One idea, four answers: how opinions on the Pentagon’s new Autonomous Warfare Command are taking shape, and why it matters to the future of the fleet.
On Veterans Day, Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), wrote that wars are won in shipyards and factories as much as at sea. In the same column, he called the Pentagon’s new Autonomous Warfare Command a good step, likening it to how the U.S. reorganized its commands to manage new technology in the Pacific in World War II [1].
Two weeks earlier, Dr. Steven Wills of the Center for Maritime Strategy argued the opposite: the services do not need a four-star command for autonomous warfare at all [2].
Both men are serious naval thinkers. Both want the Navy to win. So who is right? To answer that, it helps to look past the headline.
Why this matters to every American
Drones are no longer a side show. In Ukraine and in the Middle East, cheap unmanned systems have changed how wars are fought, and how fast. The Navy expects that unmanned aircraft could one day make up as much as 60 percent of a carrier air wing [2]. Whoever decides how these systems are bought, trained on and commanded will shape the Navy your children and grandchildren serve in.
There is also a “who pays” question. The Pentagon’s 2027 budget request proposed roughly $54 billion for its autonomous warfare effort, up from about $226 million the year before [3]. Where that money sits, and who controls it, is exactly what this debate is about.
What the Pentagon actually announced
On September 30, Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the Autonomous Warfare Command, or AUTOWARCOM, in a speech at Marine Corps Base Quantico [4]. It would be a four-star combatant command, the first new one since U.S. Space Command was reestablished in 2019 [5].
A few facts are often lost in the coverage:
It doesn’t exist yet. The target date is October 1, 2027, and it depends on legislation and on decisions about budgets, personnel and command relationships that haven’t been made [6].
It is meant to have “service-like” authorities. That means its own manpower, budget, acquisition authority and career paths, not just a headquarters [4][6].
It is not meant to replace the services’ own drone programs. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Space Force would keep providing forces. The command would set joint requirements and integrate them [6].
An interim effort is already running. Project Agincourt, led by Defense Innovation Unit director Owen West and Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser, is building the path to the new command [6].
The services are moving at the same time
The Army didn’t wait. Two days after the announcement, it created its own Futures and Autonomous Systems Command, or FASCOM, to put autonomy into its formations, buying and training, with priority capabilities fielded no later than fiscal 2028 [7].
“We are done with the bureaucratic inertia holding back modernization.” — Acting Army Secretary Adam Telle [7]
The Navy has been at it too. Earlier this year, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said the Navy was weighing a dedicated commander for robotic and autonomous systems [8]. In September, the Navy stood up a Robotic and Autonomous Systems Warfighting Development Center to bring order to years of scattered experiments across its warfare communities, labs and acquisition offices [9].
So the question isn’t whether the military should adopt autonomous systems. Everyone agrees on that. The question is who should be in charge of it.
The case for a four-star command
Retired Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, makes the strongest case. His model is 1986, when Congress, frustrated that special operations forces were scattered across the services, created U.S. Special Operations Command with the power to organize, equip and advocate for that mission [10]. Drones, he argues, face the same problem today. He also warns that a reform made by one Pentagon leadership team can be undone by the next.
“Administrative action can begin reform, but lasting change requires Congress.” — Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, USMC (Ret.) [10]
Admiral Stavridis comes at it from history. In World War II, he notes, the U.S. adapted its command structures to keep up with radar, code-breaking and the carrier [1].
The case against
Dr. Wills thinks the SOCOM comparison falls short. Special Operations Command was born from a specific failure, the 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran. No similar failure with unmanned systems has happened. And drones, unlike special operations forces, are becoming part of the regular force [2].
His better comparison is aviation between the world wars. The U.S. let the Army and Navy develop aircraft for their own needs, and the Navy built carrier aviation into the heart of the fleet. Britain put all military aircraft under the Royal Air Force, and its naval aviation fell behind for two decades. A single command, he warns, risks a “one-size-fits-all, lowest-bid solution” [2].
Others add their own concerns:
It cuts against flattening the force. Retired Army Special Forces Lt. Col. Stephen Cook points out that the same Pentagon leadership ordered cuts to four-star billets. Autonomy, he argues, is a technology to be fitted to each service, not a domain like cyberspace. He calls a new four-star headquarters “the ultimate bureaucratic paradox” and would instead put autonomy experts inside the services’ program offices [11].
Who does what isn’t settled. Army officer Michael Carvelli warns of a command-and-control collision between AUTOWARCOM and the Army’s FASCOM, and expects the other services to build their own versions. Without clear lines on requirements, buying, testing and fielding, he writes, the command “risks reproducing the gaps that it was created to close” [12].
Congress holds the real power
The Pentagon can create a command. Only Congress can give it money and authority. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the 2027 defense bill would permit, but not require, a robotic and autonomous systems combatant command [5][13]. As Navy Captain Justin Hardy put it in Proceedings, Congress must decide what authority such a command will have [13].
That is where this debate will be settled: in the details of the final defense bill, not in the speeches.
What both sides agree on
Strip away the arguments over org charts and there is real common ground:
The current system is too slow. Supporters and critics alike say acquisition hasn’t kept pace with how fast drones are changing on the battlefield.
The warfighter has to own the result. Even supporters say the services will keep providing and fighting the forces. Critics say that is exactly why the services should keep control of development.
Clarity has to come first. Nearly every writer, for or against, asks the same questions: who sets requirements, who controls the money, and who answers for results.
The takeaway
This isn’t a fight between people who want drones and people who don’t. It is an argument among serious people about how to organize for them. History offers lessons on both sides: SOCOM shows what a dedicated command can do, and naval aviation between the wars shows what service-led experimentation can do.
For the Navy, the stakes are high. Unmanned systems will fly from its carriers, sail with its destroyers and patrol beneath the surface. Whatever structure emerges, it has to help sailors fight, not add another layer between them and the tools they need. And as Admiral Stavridis reminds us, none of it matters if we can’t build the ships and systems in the first place.
We’ll keep tracking this debate as it unfolds, and we’ll share what the voices in America at Sea say about it. Where do you come down? Join the conversation on X.
About America at Sea: Voices That Matter
America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy, supported by U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Shipbuilders, mariners, industry, the Navy community and policy experts answer the same three questions about rebuilding America at sea: What’s working? What’s in the way? What would you fix first? Views expressed are the speakers’ own, and featuring a view is not an endorsement.
References
[1] James Stavridis, “World War II Still Has Lessons for Today’s Wars,” Bloomberg Opinion, November 11, 2026.
[2] Steven Wills, “The Services Do Not Need a Four-Star Autonomous Warfare Command,” RealClearDefense, October 24, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/pentagon/articles/the-services-do-not-need-a-four-star-autonomous-warfare-command-2026-10-24
[3] Covington & Burling, Inside Government Contracts, “The Pentagon’s New Sub-Unified Command for Autonomous Warfare: What It Means and Where It Might Land.” https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/tag/autonomy/
[4] Military Times, “Hegseth announces new four-star command for autonomous warfare,” September 30, 2026. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/09/30/hegseth-announces-new-four-star-command-for-autonomous-warfare/
[5] Air & Space Forces Magazine, “Lawmakers Eye Four-Star Command for Unmanned, Autonomous Systems.” https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lawmakers-four-star-command-unmanned-autonomous-systems/
[6] IDGA, “AUTOWARCOM Explained: Inside the Pentagon’s New Autonomous Warfare Command,” October 26, 2026. https://www.idga.org/
[7] U.S. Army, “Army announces Futures and Autonomous Systems Command,” October 2, 2026. https://www.army.mil/article-amp/295913/army_announces_futures_and_autonomous_systems_command
[8] Breaking Defense, “Navy weighs creating robotic autonomous systems commander amid unmanned push,” February 2026. https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/navy-weighs-creating-robotic-autonomous-systems-commander-amid-unmanned-push/
[9] DefenseScoop, “Navy creates robotic autonomous systems warfighting development center,” September 25, 2026. https://defensescoop.com/2026/09/25/navy-creates-robotic-autonomous-systems-warfighting-development-center/
[10] Arnold Punaro, “The Lesson of 1986 for the Pentagon’s New Autonomous Warfare Command,” RealClearDefense, October 14, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/military-strategy/articles/the-lesson-of-1986-for-the-pentagons-new-autonomous-warfare-command-2026-10-14
[11] Stephen D. Cook, “Why an Autonomous Combatant Command Hinders Lethality,” RealClearDefense, October 12, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/military-strategy/articles/why-an-autonomous-combatant-command-hinders-lethality-2026-10-12
[12] Michael Carvelli, “AUTOWARCOM Is Heading for a Command and Control Collision,” RealClearDefense, October 20, 2026. https://www.realcleardefense.com/us-army/articles/autowarcom-is-heading-for-a-command-and-control-collision-2026-10-20
[13] Justin Hardy, “May, Not Shall: Congress’s Role in the Autonomous Warfare Command,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2026. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/november/may-not-shall-congresss-role-autonomous-warfare-command