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Allied ‘Say Versus Do’ Gap Raises New Questions Over U.S. Sea Power

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

In a conversation with CDR Salamander, I explore allied readiness, the Strait of Hormuz, burden-sharing and the Navy’s structural crisis.

America’s allies often say the right things about maritime security. The harder question is whether they can still do them.

That “say versus do” gap sits at the center of my conversation with CDR Salamander — a retired U.S. Navy officer, former NATO staff officer, and one of the most respected independent voices in naval commentary for nearly two decades.

We discussed Europe’s shrinking naval capacity, the Strait of Hormuz, burden-sharing, the industrial base, and the structural failures that have brought the U.S. Navy to a readiness crisis that many veterans recognize all too well.

I came to the conversation as a student. I left it convinced that Americans need a wider, more honest debate about sea power, allied obligations, and the real cost of keeping global trade moving. His explanation of the global economy is one of the most important parts of the interview.

Why I Asked These Questions

I started Americans for a Stronger Navy about two and a half years ago. Before that, I spent over three decades in telecommunications and web technologies — building and leading organizations at the intersection of global internet infrastructure, international business, and nonprofit professional management. I traveled to China and Russia during the early 2000s tech transfer era — and to other emerging markets in between — and watched, firsthand, how economic integration and strategic naivety can compound into serious long-term risk. That ground-level view of how these economies operate, and how they think about America, shapes everything I do at StrongerNavy.org.

I am not a think tank fellow. I am not a defense contractor. I am not a retired flag officer. I am a former blue water destroyer sailor who stood watches aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s during the original hollow Navy era.

That outsider status used to feel like a liability. I’ve come to think it’s an asset. Fresh eyes — from someone who has managed global organizations, tracked technology transfer across borders, and spent thirty years watching how interconnected systems succeed and fail — can sometimes see patterns that are harder to spot from inside a specialized community. That’s not a criticism. It’s an argument for a bigger tent.

My goal has never been to be the loudest voice in the room. It has been to listen carefully, learn honestly, connect what we learn to concrete legislative action — and help build the coalition this moment requires.

Which is why I reached out to CDR Salamander. If you want to understand where the naval community’s thinking actually is, you start there.

What follows is that conversation. I hope you’ll read it the same way I tried to have it.

Europe’s Readiness Gap

Q: The Royal Navy was significantly larger in 1982 than it is today, and they barely scraped together a task force to retake the Falkland Islands. The RAF was making the case that carriers were obsolete and land-based air could handle everything — they were months away from not having that carrier in the South Atlantic at all. France, the Netherlands, Denmark — Europe had a real, robust military then. Fast forward to 2026. Is that capability still there?

We find ourselves in a situation where there’s a certain inertia to assumptions — we just assume our allies can do something. You see announcements like the French carrier getting underway with a European strike group to help defend Cyprus because the British can’t get a single destroyer underway. And that’s great. But the French have one carrier. Some of their allied units are genuinely impressive — the Spanish F-100 Aegis destroyer is a fine piece of kit — but there just aren’t that many of them. They can do this one deployment. They have no follow-on. They have no endurance.

Even they themselves still carry this inertia of a memory of a military that could do things. And it’s simply not there anymore.

CDR Salamander: You have to be very careful what you take from Europe at face value, because a lot of what they’re proposing isn’t what’s best — it’s what they’re capable of. We make fun of the “strongly worded letter,” but if that’s all you have, that’s what you lean on. If you need things to delay, to push to the right, to wait for a UN or EU meeting — that’s what you’re going to do, because you don’t have the military capability to do anything else.

And even as NATO allies approach that 2% GDP threshold — which is laudable — you have to ask: what can they actually do with that? A lot of our assumptions, everything from mine sweeping to escort ships to underway replenishment, don’t hold up when you look at the actual order of battle. Mike Mullen’s “Thousand-Ship Navy” concept still echoes, but do we really have allies who can fill those billets?

Even in the Red Sea the operational experience has been revealing. CDR Salamander noted that one allied navy’s top-line unit deployed and discovered its hardware couldn’t communicate with a partner nation’s radar systems. And on the British Type 45 destroyers — everybody loves those ships — CDR Salamander observed that at least one was unable to use its main gun against air targets in the Red Sea because of a software capability that had not been purchased, a cost-saving decision that reflected years of accumulated underinvestment.

That’s the “say versus do” problem. A lot of what Europeans are saying cannot be backed up because they have so under-resourced their militaries. They can posture, protest, and stand at sight. That’s it.

Politics and NATO

Q: Is this primarily a capability problem, or is politics a bigger factor in why allies haven’t stepped up?

CDR Salamander: It depends on the nation. I say this as a former NATO staff officer who genuinely loves the alliance. I loved who I served with. In Afghanistan, I spent more time with NATO partner nations than with Americans. But out of respect — because they speak clearly to us — we should speak clearly back.

There are a couple of powerful undercurrents in Europe. One is a latent anti-Americanism that’s part of the political landscape. The other — especially in France and to a lesser degree Germany — is a desire for EU primacy over NATO. They resent American influence in the alliance. Any opportunity to position the EU as an alternative to NATO is taken, because if they can detach European security from the American relationship, the EU becomes more powerful.

You also have national habits. Some allies are simply accustomed to the US carrying the load — and then commenting from the sidelines in ways that play well domestically. And the Israel dimension cannot be discounted. The fact that the US is operating alongside Israel has triggered large portions of the European electorate in ways that make allied political leaders unwilling to be seen as part of this operation — even when it’s clearly in their own economic interest.

This was true under Carter, Clinton, and Obama as much as under Reagan, Bush, and Trump. The Europeans just don’t map their political spectrum onto ours, and right now that disconnect is making things worse.

Why Hormuz Still Matters

A note before this next section: whether you follow naval policy closely or you’re coming to this conversation for the first time, what follows is the most important part of this interview. CDR Salamander explains, in plain language, why the Strait of Hormuz matters to Americans who don’t buy a drop of Gulf oil — and why the global economy is far more fragile than most people understand. It deserves close attention.

Q: What’s the one thing Americans aren’t getting from traditional news coverage about the Strait of Hormuz?

CDR Salamander: The hardest thing to explain — but the most important — is that the US hasn’t relied on Hormuz hydrocarbons for a long time. We’re energy self-sufficient. So when people ask why this matters to Americans, the answer isn’t about our gas prices. It’s about the entire architecture of the global economy.

After the Cold War, decisions were made across North America and Europe to de-industrialize. That doesn’t mean you stop needing manufactured goods — it means you offshore the manufacturing to Asia, and you don’t have to see any of it. That works until it doesn’t. And it doesn’t work when the energy supply chain feeding Asian manufacturing gets disrupted.

The vast majority of hydrocarbons moving through the Strait of Hormuz are going to China, Japan, India, Thailand, Australia. If that energy supply is disrupted, the cost of hard industrial manufacturing in Asia rises to the point where supply chains feeding Western industries start to collapse. The whole system wavers.

And it’s not just oil. It’s fertilizer derived from natural gas — the feedstock that made the Green Revolution possible and held back mass starvation. It’s helium, a byproduct of natural gas production, essential for semiconductor manufacturing and fuel cell development. People don’t see those connections.

What they really don’t understand is that if you want to stop economic migration, you need strong economies in Southeast Asia. If you want a buffer against an expansionist China — and a Russia probing NATO’s eastern flank and an Iran that has spent forty years treating the Gulf as its own private lake — you need viable economies in Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia. That can’t happen if those nations can’t access hydrocarbons at market prices.

Burden-Sharing Without Mercenaries

Q: Asian economies receive the overwhelming share of crude moving through the Strait of Hormuz — China, India, Japan and South Korea among the largest exposed markets. We’re backstopping maritime insurance, deploying carrier strike groups, burning through hardware and personnel. What’s the value proposition for the American taxpayer?

CDR Salamander: Too many people in positions of political power don’t know how money works. They don’t understand interconnected economic systems. And they’re operating in a political environment where maintaining their coalition comes before strategic clarity.

Some of them genuinely believe that contributing to an escort operation in the Strait of Hormuz means being part of the conflict. We saw that when Italy and Spain withdrew base access for operations involving Israel. They’re making decisions out of spite and domestic political calculation — even though the disruption will hurt their own economies far more than it hurts ours.

The argument that the beneficiaries of American naval protection should contribute more is legitimate. But how you structure that contribution matters enormously.

Q: We’ve had financial models before where countries paid for protection. Kuwait in 1987. Japan in 1991. Is there a precedent for a more formal burden-sharing arrangement?

CDR Salamander: I guess in theory it could work, but I’m not a fan of the concept as it’s usually framed. America has a voluntary military. These are the sons and daughters of American citizens who chose to serve their country. If we do anything that even smacks of being somebody else’s mercenary force, I don’t want to be the one explaining to a mother why her kid came home in a box because someone was cutting us a check to do their job for them.

Now — contributing nations don’t have to contribute forces. If Iceland doesn’t have a military but will buy diesel fuel for the operation, that counts. Resources and services in lieu of forces — that’s legitimate burden sharing. That’s the Daughters of the American Revolution model: you don’t need an ancestor who fought at Yorktown. Someone who drove a supply wagon qualifies too.

But pure payment for services rendered? That leaves a bad taste. Why is Bangladesh so active in UN peacekeeping? Because they like the money. I don’t want the United States Navy in that equation.

What the Navy Commission Must Confront

Q: The National Commission on the Future of the Navy has begun its work. If you were advising the commission — not on ship counts, but on structural questions — what are the two or three things they absolutely cannot afford to skip?

CDR Salamander: First, back up and ask why this commission exists at all. It exists because the institutions given stewardship over American sea power have done a poor enough job over the last three decades that Congress felt compelled to create external oversight. So the question isn’t “what ships do we need” — it’s “what structural dysfunctions produced this situation?”

My answers are unsexy. But the foundations of a house are unsexy. Plumbing is unsexy. You can’t have a functioning structure without them.

The first thing is industrial base. The only reason we won World War II is our industrial capacity — including our maritime industrial capacity. Right now we have submarines waiting over a year for repairs. We have dry dock capacity so constrained that ships are receiving depot-level maintenance in 2026 at a rate that would have gotten people fired in 1986. We need incentives and disincentives that grow, support, and sustain a geographically and institutionally diverse shipbuilding and maintenance industry. That will take a decade to fix. Start now.

Second: officer corps incentives. How we promote people and why. The current system is not fit for purpose. If it were, we wouldn’t be where we are.

Third: geographic presence. The Navy has disappeared from the view of too many Americans. San Francisco Bay is geographically ideal for naval facilities and sits at the center of American technology and influence — and we BRAC’d our way out of it. The “Master Base” concept — concentrating everything in San Diego, Jacksonville, and Norfolk — only makes sense to an accountant. It certainly doesn’t make sense in an era of drone swarms that can take out entire airfields. We need a distributed presence.

And underneath all of this: we need a national understanding of maritime power, not just a maritime strategy document. By geography and economy, we are a maritime and aerospace nation. Our budgetary priorities don’t reflect that. Changing them will require taking resources from what is not our comparative advantage as a non-continental land power. We have to be willing to make that fight. We need more Vice Admiral Tom Connollys and fewer officers who can’t get through a sentence without the word “joint.”

The Case for Sea and Air Power

Q: Final question. What’s the key takeaway — for Navy professionals and for civilians who might be listening?

CDR Salamander: There’s an opportunity here, and it’s being missed.

Every carrier deployed for nine, ten, eleven months is proof we don’t have a large enough navy. Every static airfield attacked ashore is an argument for sea-based power projection. Every Houthi missile fired at a merchant ship is a demonstration that the only answer is at sea. Every Chinese fishing fleet strip-mining the territorial waters of a South American coastal nation is a mission for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. Every Russian submarine probing undersea infrastructure in the North Atlantic is a reminder of who owns the depths. Every Iranian fast boat swarming a merchant vessel in the Gulf is a test of resolve we cannot afford to fail.

The Western Pacific threat is maritime and aerospace. What Australia, Japan, the Philippines, New Zealand need most is help securing their maritime connections and their airspace. That is our lane.

All the argument points have been delivered to us on a plate. We have the receipts. And I’ve been frustrated for a while that the stars are aligned, the case is right there, but too much of our senior leadership would rather talk about “joint” — or worse, say nothing at all.

This isn’t parochial. It’s about the security of the Republic. We have secure land borders. Europe has the population and economy to handle most of its own land and air requirements. We don’t need to find ourselves in another land war in Asia. But we do have a unique, irreplaceable role at sea and in the air.

If conflict comes — something like what we’re watching off Iran right now — the best outcome for America is one where we limit our involvement to sea power and air power. That’s not isolationism. That’s strategy. It’s the argument we should be making every day, because it’s an easy argument to make — and right now, the world is making it for us.

Bill’s Takeaway

A few honest reflections after sitting with this conversation.

CDR Salamander is an exceptional teacher. His ability to move from a 1982 carrier nearly decommissioned by RAF budget politics to a 2026 British destroyer unable to use its main gun in the Red Sea — and have both illuminate the same structural failure — is a gift. I’d encourage every reader to go back through his answers on the global economy section slowly.

What he makes clear — and what most people never connect — is that we do not live in silos. The fertilizer derived from natural gas that feeds billions also underpins the modern technology supply chain. The strong economies in Southeast Asia that buffer against Chinese expansionism are the same economies that prevent mass migration crises from landing on our doorstep. Freedom of navigation isn’t an abstraction. It is the load-bearing wall of the modern world. Remove it and everything above it comes down.

That lesson applies closer to home too. The naval advocacy community has its own silo problem. Veterans organizations, individual advocates, civic groups, and policy voices are all making versions of the same argument — but separately, in parallel, without a unified message. A trade association of defense contractors speaks for an industry. A coalition of veterans, citizens, and civic advocates speaks for the Republic. Those are not the same thing, and the difference matters.

I don’t agree with everything he said. I want to be straightforward about that, because intellectual honesty is the only foundation worth building on.

His objection to burden-sharing — the mercenary framing — is one I take seriously. He made it with conviction and genuine feeling for the men and women who serve. I respect that completely.

But here’s my honest position: The United States is not operating from a position of unlimited fiscal strength. Debt-service costs are rising, readiness needs are growing, and the nations benefiting most from open sea lanes — China, India, Japan and South Korea among the largest — have an obligation to contribute to the cost of keeping them open. That isn’t mercenary. That’s arithmetic.

And here’s where I think CDR Salamander and I are actually closer than it might appear. His own instinct — Iceland buying diesel fuel, basing access, logistics support, the wagon driver — is a barter framework. Contributions in kind rather than cash. I’ll take it. That’s a step in the right direction. The principle that beneficiaries contribute is the thing that matters. The mechanism is a conversation worth having.

We will have more to say about the legislative path forward at StrongerNavy.org in the weeks ahead. Watch this space.

CDR Salamander and I share the core conviction: the United States is a maritime and aerospace power, the Navy is underfunded and structurally undermined, and the window to fix it is narrow. That is enough to work with.

Stronger together. Break the silos.

— Bill Cullifer
Americans for a Stronger Navy | StrongerNavy.org

About CDR Salamander

CDR Salamander is a retired U.S. Navy officer and former NATO staff officer. He has written at CDRSalamander.com for nearly two decades and publishes regularly on Substack. His post “Europe’s Say v. Do Problem” served as the starting point for this conversation.

About Americans for a Stronger Navy

I founded Americans for a Stronger Navy (StrongerNavy.org) after serving as a Quartermaster/helmsman aboard USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) in the 1970s. Our mission is simple: advocate for a properly funded, capable U.S. Navy as a cornerstone of American security and economic prosperity. Full audio of this interview is available at StrongerNavy.org.

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Understanding the U.S. Navy’s Industrial Challenge


The Questions Americans Deserve Answered (Part 1 of 8)

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

I served as a blue-water destroyer sailor in the 1970s, and like many veterans, I’ve spent the years since trying to understand how America maintains the naval strength that protects our country, our allies, and the global sea lanes we all depend on.

The charts and analysis below help tell part of that story.

This article is part of Charting the Course: Voices That Matter, our ongoing educational series exploring the future of American sea power and the policies, people, and industrial strength that sustain the U.S. Navy.

If you’re new to the series, you can start with the introduction here:
Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

This article also launches a focused 8-part series within Charting the Course examining some of the most important questions facing the Navy today — from shipbuilding capacity and fleet readiness to workforce challenges and the future of maritime deterrence.

We’re calling it The Questions Americans Deserve Answered.

For most Americans, the Navy is something we think about only in moments of crisis. A conflict erupts, a carrier group deploys, or a headline mentions tensions in the Pacific or the Middle East.

But the strength of the U.S. Navy is not decided during those moments. It is determined years — sometimes decades — earlier in shipyards, classrooms, industrial plants, research labs, and congressional hearings.

Today the United States faces serious questions about shipbuilding capacity, industrial readiness, and long-term naval strategy. China is building ships at a pace the world has not seen in generations. Russia continues to challenge Western stability at sea. Critical maritime infrastructure and supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

And yet many Americans remain understandably disconnected from the decisions shaping the future of our fleet.

The strength of the U.S. Navy is determined long before ships sail into crisis—it is built in shipyards, sustained by skilled workers, and shaped by decisions made years earlier in industry, technology, and national policy.

Why Americans Should Care

America is, and has always been, a maritime nation.

Nearly 90 percent of global trade moves by sea. The global economy depends on secure shipping lanes. Energy markets, supply chains, and the stability of democratic alliances all rely on freedom of navigation.

The U.S. Navy has quietly safeguarded those sea lanes for generations.

But maintaining that advantage requires more than ships — it requires people, industry, technology, and public understanding.

Chart: Global Operational Demand on the U.S. Navy

This Heritage Foundation chart illustrates the geographic reach of U.S. naval operations across multiple regions. Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups are routinely deployed worldwide, highlighting the constant global demand placed on the fleet.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Over the coming weeks, this series will explore several critical questions about the future of U.S. sea power.

Can America rebuild the shipbuilding capacity required to compete in a new era of great power competition?

Do we have enough skilled workers — engineers, welders, and naval architects — to sustain fleet growth?

How serious is the maintenance backlog affecting submarines and surface ships?

Are current procurement processes helping or hurting the Navy’s ability to modernize?

How should the United States balance aircraft carriers, submarines, uncrewed systems, and logistics platforms?

What role do civilian shipyards and maritime infrastructure play in national security?

Can the United States scale submarine production fast enough to match emerging threats?

And perhaps most importantly: how do we ensure the American public remains engaged in decisions that affect the future of the fleet?

These are not partisan questions. They are national questions.

Understanding the Industrial Challenge

Much of the discussion about naval power focuses on ships already at sea. But the true story begins on land — in America’s shipyards and industrial base.

Chart: Age Distribution of Chinese and U.S. Naval Fleets

This chart compares the age distribution of Chinese and U.S. naval fleets. China’s fleet contains a larger number of relatively new ships, reflecting rapid shipbuilding expansion in recent years.

China now possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding industry by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, American shipyards face workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and unpredictable funding cycles.

Chart: U.S. Navy Ships Nearing or Exceeding Service Life

This chart shows the growing number of U.S. Navy ships approaching — or exceeding — their expected service life, placing additional strain on fleet readiness and modernization timelines.

The Human Factor

Ships and technology matter — but ultimately the Navy is built on people.

From sailors standing watch at sea tonight to the skilled workers building submarines and carriers at home, the strength of the fleet depends on the dedication and expertise of thousands of Americans.

Implications for Our Allies

America does not operate alone at sea.

Alliances with countries such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners form a critical part of global maritime stability.

These partnerships reinforce an important truth: deterrence is strongest when democracies stand together.

Public Engagement Matters

The U.S. Navy ultimately belongs to the American people.

Yet the complexity of defense planning can make it difficult for citizens to understand how decisions about shipbuilding, budgets, and strategy affect national security.

That is one of the reasons we created StrongerNavy.org.

Our goal is simple: help Americans better understand the challenges facing the fleet, the industrial base that supports it, and the people who serve at sea and in shipyards across the country.

The Questions Americans Deserve Answered — Series Guide

Part 1 – Understanding the Industrial Challenge (this article)

Part 2 – Can America Rebuild Shipbuilding Capacity?

Part 3 – The Submarine Production Challenge

Part 4 – Maintenance and Fleet Readiness

Part 5 – Workforce and the Maritime Industrial Base

Part 6 – The Role of Allies in Sea Power

Part 7 – Procurement, Policy, and the Future Fleet

Part 8 – Why Public Engagement Matters

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — an ongoing
educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next.

Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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Strait of Hormuz: The Facts, The Warning, and What America Can Do

Special Report | March 5, 2026

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Cutting through the noise on the world’s most critical waterway — and why this moment calls for resolve, not panic.

There is a lot of noise right now about the Strait of Hormuz. Some of it is accurate. Some of it is not. All of it is loud. Before you form an opinion about what this crisis means — and what America should do about it — you deserve the facts, stated plainly, without an agenda.

That is what we do at StrongerNavy.org. Plain language. Verified facts. No spin.

What Is Actually Happening

The Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide waterway on Iran’s southern border — is the single maritime exit for the Persian Gulf. Every barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Iran that leaves by sea passes through this one gap. It carries 20% of the world’s oil and a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas. There is no alternative route. Ships that cannot use the strait must sail around the southern tip of Africa — adding two to three weeks to every voyage.

Since February 28, that strait has been effectively closed to nearly all commercial shipping. Let’s be precise about what that means.

It is legally open. The U.S. Central Command has confirmed the strait “remains open to international navigation.” Iran has not formally closed an international waterway — it cannot under maritime law.

It is operationally closed. Ship traffic is down 94%, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center. The world’s largest shipping companies — Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, CMA CGM — have all suspended transits. Approximately 750 ships are caught in or around the strait, unable to move.

The reason ships stopped is not Iran’s navy. It is marine insurance. A European regulatory framework called Solvency 2 requires insurers to hold capital sufficient for a once-in-200-year loss event at all times. When conflict escalated, insurers recalculated their exposure overnight. Cancelling war risk coverage takes seven days. Raising new capital takes months. The math was simple — and 90% of the world’s commercial fleet lost its coverage. As maritime historian Sal Mercogliano put it plainly on March 4: “It’s not the Iranians closing the strait. The decision was made by the shipping companies.”

Iran’s weapon is not its fleet. It is economic fear. And it has worked — for now.

What It Tells Us

None of this should be a surprise. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has been documented for decades. Naval planners have war-gamed this scenario repeatedly. The question was never whether it could happen. The question was whether America would be ready when it did.

On March 3, President Trump ordered the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide government war risk insurance for all maritime trade in the Gulf — effective immediately, at what he described as “a very reasonable price.” It was the right instinct. Private insurers had fled the market overnight, and the insurance gap — not Iranian guns — was what stopped the ships.

Whether it moves the needle remains to be seen. The shipping industry has signaled the offer may not be sufficient to restore confidence on its own. And if vessels are damaged, American taxpayers could face a bill in the hundreds of millions — potentially billions. The commitment is real. The details are still emerging.

On March 4, President Trump pledged the U.S. Navy would escort commercial tankers through the strait. Within hours, Lloyd’s List reported the Navy had privately told shipping industry leaders it does not currently have sufficient assets to fulfill that commitment. Approximately 125 ships transit the strait daily under normal conditions. The U.S. has roughly eight guided-missile destroyers and three Littoral Combat Ships in the region. As Mercogliano noted: “This is nowhere near enough assets. They just do not have the assets to do it.”

There are no frigates available — because the U.S. has not yet built a replacement frigate. The Littoral Combat Ships present cannot reliably provide air defense against drones and missiles, as the Red Sea campaign demonstrated. And even as U.S. forces degrade Iran’s conventional navy — including the March 4 torpedo sinking of the Iranian corvette IRS Dena, the first U.S. submarine sinking of a warship since World War II — the asymmetric threat remains. Drones, mines, and fast boats do not require a functioning navy. The Houthis proved that. The Ukrainians proved that in the Black Sea.

We also do not know the full readiness picture of the ships operating in the Gulf tonight — because the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey readiness reports have been classified since 2008. The American public cannot independently verify whether those vessels are fully mission-capable. That is unacceptable. #FreeTheData

The gap between the President’s public commitment and the Navy’s private assessment is not a failure of this administration alone. It is the accumulated result of a generation of deferred shipbuilding, underfunded shipyards, and what we have long called seablindness — America’s institutional tendency to underinvest in naval power during periods of relative peace, then scramble when a crisis arrives.

You cannot build a destroyer in a crisis. The fleet available tonight was determined by decisions made — and deferred — over the past decade.

We Have Been Here Before

I want to say something that tends to get lost in the noise: America has fixed this before.

I served aboard USS Henry B. Wilson in the 1970s. That was the hollow Navy — undermanned, underfunded, demoralized after Vietnam, outpaced by a Soviet fleet that was growing faster than ours. The readiness gap then was real. The threat was real. The concern among those of us who served was real.

And then America came together and fixed it.

The Reagan-era naval buildup — driven by bipartisan recognition that sea power was not optional for a global superpower — took a Navy that could barely sustain itself and rebuilt it into the 600-ship force that helped end the Cold War without firing a single shot at its primary adversary. It did not happen because of panic. It happened because enough Americans, in and out of uniform, looked at the problem clearly and decided the answer was investment, not retreat.

That is the moment we are in again. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not the end of the story. It is the alarm clock.

What America Does Now

The framework for action already exists. The President signed Executive Order 14269 restoring America’s maritime dominance. The Maritime Action Plan, released in February 2026, identified exactly the investments needed — shipbuilding capacity, workforce development, industrial base expansion, a Maritime Security Trust Fund with dedicated funding. The National Commission on the Future of the Navy is preparing public hearings in Q2 2026. The SHIPS for America Act has bipartisan support in Congress.

The architecture is there. What has been missing is national will — the public demand that elected representatives treat naval power as the non-negotiable strategic necessity it is.

That is what StrongerNavy.org exists to build. Not alarm. Not partisanship. Not finger-pointing. A clear-eyed, evidence-based, nonpartisan case that a strong Navy is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It is an American issue — as fundamental to our security and prosperity as any question before the country today.

The Strait of Hormuz will reopen. Insurance markets will recalibrate. Ships will move again. But the underlying readiness gap — the shipyard capacity shortfall, the escort deficit, the classified readiness reports, the two-theater question that nobody in Washington wants to answer plainly — will still be there the morning after.

The question is whether this crisis produces the national conversation that leads to real investment, or whether we absorb the shock, breathe a sigh of relief, and go back to sleep.

America does not have to choose seablindness. We chose our way into this. We can choose our way out.

“The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.” — John F. Kennedy

The sun is not shining right now. But when it does — and it will — let’s make sure we remember what this week felt like. And build accordingly.

Stay Informed. Stay Engaged.

StrongerNavy.org has been covering the naval readiness gap for over two years — plain language, verified facts, no spin. If this post was useful, share it with someone who needs to understand what is at stake. And follow our ongoing coverage as this crisis develops.

This is America’s wake-up call. What we do with it is up to us.

Sources: USNI News | Lloyd’s List | Bloomberg | CNBC | Axios | Breaking Defense | Navy Times | Seatrade Maritime | AAA | Kpler | S&P Global | Joint Maritime Information Center | U.S. Central Command | Rapidan Energy Group | U.S. Energy Information Administration | Sal Mercogliano, What’s Going On with Shipping (March 4, 2026)

 

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Inside the Navy’s Future: The Questions Americans Deserve Answered

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

As a former blue water sailor and founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, I learned early that naval strength is not defined by speeches or strategies alone. It is defined by readiness—by ships that work, sailors who are trained, and shipyards that can sustain them.

Over the past two years, through Americans for a Stronger Navy and StrongerNavy.org, I have worked to better understand the forces shaping the future of our Navy. What I have discovered is both reassuring and sobering.

Reassuring because the Navy’s leadership clearly understands the changing threat environment. Sobering because serious professionals—inside and outside the Navy—are actively debating how best to prepare for it.

This series is designed to help Americans understand that debate.

A Navy in Transition

The United States Navy is undergoing one of its most significant strategic transitions since the end of the Cold War. For decades, our Navy operated in an environment where it could project power with relative freedom. That era is over.

China now operates the world’s largest navy by ship count and continues expanding its industrial capacity at a pace unmatched in modern times. Russia remains a capable undersea competitor. Meanwhile, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and directed-energy weapons are changing how naval warfare may be conducted in the decades ahead.

The Navy’s leadership recognizes this reality. They are adapting strategy, exploring new technologies, and rethinking how naval forces will operate in the future. But within that effort, there are important and healthy debates—and Americans deserve to understand them.

Different Perspectives, Shared Purpose

Some leaders emphasize the continued importance of traditional crewed ships—destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers—as the backbone of naval power. Others emphasize the growing role unmanned systems may play in extending reach and enhancing survivability. Still others focus on the industrial foundation that makes both possible: shipyards, maintenance infrastructure, and workforce capacity.

These are not disagreements about the mission. They are discussions about how best to ensure the Navy remains ready, effective, and capable in a changing world. What unites these perspectives is a shared recognition that readiness requires sustained national support.

Ships must be built. Shipyards must be modernized. Sailors must be trained. Infrastructure must be maintained. None of this happens automatically.

Why Industrial Capacity Matters

One of the most important lessons from this work is that naval power is built on industrial strength. Strategy determines what the Navy needs to do. Industrial capacity determines whether it can do it.

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), our public and private shipyards, and the skilled workforce that supports them form the foundation of naval readiness. Without their ability to build, maintain, and modernize ships, even the best strategy cannot succeed.

This is not a criticism. It is simply reality—and it is why public understanding matters. Americans deserve to know how their Navy works, what challenges it faces, and what is required to sustain it for future generations.

From Understanding to Sustained Support: The Strategic SEAS Act

Understanding the challenge is the first step. Sustaining readiness over time requires structural solutions.

That is why Americans for a Stronger Navy developed the Strategic SEAS Act—a framework designed to provide predictable, sustained funding for shipbuilding capacity, shipyard modernization, workforce development, and allied maritime infrastructure. Its purpose is straightforward: to help ensure that the Navy and the maritime industrial base have the long-term support necessary to meet national security requirements.

The Strategic SEAS Act complements legislative efforts like the SHIPS Act by addressing a critical question: how to provide sustained, reliable funding to support the Navy’s long-term readiness. Readiness is not built in a year. It is built over decades.

Why This Matters Now

The decisions being made today—about ships, shipyards, technology, workforce, and sustained funding—will define America’s naval strength for the next generation. These decisions are being made now, in budget cycles and legislative sessions that most Americans never see.

Meanwhile, serious questions are being raised by experienced naval professionals, defense analysts, and members of Congress about whether America’s shipbuilding capacity and industrial base can support the strategy at the pace required. Those questions deserve honest, public answers.

This series is intended to provide that clarity—directly, responsibly, and in plain English.

The Questions This Series Will Address

Among them:

•  Are traditional ships like destroyers, submarines, and carriers still essential in the age of drones and autonomous systems?

•  Can unmanned systems truly enhance naval power—or are they being asked to do too much, too soon?

•  Is America’s shipbuilding and repair infrastructure strong enough to sustain the Navy the nation requires?

•  What role does Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) play in ensuring readiness—and what challenges does it face?

•  How does America’s shipbuilding capacity compare to China’s—and what does that mean strategically?

•  Can the Navy realistically surge its fleet when needed?

•  What role do Congress, industry, and the American people play in sustaining naval strength over time?

•  And most importantly: what must be done—practically, responsibly, and sustainably—to ensure the United States Navy remains ready to protect American interests for decades to come?

These are not political questions. They are national questions. And Americans deserve clear, honest answers.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects far more than military interests. It safeguards global commerce, deters conflict, reassures allies, and protects the economic system Americans depend on every day. When the Navy is ready, it helps preserve peace through strength. When industrial capacity declines, readiness becomes harder to sustain.

The decisions being made today will shape America’s naval strength for decades to come. Americans deserve to understand those decisions.

What This 8-Part Series Will Explore

In the weeks ahead, this series will examine why traditional naval ships remain essential, how unmanned systems are changing naval operations, the critical role of NAVSEA and America’s shipyards, the industrial and workforce foundation behind naval readiness, how China and other nations are approaching maritime power, how naval strength is sustained over time, and what must be done to ensure continued readiness.

This is not about choosing sides in a debate. It is about understanding the full picture—because an informed public is essential to sustaining a strong Navy.

Let’s get to work.

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Protecting America’s Naval Edge

Protecting America’s Naval Edge
Strategic competition, documented technology theft, and military-linked research highlight why protecting America’s technological advantage is essential to maintaining naval superiority.

Abstract

Naval power in the 21st century is shaped as much by technological innovation as by fleet size. Strategic competitors are investing heavily in research, industrial capacity, and military modernization to close the technological gap with the United States. This article analyzes the implications of documented research security concerns, the role of military-linked academic institutions, and the broader strategic environment, and argues that preserving America’s technological advantage requires informed public engagement, policy alignment, and sustained national awareness.

Introduction

For decades, America’s naval superiority rested on more than ships—it rested on technological advantage. That advantage was built in American shipyards, laboratories, universities, and research institutions. Today, that technological edge is being challenged by strategic competitors who have invested heavily in naval expansion, industrial capacity, and military-relevant technologies. Increasingly, naval professionals, policymakers, and national security experts are raising concerns about how technological competition is unfolding—and how little public awareness exists about its implications. Some documented cases involving technology theft, undisclosed foreign military-linked affiliations, and strategic research competition have received only limited public attention. Americans deserve to understand what is happening, why it matters, and what it means for the future strength of the United States Navy.

Naval Power Begins Long Before a Ship Is Built

Every modern U.S. Navy platform depends on breakthroughs in science and engineering:

  • Nuclear engineering enables submarine propulsion and carrier endurance
  • Advanced materials determine hull strength, stealth, and survivability
  • Semiconductors power radar, communications, and weapons systems
  • Artificial intelligence and autonomy are reshaping the future of naval warfare

The future DDG(X) destroyer, unmanned naval systems, and next-generation submarines will rely heavily on research happening today in American universities, national laboratories, and federally funded programs.

These institutions are essential to national strength.

But the knowledge they produce exists in a world defined by strategic competition.

Documented Cases Show the Risk Is Real

Concerns about research security are not theoretical. Federal investigations and criminal prosecutions have confirmed cases involving the theft of sensitive technology, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and illegal transfer of research with national security implications.

In January 2026, a U.S. federal jury convicted a former Google engineer of stealing more than 2,000 confidential artificial intelligence and supercomputing files and transferring them to entities linked to China. These technologies have direct military and intelligence applications.

In 2021, Harvard University professor Charles Lieber was convicted for failing to disclose his financial relationship with China’s Thousand Talents Program while receiving U.S. federal research funding. Federal authorities determined he had concealed foreign financial ties tied to a Chinese state-affiliated university.

U.S. authorities have also prosecuted multiple export control violations and research-related concealment cases involving sensitive technologies, including advanced materials, computing, and engineering fields directly relevant to military capability.

The FBI has warned repeatedly that China operates one of the most extensive technology acquisition efforts in modern history, targeting critical research sectors tied to national defense.

These are documented cases—not speculation.

What the “Seven Sons” Represent

U.S. government reports and independent research institutions have identified a group of Chinese universities known as the “Seven Sons of National Defense” as central to China’s military research and development ecosystem. These institutions maintain deep ties to China’s defense industry and serve as primary training grounds for engineers and scientists supporting naval, aerospace, and weapons development.

China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy explicitly integrates civilian research with military advancement, accelerating defense capability development.

This structural integration differs fundamentally from the decentralized American system and highlights the importance of protecting the technological advantage that underpins U.S. naval superiority.

Why Americans Are Only Beginning to Hear This Story

Many of these cases involving technology theft, undisclosed affiliations, and research security concerns have been publicly reported—but rarely remain in the national spotlight long enough for Americans to see the broader pattern.

Through our China Watch coverage, Americans for a Stronger Navy has documented the larger strategic picture: rapid Chinese naval expansion, sustained investment in military-relevant technologies, and long-term efforts to close the technological and industrial gap with the United States.

This is not a moment for panic—but it is a moment for awareness.

Naval superiority depends on technological leadership. And technological leadership depends on national awareness.

Congress Recognized the Challenge — But the Debate Continues

In 2025, Congress passed the SAFE Research Act in the House of Representatives to strengthen transparency and accountability in federally funded research involving foreign adversary-linked institutions.

However, the provision was removed from the final National Defense Authorization Act after opposition from major academic organizations.

Organizations raising concerns included:

  • Association of American Universities (AAU)
  • Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU)
  • American Physical Society (APS)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • Asian American Scholar Forum (AASF)

These organizations warned the legislation could harm scientific collaboration, innovation, and America’s ability to attract global talent.

Their concerns reflect legitimate interests in preserving America’s research leadership.

At the same time, the strategic competition affecting naval power continues to accelerate.

Both realities exist.

Why This Matters to the Future of the U.S. Navy

Naval superiority is no longer determined solely by fleet size.

It depends on maintaining technological leadership in:

  • Nuclear propulsion
  • Artificial intelligence
  • Advanced materials
  • Autonomous systems
  • Sensors, communications, and computing

These technologies determine whether future American ships remain dominant—or vulnerable.

Shipbuilding matters. Industrial capacity matters. But technological leadership remains decisive.

If America protects its technological edge, it protects its naval advantage.

If it does not, ship numbers alone will not be enough.

Why Americans Should Care

The U.S. Navy protects global trade, deters conflict, and secures the maritime foundation of the American economy.

Every American depends on maritime security.

But naval strength requires more than ships. It requires public awareness, industrial strength, and national alignment.

Americans cannot support what they do not understand.

That is why awareness matters.

Conclusion: A National Conversation Worth Having

America’s openness has fueled generations of innovation and built the most capable Navy in history.

But strategic competitors have studied our system, invested heavily, and worked deliberately to close the gap.

The question is not whether America should remain open.

The question is whether America will remain aware.

Naval superiority cannot be taken for granted. It must be protected—not just in shipyards, but in laboratories, in policy decisions, and in the national will of the American people.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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The Arctic is a New Front Line: Senator Sullivan is Right, and We Need a Stronger Navy Now

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer
Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy

Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) recently highlighted a critical shift in global geopolitics: the Arctic is no longer a distant, icy frontier—it is a burgeoning front line. As Russia and China actively challenge American interests in the High North, the urgency that Americans for a Stronger Navy has long advocated is now more apparent than ever.

A recent Wall Street Journal report detailed a chilling technological milestone: Chinese research submarines have successfully navigated thousands of feet beneath the Arctic ice for the first time. This is far more than a scientific expedition; it is a clear military and commercial signal. As Senator Sullivan warns, these “incursions” test our defenses. In the eyes of authoritarian regimes, the only language that resonates is power.

Projecting Power in the Arctic

Senator Sullivan identifies several pillars critical to securing our northern flank:

  • Accelerated Icebreaker Production: Our current fleet is woefully inadequate compared to Russia’s. Establishing a persistent presence requires homeporting new, capable icebreakers directly in Alaska.
  • Enhanced Missile Defense: Strengthening Alaska’s defense infrastructure is vital to protecting the homeland from trans-polar threats.
  • Energy Dominance: Unleashing Alaskan energy resources is a matter of national security, reducing dependence on foreign adversaries.
  • Strategic Infrastructure: Developing Adak and Nome into robust operational hubs ensures our forces have the reach to project power throughout the Arctic.

Our Call to Action

We fully endorse the Senator’s call to “keep the pedal to the metal.” However, true Arctic security requires a Stronger Navy fully integrated with the Coast Guard’s mission. To secure the High North, we must:

  • Close the Icebreaker Gap: We need a sustained shipbuilding plan that delivers Polar Security Cutters on schedule while exploring advanced naval platforms for icy environments.
  • Invest in Undersea Domain Awareness: The breakthrough in Chinese submarine capabilities demands a sophisticated response in undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
  • Strengthen Arctic Logistics: Our fleet needs resilient, forward-operating bases like Nome to maintain a 24/7 deterrent posture.

The Arctic is a vital theater for global trade and strategic maneuver. Senator Sullivan is providing the leadership Alaska—and the nation—needs. Americans for a Stronger Navy stands ready to advocate for the maritime power necessary to ensure “Peace through Strength” extends to the High North.

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China’s “Floating Great Wall” Just Rehearsed a Sea-Lane Blockade — And Most Americans Didn’t Notice

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This wasn’t a military drill. It was lawfare, logistics warfare, and supply-chain coercion in plain sight.

In late December and again in January, thousands of Chinese “fishing vessels” formed long, coordinated lines and rectangles across major shipping lanes in the East China Sea near Taiwan. Cargo ships were forced to zigzag through the formation. AIS signals were active. The message was visible to the world.

These were not fishing expeditions.

They were rehearsals.

And they revealed something most Americans never think about: control of sea lanes doesn’t require missiles or warships. It can be done with civilian hulls, legal ambiguity, and scale.

China’s maritime militia — civilian fishing vessels operating under military direction — just demonstrated how to create a floating wall across global commerce.

What Happened — And Why It Matters

China assembled formations of up to 2,000 vessels stretching for hundreds of miles. Analysts noted the precision, coordination, and positioning near critical routes. Many of these boats are part of a maritime militia that operates alongside the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Liberation Army Navy, often blurring the line between civilian and military activity.

Under international maritime law, warships must “give way” to vessels engaged in fishing. That legal protection becomes a weapon when the “fishing fleet” is massed, directed, and used for coercion.

This is lawfare at sea.

No shots fired. No war declared. But commercial traffic disrupted, insurance risk raised, and a Navy forced into hesitation by the rules it respects.

Why Americans Should Care

More than one-third of global trade transits the waters around Taiwan and the East and South China Seas. The goods on American shelves, the energy markets we depend on, the components in our technology supply chains all pass through sea lanes like these.

China just practiced how to slow shipping without firing a shot, raise costs for global commerce, create economic pressure on rivals, complicate lawful naval responses, and establish coercive control over maritime arteries.

This is not about Taiwan alone.

This is about the arteries of the global economy.

Implications for the Navy

The United States Navy is built to deter fleets, submarines, missiles, and aircraft. But this tactic targets something different: the legal and operational space between peace and war.

A destroyer captain facing 2,000 “fishing boats” cannot treat them like warships. A collision becomes an international incident. Determining which vessels are legitimate military targets becomes nearly impossible in real time.

China understands this.

And they are practicing it in daylight.

Implications for Our Allies

This tactic has already been used against the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in the South China Sea. It pressures smaller nations to back down without Beijing ever crossing the threshold into open conflict.

For allies who rely on these sea lanes such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners, this is a preview of how maritime coercion can be applied gradually, persistently, and legally ambiguously.

The Industrial Reality Behind the Strategy

China can do this because it possesses the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet, tens of thousands of industrial vessels that can be mobilized at scale.

The United States cannot.

This is not simply a Navy gap. It is an American maritime industrial gap.

Civilian maritime capacity, shipbuilding, port infrastructure, and merchant marine strength are not side issues. They are central to national security in an era where civilian hulls can be weaponized for state power.

The Real Headline

China just demonstrated it can interfere with the sea lanes that feed the American economy using fishing boats.

That should get our attention.

Because naval strength is not just about ships with guns. It is about protecting the lawful flow of commerce across oceans that most Americans never see but depend on every day.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

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China’s Fishing Fleet Isn’t Just About Fish — It’s About Power

Over the past several years, hundreds — sometimes thousands — of Chinese fishing vessels have been observed assembling in concentrated groups across the South China Sea, the Western Pacific, and even far beyond Asia. At first glance, it looks like industrial fishing on a massive scale.

But this story isn’t really about fish.

It’s about state power, maritime control, and what happens when economic activity and national strategy blur at sea.

What’s Actually Happening

China operates the largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world, numbering in the thousands of vessels. Many of these ships operate far from China’s coast, often for months at a time, supported by at-sea logistics ships that refuel and resupply them.

Satellite imagery and maritime tracking data have repeatedly shown large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels assembling in coordinated formations, sometimes near disputed waters or critical sea lanes.

This isn’t random.

These fleets move, loiter, disperse, and regroup in ways that mirror organized maritime behavior, not independent commercial fishing.

Why Americans Should Care

Most Americans don’t think about fishing fleets as a national security issue — but they should.

  • These vessels strip global fish stocks, threatening food security for developing nations and destabilizing regional economies.
  • They operate in areas where the U.S. Navy and allied navies must already maintain freedom of navigation.
  • They complicate maritime awareness — overwhelming sensors, patrols, and coast guards simply by their sheer numbers.

When hundreds of ships show up in one place, they change the facts on the water without firing a shot.

That matters to global trade, stability, and ultimately American prosperity.

The Gray Zone at Sea

China’s fishing fleet often operates in what strategists call the “gray zone” — the space between peace and conflict.

These vessels are nominally civilian, but many:

  • Receive state subsidies
  • Share information with maritime authorities
  • Operate alongside coast guard and naval units
  • Assert presence in disputed waters without overt military force

This creates plausible deniability while advancing national objectives.

It’s influence without invasion.

Implications for the U.S. Navy

Every large-scale fleet operating overseas demands attention, monitoring, and resources.

That means:

  • More patrols
  • More intelligence collection
  • More strain on an already stretched Navy and Coast Guard
  • More coordination with allies who face the same challenge

The U.S. Navy isn’t just deterring warships anymore — it’s managing mass maritime pressure created by civilian fleets backed by state power.

This Isn’t About Hating China — It’s About Seeing Clearly

This isn’t anti-China rhetoric. It’s pro-reality.

If you ever doubted China’s long-term maritime intentions, the scale and coordination of these fishing fleets should give you pause. Nations don’t build and sustain fleets of this size accidentally. They do it because the sea matters — economically, strategically, and politically.

Ignoring that reality doesn’t make it go away.

What Comes Next

The real question isn’t whether China will continue expanding its maritime reach — it will.

The question is whether Americans understand:

  • Why the Navy matters beyond wartime
  • Why sea control protects everyday life
  • Why economic power and maritime power are inseparable

That understanding is what ultimately determines whether the U.S. can respond smartly, calmly, and effectively.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.
Let’s roll.

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Open Letter to PM Starmer: Security Gaps in the UK-Mauritius Chagos Agreement

Diego Garcia represents the cornerstone of American naval power in the Indian Ocean—a facility that enables critical operations from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The recently signed UK-Mauritius agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, while intended to resolve a long-standing legal dispute, introduces serious security vulnerabilities that could compromise this vital base. After extensive review of the agreement, parliamentary documents, and expert analysis, Americans for a Stronger Navy has drafted an open letter to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer outlining our concerns and requesting strengthening of security provisions before final ratification. We publish this letter in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized the Special Relationship between our nations.

Key Concerns Raised:

Chinese Influence Risk: Mauritius maintains extensive economic ties with China, creating potential vectors for Beijing to establish surveillance capabilities on islands adjacent to Diego Garcia. The agreement’s prohibitions on foreign military presence may not cover civilian-flagged intelligence operations.

Weakened Control Structure: The transformation from British sovereign territory to a complex lease arrangement (UK leasing from Mauritius, US operating through UK) introduces political and legal vulnerabilities. American naval operations now depend on the stability of agreements between three parties rather than operating on secure sovereign territory.

Insufficient Security Guarantees: The agreement lacks robust enforcement mechanisms to prevent hostile powers from accessing outer islands for monitoring or influence operations. Ambiguities in defining prohibited activities could be exploited by adversaries operating under civilian cover.

Political Uncertainty: Changes in Mauritian government leadership create long-term risks. The current government has already ordered an independent review, and future administrations spanning the 99-year lease period may face economic pressure from China to renegotiate or modify terms.

What We Request:

  • Explicit provisions prohibiting Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on outer islands with clear enforcement
  • Joint UK-US monitoring and patrol authority across the archipelago
  • Automatic termination clauses if security provisions are violated
  • U.S. participation as a treaty party or guarantor for direct legal standing
  • Enhanced parliamentary scrutiny before final ratification

The Bottom Line: Diego Garcia’s strategic value has never been higher as great power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific. While we respect the UK’s efforts to address the historical injustice to the Chagossian people, justice and security need not be mutually exclusive. We urge strengthening this agreement before ratification to ensure this critical base remains secure for generations to come.

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE KEIR STARMER MP
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Agreement

From: Americans for a Stronger Navy
January 21, 2026

Dear Prime Minister,

We write to you as fellow guardians of the free world, united by history, shared values, and an unbreakable commitment to democratic liberty. The Special Relationship between our nations has been forged in the crucible of two world wars, sustained through the Cold War, and renewed in our common struggle against terrorism and authoritarianism. It is precisely because of this deep bond that we feel compelled to address our serious concerns regarding the recently signed agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

This letter is written not in criticism, but in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized Anglo-American relations. We believe the current agreement, while well-intentioned, poses risks to our shared security interests that must be addressed before ratification becomes irreversible.

THE STAKES ARE HIGHER THAN EVER

Diego Garcia is not merely a military installation—it is the keystone of Western power projection in the Indian Ocean. From this small atoll, our nations have:

  • Defeated terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Iraq
  • Countered Iranian aggression and Houthi attacks on international shipping
  • Protected vital sea lanes carrying half the world’s containerized cargo
  • Maintained stability in a region increasingly contested by China’s expanding naval presence

Today, as China constructs military facilities across the South China Sea, as Russia threatens European security, and as Iran destabilizes the Middle East, the strategic value of Diego Garcia has never been greater. Yet at this critical juncture, the agreement with Mauritius introduces vulnerabilities that our adversaries will certainly seek to exploit.

OUR CONCERNS AS ALLIES

1. The Shadow of Chinese Influence

Mauritius, a small island nation, has become deeply economically dependent on China. Chinese investment pervades Mauritian infrastructure—ports, telecommunications, energy. This is not coincidence; it is the systematic implementation of Beijing’s strategy to gain leverage over nations along critical maritime routes.

We must ask: What guarantees exist that a future Mauritian government, facing economic pressure from Beijing, will not grant China “civilian” access to the outer islands? What prevents the establishment of “research stations,” “telecommunications facilities,” or “environmental monitoring posts” that serve as covers for signals intelligence operations?

The agreement’s language prohibiting foreign armed forces is insufficient. China has mastered the art of military operations under civilian guise. Islands merely miles from Diego Garcia could become surveillance platforms monitoring every ship, submarine, and aircraft movement—intelligence that would be instantly shared with Russia, Iran, and other adversaries.

2. From Sovereignty to Lease: A Dangerous Transformation

For decades, Diego Garcia operated on British sovereign territory. This provided legal certainty and operational security. Now, under the new arrangement, the United Kingdom must lease Diego Garcia from Mauritius at a cost of $136 million annually—and the United States operates at Diego Garcia under a further sublease arrangement with the UK.

This creates a cascading dependency. American naval operations now rest upon:

  • British adherence to the lease terms
  • Mauritian governments honoring their predecessors’ commitments
  • Both nations resisting external pressure to renegotiate or restrict operations

History teaches us that 99-year leases are not permanent. China’s 99-year lease of Hong Kong ended in humiliation for the West. We cannot allow Diego Garcia to follow the same path.

3. Political Instability and Long-Term Uncertainty

The current Mauritian government has already ordered an independent review of the agreement negotiated by its predecessor. Opposition parties criticize the deal. Future elections will bring new leaders with new priorities, new pressures, and potentially new patrons.

Over 99 years, Mauritius will see dozens of governments. Can we truly be confident that all of them will prioritize Western security interests over economic inducements from Beijing? The agreement provides insufficient mechanisms to prevent a future Mauritian government from effectively weaponizing the lease against Allied interests.

4. Legal and Historical Justice vs. Strategic Reality

We understand the moral arguments underlying this agreement. The forced removal of the Chagossians was a grave injustice that demands acknowledgment and remedy. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion and UN General Assembly resolutions created legal and political pressure.

But we must also recognize that international law is not self-executing and that advisory opinions do not carry binding force. The United Kingdom acted under the legitimate belief that resolving this dispute was necessary—yet in doing so, it may have exchanged one set of problems for far graver ones.

Justice for the Chagossians and security for the free world are not mutually exclusive. Better solutions existed—and may still exist—that address historical wrongs without compromising the strategic foundation of Indo-Pacific security.

WHAT WE ASK OF YOUR GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister, we do not ask the United Kingdom to repudiate this agreement outright. We recognize that your government has acted in good faith, seeking to resolve a complex legal and moral situation. What we ask is that, before final ratification, you consider strengthening the agreement to address the security vulnerabilities we have identified.

Specifically, we respectfully urge:

For Your Government:

  • Negotiate explicit provisions prohibiting any Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on the outer islands, with clear enforcement mechanisms
  • Establish joint UK-US monitoring and patrol of the archipelago with authority to prevent unauthorized activities
  • Include automatic termination clauses if Mauritius violates security provisions or grants access to adversary nations
  • Secure American participation as a treaty party or guarantor, giving the United States direct legal standing

For Parliament:

  • Conduct thorough scrutiny of the agreement’s security implications before ratification
  • Demand full transparency regarding payment terms and any side agreements with Mauritius
  • Require regular reporting to Parliament on compliance with security provisions

For the British People:

  • Recognize that Diego Garcia represents not just American interests, but British interests and the interests of the entire free world. This is not a matter of American imperialism—it is a matter of collective defense of the international order that has brought unprecedented prosperity and peace.

THE WAY FORWARD: PARTNERSHIP, NOT DIVISION

Some will say we are being alarmist. They will argue that Mauritius is a democracy, that China’s influence is exaggerated, that the 99-year lease provides sufficient security. We respectfully but firmly disagree.

In 1997, many believed Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” would endure. In the early 2000s, few imagined China would militarize the South China Sea. In 2014, the West was shocked when Russia annexed Crimea. Again and again, we have learned that authoritarian powers exploit every opening, every ambiguity, every moment of Western inattention.

We cannot afford such complacency at Diego Garcia. The Indo-Pacific theater is where the fate of the 21st century will be decided. Chinese naval expansion, the militarization of artificial islands, aggressive territorial claims, and economic coercion of smaller nations—all of this points to a future where freedom of navigation and the rule of law are under assault.

Diego Garcia is our insurance policy against that future. It must remain invulnerable, legally secure, and operationally unrestricted. The current agreement, as written, does not provide these assurances.

A CALL TO ACTION

Prime Minister, we urge you to pause, reconsider, and strengthen this agreement before it becomes irreversible. History will not judge kindly those who prioritized legal formalism over strategic necessity at such a critical moment.

To the British people: Understand that your government is making a decision with consequences that will echo for generations. Diego Garcia is not a relic of empire to be shed in pursuit of moral absolution. It is a shield protecting your nation, our nation, and the free world from those who would overthrow the international order.

To our American leaders: Stand with our British allies, but make clear that we cannot accept an arrangement that compromises the security foundation of our Indo-Pacific strategy. If necessary, pursue alternative arrangements that preserve American access to Diego Garcia under conditions we can trust.

The United States and United Kingdom have stood together through our darkest hours. We fought side by side against fascism, communism, and terrorism. That partnership endures because we share not just interests but values—democracy, liberty, and the rule of law.

Today, we face new threats from authoritarian powers who respect only strength and exploit every weakness. The Chagos agreement, in its current form, creates weakness where we desperately need strength. We can do better. We must do better.

We write not as adversaries, but as friends. Not to divide, but to unite. Not to criticize, but to protect that which we have built together and must defend together.

The Special Relationship demands nothing less than total candor. In that spirit, we ask: strengthen this agreement, secure Diego Garcia, and ensure that the beacon of freedom in the Indian Ocean continues to shine brightly for generations to come.

Respectfully and in friendship,

Americans for a Stronger Navy

On behalf of Americans who cherish the Special Relationship
and recognize that our security is inseparable from yours

Contact:
Americans for a Stronger Navy
StrongerNavy.org
StrongerNavy.org/blog

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China’s New Invasion Barges Reveal a Bigger Truth About Modern Power

Chinese Shuiqiao-class invasion barges

What Just Happened

Between January 11 and 15, 2026, China deployed three newly built Shuiqiao-class invasion barges to Nansan Island in the South China Sea. These are not ordinary ships. They are mobile, self-deploying logistics platforms designed to create instant docks, temporary ports, and heavy equipment offload points where no infrastructure exists.

Each barge can drive into shallow water, jack itself above the surface, and deploy roadway systems that turn open coastline into a functioning logistics hub.

This is not experimentation. This is rehearsal.

China is practicing how to build ports on demand.

Why This Is Different

Most people imagine amphibious invasions as waves of troops and armored vehicles storming beaches.

That image is outdated.

Modern war is won by logistics.

Fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, medical care, maintenance, and the continuous movement of people and equipment matter more than the first landing. Whoever sustains operations longest wins.

These barges are not weapons.
They are infrastructure.

And infrastructure is what makes everything else possible.

By deploying these platforms, China is demonstrating its ability to:

  • Create instant ports
  • Establish temporary logistics hubs
  • Sustain forces across islands
  • Operate without fixed bases
  • Support heavy equipment transfers
  • Expand control incrementally

This is how power is consolidated in the 21st century.

My Commentary

If you once doubted China’s intentions, think again.

This is not defensive infrastructure. This is not routine maritime development. This is not a commercial experiment.

This is about control.

This is about reach.

This is about being able to move, land, supply, reinforce, and sustain military forces wherever and whenever they choose.

You don’t build mobile ports unless you intend to use them.

This is not about one island.
This is about a system.

Why Americans Should Care

Naval power is not a platform.
It is a system.

Ships, ports, logistics, repair facilities, supply chains, workforce, industrial capacity, and governance all matter.

China understands this.

That’s why it is investing in portable infrastructure, modular logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities—while the United States struggles with:

  • Aging sealift
  • Fragile port security
  • Long shipyard delays
  • Limited surge capacity
  • Shrinking industrial depth
  • Vulnerable maritime infrastructure

Power today is not just about firepower.

It is about who can show up, stay, and sustain.

China is building that capability deliberately.

What This Signals About China’s Strategy

This development aligns with a broader pattern:

  • Artificial islands
  • Dual-use ports
  • Civil-military fusion
  • Expeditionary logistics
  • Rapid infrastructure construction
  • Maritime normalization

China is not just building ships.

It is building the scaffolding of dominance.

And it is doing so quietly, persistently, and methodically.

This is how territorial control is modernized.

This Is a Governance Issue, Not Just a Military One

Military capability does not appear by accident.

It is built through alignment:

National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness

China is aligning all five.

The United States is not.

We debate platforms.
They build systems.

We argue procurement.
They build logistics.

We delay shipyards.
They build mobile ports.

This is not about spending more.
It is about thinking differently.

What Must Change

America must stop treating naval strength as a niche defense topic.

It is economic security.
It is supply chain security.
It is alliance credibility.
It is deterrence.
It is peace.

If we fail to understand how power is now constructed, we will lose it without a single dramatic moment.

That is the real danger.

Not invasion headlines.
Not dramatic conflict.

But quiet displacement.

Closing

China just showed us something important.

Not with missiles.
Not with warships.
But with infrastructure.

And that should worry anyone who believes in a free, open, and stable maritime world.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.