America at Sea: CDR Jim McLaughlin on Steady Demand, Fixed-Price Contracts and Rebuilding the Fleet

Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. Today we hear from Commander Jim McLaughlin, U.S. Navy. He is a graduate of the California Maritime Academy, worked as a junior project manager at General Dynamics NASSCO, sailed as a licensed merchant mariner on offshore supply vessels in the Gulf, and now serves as an active-duty Navy commander. His views are his own and not those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of War or the U.S. government. Same three questions as everyone: what’s working, what’s in the way, and what he’d fix first.

What we heard

Why it matters: “The health of the merchant marine and the United States Navy are indissolubly linked.” A strong merchant fleet and shipbuilding base are what make a strong, affordable Navy possible, and what keep the country supplied in a crisis.

What’s working: The push to re-industrialize America, and joint ventures between American and foreign shipbuilders, like Hanwha and Philly Shipyard. “American shipbuilding still uses 1980s know-how and 1940s infrastructure.”

The biggest barrier: Economic competitiveness. Most of the world’s merchant fleets, he says, are not free-market businesses but state-run cartels that depend on subsidies.

Fix first: Consistent demand for ships. He lays out a detailed plan: a 10-year build plan funded up front, starting with Military Sealift Command, whose ships average more than 40 years old; training pipelines for mariners and shipbuilders; a 20-year average fleet age; and fixed-price contracts instead of cost-plus.

“Steady, predictable orders are the lifeblood of the industry.”

Full transcript

Lightly edited for clarity.

Bill Cullifer: Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy. Welcome back to America at Sea: Voices That Matter. We’ve got a great lineup this week, and a big thank you and a shout-out to everyone who’s taking part. Today we hear from Commander Jim McLaughlin, a Cal Maritime grad who has worked in a shipyard, sailed as a merchant mariner, and now serves as an active-duty Navy commander. His views are his own. If you find this worthwhile, please like and share it. Commander Jim McLaughlin, over to you.

Introduction

Jim McLaughlin: Hello, my name is Jim McLaughlin. I’m a commander in the United States Navy. I previously had command of USS Canberra (LCS 30), where I participated in Operation Epic Fury and the ensuing blockade. I’m currently in command of USS Jackson (LCS 6), and I hold a B.S. in Marine Engineering Technology from the California Maritime Academy. Before my naval service, I worked as a junior project manager at General Dynamics NASSCO and as a licensed merchant mariner aboard offshore support vessels in the Gulf of America. The opinions expressed here are my own and not the opinions of the United States Navy, the Department of War or the government of the United States.

For the general public, I think the main question we need to ask and answer is: why does America need to grow the merchant marine and shipbuilding sectors? We need to grow them to ensure we have, and can afford, the world’s strongest Navy, and that in times of war or crisis we can move the materials required to sustain our armed forces and our economy. The health of the merchant marine and the United States Navy are indissolubly linked. It’s very hard to have a healthy Navy without a healthy merchant fleet and shipbuilding industry.

Question 1: What’s working right now that we should do more of?

Jim McLaughlin: At a macro level, the push to re-industrialize America is probably the most important thing required to expand the merchant and naval fleets. As we’ve seen with the Chinese, you can’t be competent in naval construction unless you’re competent in commercial construction, and you can’t be competent in commercial construction unless your nation has a large and competent manufacturing base.

At a micro level, joint ventures such as the one between the Hanwha Group and Philly Shipyard must be expanded. To a large degree, American shipbuilding still uses 1980s know-how and 1940s infrastructure. The only way we’re going to modernize quickly is by partnering with firms that excel at modern ship construction, and by offering monetary incentives to expand and upgrade shipbuilding infrastructure.

“American shipbuilding still uses 1980s know-how and 1940s infrastructure.”

Question 2: What’s the biggest barrier to rebuilding America at sea?

Jim McLaughlin: The single largest barrier is economic competitiveness. Unfortunately, most of the world’s merchant fleets are not true private, free-market enterprises. They’re state-run cartels. They’re not inherently profitable, and they rely heavily on state subsidies to build and operate ships. The American government will have to provide some degree of subsidy to incentivize investment in the industry.

Question 3: If you could fix one thing first, what would it be?

Jim McLaughlin: There’s a lot more than one thing that needs to be fixed, but the main thing I would do is ensure consistent demand for ships, to achieve consistent investment in shipbuilding. The government is the only customer capable of doing this. If Congress were to commit to and fund a set number of orders over the next decade, it would result in a healthy shipbuilding ecosystem.

As always, the devil’s in the details. Here’s how I would lay out my plan.

Congress should commit to a 10-year build plan. Congress should also appropriate all the funds required to execute that plan in year one, meaning all the money is allocated and sitting in an account, ready to be spent over the course of 10 years. That ensures a steady flow of orders that aren’t subject to annual wrangling over funding.

I would start by expanding the Military Sealift Command fleet. The average age of MSC ships is over 40 years, and the fleet is far too small for a major peer-on-peer conflict. Logistics ships are also generally easier to build than warships. As the industry gains proficiency building logistics ships, it can apply that proficiency to building warships.

I would incentivize private construction of commercial vessels through favorable government lending or construction subsidies.

We also need to address the personnel side, because without sailors and welders, a ship and a shipyard are pretty useless. I would start a reserve officer training corps for Military Sealift Command. To grow the cadre of merchant mariners, MSC or the Maritime Administration should offer scholarships to students at maritime colleges, on the condition that once they’re licensed, they work four years for MSC or aboard another privately operated American vessel. Kings Point, the federal maritime academy, already works this way, and it could be expanded to the state maritime academies.

I would also streamline the process for upgrading a merchant mariner’s license and eliminate unneeded requirements. On a personal note, I let my own license expire some years ago. I reported a minor case of sleep apnea to the Coast Guard, and they sent mountains of paperwork requesting sleep studies and physicals. At the time I was on active duty and fully fit for the Navy, and I simply didn’t have time to deal with it, so I let my license lapse.

I would also grow the cadre of shipbuilders by offering similar scholarships for students to attend trade schools, with an obligation to work a set number of years at a public or private shipyard.

I would commit to maintaining a set fleet size for the Navy, MSC and the merchant fleet. And I would commit in law to maintaining a 20-year average fleet age for both MSC and the Navy. Those two steps would ensure the construction of new vessels and a steady improvement in shipbuilding infrastructure. Steady, predictable orders are the lifeblood of the industry. We must avoid a feast-and-famine environment like the 1940s, when we crash-built thousands of ships in a few short years and then sharply cut orders for decades afterward.

“We must avoid a feast-and-famine environment like the 1940s.”

Finally, the vast majority of government ship purchases need to be fixed-price contracts instead of cost-plus contracts. Under cost-plus, contractors bill the government for their costs and then get an agreed profit based on a set percentage of those costs. The higher the costs, the higher the profit. That’s exactly the kind of incentive we don’t want. We want builders to be efficient and to keep improving their infrastructure and skills, and the way to do that is consistent orders over a long period at fixed unit prices. A fixed-price contract sets what the customer will pay per unit, and the contractor has to build below that price to make a profit. Fixed prices plus the certainty of steady orders push contractors to innovate, upgrade equipment and upskill employees to increase their margins. Over time, that results in a healthy, competent shipbuilding sector that produces more ships of higher quality, and eventually at a lower unit cost.

Once again, the opinions expressed are my own, not the opinions of the United States Navy, the Department of War or the government of the United States. Thank you.

About America at Sea: Voices That Matter

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea. Views expressed are the speaker’s own and do not represent the U.S. Navy or the Department of War. Featuring a view is not an endorsement.

Join the conversation on X. What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first?

The Conversation Is Shifting on Sea Power — Now Americans Must Engage

Bill Cullifer, Founder
Bill Cullifer, Founder

Something important is happening.

For years, maritime decline has been treated as a niche issue — something for defense insiders, shipyard executives, or Navy circles to debate quietly. That is beginning to change.

Recently, Senator Todd Young published, in American Affairs Journal a thoughtful piece arguing that rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base is essential to both economic strength and national security. He traced the issue back to the Revolution, through Mahan, and into the present-day competition with China.

That matters.

Not because of who wrote it. But because of what it signals.

Maritime Power Is Back in the Conversation

For decades, America has allowed its commercial fleet to shrink. Shipyards have closed. Skilled labor has aged out. Foreign-flagged vessels now move the overwhelming majority of our trade.

Meanwhile, China designated shipbuilding a strategic industry and built accordingly.

This is not about panic. It is about arithmetic.

Eighty percent of global trade moves by sea. Most of America’s trade does too. If we cannot build, repair, and crew ships at scale, we are strategically exposed — economically and militarily.

The encouraging sign is that leaders are once again speaking openly about maritime strength.

That is progress.

Policy Is Necessary — But Not Sufficient

Legislation like the proposed SHIPS Act is an important step. Tax incentives, regulatory reform, maritime academy modernization — these are serious proposals.

But here is the harder truth:

Industrial revival cannot be sustained by legislation alone.

Shipbuilding capacity requires:

Workforce development
Steel production
Port modernization
Cybersecurity resilience
Long-term capital investment
And, above all, public understanding

Without public buy-in, even well-crafted policy fades with political cycles.

This Is Not a Coastal Issue

One of the most overlooked truths in this debate is that maritime strength touches every American.

Indiana steel feeds shipyards.
Midwestern grain moves to global markets by sea.
Energy exports rely on tankers.
Supply chains run through ports.

Sea power is not about nostalgia. It is about jobs, commerce, resilience, and deterrence.

When ships deploy longer because the fleet is too small…
When maintenance backlogs grow…
When sealift capacity shrinks…

Those are not abstract statistics. They are signs of strain in a system Americans depend on every day.

Civic Engagement Is the Missing Ingredient

We can debate fleet numbers. We can debate funding mechanisms. We can debate industrial policy.

But unless Americans understand why this matters — and choose to participate in the conversation — nothing lasting will change.

Rebuilding sea power is not simply a government project. It is a civic project.

It requires voters who ask informed questions.
Taxpayers who demand accountability.
Educators who teach maritime history and strategy.
Industry leaders willing to invest long-term.

America’s maritime strength has always rested on the character and engagement of its people.

That spirit has not disappeared.

The conversation is shifting. That is a good sign.

Now the responsibility shifts to us.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.

Read the full article here.

Six Frigates: Why America Chose Sea Power — and Why That Choice Still Matters

Six Frigates: Why America Chose Sea Power — and Why That Choice Still Matters

Ian W. Toll’s Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy should be required reading for anyone who believes America’s naval strength simply “happened” or that today’s debates about shipbuilding, cost, and purpose are somehow new.

They aren’t.

This book tells the story of how a young, divided, cash-strapped republic made a deliberate decision to build a Navy — not for glory, not for empire, but for survival, commerce, and credibility in a dangerous world.

Reading it today, the parallels are impossible to miss.

What the Book Is Really About

On the surface, Six Frigates recounts the creation of the first six capital ships authorized by the Naval Act of 1794. But at its core, the book is about civic will.

Toll shows that the U.S. Navy was born amid fierce political resistance, public skepticism, regional rivalries, and intense arguments over cost and necessity. Many Americans feared a standing Navy would drag the nation into foreign wars or empower a central government at the expense of liberty.

Nothing about this debate feels distant.

“The debate was never just about ships — it was about what kind of nation America would become.”
— Ian W. Toll

From the beginning, sea power was a choice — not a given.

Notable Quotes That Still Matter Today

Toll repeatedly underscores a truth early Americans learned the hard way:

“A nation that depended on commerce could not afford to remain defenseless at sea.”

American sailors were seized, trade was disrupted, and diplomacy without strength proved ineffective.

Another passage feels especially relevant now:

“Naval power was expensive, controversial — and delay was more dangerous still.”

That sentence could be written today about shipbuilding delays, fragile supply chains, and readiness gaps without changing a word.

And perhaps the most important civic reminder in the book:

“The frigates represented an investment not just in ships, but in skills, infrastructure, and national confidence.”

The founders weren’t just building hulls. They were building a maritime nation.

Why Americans Should Care

This book makes one thing unmistakably clear: the founders did not stumble into sea power. They argued their way into it.

They debated cost, foreign entanglements, corruption, and waste. And then they acted — because they understood that refusing to decide was itself a decision.

Today, Americans benefit daily from secure sea lanes, global trade, and deterrence at sea. Yet public understanding of how fragile that system is has faded.

Six Frigates reminds us that civic engagement is not optional when it comes to national security. The Navy exists because Americans once paid attention.

Implications for the Navy

One of the book’s strongest lessons is that shipbuilding takes time — and delay carries strategic risk.

The original frigates faced cost overruns, workforce shortages, material constraints, and political interference. None of that stopped the effort, because leaders understood that maritime strength could not be created on demand.

“Ships could not be conjured by urgency alone. They required patience, discipline, and sustained public support.”

That lesson applies directly to today’s challenges: a smaller fleet, stressed shipyards, and a public often disconnected from the maritime foundations of American power.

What Has Changed — and What Hasn’t

Technology has changed. The scale of global competition has changed. The oceans have not.

America remains a maritime nation, dependent on trade, energy flows, undersea cables, and allied sea lanes. Adversaries understand this and are building accordingly.

What has not changed is the central truth Six Frigates makes clear: sea power depends on informed citizens willing to support long-term decisions — even when they are politically uncomfortable.

Final Reflection

Six Frigates is not a call for militarism. It is a warning against complacency.

It shows that the U.S. Navy was born not from inevitability, but from hard choices made by leaders who understood the world as it was — not as they wished it to be.

As America approaches its 250th anniversary, this book offers a timely reminder: the Navy belongs to the American people, and its strength ultimately reflects public understanding, engagement, and resolve.

That responsibility didn’t end in 1794.

That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.

Let’s roll.