Peace Through Strength – Community Driven – Membership Supported
Category: Global News Watch
Global news is important because it helps people to be informed, engaged, and aware of what is happening in the world. It can promote understanding, facilitate action, and lead to positive change.
Over the past several years, hundreds — sometimes thousands — of Chinese fishing vessels have been observed assembling in concentrated groups across the South China Sea, the Western Pacific, and even far beyond Asia. At first glance, it looks like industrial fishing on a massive scale.
But this story isn’t really about fish.
It’s about state power, maritime control, and what happens when economic activity and national strategy blur at sea.
What’s Actually Happening
China operates the largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world, numbering in the thousands of vessels. Many of these ships operate far from China’s coast, often for months at a time, supported by at-sea logistics ships that refuel and resupply them.
Satellite imagery and maritime tracking data have repeatedly shown large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels assembling in coordinated formations, sometimes near disputed waters or critical sea lanes.
This isn’t random.
These fleets move, loiter, disperse, and regroup in ways that mirror organized maritime behavior, not independent commercial fishing.
Why Americans Should Care
Most Americans don’t think about fishing fleets as a national security issue — but they should.
These vessels strip global fish stocks, threatening food security for developing nations and destabilizing regional economies.
They operate in areas where the U.S. Navy and allied navies must already maintain freedom of navigation.
They complicate maritime awareness — overwhelming sensors, patrols, and coast guards simply by their sheer numbers.
When hundreds of ships show up in one place, they change the facts on the water without firing a shot.
That matters to global trade, stability, and ultimately American prosperity.
The Gray Zone at Sea
China’s fishing fleet often operates in what strategists call the “gray zone” — the space between peace and conflict.
These vessels are nominally civilian, but many:
Receive state subsidies
Share information with maritime authorities
Operate alongside coast guard and naval units
Assert presence in disputed waters without overt military force
This creates plausible deniability while advancing national objectives.
It’s influence without invasion.
Implications for the U.S. Navy
Every large-scale fleet operating overseas demands attention, monitoring, and resources.
That means:
More patrols
More intelligence collection
More strain on an already stretched Navy and Coast Guard
More coordination with allies who face the same challenge
The U.S. Navy isn’t just deterring warships anymore — it’s managing mass maritime pressure created by civilian fleets backed by state power.
This Isn’t About Hating China — It’s About Seeing Clearly
This isn’t anti-China rhetoric. It’s pro-reality.
If you ever doubted China’s long-term maritime intentions, the scale and coordination of these fishing fleets should give you pause. Nations don’t build and sustain fleets of this size accidentally. They do it because the sea matters — economically, strategically, and politically.
Ignoring that reality doesn’t make it go away.
What Comes Next
The real question isn’t whether China will continue expanding its maritime reach — it will.
The question is whether Americans understand:
Why the Navy matters beyond wartime
Why sea control protects everyday life
Why economic power and maritime power are inseparable
That understanding is what ultimately determines whether the U.S. can respond smartly, calmly, and effectively.
That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late. Let’s roll.
There’s a concept every naval planner understands but few Americans realize – one that I’ve come to appreciate over time: the decisions we make today about shipbuilding, maintenance, and industrial capacity don’t affect today’s Navy – they determine what Navy we’ll have seven to ten years from now.
This creates what I call the Critical Window – a concept familiar to anyone who’s managed large-scale projects. It’s that narrow period when decisions made now lock in outcomes years down the line. For shipbuilding, budget decisions, industrial investments, and strategic commitments made in 2026-2027 will directly shape our naval capabilities in the 2030s.
After this window closes, the die is cast. The industrial base will be committed. The budgets will be locked in. The ships – or the absence of ships – will be determined by choices we’re making right now.
Why 2026-2027 Is The Critical Window
The mathematics of naval construction are unforgiving:
Attack submarines take 7-8 years from contract award to delivery. A Virginia-class submarine ordered in FY2027 enters the fleet in 2034-2035.
Surface combatants take 4-5 years to build. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer funded in FY2027 delivers in 2031-2032.
Shipyard expansions take 3-4 years to become operational. Capacity investments made in FY2027 start producing results in 2030-2031.
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines require 7+ years and are consuming enormous portions of the shipbuilding budget through the end of this decade.
This isn’t abstract policy planning – it’s industrial reality. You cannot surge naval capability. You cannot speed up physics, metallurgy, or the skilled workforce required to build nuclear-powered warships.
Several factors converge to make 2026-2027 uniquely consequential:
The Big Beautiful Bill Timeline: The $150 billion defense investment passed in July 2025 is one-time funding available through 2029. By 2027, Congress must decide whether to sustain these investments with recurring appropriations or let them lapse.
The 2030s Capability Gap: Multiple studies project the Navy falling below required force structure in the early 2030s as older ships retire faster than new ones are built.
The China Pacing Challenge: China’s shipbuilding capacity far exceeds America’s. The gap between their naval growth and ours widens with each passing year we fail to accelerate production.
The Commission Opportunity: The National Commission on the Future of the Navy becomes operational in 2026. This represents a once-in-a-generation chance to reshape naval policy.
Looking Through The Binoculars: What We See In The 2030s
What you see depends entirely on decisions being made right now. If we maintain the current trajectory, the total battle force will decline by 2030, and the attack submarine fleet will reach minimum viable numbers by 2032. By 2035, China’s navy will be substantially larger, exploiting our constrained shipbuilding.
If we use the Critical Window wisely, shipyard expansions funded in 2026-2027 will come online by 2030. Accelerated production will begin delivering boats by 2032, and industrial base investments will enable us to match strategic requirements by 2035.
What The Critical Window Requires
Using this window effectively demands moving beyond one-time supplemental funding to sustained, recurring appropriations. The Big Beautiful Bill provided a down payment, but the FY2027 and FY2028 budgets must demonstrate a commitment to sustaining those investments. We also need acquisition reform to reduce the time from budget authorization to ship delivery and alternative funding mechanisms to supplement traditional appropriations.
From Experience: The Hollow Navy and The Reagan Response
I served during the 1970s hollow Navy – ships that couldn’t deploy and maintenance deferred. I also witnessed the Reagan administration’s response: a commitment to rebuild the Navy to 600 ships. That wasn’t just rhetoric – it was budget authority and political will sustained across multiple cycles. We face the same choice now. The 1980s rebuild succeeded because leaders recognized their Critical Window. We must do the same.
What You Can Do During The Critical Window
For veterans and advocates, understand that your voice matters most during the budget markup season. For policymakers, recognize that today’s choices have 10-year consequences. For concerned citizens, ask candidates about their plans for sustaining naval investment. Peace through strength requires backing rhetoric with budget authority.
The Bottom Line
The Critical Window of 2026-2027 is closing. We cannot change the physics of shipbuilding, but we can recognize this moment for what it is. The decisions made in the next 18 months will determine what Navy America has in the 2030s.
Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for naval transparency, readiness, and strategic policy development. Learn more: StrongerNavy.org
Follow the Commission: National Commission on the Future of the Navy
The Critical Window is now. The time to act is today.
Why a narrow stretch of ocean between three landmasses has shaped 80 years of naval strategy — and why Americans need to understand it now
Introduction
A recent debate centered on whether China or Russia pose an imminent military threat to Greenland. The answer from intelligence sources appears to be no. But that answer, while technically correct, misses the deeper strategic point that has guided U.S. thinking for over two centuries.
The real issue is not invasion. The real issue is strategic positioning in geography that matters to naval power.
Greenland sits in one of the most important pieces of maritime real estate on the planet. And the United States has understood that for a very long time.
The GIUK Gap: A Naval Choke Point Since World War II
Greenland forms the western anchor of what naval strategists call the GIUK Gap — the sea space between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom.
This is not a modern concept. During World War II and throughout the Cold War, this gap was the primary maritime passage between the Russian Northern Fleet and the Atlantic Ocean. Soviet submarines had to pass through this space to threaten U.S. and NATO shipping lanes.
The U.S. and NATO built an entire system of surveillance, patrols, air bases, and anti-submarine warfare doctrine around this geography. This was one of the most heavily monitored naval regions on earth for decades.
That geography has not changed.
What has changed is public memory of why it mattered.
Greenland and the U.S. Military Presence
The United States has maintained a military presence in Greenland since World War II. Today, Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) remains a critical U.S. installation for:
Missile warning
Space surveillance
Arctic operations
Early warning radar coverage of the North Atlantic and polar approaches
This is not symbolic. It is operationally significant to U.S. homeland defense and NATO maritime awareness.
The Monroe Doctrine and Western Hemisphere Strategy
In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine established a foundational principle of U.S. strategy:
Foreign powers establishing strategic footholds in the Western Hemisphere is a U.S. security concern — even if that presence appears commercial or political rather than military.
This was never about invasion. It was about presence.
Because presence becomes leverage.
That thinking has guided U.S. behavior for 200 years across the Caribbean, South America, Central America, and the Arctic.
Greenland fits squarely into that tradition.
China’s Pattern of Strategic Positioning
There is no evidence China plans to invade Greenland. But there is extensive documentation of China’s interest in:
Arctic shipping routes as ice recedes
Rare earth and mineral projects in Greenland
Financing infrastructure projects, including attempted airport construction
Expanding its presence in Arctic research and commercial ventures
This pattern is not unique to Greenland. Similar approaches have been seen in Africa, the Pacific Islands, South America, and Australia.
The pattern is not military. It is long-term positioning.
That is what concerns strategists, not headlines.
Why This Matters to Naval Strategy
Naval strategy is built around geography, choke points, and access.
Greenland is not important because of its population or economy. It is important because of where it sits on the map.
Control and awareness of the GIUK Gap means control and awareness of submarine movement between the Arctic and the Atlantic. That has been true for 80 years.
It is still true today.
Why This Is Urgent Now
Three developments make Greenland’s strategic position more critical today than at any point since the Cold War:
1. Arctic ice recession is opening new shipping routes and resource access, increasing activity in waters the U.S. has monitored for decades.
2. Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has returned to Cold War levels, but U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities have atrophied.
3. China’s systematic positioning in Arctic governance, research, and commercial ventures is establishing presence before the U.S. fully recognizes the competition.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy faces its smallest fleet since 1916 and readiness challenges that limit sustained presence in multiple regions simultaneously.
The stake is not hypothetical: If the U.S. cannot maintain awareness and presence in the GIUK Gap, it cannot guarantee:
Protection of transatlantic commerce that underpins the American economy
Early warning of submarine-launched threats to the homeland
Credible deterrence that prevents crises from starting
Why Americans Should Care
Most Americans think of naval strength as ships and aircraft carriers. Few think about the map.
But naval power is first and foremost about geography.
The sea lanes that carry global trade, energy supplies, and military movement pass through predictable choke points. Greenland anchors one of them.
Understanding this is key to understanding why the United States watches foreign interest in Greenland closely — not because of paranoia, but because of history.
Implications for the Navy
For the U.S. Navy and NATO maritime forces, Greenland and the GIUK Gap remain central to:
Monitoring Russian submarine activity
Securing North Atlantic shipping lanes
Maintaining Arctic awareness as access increases
Supporting homeland and allied defense from the maritime domain
This is classic naval statecraft.
Implications for Our Allies
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Canada, and NATO partners all share an interest in maintaining control and awareness of this region.
Greenland is not just a U.S. concern. It is a NATO maritime concern.
The Real Debate
The debate is not about whether China or Russia plan to invade Greenland.
It is about whether we recognize the long pattern of strategic positioning that great powers use long before conflict.
Geography doesn’t change. Neither does its importance to naval strategy.
Understanding Geography Is Just The Beginning
Greenland matters because of where it sits on the map. But knowing why geography matters doesn’t answer the harder questions:
How did the U.S. Navy — which once dominated these waters without question — reach a point where we’re debating our ability to maintain presence in strategically vital regions?
What decisions, what budget choices, what policy shifts brought us here?
And most importantly: what must happen next?
That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. We connect the dots between geography, strategy, budgets, readiness, and national will. Our goal is simple: educate the public on the fundamentals of naval power so Americans understand what’s at stake — and what it will take to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.
Diego Garcia represents the cornerstone of American naval power in the Indian Ocean—a facility that enables critical operations from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The recently signed UK-Mauritius agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, while intended to resolve a long-standing legal dispute, introduces serious security vulnerabilities that could compromise this vital base. After extensive review of the agreement, parliamentary documents, and expert analysis, Americans for a Stronger Navy has drafted an open letter to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer outlining our concerns and requesting strengthening of security provisions before final ratification. We publish this letter in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized the Special Relationship between our nations.
Key Concerns Raised:
Chinese Influence Risk: Mauritius maintains extensive economic ties with China, creating potential vectors for Beijing to establish surveillance capabilities on islands adjacent to Diego Garcia. The agreement’s prohibitions on foreign military presence may not cover civilian-flagged intelligence operations.
Weakened Control Structure: The transformation from British sovereign territory to a complex lease arrangement (UK leasing from Mauritius, US operating through UK) introduces political and legal vulnerabilities. American naval operations now depend on the stability of agreements between three parties rather than operating on secure sovereign territory.
Insufficient Security Guarantees: The agreement lacks robust enforcement mechanisms to prevent hostile powers from accessing outer islands for monitoring or influence operations. Ambiguities in defining prohibited activities could be exploited by adversaries operating under civilian cover.
Political Uncertainty: Changes in Mauritian government leadership create long-term risks. The current government has already ordered an independent review, and future administrations spanning the 99-year lease period may face economic pressure from China to renegotiate or modify terms.
What We Request:
Explicit provisions prohibiting Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on outer islands with clear enforcement
Joint UK-US monitoring and patrol authority across the archipelago
Automatic termination clauses if security provisions are violated
U.S. participation as a treaty party or guarantor for direct legal standing
Enhanced parliamentary scrutiny before final ratification
The Bottom Line: Diego Garcia’s strategic value has never been higher as great power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific. While we respect the UK’s efforts to address the historical injustice to the Chagossian people, justice and security need not be mutually exclusive. We urge strengthening this agreement before ratification to ensure this critical base remains secure for generations to come.
AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE KEIR STARMER MP PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Agreement
From: Americans for a Stronger Navy January 21, 2026
Dear Prime Minister,
We write to you as fellow guardians of the free world, united by history, shared values, and an unbreakable commitment to democratic liberty. The Special Relationship between our nations has been forged in the crucible of two world wars, sustained through the Cold War, and renewed in our common struggle against terrorism and authoritarianism. It is precisely because of this deep bond that we feel compelled to address our serious concerns regarding the recently signed agreement transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.
This letter is written not in criticism, but in the spirit of candid friendship that has always characterized Anglo-American relations. We believe the current agreement, while well-intentioned, poses risks to our shared security interests that must be addressed before ratification becomes irreversible.
THE STAKES ARE HIGHER THAN EVER
Diego Garcia is not merely a military installation—it is the keystone of Western power projection in the Indian Ocean. From this small atoll, our nations have:
Defeated terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Iraq
Countered Iranian aggression and Houthi attacks on international shipping
Protected vital sea lanes carrying half the world’s containerized cargo
Maintained stability in a region increasingly contested by China’s expanding naval presence
Today, as China constructs military facilities across the South China Sea, as Russia threatens European security, and as Iran destabilizes the Middle East, the strategic value of Diego Garcia has never been greater. Yet at this critical juncture, the agreement with Mauritius introduces vulnerabilities that our adversaries will certainly seek to exploit.
OUR CONCERNS AS ALLIES
1. The Shadow of Chinese Influence
Mauritius, a small island nation, has become deeply economically dependent on China. Chinese investment pervades Mauritian infrastructure—ports, telecommunications, energy. This is not coincidence; it is the systematic implementation of Beijing’s strategy to gain leverage over nations along critical maritime routes.
We must ask: What guarantees exist that a future Mauritian government, facing economic pressure from Beijing, will not grant China “civilian” access to the outer islands? What prevents the establishment of “research stations,” “telecommunications facilities,” or “environmental monitoring posts” that serve as covers for signals intelligence operations?
The agreement’s language prohibiting foreign armed forces is insufficient. China has mastered the art of military operations under civilian guise. Islands merely miles from Diego Garcia could become surveillance platforms monitoring every ship, submarine, and aircraft movement—intelligence that would be instantly shared with Russia, Iran, and other adversaries.
2. From Sovereignty to Lease: A Dangerous Transformation
For decades, Diego Garcia operated on British sovereign territory. This provided legal certainty and operational security. Now, under the new arrangement, the United Kingdom must lease Diego Garcia from Mauritius at a cost of $136 million annually—and the United States operates at Diego Garcia under a further sublease arrangement with the UK.
This creates a cascading dependency. American naval operations now rest upon:
British adherence to the lease terms
Mauritian governments honoring their predecessors’ commitments
Both nations resisting external pressure to renegotiate or restrict operations
History teaches us that 99-year leases are not permanent. China’s 99-year lease of Hong Kong ended in humiliation for the West. We cannot allow Diego Garcia to follow the same path.
3. Political Instability and Long-Term Uncertainty
The current Mauritian government has already ordered an independent review of the agreement negotiated by its predecessor. Opposition parties criticize the deal. Future elections will bring new leaders with new priorities, new pressures, and potentially new patrons.
Over 99 years, Mauritius will see dozens of governments. Can we truly be confident that all of them will prioritize Western security interests over economic inducements from Beijing? The agreement provides insufficient mechanisms to prevent a future Mauritian government from effectively weaponizing the lease against Allied interests.
4. Legal and Historical Justice vs. Strategic Reality
We understand the moral arguments underlying this agreement. The forced removal of the Chagossians was a grave injustice that demands acknowledgment and remedy. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion and UN General Assembly resolutions created legal and political pressure.
But we must also recognize that international law is not self-executing and that advisory opinions do not carry binding force. The United Kingdom acted under the legitimate belief that resolving this dispute was necessary—yet in doing so, it may have exchanged one set of problems for far graver ones.
Justice for the Chagossians and security for the free world are not mutually exclusive. Better solutions existed—and may still exist—that address historical wrongs without compromising the strategic foundation of Indo-Pacific security.
WHAT WE ASK OF YOUR GOVERNMENT
Prime Minister, we do not ask the United Kingdom to repudiate this agreement outright. We recognize that your government has acted in good faith, seeking to resolve a complex legal and moral situation. What we ask is that, before final ratification, you consider strengthening the agreement to address the security vulnerabilities we have identified.
Specifically, we respectfully urge:
For Your Government:
Negotiate explicit provisions prohibiting any Chinese presence, investment, or infrastructure on the outer islands, with clear enforcement mechanisms
Establish joint UK-US monitoring and patrol of the archipelago with authority to prevent unauthorized activities
Include automatic termination clauses if Mauritius violates security provisions or grants access to adversary nations
Secure American participation as a treaty party or guarantor, giving the United States direct legal standing
For Parliament:
Conduct thorough scrutiny of the agreement’s security implications before ratification
Demand full transparency regarding payment terms and any side agreements with Mauritius
Require regular reporting to Parliament on compliance with security provisions
For the British People:
Recognize that Diego Garcia represents not just American interests, but British interests and the interests of the entire free world. This is not a matter of American imperialism—it is a matter of collective defense of the international order that has brought unprecedented prosperity and peace.
THE WAY FORWARD: PARTNERSHIP, NOT DIVISION
Some will say we are being alarmist. They will argue that Mauritius is a democracy, that China’s influence is exaggerated, that the 99-year lease provides sufficient security. We respectfully but firmly disagree.
In 1997, many believed Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” would endure. In the early 2000s, few imagined China would militarize the South China Sea. In 2014, the West was shocked when Russia annexed Crimea. Again and again, we have learned that authoritarian powers exploit every opening, every ambiguity, every moment of Western inattention.
We cannot afford such complacency at Diego Garcia. The Indo-Pacific theater is where the fate of the 21st century will be decided. Chinese naval expansion, the militarization of artificial islands, aggressive territorial claims, and economic coercion of smaller nations—all of this points to a future where freedom of navigation and the rule of law are under assault.
Diego Garcia is our insurance policy against that future. It must remain invulnerable, legally secure, and operationally unrestricted. The current agreement, as written, does not provide these assurances.
A CALL TO ACTION
Prime Minister, we urge you to pause, reconsider, and strengthen this agreement before it becomes irreversible. History will not judge kindly those who prioritized legal formalism over strategic necessity at such a critical moment.
To the British people: Understand that your government is making a decision with consequences that will echo for generations. Diego Garcia is not a relic of empire to be shed in pursuit of moral absolution. It is a shield protecting your nation, our nation, and the free world from those who would overthrow the international order.
To our American leaders: Stand with our British allies, but make clear that we cannot accept an arrangement that compromises the security foundation of our Indo-Pacific strategy. If necessary, pursue alternative arrangements that preserve American access to Diego Garcia under conditions we can trust.
The United States and United Kingdom have stood together through our darkest hours. We fought side by side against fascism, communism, and terrorism. That partnership endures because we share not just interests but values—democracy, liberty, and the rule of law.
Today, we face new threats from authoritarian powers who respect only strength and exploit every weakness. The Chagos agreement, in its current form, creates weakness where we desperately need strength. We can do better. We must do better.
We write not as adversaries, but as friends. Not to divide, but to unite. Not to criticize, but to protect that which we have built together and must defend together.
The Special Relationship demands nothing less than total candor. In that spirit, we ask: strengthen this agreement, secure Diego Garcia, and ensure that the beacon of freedom in the Indian Ocean continues to shine brightly for generations to come.
Respectfully and in friendship,
Americans for a Stronger Navy
On behalf of Americans who cherish the Special Relationship and recognize that our security is inseparable from yours
Contact: Americans for a Stronger Navy StrongerNavy.org StrongerNavy.org/blog
As the founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy, my mission is to advocate for the naval power our nation needs to secure its interests, project influence, and deter aggression in an increasingly complex world. For too long, discussions about naval strength have focused almost exclusively on traditional, crewed warships. While these mighty vessels remain the backbone of our fleet, a silent revolution is underway—one that promises to redefine naval warfare as we know it.
More Than Just Boats: The Brains Behind the Brawn
What makes these vessels so transformative isn’t just their ability to operate without a crew, but the sophisticated artificial intelligence that empowers them. Both the Sea Hunter and Seahawk were designed and built by Leidos, and they are powered by an advanced software ecosystem called LAVA (Leidos Autonomous Vessel Architecture).
Self-Correction & Resilience: If a system fails or damage occurs, LAVA can reconfigure its mission in real-time. It’s like having a captain who can rewrite the playbook mid-battle without human intervention.
Intelligent Navigation: LAVA constantly processes data from radar, lidar, AIS, and cameras to execute collision avoidance maneuvers in full compliance with international “Rules of the Road” (COLREGS).
Modular Versatility: The same “brain” can be installed across a wide range of vessels, from high-speed interceptors to specialized sub-hunters.
A Fleet of Ghost Ships: The Strategic Advantages
Persistence & Endurance: Without a crew, these ships can operate for extended periods without the need for rotation or resupply.
Reduced Risk to Personnel: Deploying unmanned vessels for dangerous missions like anti-submarine warfare (ASW) preserves our most valuable asset: our sailors.
Cost-Effectiveness: Long-term operational costs are significantly lower than traditional warships, offering an affordable way to expand global presence.
Scalability & Swarming: LAVA enables “swarms” of USVs to coordinate and search vast ocean areas for threats simultaneously.
Looking Ahead: The Future is Unmanned
The US Navy’s commitment is clear. With an expansion from just four small USVs to hundreds projected within a single year, the shift is undeniable. The Seahawk and Sea Hunter have already logged over 140,000 autonomous nautical miles—more than five times the Earth’s circumference.
For Americans for a Stronger Navy, this represents a crucial step forward. Investing in these innovative, autonomous systems ensures that our Navy remains at the forefront of global naval power, ready to face the challenges of tomorrow’s maritime domain with unparalleled strength.
Join the Mission for a Modern Fleet
The transition to an autonomous-integrated fleet is a generational shift that requires steady advocacy and public support. At Americans for a Stronger Navy, we are dedicated to ensuring our sailors have the most advanced technology on the planet to keep our seas free and our nation secure.
Support our efforts today:
Stay Informed: Subscribe to our newsletter for deep dives into naval tech like LAVA and the Ghost Fleet.
Spread the Word: Share this article with your network to highlight the innovation happening in our shipyards.
Advocate: Join our community of maritime supporters and help us champion the 21st-century fleet.
Between January 11 and 15, 2026, China deployed three newly built Shuiqiao-class invasion barges to Nansan Island in the South China Sea. These are not ordinary ships. They are mobile, self-deploying logistics platforms designed to create instant docks, temporary ports, and heavy equipment offload points where no infrastructure exists.
Each barge can drive into shallow water, jack itself above the surface, and deploy roadway systems that turn open coastline into a functioning logistics hub.
This is not experimentation. This is rehearsal.
China is practicing how to build ports on demand.
Why This Is Different
Most people imagine amphibious invasions as waves of troops and armored vehicles storming beaches.
That image is outdated.
Modern war is won by logistics.
Fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, medical care, maintenance, and the continuous movement of people and equipment matter more than the first landing. Whoever sustains operations longest wins.
These barges are not weapons. They are infrastructure.
And infrastructure is what makes everything else possible.
By deploying these platforms, China is demonstrating its ability to:
Create instant ports
Establish temporary logistics hubs
Sustain forces across islands
Operate without fixed bases
Support heavy equipment transfers
Expand control incrementally
This is how power is consolidated in the 21st century.
My Commentary
If you once doubted China’s intentions, think again.
This is not defensive infrastructure. This is not routine maritime development. This is not a commercial experiment.
This is about control.
This is about reach.
This is about being able to move, land, supply, reinforce, and sustain military forces wherever and whenever they choose.
You don’t build mobile ports unless you intend to use them.
This is not about one island. This is about a system.
Why Americans Should Care
Naval power is not a platform. It is a system.
Ships, ports, logistics, repair facilities, supply chains, workforce, industrial capacity, and governance all matter.
China understands this.
That’s why it is investing in portable infrastructure, modular logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities—while the United States struggles with:
Aging sealift
Fragile port security
Long shipyard delays
Limited surge capacity
Shrinking industrial depth
Vulnerable maritime infrastructure
Power today is not just about firepower.
It is about who can show up, stay, and sustain.
China is building that capability deliberately.
What This Signals About China’s Strategy
This development aligns with a broader pattern:
Artificial islands
Dual-use ports
Civil-military fusion
Expeditionary logistics
Rapid infrastructure construction
Maritime normalization
China is not just building ships.
It is building the scaffolding of dominance.
And it is doing so quietly, persistently, and methodically.
This is how territorial control is modernized.
This Is a Governance Issue, Not Just a Military One
Military capability does not appear by accident.
It is built through alignment:
National will → budgets → priorities → behavior → readiness
China is aligning all five.
The United States is not.
We debate platforms. They build systems.
We argue procurement. They build logistics.
We delay shipyards. They build mobile ports.
This is not about spending more. It is about thinking differently.
What Must Change
America must stop treating naval strength as a niche defense topic.
It is economic security. It is supply chain security. It is alliance credibility. It is deterrence. It is peace.
If we fail to understand how power is now constructed, we will lose it without a single dramatic moment.
That is the real danger.
Not invasion headlines. Not dramatic conflict.
But quiet displacement.
Closing
China just showed us something important.
Not with missiles. Not with warships. But with infrastructure.
And that should worry anyone who believes in a free, open, and stable maritime world.
That’s why we launched Charting the Course: Voices That Matter — a 24-part educational series breaking down how we got here, what went wrong, and what must happen next. Our goal is simple: educate the public, connect the dots, and build the support needed to close the readiness gap before it’s too late.
When Americans hear about Venezuela, they tend to think in humanitarian terms—migration, political repression, economic collapse. But that framing misses the point. Venezuela is not just a tragedy. It’s a test case for how power works in the modern world.
And power today is not primarily exercised by invading countries. It is exercised by controlling access.
Naval strategist Brent Sadler calls this naval statecraft: the use of maritime power not to occupy territory, but to shape outcomes by controlling sea lanes, ports, trade routes, and strategic flows.
That may sound academic. It isn’t.
Oil moves by tanker. Food moves by ship. Weapons move by ship. Data moves across undersea cables. Whoever controls maritime access controls leverage over markets, pricing, and political behavior.
That is why Venezuela matters.
The country holds the largest proven oil reserves on earth. Those reserves don’t just sit in the ground—they move through ports, shipping routes, refineries, and insurance markets. If you influence those arteries, you influence global energy prices.
This is how power works now.
China, Russia, and Iran understand this. That’s why they don’t primarily project influence through armies anymore. They do it through ports, infrastructure loans, logistics hubs, shipping contracts, and maritime footholds.
This isn’t ideological. It’s commercial.
It’s about controlling the plumbing of globalization.
Most Americans still think about war in 20th-century terms: tanks crossing borders, armies seizing capitals, long occupations. Iraq and Afghanistan showed us the limits of that model—astronomical cost, endless entanglement, poor return on investment.
Naval power offers a different approach.
You don’t need to own the house to control the driveway.
Naval statecraft lets a country shape outcomes without rebuilding foreign societies, policing local politics, or stationing troops for decades. It raises the cost of destabilizing behavior. It disrupts illicit flows. It protects trade. It limits rivals’ reach.
No nation-building. No permanent occupation. No trillion-dollar quagmires.
Just leverage.
That matters to Americans because the modern economy is maritime. Roughly 90% of global trade moves by sea. Energy markets are maritime. Supply chains are maritime. Even the internet relies on undersea cables.
When those systems destabilize, Americans feel it—in fuel prices, grocery bills, insurance costs, and lost jobs.
The Navy doesn’t just protect territory. It protects flows.
And flows are what modern economies run on.
The public debate still frames U.S. foreign policy as a binary choice: invade or disengage. But the events in Venezuela show that this is a false choice.
Naval statecraft offers a third option.
It allows the U.S. to protect its interests without trying to govern other nations. It shapes incentives instead of regimes. It deters without occupying.
It is not warmongering. It is cost control.
It is not militarism. It is market stability.
And it has domestic benefits.
A credible naval presence requires ships, ports, dry docks, logistics networks, and skilled labor. That means long-term industrial jobs, capital investment, and manufacturing capacity—things America has been hollowing out for decades.
Naval power is not just a security asset. It is an economic one.
When rival powers build ports in the Western Hemisphere, they aren’t doing charity work. They’re building leverage. They’re shaping future trade behavior. They’re embedding themselves into supply chains.
Naval statecraft is how you counter that without turning every dispute into a war.
It is power with restraint. It is influence without occupation. It is competition without catastrophe.
And it may be the most important strategic concept Americans have never been taught.
Naval Advocacy Group Calls for “Strategic Seas Act” Requiring Tech Companies Profiting from China to Fund Fleet Modernization
December 31, 2025 — Americans for a Stronger Navy today released new data showing the U.S. Navy is projected to commission only 2 ships in 2025, marking the steepest decline in naval shipbuilding in modern history and creating a critical gap in America’s ability to counter China’s rapidly expanding fleet.
The analysis reveals a stark 10-year trend: from 2015 to 2025, the Navy averaged just 8 ships commissioned per year — falling far short of the 12 ships per year required to meet strategic goals. This represents a shortfall of approximately 40 fewer ships over the decade, occurring precisely as China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has become the world’s largest naval force.
“We’re watching American naval power erode in real time,” said Bill Cullifer, founder of Americans for a Stronger Navy. “The 2025 commissioning rate of just 2 ships isn’t a budget blip — it’s a strategic crisis that threatens our ability to maintain freedom of navigation in the Pacific and protect the very trade routes that make Silicon Valley’s global business model possible.”
The Taxpayer-Funded Tech Paradox
The organization notes a troubling disconnect: many of Silicon Valley’s most profitable companies were built on taxpayer-funded research from DARPA, the National Science Foundation, and Department of Defense programs — yet now generate billions in revenue from China while the Navy that protects their supply chains faces resource constraints.
“American taxpayers funded the fundamental research that created Google, GPS, the internet, smartphone AI, and semiconductor breakthroughs,” Cullifer said. “These companies now generate enormous profits from Chinese markets, yet contribute nothing directly to the naval forces that secure the Pacific shipping lanes their business depends on.”
The Strategic Seas Act: A Solution
Americans for a Stronger Navy is calling for Congress to pass a “Strategic Seas Act” that would require technology companies with significant China operations to contribute a modest percentage of those revenues to a dedicated Naval Modernization and Maintenance Fund.
Key provisions would include:
Companies with over $5 billion in annual China revenue contribute 2% to the fund
Revenues earmarked specifically for ship repair backlogs, shipyard modernization, and Pacific Fleet readiness
Projected to generate billions annually based on current tech sector China operations
Estimated to fund 4-6 additional ship commissionings per year, substantially closing the strategic gap
“This isn’t a tax — it’s a user fee,” Cullifer explained. “If you’re generating billions moving products and data across the Pacific, you should help pay for the destroyers and submarines that keep those sea lanes open. If you’re profiting from China’s market, you should help fund our ability to compete with China’s military.”
Bipartisan Issue Gaining Momentum
The proposal has gained interest across the political spectrum, appealing to defense hawks concerned about Chinese military expansion, economic populists focused on corporate responsibility, and fiscal conservatives seeking efficient solutions to readiness gaps.
“This issue transcends party politics,” said Cullifer. “Whether you’re concerned about China as a strategic competitor, frustrated by corporate tax avoidance, or worried about return on taxpayer investment in R&D, the answer is the same: those who profit most from the Pacific trade system should contribute to its protection.”
By The Numbers
U.S. Navy Ship Commissioning (2015-2025):
2015: 11 ships
2016: 11 ships
2018: 10 ships
2020: 8 ships
2022: 6 ships
2024: 3 ships
2025: 2 ships (confirmed)
Strategic Requirement: 12 ships per year 10-Year Average: ~8 ships per year Cumulative Shortfall: ~40 ships
Call to Action
Americans for a Stronger Navy is calling on Congress to:
Hold hearings on the naval shipbuilding crisis and its implications for Pacific deterrence
Commission a GAO study examining the relationship between taxpayer-funded tech R&D, corporate profits from China operations, and naval readiness gaps
Introduce and pass the Strategic Seas Act in the 119th Congress
Ensure 2026 defense authorization bills include dedicated funding to address the ship commissioning shortfall
“China is building a fleet designed to push the U.S. Navy out of the Western Pacific,” Cullifer concluded. “We built Silicon Valley with taxpayer dollars. Silicon Valley profits from Pacific trade. It’s time Silicon Valley helps us maintain the naval power that makes their business model possible. This isn’t just fair — it’s strategically essential.”
About Americans for a Stronger Navy
Americans for a Stronger Navy (StrongerNavy.org) is a non-partisan advocacy organization dedicated to ensuring the United States maintains the naval capabilities required to protect American interests, support allies, and preserve freedom of navigation in an era of great power competition.
For full data, graphics, and supporting documentation, visit StrongerNavy.org/shipbuilding-crisis
EDITOR’S NOTE: High-resolution graphics showing ship commissioning trends, comparative data with Chinese naval expansion, and the taxpayer investment in Silicon Valley technologies are available upon request.
Hello friends. Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy.
As we close out this year and gather with the people we care about, I want to take a moment to share something important with you. We’ve just completed a comprehensive review of America’s naval and maritime posture in twenty twenty-five. What we found is complicated. There is good news, troubling news, and some revelations that demand attention.
This is not another white paper filled with jargon. It’s a clear-eyed assessment of where we actually stand, what our competitors are doing, and what stands in the way of American maritime renewal.
Watch our short video below for a visual recap of the key findings:
https://x.com/i/status/2003462404315987976
Let me start with the good news, because it matters. Despite everything else, the U.S. Navy did what it always does. It showed up.
Our sailors and Marines maintained global presence across multiple theaters. They responded to crises in the Red Sea, deterred aggression in the Pacific, and supported allies worldwide. Ship captains and crews performed with the professionalism Americans expect, even while operating aging ships and dealing with stretched maintenance schedules.
Leadership also spoke with urgency. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan captured the crisis perfectly when he said, “A decade to deliver capability is the equivalent of fielding a twenty fifteen iPhone today, already obsolete.”
Navalists and key voices in Congress continued pushing for shipbuilding reform, the SHIPS Act, and workforce development. They have not given up — and neither should we. So we still have talent, commitment, and awareness. But awareness alone is not a strategy.
That leads to the harder truth. Twenty twenty-five left Americans and our allies asking the same question again and again: What is U.S. strategy?
For the first time in years, two congressionally mandated documents failed to appear. The China Military Security Developments Report — missing. The Navy Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan — missing.
Congress was left writing budgets without the strategic guidance it is legally entitled to receive. Allies grew uncertain. Adversaries grew bolder.
Policy signals also contradicted each other. There were trial balloons about groupings that would include both the United States and China. Approvals of advanced AI chip sales to Beijing. Envoys sent to Moscow while tensions remained high. And a National Security Strategy that appeared to sideline Europe.
The result was strategic ambiguity. Friends worried. Competitors took notes.
At the same time, despite all the urgent rhetoric about industrial mobilization, America did not see new shipyards opening. We did not see expanded dry docks under construction. We did not see welding sparks flying from California to Virginia.
As one observer put it, “We talked about shipbuilding more than we did shipbuilding.” China built more than two hundred ships this year. We built a handful.
Now here is what really changed the conversation in twenty twenty-five. The most significant military development was not theoretical — it was operational.
China and Russia conducted coordinated naval and air operations in the Philippine Sea, the exact waters the U.S. Navy plans to defend in a future conflict. China surged a carrier group with real flight operations. Russian long-range bombers entered the same battlespace.
They are operating today the way we keep saying we will operate tomorrow.
And here is what surprised even us. The biggest obstacle to American maritime renewal is not foreign competition — it is American corporate lobbying.
Bloomberg revealed that U.S. retail and shipping interests spent millions lobbying against funding our own shipyards. These corporations want U.S. Navy protection of the sea lanes, but they oppose investing in American shipbuilding because they profit from Chinese-built ships.
Let that sink in.
There is also a structural problem most Americans never hear about. The Navy no longer fully controls its own future. Civilian budget offices and corporate lobbies now shape more naval policy than the uniformed Navy and Marine Corps.
One naval officer summarized it perfectly: “We no longer build the Navy the Navy needs. We build the Navy the accountants will tolerate.” That is not a recipe for maritime power.
So what do we do? Naval expert Brent Sadler has identified a clear solution: We need a Maritime Advisor to the President — one empowered official coordinating the Navy, MARAD, OMB, Commerce, and industry. Someone whose job is to think about American sea power every single day.
America is not outmatched. We are under-mobilized.
Our twenty-five page report explains how we got here, what twenty twenty-five revealed, and what must happen in twenty twenty-six if we’re serious about remaining a maritime power. You can request it at StrongerNavy.org by clicking Contact Us. We’ll send it to you right away.
The adversaries are watching. The allies are calculating. And the American people deserve to know what is at stake.
Let’s make twenty twenty-six the year we finally close the gap between words and action. From all of us at Americans for a Stronger Navy, happy holidays — and fair winds.
The 2027 Countdown: What the Pentagon’s Delayed China Report Reveals
Bill Cullifer, Founder
Hello friends, and fellow supporters of America’s Navy. Bill Cullifer here with Americans for a Stronger Navy.
On December 23rd, the Pentagon released its annual China Military Power Report. This assessment had been missing all year while Congress debated budgets. Now that it’s here, we understand the delay. The report contains the most direct warning yet: China expects to be able to fight and win a war over Taiwan by the end of 2027. That’s less than three years away.
Why Taiwan Matters to You
As Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, wrote in TIME Magazine:
“Defending far-off Taiwan and our allies… is rooted in a practical, hard-nosed assessment of what is in Americans’ concrete economic and political interests. It is about defending Americans’ security, liberties, and prosperity from a very real, and in terms of China’s gigantic scale, unprecedented danger.”
Your Phone. Your Car. Your Hospital Equipment.
Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. A Chinese blockade or invasion would cost the global economy at least one trillion dollars per year.
What the Pentagon Report Reveals
Nuclear Expansion: Stockpile reached 600+ in 2024, on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030.
Space Surveillance: 359+ satellites now track U.S. ships in near real-time.
Cyber Weapons: Operations like Volt Typhoon have burrowed into U.S. power grids for wartime sabotage.
Taiwan Pressure: 3,067 air incursions in 2024—nearly double the previous year.
The Timeline Should Terrify You
The Western Pacific is becoming a “Kill Zone.” As one naval officer put it: “We no longer build the Navy the Navy needs. We build the Navy the accountants will tolerate.”
America is not outmatched; we are under-mobilized. The decisions we make in 2025 determine whether deterrence holds in 2027. Visit StrongerNavy.org to request your copy of our 2025 U.S. Navy Year in Review.
Thank you for caring about America’s maritime strength.
Fair winds and following seas,
Bill Cullifer Founder, Americans for a Stronger Navy StrongerNavy.org
