battlespace now includes the invisible infrastructure of positioning, navigation, and timing.

Implications for the Navy

When commerce comes under electronic pressure, the U.S. Navy becomes the stabilizer. Escort missions, presence operations, surveillance, and deterrence all require ships, crews, logistics depth, and technological resilience. Strength at sea is not abstract. It is measured in hulls, readiness, training, and industrial capacity.

Yet we continue to fund our maritime industrial base through unstable, year-to-year appropriations cycles. We debate ship counts while the underlying architecture remains fragile. Predictable investment is not about expansion for its own sake. It is about reducing systemic risk.

Electronic warfare against commercial shipping highlights the need for redundancy. Redundancy in fleet capacity. Redundancy in basing and logistics. Redundancy in navigation technologies. If GPS can be degraded in one of the world’s most vital trade routes, resilience cannot be optional.

The Case for Predictable Maritime Investment

This moment should not trigger panic. It should prompt clarity.

America’s maritime security underwrites global commerce. Yet the economic beneficiaries of secure sea lanes are not structurally aligned with long-term investment in the maritime industrial base. That mismatch creates vulnerability.

The Strategic Economic Alignment for the Maritime Industrial Base Act, the SEAS Act, is about architecture, not urgency. It seeks to create stability and predictability in funding so that shipyards, suppliers, and maritime infrastructure can plan for the long term. It recognizes that maritime security is foundational economic infrastructure.

If navigation becomes a weapon, then resilience becomes a responsibility.

Strength is built on redundancy. Stability is built on predictability. The events in the Strait of Hormuz are a reminder that modern conflict increasingly targets the connective tissue of commerce. We can either respond episodically, or we can build a durable framework that matches the strategic environment.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we believe the American people must understand what is at stake. The Navy belongs to the nation. Its readiness, its resilience, and its industrial foundation require public awareness and engagement.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

As a former blue water sailor and founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I learned early that naval strength is not defined by speeches or strategies alone. It is defined by readiness—by ships that work, sailors who are trained, and shipyards that can sustain them.

Over the past two years, through Americans for a Stronger Navy and StrongerNavy.org, I have worked to better understand the forces shaping the future of our Navy. What I have discovered is both reassuring and sobering.

Reassuring because the Navy’s leadership clearly understands the changing threat environment. Sobering because serious professionals—inside and outside the Navy—are actively debating how best to prepare for it.

This series is designed to help Americans understand that debate.

A Navy in Transition

The United States Navy is undergoing one of its most significant strategic transitions since the end of the Cold War. For decades, our Navy operated in an environment where it could project power with relative freedom. That era is over.

China now operates the world’s largest navy by ship count and continues expanding its industrial capacity at a pace unmatched in modern times. Russia remains a capable undersea competitor. Meanwhile, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and directed-energy weapons are changing how naval warfare may be conducted in the decades ahead.

The Navy’s leadership recognizes this reality. They are adapting strategy, exploring new technologies, and rethinking how naval forces will operate in the future. But within that effort, there are important and healthy debates—and Americans deserve to understand them.

Different Perspectives, Shared Purpose

Some leaders emphasize the continued importance of traditional crewed ships—destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers—as the backbone of naval power. Others emphasize the growing role unmanned systems may play in extending reach and enhancing survivability. Still others focus on the industrial foundation that makes both possible: shipyards, maintenance infrastructure, and workforce capacity.

These are not disagreements about the mission. They are discussions about how best to ensure the Navy remains ready, effective, and capable in a changing world. What unites these perspectives is a shared recognition that readiness requires sustained national support.

Ships must be built. Shipyards must be modernized. Sailors must be trained. Infrastructure must be maintained. None of this happens automatically.

Why Industrial Capacity Matters

One of the most important lessons from this work is that naval power is built on industrial strength. Strategy determines what the Navy needs to do. Industrial capacity determines whether it can do it.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), our public and private shipyards, and the skilled workforce that supports them form the foundation of naval readiness. Without their ability to build, maintain, and modernize ships, even the best strategy cannot succeed.

This is not a criticism. It is simply reality—and it is why public understanding matters. Americans deserve to know how their Navy works, what challenges it faces, and what is required to sustain it for future generations.

From Understanding to Sustained Support: The Strategic SEAS Act

Understanding the challenge is the first step. Sustaining readiness over time requires structural solutions.

That is why Americans for a Stronger Navy developed the Strategic SEAS Act—a framework designed to provide predictable, sustained funding for shipbuilding capacity, shipyard modernization, workforce development, and allied maritime infrastructure. Its purpose is straightforward: to help ensure that the Navy and the maritime industrial base have the long-term support necessary to meet national security requirements.

The Strategic SEAS Act complements legislative efforts like the SHIPS Act by addressing a critical question: how to provide sustained, reliable funding to support the Navy’s long-term readiness. Readiness is not built in a year. It is built over decades.

Why This Matters Now

The decisions being made today—about ships, shipyards, technology, workforce, and sustained funding—will define America’s naval strength for the next generation. These decisions are being made now, in budget cycles and legislative sessions that most Americans never see.

Meanwhile, serious questions are being raised by experienced naval professionals, defense analysts, and members of Congress about whether America’s shipbuilding capacity and industrial base can support the strategy at the pace required. Those questions deserve honest, public answers.

This series is intended to provide that clarity—directly, responsibly, and in plain English.

The Questions This Series Will Address

Among them:

•  Are traditional ships like destroyers, submarines, and carriers still essential in the age of drones and autonomous systems?

•  Can unmanned systems truly enhance naval power—or are they being asked to do too much, too soon?

•  Is America’s shipbuilding and repair infrastructure strong enough to sustain the Navy the nation requires?

•  What role does Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) play in ensuring readiness—and what challenges does it face?

•  How does America’s shipbuilding capacity compare to China’s—and what does that mean strategically?

•  Can the Navy realistically surge its fleet when needed?

•  What role do Congress, industry, and the American people play in sustaining naval strength over time?

•  And most importantly: what must be done—practically, responsibly, and sustainably—to ensure the United States Navy remains ready to protect American interests for decades to come?

These are not political questions. They are national questions. And Americans deserve clear, honest answers.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects far more than military interests. It safeguards global commerce, deters conflict, reassures allies, and protects the economic system Americans depend on every day. When the Navy is ready, it helps preserve peace through strength. When industrial capacity declines, readiness becomes harder to sustain.

The decisions being made today will shape America’s naval strength for decades to come. Americans deserve to understand those decisions.

What This 8-Part Series Will Explore

In the weeks ahead, this series will examine why traditional naval ships remain essential, how unmanned systems are changing naval operations, the critical role of NAVSEA and America’s shipyards, the industrial and workforce foundation behind naval readiness, how China and other nations are approaching maritime power, how naval strength is sustained over time, and what must be done to ensure continued readiness.

This is not about choosing sides in a debate. It is about understanding the full picture—because an informed public is essential to sustaining a strong Navy.

Let’s get to work.

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The Carrier Irony: The Strongest Navy in the World — Worn Thin

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Introduction

Over the years, I’ve watched with pride as the United States Navy continues to answer the call — anywhere, anytime. We remain the most capable blue-water navy on earth. Our carriers project power globally. Our submarines dominate beneath the waves. Our sailors perform with professionalism and discipline that few nations can match.

But there’s a hard truth we need to confront as Americans.

We are running our fleet — and our sailors — very hard.

The USS Gerald R. Ford and the Bigger Pattern

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When the USS Gerald R. Ford deploys, it represents American industrial power, advanced engineering, and decades of naval aviation expertise. It is the most technologically advanced aircraft carrier ever built.

And yet, like so many ships before it, it has faced extended deployments, compressed maintenance cycles, and intense operational tempo.

This is not about one ship.

It’s about a pattern.

For more than two decades, global demand for U.S. naval presence has increased — while fleet size has not kept pace. The Navy today operates fewer ships than it did during much of the Cold War, yet it is tasked with deterring conflict in the Western Pacific, reassuring allies in Europe, maintaining stability in the Middle East, countering threats in the Red Sea, and responding to crises in the Caribbean and beyond.

The math is unforgiving.

The Carrier Debate — And the Irony

We often hear arguments that aircraft carriers are obsolete, too vulnerable, or relics of a past era.

Yet when tensions rise, when diplomacy tightens, when regional stability wavers — who gets called?

The carrier.

Because nothing else can:

• Deliver sustained airpower without relying on host nation permission
• Generate massive sortie rates from international waters
• Provide immediate, sovereign options to a president
• Signal deterrence visibly and credibly

Critics focus on vulnerability.
Decision-makers focus on options.

That is the carrier irony.

We debate their relevance in peacetime — and depend on them in crisis.

The Real Issue: Capacity, Not Capability

The U.S. Navy is still the strongest in the world.

But strength without depth creates strain.

Extended deployments affect more than headlines. They impact:

• Sailor fatigue and family stability
• Training cycles
• Shipyard scheduling
• Long-term readiness

When maintenance gets compressed, the effects don’t show up immediately. They show up later — in availability gaps, repair delays, and cascading readiness challenges across the fleet.

This is not alarmism.

It is operational reality.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans assume we have a massive Navy that can surge indefinitely.

They see a carrier sent to a region and feel reassured.

They do not see the maintenance backlogs, the stretched crews, or the industrial bottlenecks behind the scenes.

Sea power underwrites global commerce. Roughly 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. Energy flows, supply chains, and strategic chokepoints all depend on maritime stability.

When the Navy is stretched thin, that stability becomes more fragile.

This isn’t about war. It’s about deterrence, economic security, and preventing conflict before it starts.

The Path Forward

The answer is not to bash carriers.

The answer is not to overuse them either.

The answer is depth:

• More ships
• Stable deployment cycles
• Stronger shipbuilding capacity
• Investment in maintenance infrastructure
• Support for the sailors and families who carry the burden

America’s Navy belongs to the American people. And if we expect it to remain the strongest in the world, we must understand what it actually takes to sustain that strength.

We can be proud of our Navy.

But pride alone does not build ships.

Public understanding does.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Lockheed Martin’s Lamprey: The “Hitchhiking” Sub Drone That Steals Power to Fight



Lockheed Martin has officially pulled back the curtain on a revolutionary piece of naval technology: the Lamprey Multi-Mission Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (AUV).
While the world focuses on high-speed drones, Lockheed is looking at persistence and endurance. Inspired by the natural world, the Lamprey isn’t just a drone; it’s a parasite—in the best way possible.

The Remora Strategy: Hitching a Ride
Named after the fish known for latching onto larger marine animals, the Lamprey drone solves the “energy gap” in undersea warfare. Typically, a small drone wastes most of its battery life just traveling to its mission area.

The Lamprey changes the game

  • Passive Transit: It attaches to the hull of a friendly ship or submarine using suction or a mechanical docking system.
  • Energy Harvesting: Instead of draining its batteries, it uses small onboard turbines (hydrogenerators) to harvest energy from the water flowing past the host vessel.
  • Arrive Fully Charged: By the time the host ship reaches the objective, the Lamprey detaches with 100% battery, ready for combat.
    Modular Lethality: A 24-Cubic-Foot Payload
    The Lamprey isn’t just a sensor; it’s a modular “Swiss Army knife” for the Navy. Built with an open architecture and a 24-cubic-foot internal payload bay, it can be swapped for various missions without a major redesign:
  • Anti-Submarine Warfare: Carrying lightweight torpedoes.
  • Electronic Warfare: Deploying acoustic decoys and intercepting signals.
  • Intelligence Gathering: Using deployable sensor arrays.
  • Aerial Dominance: It can be fitted with up to three retractable twin-tube launchers to deploy aerial drones from beneath the waves.
    Distributed Warfare: The “Quiet” Threat
  • In a conflict, these drones are built for persistence. Multiple units can deploy at once, settle quietly on the seabed, and wait. They can sit silently for days or weeks, gathering data and relaying intelligence. When commanded, they shift from passive observers to active disruptors or strike platforms.
  • Status Check: Is Lamprey Mission-Ready?
    While the technology is groundbreaking, it is important to distinguish between “unveiled” and “fully operational.” Based on recent developments in February 2026, here is the ground truth:
  • Advanced Prototyping: Lockheed Martin developed the Lamprey using internal research and development (IRAD) funds. This means they built it on their own initiative to prove the concept before seeking a formal government contract.
  • Proven at Sea: The drone has already undergone successful sea trials, validating its autonomous maneuvering and “hitchhiking” energy-harvesting capabilities in real-world conditions.
  • The “Product on the Shelf”: Lockheed has effectively “handed the keys” to the U.S. Navy. It is a mature system ready for immediate adoption, though it has not yet been designated as an official “Program of Record” for mass production.

    The Lamprey addresses the biggest challenge in autonomous undersea systems: endurance. By turning friendly vessels into mobile charging stations, it trades raw speed for staying power.
    In a battle space where hiding matters more than sprinting, the Lamprey is the future—quiet, modular, and already in position before the fight begins.
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China’s Fishing Fleet Isn’t Just About Fish — It’s About Power

Over the past several years, hundreds — sometimes thousands — of Chinese fishing vessels have been observed assembling in concentrated groups across the South China Sea, the Western Pacific, and even far beyond Asia. At first glance, it looks like industrial fishing on a massive scale.

But this story isn’t really about fish.

It’s about state power, maritime control, and what happens when economic activity and national strategy blur at sea.

What’s Actually Happening

China operates the largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world, numbering in the thousands of vessels. Many of these ships operate far from China’s coast, often for months at a time, supported by at-sea logistics ships that refuel and resupply them.

Satellite imagery and maritime tracking data have repeatedly shown large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels assembling in coordinated formations, sometimes near disputed waters or critical sea lanes.

This isn’t random.

These fleets move, loiter, disperse, and regroup in ways that mirror organized maritime behavior, not independent commercial fishing.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans don’t think about fishing fleets as a national security issue — but they should.

  • These vessels strip global fish stocks, threatening food security for developing nations and destabilizing regional economies.
  • They operate in areas where the U.S. Navy and allied navies must already maintain freedom of navigation.
  • They complicate maritime awareness — overwhelming sensors, patrols, and coast guards simply by their sheer numbers.

When hundreds of ships show up in one place, they change the facts on the water without firing a shot.

That matters to global trade, stability, and ultimately American prosperity.

The Gray Zone at Sea

China’s fishing fleet often operates in what strategists call the “gray zone” — the space between peace and conflict.

These vessels are nominally civilian, but many:

  • Receive state subsidies
  • Share information with maritime authorities
  • Operate alongside coast guard and naval units
  • Assert presence in disputed waters without overt military force

This creates plausible deniability while advancing national objectives.

It’s influence without invasion.

Implications for the U.S. Navy

Every large-scale fleet operating overseas demands attention, monitoring, and resources.

That means:

  • More patrols
  • More intelligence collection
  • More strain on an already stretched Navy and Coast Guard
  • More coordination with allies who face the same challenge

The U.S. Navy isn’t just deterring warships anymore — it’s managing mass maritime pressure created by civilian fleets backed by state power.

This Isn’t About Hating China — It’s About Seeing Clearly

This isn’t anti-China rhetoric. It’s pro-reality.

If you ever doubted China’s long-term maritime intentions, the scale and coordination of these fishing fleets should give you pause. Nations don’t build and sustain fleets of this size accidentally. They do it because the sea matters — economically, strategically, and politically.

Ignoring that reality doesn’t make it go away.

What Comes Next

The real question isn’t whether China will continue expanding its maritime reach — it will.

The question is whether Americans understand:

  • Why the Navy matters beyond wartime
  • Why sea control protects everyday life
  • Why economic power and maritime power are inseparable

That understanding is what ultimately determines whether the U.S. can respond smartly, calmly, and effectively.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.
Let’s roll.

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The Critical Window: Why Decisions Made in 2026-2027 Will Determine America’s Naval Power in the 2030s


Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

There’s a concept every naval planner understands but few Americans realize – one that I’ve come to appreciate over time: the decisions we make today about shipbuilding, maintenance, and industrial capacity don’t affect today’s Navy – they determine what Navy we’ll have seven to ten years from now.

This creates what I call the Critical Window – a concept familiar to anyone who’s managed large-scale projects. It’s that narrow period when decisions made now lock in outcomes years down the line. For shipbuilding, budget decisions, industrial investments, and strategic commitments made in 2026-2027 will directly shape our naval capabilities in the 2030s.

After this window closes, the die is cast. The industrial base will be committed. The budgets will be locked in. The ships – or the absence of ships – will be determined by choices we’re making right now.

Why 2026-2027 Is The Critical Window

The mathematics of naval construction are unforgiving:

  • Attack submarines take 7-8 years from contract award to delivery. A Virginia-class submarine ordered in FY2027 enters the fleet in 2034-2035.
  • Surface combatants take 4-5 years to build. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer funded in FY2027 delivers in 2031-2032.
  • Shipyard expansions take 3-4 years to become operational. Capacity investments made in FY2027 start producing results in 2030-2031.
  • Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines require 7+ years and are consuming enormous portions of the shipbuilding budget through the end of this decade.

This isn’t abstract policy planning – it’s industrial reality. You cannot surge naval capability. You cannot speed up physics, metallurgy, or the skilled workforce required to build nuclear-powered warships.

Several factors converge to make 2026-2027 uniquely consequential:

  • The Big Beautiful Bill Timeline: The $150 billion defense investment passed in July 2025 is one-time funding available through 2029. By 2027, Congress must decide whether to sustain these investments with recurring appropriations or let them lapse.
  • The 2030s Capability Gap: Multiple studies project the Navy falling below required force structure in the early 2030s as older ships retire faster than new ones are built.
  • The China Pacing Challenge: China’s shipbuilding capacity far exceeds America’s. The gap between their naval growth and ours widens with each passing year we fail to accelerate production.
  • The Commission Opportunity: The National Commission on the Future of the Navy becomes operational in 2026. This represents a once-in-a-generation chance to reshape naval policy.

Looking Through The Binoculars: What We See In The 2030s

What you see depends entirely on decisions being made right now. If we maintain the current trajectory, the total battle force will decline by 2030, and the attack submarine fleet will reach minimum viable numbers by 2032. By 2035, China’s navy will be substantially larger, exploiting our constrained shipbuilding.

If we use the Critical Window wisely, shipyard expansions funded in 2026-2027 will come online by 2030. Accelerated production will begin delivering boats by 2032, and industrial base investments will enable us to match strategic requirements by 2035.

What The Critical Window Requires

Using this window effectively demands moving beyond one-time supplemental funding to sustained, recurring appropriations. The Big Beautiful Bill provided a down payment, but the FY2027 and FY2028 budgets must demonstrate a commitment to sustaining those investments. We also need acquisition reform to reduce the time from budget authorization to ship delivery and alternative funding mechanisms to supplement traditional appropriations.

From Experience: The Hollow Navy and The Reagan Response

I served during the 1970s hollow Navy – ships that couldn’t deploy and maintenance deferred. I also witnessed the Reagan administration’s response: a commitment to rebuild the Navy to 600 ships. That wasn’t just rhetoric – it was budget authority and political will sustained across multiple cycles. We face the same choice now. The 1980s rebuild succeeded because leaders recognized their Critical Window. We must do the same.

What You Can Do During The Critical Window

For veterans and advocates, understand that your voice matters most during the budget markup season. For policymakers, recognize that today’s choices have 10-year consequences. For concerned citizens, ask candidates about their plans for sustaining naval investment. Peace through strength requires backing rhetoric with budget authority.

The Bottom Line

The Critical Window of 2026-2027 is closing. We cannot change the physics of shipbuilding, but we can recognize this moment for what it is. The decisions made in the next 18 months will determine what Navy America has in the 2030s.

Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for naval transparency, readiness, and strategic policy development. Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

Follow the Commission: National Commission on the Future of the Navy

The Critical Window is now. The time to act is today.