Rust, Mines, and Shipyards — CDR Stephen Phillips

Rust, Mines, and Shipyards

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation hosted by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action and moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.). Each voice answers the same three questions: What’s working? What’s the biggest barrier? What would you fix first?

CDR Stephen Phillips, USNR (Ret.), PhD, brings an unusual combination of operational experience and historical scholarship to the America at Sea conversation. He is the producer and host of Preble Hall, the Naval History podcast of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum, and Talk a Little, Learn a Lot, the podcast of the American Society of Naval Engineers [1][2]. A 1992 Naval Academy graduate, he served as a Surface Warfare Officer aboard USS Harlan County (LST-1196) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), then lateral transferred to Explosive Ordnance Disposal before completing a career in the Naval Reserves in 2012.

His PhD dissertation at King’s College London became the book A Poisoned Chalice: The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988, published in April 2026 [3]. That background — practitioner turned historian — gives his answers here a depth that connects what happened in the Gulf four decades ago to what the Navy must do today.

What’s Working: Mine Warfare Deserves Renewed Emphasis

Phillips frames his answer through the lens of Operation Earnest Will — the 1987–88 U.S. Navy convoy escort mission in the Persian Gulf that he calls “the precursor to all of our conflict in the Gulf.”

Iran’s mine warfare campaign successfully denied areas of the sea around the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy responded by attacking mine layers and clearing the strait. Phillips sees that chapter as proof that mine countermeasures (MCM) matter — and as a warning about what happens when emphasis fades.

“I want mine warfare to experience renewed emphasis. I think that we should set a goal of getting out of the classic cycle in which mine warfare eventually starts to atrophy.”

He calls for reestablishing Mine Warfare Command and notes that the MCM community “has been in the vanguard of developing unmanned platforms with the mantra of get the sailor out of the minefield.” He wants that momentum to continue through unmanned undersea and surface vessels — alongside the Navy’s broader unmanned push [4].

Phillips also reminds us not to overlook offensive mine warfare, pointing to Operation Starvation (the WWII B-29 mining campaign against Japan) and Operation Pocket Money (the 1972 mining of Haiphong Harbor) as precedents worth studying [5][6].

The Biggest Barrier: A Lack of Shipyards

Phillips states the barrier plainly: the nation needs more ships, and the greatest obstacle to getting them is a lack of shipyards.

“Some should be traditional like the next destroyer or frigate. Some should be transformational like the ESBs or unmanned platforms. And some need to be a modern interpretation of a legacy platform — like hospital ships, or ships for deep salvage so that we can fight battles on the seabed.”

His prescription is a mix: commercial shipyards adding production lines for naval vessels, venture capital to build new shipyards from the ground up, and public shipyards taking on shipbuilding alongside their repair work.

He draws a parallel to the automotive and space industries, which have seen technology-driven transformation in recent years. “It’s just time for the maritime realm to catch up.”

And he paraphrases VADM David Lewis, president of the American Society of Naval Engineers:

“There’s a lot of engineers currently in the education pipeline — in fields they think are focusing on something else. Mechanical engineering. Computer science. AI. They’re going to find themselves in the naval engineering or maritime engineering realm. In other words, they’re in maritime building. They just don’t know it yet.”

Fix One Thing: Rust

If he could fix one thing, Phillips would fix the material condition of the fleet. He calls rust “the broken window policing of the fleet’s readiness” — a small visible failure that signals deeper problems.

He tells two sea stories to make his point.

The first is about ship design. As First Lieutenant aboard San Jacinto in the Mediterranean, he watched his crew vacuum and mop water off the deck while a French frigate across the pier had sailors relaxing under an awning. Why? The French ship had a cambered deck — the water drained itself.

“We were going through all of this effort to get water off of our decks while they had a camber deck and the water was just gently draining right over the side.”

The second is about investment. His brother served as an exchange officer on a Dutch frigate. Phillips went aboard expecting a new ship. It wasn’t — it was mid-career. But it looked brand new because the Dutch apply high-quality coatings and paints in the shipyard, and the crew focuses on cleanliness rather than constantly fighting corrosion.

“Our Navy has maintained our ships with economical paint and coatings, with a crew sized to constantly maintain material condition. This was eroded by minimal manning and now longer periods at sea.”

His proposal: take a page from the Dutch and deliver ships with the highest quality paints and coatings, then reapply them whenever the ship goes into an availability. Take a page from the French and design decks that drain themselves. And consider dedicated shore-based teams that address material condition issues in home port during off-cycle time.

The Takeaway

Phillips connects three threads that don’t often appear in the same conversation: the enduring relevance of mine warfare, the urgent need for more shipyards, and the hidden cost of neglecting ship maintenance. His perspective — shaped by service in the Gulf, years of historical research, and deep ties to the naval engineering community — argues that rebuilding at sea is not just about counting hulls. It’s about the industrial base, the technology, and the daily decisions that determine whether a ship is ready to fight.

“I have high hopes for the future of the maritime industry and for the United States Navy. These solutions are out there. I’m glad that we’re talking about them. We will get there. God bless our Navy.”

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About America at Sea

America at Sea: Voices That Matter is a 45-day maritime conversation launched October 18, 2026, by Americans for a Stronger Navy with U.S. Maritime Action. Moderated by Capt. Brent Sadler, USN (Ret.), the series asks shipbuilders, mariners, industry leaders, the Navy community, and policy experts the same three questions. A common-ground report will be delivered to policymakers, their staffs, and the public at the end of November.

Learn more: StrongerNavy.org

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About the Guest

CDR Stephen Phillips, USNR (Ret.), PhD, is a 1992 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He served as a Surface Warfare Officer and Explosive Ordnance Disposal officer, completing his career in the Naval Reserves in 2012. He holds a PhD from King’s College London and is the author of A Poisoned Chalice: The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988. He produces and hosts Preble Hall, the Naval History podcast of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum, and Talk a Little, Learn a Lot, the podcast of the American Society of Naval Engineers.

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References

[1] Preble Hall podcast, U.S. Naval Academy Museum: https://www.usna.edu/Museum/PrebleHall/
[2] Talk a Little, Learn a Lot podcast, American Society of Naval Engineers: https://talk-a-little-learn-a-lot.transistor.fm/
[3] Stephen P. Phillips, A Poisoned Chalice: The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 (Naval Institute Press, 2026).
[4] Mine Countermeasures and unmanned naval systems: the Navy’s Mine Warfare Command (historically, Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command) has led development of unmanned MCM platforms.
[5] Operation Starvation: the 1945 B-29 aerial mining campaign that laid over 12,000 mines in Japanese home waters, sinking or damaging more tonnage than any other naval operation in the Pacific.
[6] Operation Pocket Money: the 1972 aerial mining of Haiphong Harbor, North Vietnam, which effectively closed the port to enemy shipping.