America at Sea: Clay Wirsing on Momentum, Shipyard Capacity and Building What We Know

America at Sea: Voices That Matter continues with Clay Wirsing, founder of U.S. Maritime Action. Clay started his career as a welding engineer at Newport News Shipbuilding. He answers the same three questions we ask everyone, from the shipyard floor up.

New to the SHIPS for America Act? Clay gets into the details, so you may want to start with our plain-English primer.

Join the conversation. Reply to the post above on X and tell us what’s working, what’s in the way, and what you’d fix first.

What we heard

What’s working: momentum. Clay sees real energy behind the SHIPS for America Act and more public attention to maritime policy than ever. He calls it “an overwhelmingly positive bill for the maritime industry.”

What’s in the way: shipyard capacity. Clay walks through j JM mmthree parts of the bill and asks whether our yards can deliver. The cargo rules for government cargo, imports from China and LNG exports would each call for more U.S. ships than today’s yards can build quickly. The yards that build commercial ships produce about five ships a year at peak, many are tied up with government work, and there’s already a shortage of welders and other tradesmen.

“I like the initiative behind this. I think it’s just getting a little bit ahead of ourselves.” — Clay Wirsing

What he’d fix first: start with what we know how to build. Begin with standard tankers, container ships and bulk carriers, including bulk carriers to secure supply chains like rare earth elements, before moving to complex LNG carriers. Phase the government cargo requirement in, at something like 75 to 90 percent, as the fleet grows.

The long view. China revisits its maritime policy every five to ten years. The United States hasn’t made a major update since the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. “It’s long overdue,” Clay says, and the work shouldn’t stop with one bill.

The three questions

1. What’s working right now that we should do more of?
2. What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?
3. If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

Transcript

Lightly edited for readability.

Bill Cullifer: Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy. Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Today we hear from Clay Wirsing, founder of U.S. Maritime Action in San Diego. He started his career on the shipyard floor in Newport News, Virginia. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d like to fix first. Clay, over to you.

Introduction

Clay Wirsing: My name is Clay Wirsing. I started off as a welding engineer back in 2017 at Newport News Shipbuilding. At the time I really didn’t have any idea what the global situation was with shipbuilding or maritime. And I can remember about a year after I started, some high-level officials from the Navy came in and talked to us about speeding up the pace of our shipyard in order to compete with China. That was kind of my first introduction to how far we’ve fallen behind as a maritime nation, especially in shipbuilding.

Unfortunately, not a lot has changed since then in terms of actual shipbuilding capacity, but we do now see a ton of momentum, which has been great to see, with the SHIPS for America Act, and a lot more public recognition of what’s going on. And so I just want to continue to contribute to that, and hope to see more people join the movement and let our politicians know that maritime is an important space for both our economy and national defense, and we need to have the right laws and policies that allow us to succeed in that domain.

What’s working right now that we should do more of?

I love the momentum that’s being built up behind the SHIPS for America Act. It’s great to see that there’s a lot of attention to our maritime policy and laws, and that’s becoming more recognized by the public. And I think we need to just continue to join that discussion and get as many people involved, to let our politicians know that maritime policy is an important part of our country.

The SHIPS for America Act is an overwhelmingly positive bill for the maritime industry. I think there are some little tweaks that I would urge our politicians to consider, to better suit the needs of our maritime industry and also have realistic policy.

What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?

In section 412 of the bill, there is a mandate for 100% U.S. government cargo preference going to U.S.-flag ships. I think this is a great initiative, but we might be a little bit ahead of ourselves just because of the small size of the U.S. fleet. If we increase this more modestly, to something like 75% or even 90%, then it does give us a little bit of flexibility when we don’t have U.S. ships available to take our government cargoes. And I think that’s something we could revisit down the line. Assuming our fleet does grow, we will be able to have 100% government cargo preference in the future.

Section 415 mandates that within 15 years, 10% of all cargo imported from China to the U.S. will be carried on U.S.-flagged vessels. Currently there are about a million TEU, twenty-foot equivalent containers, shipped from China to the U.S. each year. We’re only carrying about 2 to 3% of that trade currently, and that’s all through Matson’s CLX line. So to carry 10% of that trade, I think we’re looking at either 10 very large ships or around 50 container ships. And the shipyards we have doing commercial work right now aren’t really large enough to build these huge container ships. It’ll basically lead to a point where we need to build a lot of ships in a very short amount of time, which I don’t think is realistic. Again, I like the initiative behind this. I think it’s just getting a little bit ahead of ourselves.

Another section that might be problematic is section 420, which requires that 15% of total seaborne LNG exports be carried on U.S.-flag vessels by 2043. This is going to require somewhere between 15 and 25 LNG ships, depending on their size. LNG ships these days are quite large. They’re actually much bigger than the ships currently built at General Dynamics NASSCO or Hanwha Philly Shipyard, and those shipyards are building about five ships per year in total at their peak capacity. We currently see a lot of these shipyards tied up with government contracts, so I don’t think there’s a lot of capacity to take on LNG work. On top of that, LNG vessels are pretty complex to build, especially their containment tanks. And we already have shortages of welders and other tradesmen, which will make it difficult to build these in a cost- and time-effective manner.

If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

I think it would be better to start off with a more reasonable ship type, things that we’ve already built: standard oil tankers, container ships, or maybe even a simple ship type like bulk carriers to secure our rare earth elements or other parts of our supply chain, rather than going straight for the complex LNG vessels. Again, I like the sentiment behind this. I just think we’re not quite where we need to be with yard capacity to pull off some of the shipbuilding requirements laid out in this bill.

A lot of countries, especially China, are revisiting their maritime policy every five years, maybe a decade or so. The U.S. hasn’t really had a major effort in revisiting or revising its policy since the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. So it’s long overdue. I hope to see some bills like the SHIPS for America Act come through and pass in Congress, and then, not only that, but as we continue to move forward as a nation, that we continually revisit these issues and make sure that our maritime laws and policies are appropriate for the conditions we face in our current period.

While we argue, China plans. It’s time we started building.

Americans for a Stronger Navy is a nonpartisan not for proft organization. 

THE CASE FOR A MARITIME SECURITY ADVISOR

WHAT IS THE SHIPS FOR AMERICA ACT?

For readers new to this: the SHIPS for America Act (S. 1541 / H.R. 3151) is a bipartisan, bicameral bill—introduced by Sen. Mark Kelly, Sen. Todd Young, Rep. Trent Kelly, and Rep. John Garamendi—aimed at reversing decades of decline in the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base and the American-flagged merchant fleet. Its core provisions include rebuilding domestic shipyard capacity, growing and training a maritime workforce, expanding cargo preference requirements that favor U.S.-flagged vessels, and establishing a Maritime Security Trust Fund to reinvest industry fees back into maritime infrastructure. Its core provisions are currently riding inside the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8800), which passed the House in July but remains stalled in the Senate as of this writing. One of its most structurally important provisions is the subject of this piece: the creation of a Maritime Security Advisor and Maritime Security Board inside the White House.

BACKGROUNDER — FIRST IN A SERIES

This is the first in a series examining the Maritime Security Advisor role created by the SHIPS for America Act—a new White House post that could end up mattering more than almost anything else in the coming maritime revival. This piece lays the groundwork: what the role actually controls, why it was created, and why the decision about who leads it deserves public attention now, before it’s resolved one way or another. Later pieces in this series will look more closely at the landscape of who could fill it, how it fits into the broader package of maritime legislation moving through Congress this fall, and what coordination work is already happening inside the administration to prepare the ground for it.


Most of the public debate over the SHIPS for America Act has focused on ships—fleet targets, funding mechanisms, shipyard capacity. Getting far less attention, though it’s been argued for by the people actually working this issue for well over a year, is a provision in Title I of the bill that may end up mattering as much as any of that: the creation of a new Maritime Security Advisor, housed in the Executive Office of the President. If the bill becomes law, this single office could do more to fix America’s maritime coordination problem than any funding mechanism in the bill.

The Problem This Position Is Designed to Solve

Right now, no single person in the federal government is responsible for American maritime strategy as a whole. The Navy, the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and Military Sealift Command all operate in their own lanes, reporting up through different departments, with different budgets and different priorities [1]. The National Security Council has directors for regions and for functional issues like counterterrorism—but nobody with a standing brief to ask “what is America’s maritime strategy?” and get everyone else in the building to answer to it [1].

The Heritage Foundation’s own analysis of the maritime legislative landscape makes a related structural point: with four separate bills moving through different committees—SHIPS for America, the Shipbuilding Investment and Workforce Act, the FLEETS Now Act, and the Ready Reserve Force Modernization Accountability Act—the risk isn’t a shortage of good ideas. It’s that good ideas arrive at conference as competing claims on the same floor time rather than as a coordinated package [2]. A standing coordinating office would help avoid that same fragmentation once bills become law and start needing joint implementation.

What the Job Actually Controls

The bill text gives the Maritime Security Advisor real authority, not just a podium. As a Special Advisor to the President, the position chairs a Maritime Security Board that spans every federal agency with a stake in the maritime domain [3]. Its responsibilities include:

— Developing, updating, and implementing the National Maritime Strategy [3]
— Setting fleet-size targets for the U.S.-flagged commercial fleet [3]
— Independent oversight of federal cargo preference programs [3]
— Coordinating the national maritime workforce buildout [3]
— Setting R&D priorities for next-generation shipbuilding technology [3]
— Aligning federal policy to favor U.S.-flagged vessels in international commerce [3]
— Protecting U.S. vessels from physical and cyber threats [3]

Put simply, this office doesn’t just advise on maritime policy from the sidelines—it runs point on it, across every department that touches a ship, from the Pentagon to the Department of Commerce to the Federal Maritime Commission.

A position with real cross-agency authority is only useful if the person in it can actually use that authority—which means the credentials and judgment of whoever fills this chair will matter as much as the statute that creates it.

Why This Is Bigger Than It Looks

It’s worth being precise about scale here. The Maritime Administrator at MARAD is a real and important job—but it’s a single-agency post inside the Department of Transportation, with authority bounded by MARAD’s own statutory mission. The Maritime Security Advisor sits above that, in the West Wing, with a mandate that spans defense, commerce, transportation, and diplomacy simultaneously. It’s the closest thing the American maritime enterprise has ever had to a single point of accountability.

This Office Doesn’t Need to Wait for Congress

Here’s what’s easy to miss: the President doesn’t need the SHIPS Act to sign this office into existence. In a July 2025 Heritage Foundation report, Senior Research Fellow Brent Sadler argued exactly that—the President “should not wait for the [SHIPS Act] to reach his desk” and could name a Maritime Security Advisor directly, tied to the interagency framework already called for in his April 2025 executive order “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” [5]. On that reading, the SHIPS Act doesn’t create this idea so much as it would make permanent, by statute, something the executive branch already has the authority to stand up on its own.

Where the Legislation Actually Stands

The House passed its version of the FY27 NDAA (H.R. 8800) on July 22, 216–212. The Senate’s companion bill (S. 4784) has stalled: a cloture vote to begin floor debate failed 50–46 on July 14, and as of early September, the Senate had taken no further procedural steps to bring it up [4]. Recent NDAA cycles have often skipped a formal conference committee in favor of informal House-Senate negotiation, so even “conference” may understate how this ultimately gets resolved.

None of that changes the underlying stakes. If anything, a stalled bill is exactly the moment when it’s worth being public about what’s riding on it—and a reminder that the executive branch doesn’t have to wait on the Senate to act.


References
[1] Heritage Foundation research on maritime coordination gaps across Navy, Coast Guard, MSC, and MARAD.
[2] The Heritage Foundation, “Maritime Legislation: Explainer and Next Steps,” Factsheet No. 285, August 12, 2026.
[3] SHIPS for America Act of 2025 (S. 1541 / H.R. 3151), Sec. 101, Title I—Oversight and Accountability; Senate Commerce Committee, “SHIPS for America Act Section-by-Section,” Apr. 30, 2025.
[4] H.R. 8800 (FY27 NDAA), House passage 216-212, July 22, 2026; S. 4784 cloture failed 50-46, July 14, 2026; no further Senate floor action as of Sept. 2026.
[5] Brent D. Sadler, “Reviving America’s Maritime Strength: Comprehensive by Necessity,” The Heritage Foundation, July 24, 2025.

One Committee, One Conference, One Chance: Why Congress Needs a Select Committee for Maritime Industrial Revival

By Bill Cullifer | Americans for a Stronger Navy

The Heritage Foundation published a factsheet this month that does something rare in this space: it lays out, in plain language, exactly where the nation’s maritime revival stands and exactly what Congress needs to decide next [1]. We want to highlight one recommendation in particular, because we think it’s the single most important structural fix available to Congress right now and because it’s the kind of nonpartisan, process-focused idea a nonpartisan organization like ours can endorse without reservation.

Heritage recommends that, whether or not the Senate consolidates the current maritime bills into one, congressional leadership should create a Select Committee for Maritime Industrial Revival to coordinate across the committees that currently have jurisdiction [1]. We think that recommendation deserves support from anyone who has watched this effort unfold over the past three years.

The Problem the Committee Would Solve

The maritime revival effort is not lacking for good bills. The April 2025 version of the SHIPS for America Act carries genuine bipartisan support — 29 Senate cosponsors (15 Republican, 14 Democrat) and 140 House cosponsors (75 Democrat, 65 Republican) as of its last recorded action [1]. Alongside it sit the Shipbuilding Investment and Workforce Act, the FLEETS Now Act, and the Ready Reserve Force Modernization Accountability Act — each addressing a different piece of the same problem, each sponsored by different members, and each currently routed through different committees [1].

That’s not a failure of ideas. It’s a failure of coordination. A House amendment to the FY27 NDAA passed with two of these maritime provisions attached, and the whole package is now headed to House-Senate conference in September [2]. Conference is exactly the moment when overlapping, uncoordinated bills either get reconciled into something workable or get quietly dropped in the scramble to close out a defense authorization. A Select Committee — standing up now, ahead of that conference — is the difference between these bills arriving as a coordinated package and arriving as competing claims on the same limited floor time.

Why This Matters Beyond the Bills Themselves

We’ve spent three years arguing that naval readiness is fundamentally a “who pays” problem — allied burden-sharing through the Gulf Act, and a debt-neutral corporate demand signal through the SEAS Act’s Strategic Technology Responsibility Contribution [3]. Neither of those mechanisms competes with what’s already in SHIPS for America. Heritage’s own factsheet shows SHIPS for America’s funding model leans on shipping-side fees — non-U.S.-flagged vessel fees and Section 301 penalties tied to Chinese-built ships feeding a self-sustaining Maritime Trust Fund [1]. That’s a shipping-side answer to “who pays.” The SEAS Act is a corporate-side answer. The Gulf Act is an allied-side answer. None of these ideas need to compete for the same dollars or the same bill number — but they do need a body capable of seeing all of them at once, which is precisely what a Select Committee would provide.

What We’re Asking

We’re not asking Congress to adopt any specific funding mechanism in this post — ours or anyone else’s. We’re asking Congress to create the structure that would let good mechanisms be evaluated on the merits rather than lost to committee turf. A Select Committee for Maritime Industrial Revival, stood up before September conference, would let Congress treat this as the “generational task” Heritage rightly calls it [1], instead of a jurisdictional scramble.

The nation’s maritime revival has been, in Heritage’s words, a bipartisan, bicameral effort since its inception [1]. It should stay that way through conference. A Select Committee is how it does.


References

[1] The Heritage Foundation, “Maritime Legislation: Explainer and Next Steps,” Factsheet No. 285, August 12, 2026.
[2] H.R. 8800 (FY27 NDAA), House passage with maritime amendments, 2026; expected House-Senate conference, September 2026.
[3] Americans for a Stronger Navy / Center for Maritime Strategy, “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy,” March 2026.

The “China + 1” Illusion: What Global Trade Shifts Mean for U.S. Naval Readiness

Maritime analyst Dr. Sal Mercogliano recently highlighted a critical dynamic shaping modern trade: “The world is diversifying around China, not away from it.”

While economic headlines often celebrate Western supply chains “decoupling” from Beijing, maritime shipping data tells a very different story. Between 2023 and 2025, Chinese containerized exports surged to regional manufacturing hubs—up 40% to India, 36% to Vietnam, and 37% to Thailand.

Rather than pulling manufacturing out of China’s sphere of influence, companies are increasingly relying on a “China + 1” strategy. Raw materials, components, and machinery are still produced in Chinese factories, shipped to South and Southeast Asia for final assembly, and then sent onward to Western markets.

For the U.S. Navy and the defense industrial base, this isn’t true decoupling—it’s re-routing. And it presents serious risks to American sea power.

The Hidden Risks to the Fleet

Naval power relies on secure, resilient supply chains. The expansion of China’s sub-tier manufacturing network impacts U.S. naval readiness across three primary fronts:

  • Deep Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Vulnerabilities: Federal regulations strictly forbid purchasing major military hardware directly from strategic competitors. However, Tier-3 and Tier-4 sub-suppliers—who provide basic electronics, circuit boards, and specialized alloys—remain heavily dependent on Chinese inputs. In a crisis, Beijing could restrict exports of critical sub-components, stalling U.S. ship construction and maintenance.
  • The Critical Mineral Bottleneck: Modern warships depend on Rare Earth Elements (REEs) for permanent magnets, radar systems, sonar arrays, and electric motors. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer requires roughly 5,200 lbs of rare earth elements, while a Virginia-class submarine requires 9,200 lbs. Because China controls over 80% of global REE refining capacity, shifting final assembly to third-party nations does not resolve this primary vulnerability.
  • Strained Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs): Multi-leg supply chains (China \rightarrow Southeast Asia \rightarrow U.S.) make maritime trade routes longer and more fragmented. This places greater operational demand on the U.S. Navy to monitor, protect, and maintain freedom of navigation across critical maritime chokepoints like the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.

Policy Action: The Return of Domestic Industrial Mobilization

Recognizing these deep supply chain risks, federal leaders recently announced the revival of a World War II-era model: the Smaller War Plants Commission (SWPC), spearheaded by the Department of Defense and the Small Business Administration (SBA).

Because roughly 70% of the defense industrial base consists of small businesses, this initiative targets the exact lower-tier chokepoints that threaten naval readiness. By expanding capital access and streamlining support for small domestic manufacturers, the SWPC focuses on critical areas:

  • Domestic production of microelectronics and legacy chips.
  • Critical mineral refining on American soil.
  • Specialized castings, forgings, and shipbuilding components.

Rebuilding the U.S. Fleet requires ensuring American warships aren’t grounded by missing foreign-sourced parts during a crisis. Programs like the SWPC are essential steps toward restoring true maritime sovereignty.

Rebuilding True Maritime Strength

Securing U.S. naval readiness requires moving past the illusion of trade diversification:

  1. Map Deep-Tier Supply Chains: Track sub-tier components to eliminate single-point dependencies on foreign raw materials.
  2. Onshore Critical Refining: Leverage domestic programs to build processing facilities for critical minerals and defense components.
  3. Expand Shipyard Infrastructure: Invest directly in U.S. commercial and naval shipyard capacity so the fleet can build, maintain, and repair vessels independently.

As Dr. Mercogliano’s analysis reminds us, trade routes may shift on paper, but strategic dependencies remain. Rebuilding American sea power means securing the industrial foundation behind every ship, sensor, and sailor.

Take Action for American Sea Power

Join Americans for a Stronger Navy in advocating for policies that rebuild domestic shipbuilding, secure defense supply lines, and maintain a fleet capable of protecting global freedom of navigation.

  • Sign up for updates at strongernavy.org
  • Share this analysis on social media to spread awareness about U.S. maritime security.

U.S. Navy on Track to Commission Only 2 Ships in 2025 — Lowest in Decades — While Silicon Valley Banks Billions from China Operations

Naval Advocacy Group Calls for “Strategic Seas Act” Requiring Tech Companies Profiting from China to Fund Fleet Modernization

December 31, 2025 — Americans for a Stronger Navy today released new data showing the U.S. Navy is projected to commission only 2 ships in 2025, marking the steepest decline in naval shipbuilding in modern history and creating a critical gap in America’s ability to counter China’s rapidly expanding fleet.

The analysis reveals a stark 10-year trend: from 2015 to 2025, the Navy averaged just 8 ships commissioned per year — falling far short of the 12 ships per year required to meet strategic goals. This represents a shortfall of approximately 40 fewer ships over the decade, occurring precisely as China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has become the world’s largest naval force.

“We’re watching American naval power erode in real time,” said Bill Cullifer, founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy. “The 2025 commissioning rate of just 2 ships isn’t a budget blip — it’s a strategic crisis that threatens our ability to maintain freedom of navigation in the Pacific and protect the very trade routes that make Silicon Valley’s global business model possible.”

The Taxpayer-Funded Tech Paradox

The organization notes a troubling disconnect: many of Silicon Valley’s most profitable companies were built on taxpayer-funded research from DARPA, the National Science Foundation, and Department of Defense programs — yet now generate billions in revenue from China while the Navy that protects their supply chains faces resource constraints.

“American taxpayers funded the fundamental research that created Google, GPS, the internet, smartphone AI, and semiconductor breakthroughs,” Cullifer said. “These companies now generate enormous profits from Chinese markets, yet contribute nothing directly to the naval forces that secure the Pacific shipping lanes their business depends on.”

The Strategic Seas Act: A Solution

Americans for a Stronger Navy is calling for Congress to pass a “Strategic Seas Act” that would require technology companies with significant China operations to contribute a modest percentage of those revenues to a dedicated Naval Modernization and Maintenance Fund.

Key provisions would include:

  • Companies with over $5 billion in annual China revenue contribute 2% to the fund
  • Revenues earmarked specifically for ship repair backlogs, shipyard modernization, and Pacific Fleet readiness
  • Projected to generate billions annually based on current tech sector China operations
  • Estimated to fund 4-6 additional ship commissionings per year, substantially closing the strategic gap

“This isn’t a tax — it’s a user fee,” Cullifer explained. “If you’re generating billions moving products and data across the Pacific, you should help pay for the destroyers and submarines that keep those sea lanes open. If you’re profiting from China’s market, you should help fund our ability to compete with China’s military.”

Bipartisan Issue Gaining Momentum

The proposal has gained interest across the political spectrum, appealing to defense hawks concerned about Chinese military expansion, economic populists focused on corporate responsibility, and fiscal conservatives seeking efficient solutions to readiness gaps.

“This issue transcends party politics,” said Cullifer. “Whether you’re concerned about China as a strategic competitor, frustrated by corporate tax avoidance, or worried about return on taxpayer investment in R&D, the answer is the same: those who profit most from the Pacific trade system should contribute to its protection.”

By The Numbers

U.S. Navy Ship Commissioning (2015-2025):

  • 2015: 11 ships
  • 2016: 11 ships
  • 2018: 10 ships
  • 2020: 8 ships
  • 2022: 6 ships
  • 2024: 3 ships
  • 2025: 2 ships (confirmed)

Strategic Requirement: 12 ships per year
10-Year Average: ~8 ships per year
Cumulative Shortfall: ~40 ships

Call to Action

Americans for a Stronger Navy is calling on Congress to:

  1. Hold hearings on the naval shipbuilding crisis and its implications for Pacific deterrence
  2. Commission a GAO study examining the relationship between taxpayer-funded tech R&D, corporate profits from China operations, and naval readiness gaps
  3. Introduce and pass the Strategic Seas Act in the 119th Congress
  4. Ensure 2026 defense authorization bills include dedicated funding to address the ship commissioning shortfall

“China is building a fleet designed to push the U.S. Navy out of the Western Pacific,” Cullifer concluded. “We built Silicon Valley with taxpayer dollars. Silicon Valley profits from Pacific trade. It’s time Silicon Valley helps us maintain the naval power that makes their business model possible. This isn’t just fair — it’s strategically essential.”

About Americans for a Stronger Navy

Americans for a Stronger Navy (StrongerNavy.org) is a non-partisan advocacy organization dedicated to ensuring the United States maintains the naval capabilities required to protect American interests, support allies, and preserve freedom of navigation in an era of great power competition.

For full data, graphics, and supporting documentation, visit StrongerNavy.org/shipbuilding-crisis

EDITOR’S NOTE: High-resolution graphics showing ship commissioning trends, comparative data with Chinese naval expansion, and the taxpayer investment in Silicon Valley technologies are available upon request.

Guard the Lanes


Silicon Valley builds the networks. The Navy protects them. Invest to keep them both secure.

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Sometimes the search for clarity keeps me up long past midnight. That was the case at 3 a.m. this week when I came across a RAND report titled Economic Deterrence in a China Contingency. I hoped it might explain how America could keep the peace without firing a shot. It did—and it didn’t. RAND’s conclusion is clear: economic tools help, but they work only when anchored to credible strength, industrial capacity, and alliances that hold.

Why Americans Should Care
RAND’s analysis shows that sanctions alone can’t deter China from acting against Taiwan. Even coordinated multilateral efforts might shave a few points off China’s GDP, but they won’t change its core objectives. Unilateral U.S. measures could even harm our own economy. That means deterrence isn’t about paperwork or tariffs—it’s about preparation, partnerships, and public will.

When the lanes of trade and data stay open, the world stays stable. If those lanes close, the cost lands on every American household.

Implications for the Navy
For navalists, the message is unmistakable: economic deterrence rides on sea power. If sanctions are to work, allied fleets must protect the supply lines and chokepoints that keep global commerce moving. RAND calls for better modeling of economic impacts; I’d add that we also need better modeling of shipbuilding, repair, and readiness.

Our destroyers, carriers, and submarines aren’t just tools of war—they’re instruments of economic freedom. They guard the lanes.

Implications for Our Allies
RAND emphasizes that sanctions mean little without unified action. The same applies to maritime strength. Japan, Australia, and the U.K. can’t afford hesitation; unity is deterrence. Coordinated naval presence across the Indo-Pacific signals resolve more effectively than any embargo ever could.

A Call to Silicon Valley
This is where the RAND findings connect directly to our call for America’s tech industry. The report warns that markets adapt faster than governments—and that the private sector will make or break national resilience. That’s a polite way of saying: Silicon Valley, you’re in this fight whether you know it or not.

We’re not asking for militarization of innovation. We’re asking for civic responsibility: secure the code, protect the data, and strengthen the digital lanes that mirror the sea lanes our sailors defend. The Navy protects what you build. Now America must invest to keep both secure.

The Bottom Line
Peace depends on readiness. RAND’s economists proved it with data; our sailors prove it every day with sweat and steel. The future will be written not only in shipyards and naval bases, but also in design labs and data centers.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter—a 24-part educational series explaining how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.


America’s Next Generation of Warships: Drones Built for the Pacific Fight


In Response to the Call for a Stronger Navy

A major announcement this week marks a breakthrough in naval innovation. Blue Water Autonomy, a Boston-based defense startup, confirmed on November 5 that it has successfully tested its long-range autonomous ship technology on the waters off Massachusetts — a first for U.S. industry.

The company shared new images and data from sea trials, demonstrating that its medium-sized drone warship systems can operate reliably in open-ocean conditions, a critical milestone as the Navy looks to expand its reach in the Pacific. A full-scale 150-foot prototype is planned for 2026, advancing the goal of deploying uncrewed ships capable of long-range operations alongside traditional fleets.

Why It Matters

China’s shipyards continue to outproduce America’s by wide margins, while U.S. shipbuilding struggles with delays, labor shortages, and cost overruns. Blue Water Autonomy’s success offers a glimpse of what’s possible when innovation meets urgency. These modular vessels are designed to carry sensors, radars, and missile payloads across more than 6,000 nautical miles, from California to Taiwan and back — a range that redefines how the U.S. could project power across the Indo-Pacific.

Implications for the Navy

The Navy’s future battle force calls for 381 crewed ships and 134 uncrewed vessels, but reaching those numbers requires new approaches. By designing ships that can be mass-produced quickly at smaller shipyards, Blue Water Autonomy’s model could help offset the strain on America’s overstretched industrial base. With a Navy contract already in hand and potential full-scale production in Louisiana shipyards next year, the company’s success represents a tangible step toward restoring U.S. maritime advantage through technology and industrial reform.

Why Americans Should Care

Every advancement in autonomy brings the same truth into sharper focus: deterrence is cheaper than war. Building smarter, more flexible fleets keeps sailors safe, strengthens deterrence, and ensures America remains a global maritime leader. Blue Water Autonomy’s announcement isn’t just about a new vessel — it’s about rebuilding the capacity and confidence of a nation that must once again lead at sea.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.


China’s Dark Fishing Fleet: What the Studies Say—and What We Should Do

Plain Talk

America’s prosperity rides on open sea lanes and the rule of law. China’s distant-water fishing (DWF) armada and gray-zone tactics put both at risk—from industrial-scale illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing to militia-enabled “enforcement” around disputed waters. Recent studies converge on two points: (1) the problem is broader than fish; (2) deterrence through presence, enforcement, and allied capacity is cheaper than crisis or war. (RAND Corporation)

What the Evidence Shows (Key Findings)

  • Largest fleet, outsized IUU footprint. China fields thousands of DWF vessels active across the Indo-Pacific and Latin America. Analysts document repeated IUU patterns, transshipment opacity, and vessel “darkness” (AIS off). Heritage’s new issue brief details how these logistics networks can intersect with other illicit trades. Treat this as a credible risk pathway, not proof that fentanyl precursors are already moving on trawlers. (The Heritage Foundation)
  • Fishing–militia–coast guard nexus = gray-zone leverage. RAND shows how militia-backed swarms and lawfare help create “facts in the water,” coercing neighbors below the threshold of war and undermining a rules-based order—especially around Second Thomas Shoal. Presence operations alone are “necessary but insufficient.” (RAND Corporation)
  • Crime convergence at sea. Cross-sector research warns that IUU fishing correlates with forced labor, money laundering, and smuggling—illicit markets that transnational criminal organizations exploit. Global Financial Integrity’s 2025 report quantifies the scale of profits across ten crime markets and flags illegal fishing as a persistent revenue stream in weak-governance corridors. (Global Financial Integrity)
  • Enforcement tools exist—and work when used. NOAA has expanded port-state controls: denying U.S. port privileges to vessels from negatively certified nations and engaging bilaterally under the Moratorium Protection Act. These measures raise operational costs for serial offenders and their backers. (NOAA Fisheries)
  • Partners need capacity, data, and doctrine. Stimson’s roadmaps emphasize fusing civilian and maritime-security tools (MDA sensors, legal alignment, port controls) and building partner constabulary forces for day-to-day enforcement in Southeast Asia’s hot spots. (Stimson Center)

Why Americans Should Care

This touches food security (legal fishermen undercut), economic security (coercion distorts trade), and sovereignty (testing U.S. and allied EEZs). It also burdens our sailors and Coast Guardsmen who are asked to manage gray-zone friction without the industrial base or shipyard throughput they need. We’re fiscal conservatives about this: spend smart, fix shipyards, and back people. Deterrence is cheaper than war—but it isn’t free. (RAND Corporation)

What the Studies Recommend (Action Plan We Support)

  • Make presence purposeful—and persistent. RAND advises pairing routine naval presence with tactics that impose costs for gray-zone coercion: tighter public attribution, allied broadcasting of incidents, and treaty updates that reflect gray-zone realities (e.g., with the Philippines). We endorse presence that cues law-enforcement actions—not photo ops. (RAND Corporation)
  • Supercharge Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Stimson calls for fusing RF/AIS/EO data to target dark vessels and suspicious rendezvous, then sharing the common operating picture with partners in near-real time. Invest where it bites: chokepoints near allied EEZs and U.S. territories. (Stimson Center)
  • Harden ports—follow the money. NOAA’s port-denial authorities should be used early and often, with public case files that stigmatize offenders and their beneficial owners. Link port denials to targeted sanctions and AML actions that disrupt crewing agencies, processors, and shell companies bankrolling IUU fleets. (NOAA Fisheries)
  • Scale partner enforcement. Expand shiprider agreements, small-craft patrol capacity, and prosecutor-to-prosecutor cooperation so cases don’t die in court. Stimson’s Southeast Asia roadmap offers a practical menu; implementers need training, maintenance money, and spares—not only hulls. (Stimson Center)
  • Plan for crime convergence. GFI’s findings argue for joint task forces that treat IUU as part of a larger illicit-trade ecosystem. Prioritize investigations that tie illegal catch to labor abuse, laundering, and smuggling flows. Measure success by disrupted networks, not boardings alone. (Global Financial Integrity)
  • Message clearly: rules, not rhetoric. RAND recommends more transparent, real-time communications about unlawful behavior and legal basis for actions (UNCLOS, tribunal rulings). That helps allies hold the line and inoculates the public against lawfare narratives. (RAND Corporation)

Implications for the Navy (and Coast Guard)

  • Navy: Provide the high-end backstop and integrated MDA, deter coast-guard intimidation with credible presence, and be ready to surge when gray-zone friction escalates. Use deployments to exercise allied response playbooks and media transparency. (RAND Corporation)
  • Coast Guard: Lead day-to-day maritime law enforcement, port-state controls, and shiprider operations. Expand training and case-building with partner constabularies so interdictions translate into convictions. (NOAA Fisheries)
  • Industrial base: Presence is math. Clear maintenance backlogs, add dry-dock capacity, and streamline parts pipelines so the fleet isn’t deterred by its own yard schedules. (Multiple studies note presence without readiness is a hollow signal.) (RAND Corporation)

What We’re Asking For (Smart, Doable Steps)

  1. Fund allied-linked MDA projects that feed actionable leads to patrol craft—not dashboards that gather dust. (Stimson Center)
  2. Expand port-denial designations and pair them with targeted financial actions against owners and processors tied to IUU. (NOAA Fisheries)
  3. Grow shiprider programs and small-boat sustainment budgets in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia to raise the daily cost of IUU and harassment. (Stimson Center)
  4. Update alliance documents to reflect gray-zone realities and publicize unlawful incidents fast and with evidence. (RAND Corporation)
  5. Invest in U.S. shipyards and people so presence is persistent, credible, and sustainable. (RAND Corporation)

Our Commitment

Americans for a Stronger Navy exists to educate, connect, and mobilize the public. We believe civic engagement—not insider talk—closes the readiness gap. If you care about safe seas, fair trade, and peace through strength, this is your fight too.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late. Let’s roll.

U.S. Navy News – December 11-19, 2024

Global News

NATO Aircraft Carrier to Visit West Pacific
France’s Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group is scheduled to visit Japan in early 2025 during its Indo-Pacific deployment, with stops in Okinawa. This reflects NATO’s growing strategic focus on the region.

USS Savannah Makes Historic Cambodian Port Call
The Littoral Combat Ship USS Savannah docked in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, from December 16–20, marking the first U.S. Navy port call in Cambodia in eight years.

USS Harry S. Truman Enters Middle East Waters
The USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group transited the Suez Canal on December 15, bringing U.S. carrier presence back to the region after a month-long absence.

Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 151 Returns for Holidays
The “Vigilantes” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 151 returned to Naval Air Station Lemoore on December 14 after a 5-month deployment in U.S. 7th and 5th Fleet areas.

U.S. Navy Tests Hypersonic Missile
A successful test of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body showcased advancements in the Navy and Army’s hypersonic strike capabilities, achieving speeds at extended ranges.

U.S. Navy Awards Textron $106M for Mine Sweeping Technology
A new contract for the Mine Sweeping Payload Delivery System aims to expand semi-autonomous mine-clearing operations, ensuring maritime security.

U.S. Navy’s Next-Gen Jammer Completes First Deployment
Advanced electronic warfare systems, capable of disrupting enemy air defenses, completed their inaugural deployment with notable success.

New Constellation-Class Frigate Honors Female Naval Pioneer
The USS Joy Bright Hancock (FFG 69) will commemorate one of the first female Navy officers and her trailblazing contributions to military gender integration.

U.S. Navy Intercepts Houthi Attacks in Gulf of Aden
For the second time this month, destroyers USS Stockdale and USS O’Kane intercepted missiles and drones from Houthi forces in the Gulf of Aden.

Quantum Computing for Naval Applications
The Navy explores quantum computing for tasks such as simulating war games, enabling secure communications, and solving maintenance challenges, aiming for transformative operational impacts.

Congress Allocates $5.7 Billion for Virginia-Class Submarines
A stopgap funding bill includes significant investments for the Virginia-class program, emphasizing the importance of submarine force expansion.

U.S. Navy to Expand Constellation-Class Frigate Production
To mitigate delays, the Navy considers adding a second shipyard to accelerate the production of these versatile surface combatants.

China Watch
China Releases ‘Hit List’ Targeting U.S. Navy Systems

The PLA published plans to target U.S. Navy carrier groups, including AEGIS vessels and E-2C Hawkeyes, by overwhelming electronic warfare systems.

Pentagon Warns of China’s Growing Naval Power. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China has significantly expanded its global reach over the past year, moving more frequently and in greater force beyond its regional waters. This growth is attributed to the ongoing development and deployment of advanced warships and logistics support vessels, which enable the PLAN to operate at greater distances from its home waters

Report: Despite Corruption Problems, China Progresses Toward Modernization
The Defense Department today released the annual “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” report, a congressionally mandated annual report that offers insight into the capabilities, strategies and goals of China and its military.

China Conducts Largest Naval Drill in Decades Near Taiwan
A massive PLA naval exercise, involving 100 ships, heightened regional tensions as unannounced drills continued close to Taiwan.

Satellite Image Shows Chinese Aircraft Carrier Near Vietnam’s Shores. A satellite image captured on Tuesday reveals a Chinese aircraft carrier operating in the contested South China Sea, close to Vietnam’s coastline.

Russia Watch
Russia Disrupts Baltic Communications
Russian forces have interfered with mobile an
d maritime communication in the Baltic Sea, testing NATO’s response and posing risks to shipping and energy supplies.

Russia’s Investment in Underwater Drones Increases
Russia and other global powers advance unmanned undersea capabilities, focusing on drones capable of long-range and deep-sea operations.

Iran Watch
Iran’s New Drone Corvette Operates Undetected

The Shahid Bagheri drone corvette patrolled the Persian Gulf for weeks, showcasing Iran’s increasing maritime stealth capabilities.

U.S. Strikes Houthi Command Hub in Yemen
Retaliatory strikes on a Houthi
hub responsible for launching attacks in the Gulf of Aden emphasized the Navy’s commitment to regional security.

Upcoming Developments
French Carrier Strike Group Deployment to Japan
France’s Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group will reinforce Indo-Pacific partnerships in early 2025 with planned stops in Okinawa.

U.S. Navy’s E-130J Aircraft Contract Announced
A $3.5 billion contract for the E-130J “Doomsday Plane” will enhance nuclear command and control capabilities.


U.S. Naval News Wednesday: November 7 – November 13, 2024

Courtesty of the U.S. Navy

This past week, the U.S. Navy has been actively engaged in diverse operations and has been vigilant in monitoring developments related to international security and technological advancements. Here’s the latest:

Global Operations and Exercises

  • Red Sea Engagements: On November 11, 2024, the USS Stockdale and USS Spruance successfully intercepted multiple drones and missiles launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital maritime chokepoint. The attacks were thwarted without any damage or injuries, underscoring the Navy’s commitment to securing international shipping lanes.
  • Pacific Deployments: The U.S. Navy has forward-deployed F-35C Lightning II aircraft and CMV-22B Osprey to Japan, enhancing capabilities and strengthening maritime partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.

Technological Advancements

  • Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs): The U.S. Navy is advancing its procurement of Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), with plans to acquire seven units over the next two years. This initiative reflects a shift toward integrating unmanned platforms into naval operations.
  • Missile Reloading at Sea: In a significant milestone, the Navy conducted successful tests of reloading missiles and rearming warships at sea, enhancing operational readiness and extending the endurance of naval vessels during deployments.

Leadership and Personnel Updates

  • Command Changes: The Navy relieved the commanding officer of the Naval Information Warfare Training Group in San Diego on November 7, 2024, due to a loss of confidence in her ability to command. This decision underscores the Navy’s commitment to maintaining high leadership standards.
  • NCIS Special Agents Graduation: On November 8, 2024, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro welcomed 18 new NCIS special agents during a graduation ceremony at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. This event highlights the Navy’s dedication to strengthening its investigative capabilities.

Historical Discoveries

  • WWII Shipwreck Found: The wreckage of the USS Edsall, a World War II warship nicknamed the “Dancing Mouse,” was discovered in the Indian Ocean 81 years after it sank with 200 sailors aboard. The discovery serves as a poignant reminder of the sacrifices made during the war.

Legal and Disciplinary Actions

  • ‘Fat Leonard’ Sentencing: Leonard Glenn Francis, known as “Fat Leonard,” was sentenced to 15 years in prison for orchestrating a massive bribery scandal involving high-ranking U.S. military officials. He was also ordered to pay $20 million in restitution and forfeit $35 million in illicit gains.

International Collaborations

  • AUKUS Submarine Program: Admiral William Houston, head of the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, acknowledged the challenges in meeting production targets for supplying Australia with Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines by 2032 under the AUKUS agreement. However, he expressed confidence in achieving this goal, emphasizing the importance of international defense partnerships.

Infrastructure and Maintenance

  • Shipyard Visits: Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jim Kilby visited shipyards and Navy leadership in the Northeast from October 29 to November 1, 2024, focusing on readiness and maintenance. These visits are part of ongoing efforts to ensure the Navy’s operational capabilities remain robust.

Community Engagement

  • Veterans Day Observance: The Navy participated in various events and ceremonies across the nation to honor veterans on November 11, 2024. These activities reflect the Navy’s commitment to recognizing the service and sacrifices of military personnel.

China Watch

  • New Hypersonic Weapon Unveiled: China revealed a new hypersonic boost-glide weapon, the GDF-600, capable of launching sub-payloads mid-flight. These sub-payloads, designed for multiple functions like electronic warfare and reconnaissance, represent a significant leap in China’s military capabilities.
  • Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier Development: Analysts have confirmed that China is developing a prototype nuclear reactor intended for a large warship, potentially marking a significant advancement for the country’s naval capabilities and putting the U.S. Navy on alert.
  • Tensions with the Philippines: China’s embassy in Beijing warned the Philippines against “unilateral actions” following Manila’s new maritime laws designed to define territory, sea lanes, and air routes. China has vowed to take necessary measures to safeguard its claimed territorial rights.
  • China’s New Hypersonic Weapon Concept: China has unveiled a model of its GDF-600 hypersonic boost-glide weapon at the Zhuhai Airshow. This advanced weapon, developed by the Guangdong Aerodynamic Research Academy (GARA), carries sub-payloads that can be launched mid-flight to strike multiple targets. These sub-payloads are versatile, with capabilities for electronic warfare and reconnaissance operations, representing a significant advancement in China’s military technology.
  • Nuclear Reactor for Chinese Aircraft Carrier: U.S. researchers have confirmed China’s progress on a nuclear-powered propulsion system for an aircraft carrier. Satellite imagery and documents reveal a land-based prototype nuclear reactor capable of powering large surface warships, which marks a potential shift in Chinese naval power.

Russia Watch

  • Missile Defense Site Inauguration: On November 13, 2024, U.S. and Polish officials inaugurated a NATO missile defense base in northern Poland, equipped with the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Ashore system. Russia has protested the base, viewing it as a threat, and has vowed to take countermeasures.
  • Naval Movements in the English Channel: Russia claimed its warship Admiral Golovko conducted drills in the English Channel, which the British Royal Navy contested, asserting the ship was merely transiting under surveillance by HMS Iron Duke. This movement reflects ongoing tensions over the conflict in Ukraine.

Iran Watch

  • Threats Against Israel: Iran has threatened a “strong and complex” attack against Israel in retaliation for recent strikes, raising concerns over escalating Middle East tensions.
  • Houthi Rebel Attacks: Yemen’s Houthi rebels launched a barrage of drones and missiles targeting U.S. Navy destroyers, including the USS Spruance, near the Red Sea. Though there were no damages or casualties, these attacks have disrupted shipping traffic and raised security concerns in the region.

Conclusion

This week’s developments highlight the U.S. Navy’s ongoing efforts to maintain global security, engage in technological advancements, and honor its personnel. From strategic partnerships to countering emerging threats, the Navy remains steadfast in its mission to ensure maritime security and readiness.

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