Analysis Archives - Americans for a Stronger Navy

January 21, 2026January 21, 2026

Open Letter to PM Starmer: Security Gaps in the UK-Mauritius Chagos Agreement

Diego Garcia represents the cornerstone of American naval power in the Indian Ocean—a facility that enables critical operations from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The recently signed UK-Mauritius agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, while intended to resolve a long-standing legal dispute, introduces serious security vulnerabilities that could compromise this vital base. After extensive review of the agreement, parliamentary documents, and expert analysis, Americans for a Stronger Navy has drafted an open letter to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer outlining our concerns and requesting strengthening of security provisions before final ratification. We publish this letter in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized the Special Relationship between our nations.

Key Concerns Raised:

Chinese Influence Risk: Mauritius maintains extensive economic ties with China, creating potential vectors for Beijing to establish surveillance capabilities on islands adjacent to Diego Garcia. The agreement’s prohibitions on foreign military presence may not cover civilian-flagged intelligence operations.

Weakened Control Structure: The transformation from British sovereign territory to a complex lease arrangement (UK leasing from Mauritius, US operating through UK) introduces political and legal vulnerabilities. American naval operations now depend on the stability of agreements between three parties rather than operating on secure sovereign territory.

Insufficient Security Guarantees: The agreement lacks robust enforcement mechanisms to prevent hostile powers from accessing outer islands for monitoring or influence operations. Ambiguities in defining prohibited activities could be exploited by adversaries operating under civilian cover.

Political Uncertainty: Changes in Mauritian government leadership create long-term risks. The current government has already ordered an independent review, and future administrations spanning the 99-year lease period may face economic pressure from China to renegotiate or modify terms.

What We Request:

Explicit provisions prohibiting Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on outer islands with clear enforcement
Joint UK-US monitoring and patrol authority across the archipelago
Automatic termination clauses if security provisions are violated
U.S. participation as a treaty party or guarantor for direct legal standing
Enhanced parliamentary scrutiny before final ratification

The Bottom Line: Diego Garcia’s strategic value has never been higher as great power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific. While we respect the UK’s efforts to address the historical injustice to the Chagossian people, justice and security need not be mutually exclusive. We urge strengthening this agreement before ratification to ensure this critical base remains secure for generations to come.

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE KEIR STARMER MP
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Agreement

From: Americans for a Stronger Navy
January 21, 2026

Dear Prime Minister,

We write to you as fellow guardians of the free world, united by history, shared values, and an unbreakable commitment to democratic liberty. The Special Relationship between our nations has been forged in the crucible of two world wars, sustained through the Cold War, and renewed in our common struggle against terrorism and authoritarianism. It is precisely because of this deep bond that we feel compelled to address our serious concerns regarding the recently signed agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

This letter is written not in criticism, but in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized Anglo-American relations. We believe the current agreement, while well-intentioned, poses risks to our shared security interests that must be addressed before ratification becomes irreversible.

THE STAKES ARE HIGHER THAN EVER

Diego Garcia is not merely a military installation—it is the keystone of Western power projection in the Indian Ocean. From this small atoll, our nations have:

Defeated terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Iraq
Countered Iranian aggression and Houthi attacks on international shipping
Protected vital sea lanes carrying half the world’s containerized cargo
Maintained stability in a region increasingly contested by China’s expanding naval presence

Today, as China constructs military facilities across the South China Sea, as Russia threatens European security, and as Iran destabilizes the Middle East, the strategic value of Diego Garcia has never been greater. Yet at this critical juncture, the agreement with Mauritius introduces vulnerabilities that our adversaries will certainly seek to exploit.

OUR CONCERNS AS ALLIES

1. The Shadow of Chinese Influence

Mauritius, a small island nation, has become deeply economically dependent on China. Chinese investment pervades Mauritian infrastructure—ports, telecommunications, energy. This is not coincidence; it is the systematic implementation of Beijing’s strategy to gain leverage over nations along critical maritime routes.

We must ask: What guarantees exist that a future Mauritian government, facing economic pressure from Beijing, will not grant China “civilian” access to the outer islands? What prevents the establishment of “research stations,” “telecommunications facilities,” or “environmental monitoring posts” that serve as covers for signals intelligence operations?

The agreement’s language prohibiting foreign armed forces is insufficient. China has mastered the art of military operations under civilian guise. Islands merely miles from Diego Garcia could become surveillance platforms monitoring every ship, submarine, and aircraft movement—intelligence that would be instantly shared with Russia, Iran, and other adversaries.

2. From Sovereignty to Lease: A Dangerous Transformation

For decades, Diego Garcia operated on British sovereign territory. This provided legal certainty and operational security. Now, under the new arrangement, the United Kingdom must lease Diego Garcia from Mauritius at a cost of $136 million annually—and the United States operates at Diego Garcia under a further sublease arrangement with the UK.

This creates a cascading dependency. American naval operations now rest upon:

British adherence to the lease terms
Mauritian governments honoring their predecessors’ commitments
Both nations resisting external pressure to renegotiate or restrict operations

History teaches us that 99-year leases are not permanent. China’s 99-year lease of Hong Kong ended in humiliation for the West. We cannot allow Diego Garcia to follow the same path.

3. Political Instability and Long-Term Uncertainty

The current Mauritian government has already ordered an independent review of the agreement negotiated by its predecessor. Opposition parties criticize the deal. Future elections will bring new leaders with new priorities, new pressures, and potentially new patrons.

Over 99 years, Mauritius will see dozens of governments. Can we truly be confident that all of them will prioritize Western security interests over economic inducements from Beijing? The agreement provides insufficient mechanisms to prevent a future Mauritian government from effectively weaponizing the lease against Allied interests.

4. Legal and Historical Justice vs. Strategic Reality

We understand the moral arguments underlying this agreement. The forced removal of the Chagossians was a grave injustice that demands acknowledgment and remedy. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion and UN General Assembly resolutions created legal and political pressure.

But we must also recognize that international law is not self-executing and that advisory opinions do not carry binding force. The United Kingdom acted under the legitimate belief that resolving this dispute was necessary—yet in doing so, it may have exchanged one set of problems for far graver ones.

Justice for the Chagossians and security for the free world are not mutually exclusive. Better solutions existed—and may still exist—that address historical wrongs without compromising the strategic foundation of Indo-Pacific security.

WHAT WE ASK OF YOUR GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister, we do not ask the United Kingdom to repudiate this agreement outright. We recognize that your government has acted in good faith, seeking to resolve a complex legal and moral situation. What we ask is that, before final ratification, you consider strengthening the agreement to address the security vulnerabilities we have identified.

Specifically, we respectfully urge:

For Your Government:

Negotiate explicit provisions prohibiting any Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on the outer islands, with clear enforcement mechanisms
Establish joint UK-US monitoring and patrol of the archipelago with authority to prevent unauthorized activities
Include automatic termination clauses if Mauritius violates security provisions or grants access to adversary nations
Secure American participation as a treaty party or guarantor, giving the United States direct legal standing

For Parliament:

Conduct thorough scrutiny of the agreement’s security implications before ratification
Demand full transparency regarding payment terms and any side agreements with Mauritius
Require regular reporting to Parliament on compliance with security provisions

For the British People:

Recognize that Diego Garcia represents not just American interests, but British interests and the interests of the entire free world. This is not a matter of American imperialism—it is a matter of collective defense of the international order that has brought unprecedented prosperity and peace.

THE WAY FORWARD: PARTNERSHIP, NOT DIVISION

Some will say we are being alarmist. They will argue that Mauritius is a democracy, that China’s influence is exaggerated, that the 99-year lease provides sufficient security. We respectfully but firmly disagree.

In 1997, many believed Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” would endure. In the early 2000s, few imagined China would militarize the South China Sea. In 2014, the West was shocked when Russia annexed Crimea. Again and again, we have learned that authoritarian powers exploit every opening, every ambiguity, every moment of Western inattention.

We cannot afford such complacency at Diego Garcia. The Indo-Pacific theater is where the fate of the 21st century will be decided. Chinese naval expansion, the militarization of artificial islands, aggressive territorial claims, and economic coercion of smaller nations—all of this points to a future where freedom of navigation and the rule of law are under assault.

Diego Garcia is our insurance policy against that future. It must remain invulnerable, legally secure, and operationally unrestricted. The current agreement, as written, does not provide these assurances.

A CALL TO ACTION

Prime Minister, we urge you to pause, reconsider, and strengthen this agreement before it becomes irreversible. History will not judge kindly those who prioritized legal formalism over strategic necessity at such a critical moment.

To the British people: Understand that your government is making a decision with consequences that will echo for generations. Diego Garcia is not a relic of empire to be shed in pursuit of moral absolution. It is a shield protecting your nation, our nation, and the free world from those who would overthrow the international order.

To our American leaders: Stand with our British allies, but make clear that we cannot accept an arrangement that compromises the security foundation of our Indo-Pacific strategy. If necessary, pursue alternative arrangements that preserve American access to Diego Garcia under conditions we can trust.

The United States and United Kingdom have stood together through our darkest hours. We fought side by side against fascism, communism, and terrorism. That partnership endures because we share not just interests but values—democracy, liberty, and the rule of law.

Today, we face new threats from authoritarian powers who respect only strength and exploit every weakness. The Chagos agreement, in its current form, creates weakness where we desperately need strength. We can do better. We must do better.

We write not as adversaries, but as friends. Not to divide, but to unite. Not to criticize, but to protect that which we have built together and must defend together.

The Special Relationship demands nothing less than total candor. In that spirit, we ask: strengthen this agreement, secure Diego Garcia, and ensure that the beacon of freedom in the Indian Ocean continues to shine brightly for generations to come.

Respectfully and in friendship,

Americans for a Stronger Navy

On behalf of Americans who cherish the Special Relationship
and recognize that our security is inseparable from yours

Contact:
Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org
StrongerNavy.org/blog

January 19, 2026January 20, 2026

China’s New Invasion Barges Reveal a Bigger Truth About Modern Power

What Just Happened

Between January 11 and 15, 2026, China deployed three newly built Shuiqiao-class invasion barges to Nansan Island in the South China Sea. These are not ordinary ships. They are mobile, self-deploying logistics platforms designed to create instant docks, temporary ports, and heavy equipment offload points where no infrastructure exists.

Each barge can drive into shallow water, jack itself above the surface, and deploy roadway systems that turn open coastline into a functioning logistics hub.

This is not experimentation. This is rehearsal.

China is practicing how to build ports on demand.

Why This Is Different

Most people imagine amphibious invasions as waves of troops and armored vehicles storming beaches.

That image is outdated.

Modern war is won by logistics.

Fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, medical care, maintenance, and the continuous movement of people and equipment matter more than the first landing. Whoever sustains operations longest wins.

These barges are not weapons.
They are infrastructure.

And infrastructure is what makes everything else possible.

By deploying these platforms, China is demonstrating its ability to:

Create instant ports
Establish temporary logistics hubs
Sustain forces across islands
Operate without fixed bases
Support heavy equipment transfers
Expand control incrementally

This is how power is consolidated in the 21st century.

My Commentary

If you once doubted China’s intentions, think again.

This is not defensive infrastructure. This is not routine maritime development. This is not a commercial experiment.

This is about control.

This is about reach.

This is about being able to move, land, supply, reinforce, and sustain military forces wherever and whenever they choose.

You don’t build mobile ports unless you intend to use them.

This is not about one island.
This is about a system.

Why Americans Should Care

Naval power is not a platform.
It is a system.

Ships, ports, logistics, repair facilities, supply chains, workforce, industrial capacity, and governance all matter.

China understands this.

That’s why it is investing in portable infrastructure, modular logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities—while the United States struggles with:

Aging sealift
Fragile port security
Long shipyard delays
Limited surge capacity
Shrinking industrial depth
Vulnerable maritime infrastructure

Power today is not just about firepower.

It is about who can show up, stay, and sustain.

China is building that capability deliberately.

What This Signals About China’s Strategy

This development aligns with a broader pattern:

Artificial islands
Dual-use ports
Civil-military fusion
Expeditionary logistics
Rapid infrastructure construction
Maritime normalization

China is not just building ships.

It is building the scaffolding of dominance.

And it is doing so quietly, persistently, and methodically.

This is how territorial control is modernized.

This Is a Governance Issue, Not Just a Military One

Military capability does not appear by accident.

It is built through alignment:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

China is aligning all five.

The United States is not.

We debate platforms.
They build systems.

We argue procurement.
They build logistics.

We delay shipyards.
They build mobile ports.

This is not about spending more.
It is about thinking differently.

What Must Change

America must stop treating naval strength as a niche defense topic.

It is economic security.
It is supply chain security.
It is alliance credibility.
It is deterrence.
It is peace.

If we fail to understand how power is now constructed, we will lose it without a single dramatic moment.

That is the real danger.

Not invasion headlines.
Not dramatic conflict.

But quiet displacement.

Closing

China just showed us something important.

Not with missiles.
Not with warships.
But with infrastructure.

And that should worry anyone who believes in a free, open, and stable maritime world.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

January 19, 2026January 19, 2026

Captain John Konrad Just Proved Our Point—From the Logistics Side

A few days ago, we published a piece about rust on Navy ships. Not because rust is the problem, but because rust is the symptom of something deeper: a governance system that doesn’t fund the unglamorous, essential work of maintaining a ready fleet.

Now Captain John Konrad has walked through the 2025 Military Sealift Command handbook page by page in a detailed podcast, and he’s telling the exact same story—from the other side of the hull.

What Konrad Found

Captain Konrad, founder of gCaptain and a licensed Master Mariner with decades at sea, attended the Surface Navy Association’s National Symposium and picked up what he calls “the most important book the Navy publishes every year”—the MSC handbook.

His conclusion after reviewing it: “We are completely unprepared for a war in the Pacific.”

Here’s what the handbook reveals:

$5 billion annual budget for Military Sealift Command—the organization responsible for 90% of everything the military moves overseas, including fuel, ammunition, food, and equipment for all services across all theaters worldwide.

As Konrad puts it bluntly: “Ships are expensive, people. Crewing ships are expensive. Maintaining ships are expensive. And you just can’t do it with a $5 billion budget.” That’s less than 0.5% of the $1.1 trillion defense budget to sustain the logistics backbone that enables everything else.

17 ships laid up—not because they’re broken, but because there aren’t enough licensed merchant mariners to crew them. The workforce crisis isn’t theoretical. It’s operational right now.

A command authority mismatch: MSC is a one or two-star command trying to support operations across all numbered fleets, which are three and four-star commands. When they compete for resources in Congress, they get outranked by everyone.

The Single Point of Failure Inventory

Konrad methodically documents what “running on fumes” actually looks like:

1 Missile Range Instrumentation Ship (to track adversary weapons development)
1 Advanced towed array surveillance ship
1 Cable repair ship (for undersea cables carrying secure communications)
1 Ballistic missile tracking ship
1 Navigation test support ship
4 Ocean surveillance ships (we had dozens during the Cold War to track Soviet submarines)
4 Submarine support ships (submarines can’t safely enter or leave port without them)
4 New John Lewis-class replenishment oilers—with only one or two actually deployed due to environmental scrubber requirements making them too tall to fit under 70% of bridges

The oiler situation is particularly critical. As Konrad notes, a former Commandant of the Merchant Marine wrote that we’re 100 tankers short of minimum requirements to fuel the fleet in a Pacific campaign.

This Is the Same Story We’ve Been Telling

In our earlier post on rust, we made a simple point: rust isn’t a Navy problem. It’s an American one.

We showed this governance chain:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

When that chain breaks down, you get rust on deckplates. But as Konrad’s breakdown proves, you also get:

Ships that can’t deploy because bureaucracy matters more than mission
Mariners overworked to the point of tragedy (he references the officer who died by suicide aboard the USNS Amelia Earhart from stress and overwork)
Single ships doing missions that require dozens
A logistics fleet averaging 40 years old with no replacement plan adequate to requirements

The Governance Failure at Every LevelKonrad’s evidence maps directly to our framework:

National will: Americans support the Navy—surveys prove it. But they picture aircraft carriers and destroyers, not oilers and cable repair ships. They don’t know Military Sealift Command exists. They don’t understand that 90% of military logistics moves by ship, or that the Air Force’s entire airlift capacity is less than what China can fit on one modern container ship.

Budgets: When the public doesn’t understand what naval power requires, Congress doesn’t fund it. MSC gets 0.5% of the defense budget to do what Konrad calls “the most important mission” because logistics wins wars.

Priorities: MSC is outranked by every other command. When it’s time to fight for resources, they lose. The result is predictable: deferred maintenance, aging ships, no replacement pipeline, and a workforce crisis.

Behavior: With inadequate funding and low command priority, you get exactly what Konrad documents—ships laid up, mariners burned out, critical capabilities down to single digits, and new ships stuck pier-side because nobody fixed the bureaucratic tangles.

Readiness: We can move the fleet to the Pacific. But we can’t sustain them there. We can win the first battle, but we can’t win the campaign.

What “Lack of Support” Actually Means

This isn’t about public indifference. It’s about invisibility.

The American public sees:

Carriers launching jets (thrilling)
Destroyers shooting missiles (dramatic)
Submarines running silent (mysterious)

They don’t see:

The oiler keeping the carrier’s air wing flying
The dry cargo ship bringing ammunition to the destroyers
The cable repair ship maintaining secure communications
The ocean surveillance ship tracking enemy submarines before they become threats
The submarine tender ensuring boats can safely enter and leave port

What’s invisible doesn’t get funded.

This is why the governance failure at the top of the chain matters so much. If national will doesn’t include understanding what naval power actually requires, budgets will never prioritize the systems that make it work.

Naval Power Is Systems, Not Platforms

We’ve been making this point for months: naval power isn’t platforms. It’s systems.

You can have the most advanced destroyers and carriers in the world, but if you can’t fuel them at sea, resupply them with ammunition, track enemy submarines approaching your bases, repair undersea cables when they’re cut, or crew the ships you already have—then you don’t have naval power. You have expensive hulls that can’t sustain operations.

Konrad’s handbook walkthrough proves this from the logistics side. The platforms get the attention and the funding. The systems that enable them get $5 billion and a two-star admiral.

A Call to Action: DOD and Congress Must Act

We know from surveys that Americans support a strong Navy. They want us to be ready. But readiness isn’t just about how many ships we have—it’s about whether those ships can operate, sustain, and prevail in extended campaigns.

The Department of Defense must:

Elevate MSC to a three-star command so it has the authority to compete for resources
Fix bureaucratic tangles keeping new capabilities pier-side
Properly recognize civilian mariners to improve recruitment and retention
Stop treating logistics as an afterthought in force structure decisions

Congress must:

Fund MSC and the maritime industrial base at levels that match strategic requirements, not political convenience
Expand the Maritime Security Program, especially tankers
Invest in the mariner training pipeline and Strategic Sealift Officer program
Demand readiness reporting that focuses on systems and sustainability, not just platform counts

Acknowledging Captain Konrad’s Work

Captain Konrad has been a persistent, credible voice highlighting America’s maritime readiness crisis. Through gCaptain, his podcasts, and media appearances on NPR, BBC, the New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, he’s documented the decline of our merchant marine, the shipbuilding crisis, and strategic sealift challenges.

His latest breakdown of the MSC handbook is a public service. He’s showing Americans what their Navy actually depends on—and how fragile that foundation has become.

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we’ve been making the case that rust is a symptom and the system is the cause. Konrad just proved it from the logistics side. His work validates our concerns and strengthens the case for urgent action.

The Bottom Line

Rust isn’t a deckplate problem. It’s a governance one.

Ships laid up for lack of crews isn’t a manning problem. It’s a governance one.

Oilers stuck pier-side because nobody fixed the bureaucracy isn’t a maintenance problem. It’s a governance one.

And a $5 billion budget for the logistics backbone that enables 90% of military power projection isn’t a budget problem—it’s a national priority failure.

Captain Konrad is right: we’re not ready for a sustained fight in the Pacific.

But the solution isn’t just to build more ships. It’s to fix the governance chain that determines whether we fund, crew, maintain, and deploy the capabilities we already need.

The American people support a strong Navy. Now we need DOD and Congress to match that support with the resources, priorities, and leadership that readiness actually requires.

Let’s roll.

January 17, 2026January 18, 2026

Rust, Readiness, and Reality: Why This Debate Matters to Every American

Why This Is Not a Navy Problem, but an American One

This essay explores why the current debate over rust and warfighting readiness is not an internal Navy issue, but a national one. The real problem is not cosmetic—it is systemic. Sailors are capable. The American public is supportive. What often fails is alignment upstream—where Congress, the Department of Defense, and senior leadership decide what gets funded, staffed, scheduled, and rewarded.

From the Founder

I served on a U.S. Navy destroyer in the 1970s. Some of the hardest-working, most capable people I’ve ever known wore Navy uniforms—officers and enlisted, engineers and operators, deckplate sailors and watchstanders. They weren’t lazy. They weren’t careless. And they weren’t disconnected from the mission.

They were doing the best they could inside a system that constantly forced tradeoffs.

That experience is why I’m paying close attention to the public debate about rust, preservation, and warfighting readiness. Because this is not a Navy culture fight. It’s not a generational fight. And it’s not an internal matter.

It’s a national readiness issue.

What Sparked This Debate

A recent article by LT Spike Dearing, published on the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), argued that today’s surface fleet is being inspected more for preservation than for warfighting. His point was not that preservation doesn’t matter—it absolutely does—but that what leaders choose to inspect shapes what sailors prioritize.

His concern is simple and serious: if warfighting performance is rarely inspected, it will inevitably become secondary.

The article prompted multiple responses in the CIMSEC comment section, including from naval historian and analyst Steven Wills, and was later republished on other defense platforms—signaling that its themes are resonating beyond its initial posting.

This is not a closed-door conversation. This is a public one—because the consequences of readiness, or the lack of it, do not stay inside the Navy.

What Steven Wills Gets Right

Steven Wills made an important point: corrosion is not cosmetic. Rust is not superficial. Preservation reflects discipline. And visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay.

He’s right.

Saltwater destroys steel. Systems fail. Neglect spreads. No serious warfighting force can afford to treat material condition as optional.

But this is where people often misframe the issue.

This is not a choice between paint and warfighting.

It is about whether the system enables both.

What LT Dearing Gets Right

LT Dearing is also right.

People respond rationally to what leaders inspect.

If leaders inspect surfaces, crews will optimize for surfaces. If leaders inspect tactics, crews will optimize for tactics.

That’s not laziness. That’s survival.

After the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, the Navy made fire safety non-negotiable. Inspections changed. Behavior changed. Training changed.

That’s how priorities shift.

Standards Matter — But Systems Decide Whether They Are Achievable

When defense analyst Brent Sadler says that a clean ship is a well-run ship and a combat-ready ship, he is pointing to something real: discipline, standards, and leadership signals matter. Order reflects process. Process reflects leadership. And leadership shapes behavior.

But that truth only holds when the system supporting those standards is aligned.

A ship can only be clean, disciplined, and well-run if crews are given the time, manpower, training windows, maintenance access, and parts availability needed to meet those standards. Without that support, expectations become performative instead of operational.

This is where the problem becomes systemic.

When standards are enforced without the resources to meet them, discipline turns into distortion. Crews are not failing — they are adapting. And adaptation is not weakness. It is rational behavior inside a misaligned system.

This is why this is not a deckplate problem.

This is a governance problem.

Who sets the priorities? Who controls the budgets? Who defines the metrics? Who decides what gets inspected, rewarded, and penalized? Readiness is not free. It is built—or it is hollowed out—by budgets, manpower decisions, and time allocations.

Those decisions are made upstream.

Sadler’s point about cleanliness is not wrong — it is incomplete without a systems lens. A clean ship should reflect readiness. But that only works when leadership designs a system that makes real readiness possible, not just presentable.

This is why LT Spike Dearing’s argument about what leaders choose to inspect matters. And it is why Steven Wills is right to warn that visible neglect often signals deeper organizational decay. Both are describing the same thing from different angles: signals versus systems.

Signals matter. But systems decide outcomes.

My Experience

When I served, my shipmates worked relentlessly. We fought corrosion while underway. We knew what mattered. But we also knew what inspectors looked for.

So when inspections came, we painted.

Not because we didn’t care about readiness. But because we cared about protecting our command inside the system.

And a lot has changed since the 1970s. The Navy is smaller now and stretched even further. The systems are more complex, the demands are higher, and many of the sailors and officers carrying this load today could be my children. In many cases, they may not even have the time to paint over rust—because they are busy keeping the ship running, the systems online, and the mission moving.

That doesn’t weaken this argument. It strengthens it.

That’s not moral failure.

That’s a warning sign.

Hardworking people will always try to do everything. When they can’t, they triage based on what leadership rewards.

This Is Not a Navy-Internal Problem

This is not about sailors. This is not about pride. This is not about tradition.

This is about alignment.

Sailors are capable. Sailors are disciplined. Sailors are supported by the American people.

What they often lack is consistent backing from those who control resources, manpower, time, and priorities.

Readiness is not a slogan. It’s a system.

And when that system is misaligned, people adapt.

Why Americans Should Care

The Navy does not exist for the Navy. It exists for the American people.

If we want deterrence, we must prepare seriously. If we want peace, we must be credible. If we want stability, we must invest in real readiness—not performative readiness.

You cannot paint your way to warfighting competence.

Implications for the Navy

This debate exposes a dangerous risk: a force that looks ready but is not consistently evaluated for the conditions it will actually face.

War does not care about inspections. Adversaries do not grade on appearance. And there are no do-overs.

Implications for Our Allies

Our allies don’t just watch our ships. They watch our seriousness.

Credibility comes from demonstrated competence under stress—not polish.

The Bottom Line

Preservation matters. Warfighting matters more. Both must be enabled.

This is not about rust. It is about readiness design.

Real readiness cannot be painted on.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

January 13, 2026January 13, 2026

Why Battleships Still Matter—Even If We Never Build One Again

Naval historian Trent Hone recently published a thoughtful piece explaining why the U.S. Navy no longer builds battleships—and why, from a warfighting standpoint, it probably shouldn’t.

Hone’s argument is straightforward: the operational logic that once justified battleships has been obsolete for decades. Big guns gave way to aircraft. Aircraft gave way to missiles. Today’s naval combat rewards dispersion, networking, and numbers—not massive armored hulls.

That assessment is widely shared among naval professionals.

But Hone makes a second, more subtle point that deserves more attention: battleships have always carried symbolic power far beyond their military utility. They were never just weapons. They were national statements—about strength, reach, prestige, and ambition.

That symbolic role has not disappeared.

And that’s where the conversation gets interesting.

Two Serious Perspectives, One Shared Conclusion

Hone is a respected scholar and strategist. He holds the Marine Corps University Foundation Chair of Strategic Studies and has written extensively about how naval doctrine evolves with technology and threat environments. His view is clear: building a new battleship today would produce a smaller, less resilient, less lethal fleet than the alternatives.

Others, however, approach the issue from a different angle.

Defense analyst Brent Sadler, for example, has argued that what matters most is not any specific platform but the urgent need to rebuild American sea power at scale. His emphasis is on fleet size, industrial capacity, and the ability to sustain combat operations over time. For Sadler, bold ideas—even controversial ones—are useful if they force the public to confront how far the Navy has fallen behind its global responsibilities.

These two views may differ on specifics, but they converge on something essential:

America needs a stronger Navy.

Not symbolically. Not nostalgically. Structurally.

The Real Problem Isn’t Battleships—It’s Public Understanding

The deeper issue raised by this debate is not whether we should build a new class of battleships. It’s that the American public has lost touch with what sea power actually means.

Most Americans don’t see the Navy at work.
They don’t see trade routes.
They don’t see chokepoints.
They don’t see logistics.
They don’t see undersea cables.
They don’t see maintenance backlogs.
They don’t see shipyard fragility.
They don’t see attrition math.

But they do recognize symbols.

Battleships, like aircraft carriers, are easy to understand. They look powerful. They feel powerful. They communicate strength in a way spreadsheets and logistics diagrams do not.

That doesn’t make them good warfighting solutions—but it does make them powerful communication tools.

And the Navy has a communication problem.

A stronger Navy is not only a military challenge. It is a civic one—requiring public understanding, long-term commitment, and new thinking about how we fund and sustain national security.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy is not just a military force. It is the invisible foundation of modern American life.

It protects global trade.
It stabilizes energy flows.
It keeps shipping lanes open.
It reassures allies.
It deters coercion.
It underwrites economic stability.

When the Navy weakens, these systems become fragile.

That fragility doesn’t show up overnight—but it shows up eventually.

Implications for the Navy

Modern naval power is no longer about a few dominant platforms. It is about:

Numbers
Redundancy
Repairability
Sustainment
Resilience
Industrial depth
Networked operations

A stronger Navy is not just a bigger Navy—it is a Navy that can take losses and keep fighting.

That requires more ships, more shipyards, more trained sailors, and more public support.

Implications for Our Allies

Allies do not just look at U.S. statements. They look at U.S. capacity.

They ask:
Can America show up?
Can America stay?
Can America sustain?
Can America adapt?

A strong Navy reassures allies.
A hollow Navy invites testing.

Where We Stand

At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we are not here to pick winners in platform debates. Reasonable people will disagree about hulls, missiles, drones, and fleet composition.

But most serious voices agree on one thing:

The Navy is stretched too thin.
The industrial base is fragile.
The fleet is too small for its mission set.
And the public does not understand what’s at stake.

That is the gap we exist to close.

Not through nostalgia.
Not through fear.
But through education.

Because a democracy cannot sustain a strong Navy if it does not understand why it needs one.

Let’s roll.

January 9, 2026January 9, 2026

When Sanctions Need Ships: How Two U.S. Destroyers Chased a Dark Fleet Tanker Across the Atlantic

Introduction

Two U.S. Navy destroyers just spent weeks tracking, shadowing, and supporting the seizure of a runaway oil tanker in the North Atlantic.

This was not a combat mission.
It was not a press event.
It was not symbolic.

It was enforcement.

USS Bulkeley (DDG-84) and USS Paul Ignatius (DDG-117) helped support an operation that ultimately boarded and seized a Russian-flagged tanker that had been actively evading authorities across thousands of miles of open ocean.

This is what maritime power looks like in 2026. And most Americans never see it.

What Happened
The vessel—initially named Bella 1—was operating as part of what U.S. officials describe as a “dark fleet,” a network of tankers designed to evade sanctions through deceptive practices.

Over the course of its escape, the tanker:
• Changed its name
• Reflagged as Russian
• Painted a new national tricolor on its hull
• Altered its identity
• Evaded a U.S. naval blockade
• Attempted to disappear into the Atlantic

After weeks of pursuit, U.S. forces—supported by Navy destroyers, Coast Guard assets, special operations forces, and allied surveillance—seized the vessel in waters between the UK and Iceland.

The UK provided support. NATO was not involved.

This was a multinational, multi-domain enforcement operation.

Not war. Not peace. Enforcement.

Why This Matters
Sanctions do not enforce themselves.

Every time a government announces new sanctions, it implies something most people never think about:

Someone has to physically enforce them.

That means:
• Ships
• Crews
• Surveillance
• Boarding teams
• Legal frameworks
• Sustainment
• Allies
• Weeks of continuous presence

Sanctions without maritime power are just words on paper.

The Rise of the Dark Fleet
So-called “dark fleet” vessels use identity laundering to move oil, weapons, and sanctioned goods across the world.

They:
• Reflag repeatedly
• Change names
• Operate under shell companies
• Transmit false data
• Disable tracking systems
• Exploit legal gray zones

This is modern maritime gray-zone warfare.

And the U.S. Navy is now its primary counterforce.

Attrition Isn’t Just Combat
A Navy captain once wrote: “Wars at sea are wars of attrition.”

What most people miss is that attrition doesn’t only happen during wars.

It happens during:
• Blockades
• Sanctions enforcement
• Freedom of navigation patrols
• Counter-smuggling missions
• Persistent surveillance
• Shadowing operations

Weeks of pursuit burn:
• Fuel
• Maintenance cycles
• Crew endurance
• Parts
• Readiness margins

Every ship tied up on one mission is unavailable for another. Presence has a cost.

Why Americans Should Care
This mission protected more than a legal principle.

It protected:
• The credibility of sanctions
• The integrity of maritime law
• The security of global trade routes
• The idea that rules still matter

If the U.S. Navy cannot enforce order at sea, someone else will rewrite the rules. And they will not do it in our favor.

This Is What Presence Looks Like
Destroyers aren’t just warfighting platforms.

They are:
• Law enforcement tools
• Diplomatic signals
• Deterrence mechanisms
• Economic stabilizers
• Crisis responders

This mission never trended. But it kept the system from breaking.

The Bigger Picture
The Navy is being asked to do more:
• With fewer ships
• With aging hulls
• With shrinking margins
• With rising global demand

This operation was a success. But success should not blind us to strain.

January 7, 2026January 7, 2026

A Subscriber Asked: How Do the Jones Act, SHIPS Act, and Strategic Seas Act Actually Fit Together?

A reader recently reached out with a thoughtful question. After seeing renewed debate around the Jones Act — including critiques from respected analysts and commentators — they wanted to understand how that debate fits with our advocacy for the SHIPS Act and the recently proposed Strategic Seas Act.

It’s a fair question. And it reflects a broader challenge: America’s maritime conversation has become fragmented, emotional, and often disconnected from strategic reality.

Here’s the clearest way to understand it.

The Core Issue Isn’t One Law — It’s the System

America’s maritime problem did not emerge because of one bad law or one bad decision. It emerged because policy, industry, workforce, logistics, and security drifted out of alignment over decades.

The Jones Act, the SHIPS Act, and the Strategic Seas Act each address different layers of that system. Confusing them — or pitting them against one another — obscures the real challenge.

What the Jones Act Actually Does (and Does Not Do)

The Jones Act governs domestic coastwise and inland shipping — cargo moved between U.S. ports along rivers, coasts, and internal waterways.

Its intent is to preserve:

- A U.S. maritime workforce
- Domestic shipbuilding and repair capacity
- U.S. control over domestic trade routes

It does not regulate international or blue-water shipping.

Critics are right about one thing: the Jones Act did not prevent the collapse of America’s international commercial fleet. That collapse happened outside its scope — driven by tax policy, financing disadvantages, flag-of-convenience practices, and long-term neglect.

That critique is legitimate. But it’s also incomplete.

Why the Jones Act Debate Isn’t Decisive

For years, serious naval professionals and analysts have debated whether the Jones Act is a national security asset or a liability. That debate is not new, and it has often been conducted in good faith.

What has changed is the strategic environment.

Recent analysis has reminded us of a hard truth: wars at sea are wars of attrition. Losses come fast. Ships, crews, and shipyards lost early in a conflict cannot be replaced in time to affect the outcome.

That means no maritime policy — Jones Act included — can be judged solely by cost or efficiency in peacetime. The real question is whether the overall system can absorb loss and sustain combat before a war begins.

What the SHIPS Act Is Designed to Fix

The SHIPS Act addresses a failure the Jones Act was never designed to solve: the collapse of U.S.-flag international shipping and sealift capacity.

Its focus includes:

- Rebuilding a viable U.S.-flag fleet in international trade
- Expanding and stabilizing the pool of credentialed U.S. mariners
- Strengthening sealift capacity the Navy depends on in wartim
- Restoring American relevance in global maritime commerce

This is where America’s absence has become a strategic vulnerability — and where reform is long overdue.

Why We Proposed the Strategic Seas Act

Even rebuilding ships and mariners is no longer enough.

Modern global commerce and advanced technologies create maritime security risks at scale — from congested sea lanes and port dependencies to undersea cables and logistics chokepoints. When those risks materialize, the burden falls almost entirely on the U.S. Navy and the American taxpayer.

The Strategic Seas Act starts from a simple principle: strategic risk should be managed and shared, not externalized.

It focuses on:

- Accountability for maritime risk creation
- Protection of ports, shipyards, sea lanes, and undersea infrastructure
- Aligning commercial innovation with maritime and naval security
- Closing the gap between private gain and public security cost

This is not about shipping rates. It’s about national responsibility in a contested maritime world.

Why We Don’t Lead With the Jones Act Debate

The Jones Act debate often becomes ideological. The most urgent maritime failures today are strategic and systemic.

Our priority is:

- Whether America can move and sustain forces at scale
- Whether we have the mariners to crew ships in crisis
- Whether our industrial base can repair and regenerate under pressure
- Whether commercial success carries shared security responsibility

That doesn’t make the Jones Act irrelevant. It makes it one part of a much larger system.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans never see ships — but their food, fuel, medicine, data, and livelihoods move by sea. When maritime policy fails, the consequences show up quietly: fragile supply chains, higher prices, longer crises, and greater military risk.

Maritime strength is not abstract. It shapes daily life.

Implications for the Navy

The Navy cannot surge ships, mariners, or shipyards after a war starts. Civilian maritime capacity is not separate from naval readiness — it underpins it. Planning without industrial and workforce reality invites failure.

Implications for Our Allies

Allies measure credibility by endurance. A stronger U.S. maritime system reduces dangerous dependence on adversaries and turns alliances into real, usable capacity — not just promises.

Closing Thought

The real question isn’t whether one maritime law should be defended or repealed.

The question is whether the United States intends to remain a serious maritime nation — prepared before the first shot is fired, not scrambling after ships are lost.

Let’s roll.

January 4, 2026January 5, 2026

Listening to Americans on Naval Power and the Industrial Base

Americans Support a Strong Navy — and Expect Readiness to Match

While public debate and media commentary continue, Americans for a Stronger Navy looks under the hood — at what Americans are actually saying and feeling when asked directly about naval strength and readiness.

The 2025 Reagan National Defense Survey offers a rare opportunity to move past headlines and examine public sentiment itself. Rather than reacting to daily news cycles, this analysis focuses on the underlying signals Americans are sending about national security, deterrence, and the role of naval power in an increasingly uncertain world.

What Americans Are Saying

The survey shows strong and durable support for military strength. Eighty-seven percent of Americans believe military superiority matters, and seventy-one percent believe global peace depends on American strength. A majority believe the United States maintains superiority at sea.

Naval power remains central to how Americans think about deterrence, stability, and global leadership. This support is not tied to a single region or conflict. It reflects a broader expectation that the United States should retain the capability to protect its interests, allies, and maritime commerce.

The Confidence Gap

Alongside that support, the data reveals unease. Only forty-nine percent of Americans believe the U.S. military could win a major war overseas, and just forty-five percent believe it can effectively deter foreign aggression.

This gap does not reflect opposition to the military. It reflects concern about whether readiness, capacity, and sustainability are keeping pace with the responsibilities Americans expect the Navy to carry. The difference between support and confidence is one of the most important signals in the survey.

Capacity Matters — and Americans Know It

Two findings stand out. Sixty-eight percent of Americans support increased investment in shipbuilding and manufacturing. Ninety-four percent believe the United States needs greater domestic manufacturing capacity.

Americans appear to understand something fundamental: naval strength is not defined solely by ships at sea, but by the industrial systems that build, repair, crew, and sustain them over time. Shipyards, skilled workers, suppliers, dry docks, and logistics networks are not abstract concepts. They are the difference between plans on paper and forces that are ready when needed.

What the Survey Reveals About Deterrence

The survey also sheds light on how Americans view deterrence in practice, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

When asked about Taiwan, seventy-seven percent of Americans say it is important for the United States to help defend the island against Chinese aggression. If China were to invade Taiwan, sixty percent say they would support committing U.S. forces to Taiwan’s defense, up from forty-eight percent the prior year. Majorities also support additional measures designed to deter aggression and strengthen regional stability, including deploying more U.S. military assets to the region, sending additional military equipment to Taiwan, imposing economic sanctions, and establishing air and maritime control measures.

These responses do not reflect a desire for conflict. They reflect an expectation that deterrence must be credible. Americans appear to understand that commitments only matter if the United States has the capacity to back them up.

Deterrence at sea is not abstract. It depends on available ships, trained crews, maintained platforms, secure logistics, and resilient industrial support. When Americans express support for defending allies and preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific, they are implicitly expressing expectations about readiness — and about whether U.S. sailors have the tools they need to do their jobs effectively and safely.

From Public Sentiment to Public Support

Americans for a Stronger Navy is politically neutral. We do not support parties or candidates. But we are not neutral on readiness.

Our role is to articulate what Americans are saying and feeling — and, when appropriate, to state clearly when legislation aligns with those expressed expectations.

Based on the survey data and the readiness challenges it highlights, Americans for a Stronger Navy supports the SHIPS for America Act. This support is grounded in alignment, not politics.

Why We Support the SHIPS Act

The SHIPS for America Act does not dictate naval strategy or force employment. Its relevance lies in strengthening the foundations naval readiness depends on.

It addresses shipbuilding and repair capacity by expanding and stabilizing the yards that build and maintain naval vessels. It supports maritime workforce development by growing the skilled labor base the Navy cannot surge in a crisis. It strengthens industrial resilience and surge capacity by reinforcing the commercial and auxiliary maritime sector that supports naval logistics and sealift. And it promotes long-term sustainability by reducing boom-and-bust cycles that drive cost overruns, schedule delays, and readiness shortfalls.

What This Endorsement Is — and Is Not

Our support for the SHIPS Act is not partisan. It does not imply endorsement of every provision, and it does not replace the need for oversight, accountability, or debate.

It reflects a judgment that strengthening the maritime industrial base aligns with what Americans are asking for — and is necessary to close the confidence gap the survey reveals. If Americans expect deterrence to be credible, then policy should strengthen the capacity that makes deterrence real.

The Signal Americans Are Sending

The survey does not prescribe policy, but it does define expectations.

Americans are saying they value naval strength, deterrence over conflict, readiness that matches responsibility, and domestic capacity that sustains credibility. When expectations and outcomes align, confidence grows. When they drift apart, trust erodes.

Our role is to surface that signal clearly. The data speaks. Alignment is the challenge.

December 24, 2025December 27, 2025

Year-End Message: The Pentagon’s China Report and What It Means for 2025

The 2027 Countdown: What the Pentagon’s Delayed China Report Reveals

2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review Report Cover

Hello friends, and fellow supporters of America’s Navy. Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy.

On December 23rd, the Pentagon released its annual China Military Power Report. This assessment had been missing all year while Congress debated budgets. Now that it’s here, we understand the delay. The report contains the most direct warning yet: China expects to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan by the end of 2027. That’s less than three years away.

Why Taiwan Matters to You

As Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, wrote in TIME Magazine:

“Defending far-off Taiwan and our allies… is rooted in a practical, hard-nosed assessment of what is in Americans’ concrete economic and political interests. It is about defending Americans’ security, liberties, and prosperity from a very real, and in terms of China’s gigantic scale, unprecedented danger.”

Your Phone. Your Car. Your Hospital Equipment.

Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. A Chinese blockade or invasion would cost the global economy at least one trillion dollars per year.

What the Pentagon Report Reveals

Nuclear Expansion: Stockpile reached 600+ in 2024, on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030.
Space Surveillance: 359+ satellites now track U.S. ships in near real-time.
Cyber Weapons: Operations like Volt Typhoon have burrowed into U.S. power grids for wartime sabotage.
Taiwan Pressure: 3,067 air incursions in 2024—nearly double the previous year.

The Timeline Should Terrify You

The Western Pacific is becoming a “Kill Zone.” As one naval officer put it: “We no longer build the Navy the Navy needs. We build the Navy the accountants will tolerate.”

America is not outmatched; we are under-mobilized. The decisions we make in 2025 determine whether deterrence holds in 2027. Visit StrongerNavy.org to request your copy of our 2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review.

Thank you for caring about America’s maritime strength.

Fair winds and following seas,

Bill Cullifer
Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org

October 26, 2025October 26, 2025

Maritime Security and the Shifting Strategic Landscape: Why the Caribbean Still Matters

What held true in the 1970s when I served in the U.S. Navy remains true today: the sea—its lanes, chokepoints, and often hidden logistics networks—is where national power meets commerce and security. As founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I’ve watched the Caribbean region shift from a legacy theater of interdiction to something far more strategic and volatile. The United States must stay anchored to its enduring maritime interests, while soberly recognizing how the threat environment has evolved. The piece that follows lays out those stakes and changes in straightforward terms.

The security of the United States has always been tied to the sea. From the earliest days of the Republic, American prosperity has depended on open waterways, secure maritime trade routes, and the prevention of hostile powers establishing influence near U.S. shores. These principles are not abstractions. They are the foundation of American national strategy.

Recent naval actions in the Caribbean, including the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and the use of lethal force against suspected drug-trafficking vessels, have reopened a debate about the role of the U.S. Navy in the Western Hemisphere. Some see decisive action against destabilizing criminal networks. Others see a dangerous shift away from established maritime law and precedent.

This post does not seek to argue either side. Instead, it lays out the strategic facts that Americans must understand before forming an opinion.

I. Enduring U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere

For more than two centuries, American maritime strategy in the Caribbean has centered on three core objectives.

Freedom of Navigation
The Caribbean connects the Atlantic and Pacific trade systems. The majority of U.S. trade, energy transit, and commercial shipping depends on unobstructed access through these waters.

Security of Strategic Chokepoints
The Panama Canal remains a critical artery of global commerce. Any disruption—whether from instability, coercion, or foreign control—would have immediate and far-reaching economic consequences.

Prevention of Adversarial Influence Near U.S. Shores
From the Monroe Doctrine through the Cold War, American policy has consistently sought to prevent rival powers from establishing military or strategic footholds in the region. Today, this concern increasingly centers on the growing presence of the People’s Republic of China in ports, telecommunications, and financial networks throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Merchants Port now holds full ownership of Jamaica’s Kingston Freeport Terminal, one of the region’s key shipping hubs, and Beijing has invested billions in dual-use maritime infrastructure across the hemisphere.

These interests are longstanding. They are not partisan. They are structural.

II. The New Strategic Landscape: Crime, State Actors, and Maritime Security

What has changed is the nature of the threat.

The Synthetic Drug Crisis as a National Security Issue
The U.S. is experiencing a mass-casualty public-health emergency, with tens of thousands of deaths annually attributed to synthetic opioids. Major criminal organizations responsible for production and distribution have developed transnational financing, manufacturing, and logistics networks.

The China Connection
Multiple U.S. agencies have identified two critical dependencies.

Chemical Precursors and Equipment
Key components used to manufacture synthetic opioids are sourced overwhelmingly from Chinese firms.

Financial Networks
Laundering operations linked to PRC-based intermediaries move cartel funds through international markets at scale.

Strategic Presence in the Region
Simultaneously, the PRC has invested heavily in dual-use ports, intelligence-collection infrastructure, and economic footholds across the Caribbean and South America. By 2023, direct Chinese investment in island nations reached $3.3 billion, while infrastructure contracts totaled $32 billion.

As one recent illustrative example, the U.S. guided-missile destroyer USS Gravely docked in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 26 October 2025 as part of joint exercises with regional partners near Venezuela—a vivid symbol that U.S. maritime posture in the Caribbean is expanding from interdiction to forward presence.

The issue is no longer purely criminal. It is geopolitical.

III. The Question Before the Country: Method, Law, and Strategic Consequence

The central debate is not whether the United States should defend its interests in the region. It should and always has. The debate is how that defense should be conducted.

Argument for Military Kinetic Action
Supporters argue that the scale of the synthetic-drug crisis qualifies as a national-security threat, enabling the use of military force in self-defence. They contend that criminal networks operating with state-linked support may be treated under the laws of armed conflict.

Argument for Maintaining Traditional Maritime Law and Interdiction Precedent
Legal scholars and military ethicists warn that conducting lethal strikes against vessels without warning may erode long-standing maritime norms. Precedent matters. If the U.S. asserts the right to destroy vessels at sea based on national-security claims, adversaries could use the same justification in other contested waters—potentially including the South China Sea.

The strategic risk is that a short-term response to an urgent threat may weaken the very system of maritime stability the United States has spent generations defending.

Conclusion: The Need for Strategic Clarity

The United States cannot afford to lose stability, access, or influence in the Caribbean. The region matters today for the same reasons it mattered in 1823, 1947, and 1989: geography does not change. What has changed is the strategic environment, the nature of violence, and the actors capable of shaping the maritime domain.

As Americans, we now face a difficult question:
How do we defend our interests in the Western Hemisphere without undermining the maritime rules and partnerships that underpin global stability?

The answer requires seriousness, informed public understanding, and national unity.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.