In late August 2001, I was in Manhattan, kitty-corner from the Twin Towers, to deliver a web design course to community college instructors. I was there on behalf of the World Organization of Webmasters — WOW, for short an organization I founded in 1996.
On the final day of the course overview to the program managers, around 5:30 in the evening, I walked into the World Trade Center and rode up to the Windows of the World, the restaurant on the 106th and 107th floors of the North Tower. I was still wearing my WOW blue denim. The staff took one look at the shirt, assumed I was a friend of the owner, and treated me like one — a glass of wine, an open table, no questions asked. I sat there taking in the whole of Manhattan below me, having no idea what that room, and that building, would mean to the country two weeks later.
The Week Everything Changed
That week, the course was taught to the Borough of Manhattan Community College web design instructors — BMCC, just blocks from the towers. It would become a command center within hours of the attack.
My two trainers that week were themselves community college instructors, my partners on a national train-the-trainers program run in collaboration with Apple Education and Cisco Systems, part of a $1.2 million U.S. Department of Education grant. Within an hour of the first plane hitting, my instinct took over: get them in a rental car and get them out of the city, to family in Pennsylvania. That drive — through a Manhattan that no longer had a skyline, past a country that didn’t yet know what was happening to it is a memory I still carry.
I think about that room at Windows of the World often. The wine, the view, the ordinary kindness of strangers who thought I belonged there — and then, seventeen days later, a building full of people who did belong there, gone.
Let’s Roll
Todd Beamer was a passenger on United Flight 93 that morning, a civilian with no training for what came next. When the hijackers took the cockpit, he got on an airphone with a GTE supervisor named Lisa Jefferson, learned what had already happened on the ground, and then turned to the passengers around him. His last recorded words were simple: “Are you guys ready? Let’s roll.” [1] Minutes later, Flight 93 went down in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania — the only hijacked plane that day that didn’t reach its target. [2]
Beamer a devoted husband and father wasn’t Navy. He wasn’t a first responder. He was a father of two who saw what needed doing and organized the people around him to do it. That’s the whole of the “Let’s Roll” campaign at Americans for a Stronger Navy: not a slogan borrowed for effect, but a standard. When something needs doing — for a shipmate, a fleet, a country — you don’t wait to be asked twice.
Why I Still Tell This Story
I didn’t lose anyone I loved on 9/11. I lost a room I’d sat in two weeks earlier, and I spent that week getting two people I was responsible for out of a city that had just become a battlefield. That’s a small story next to the ones this country carries from that day. But it’s mine, and it’s why “Let’s Roll” isn’t an abstraction to me — it’s a debt.
Beamer saw the writing on the wall before anyone else on that plane did, and he acted. That’s the point of this story, and it’s the point of everything we do at Americans for a Stronger Navy: the world isn’t getting safer, and the Navy is going to carry more of the weight of that fact, not less. The 2026 National Defense Strategy says as much. We don’t have the luxury of waiting to see how it plays out. Every year on this day, I pay a little of that debt forward — it’s time to roll.
“Are you guys ready? Let’s roll.” — Todd Beamer, United Flight 93, September 11, 2001
Non sibi sed patriae. Not self, but country. Let’s roll.
References
[1] “Let’s roll,” Wikipedia, accessed September 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Let%27s_roll [2] Daily Herald, “‘Let’s roll’: Todd Beamer’s father on the valiant fight for Flight 93,” accessed September 2026, https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20210910/lets-roll-todd-beamers-father-on-the-valiant-fight-for-flight-93
Second in a series on the Maritime Security Advisor role created by the SHIPS for America Act.
In our last piece, we made the institutional case for why the Maritime Security Advisor role matters: a new Executive Office of the President post, chairing a Maritime Security Board with authority spanning Defense, Commerce, State, and the Coast Guard—the closest thing American sea power has ever had to a single point of accountability [1]. That piece deliberately named no candidate. This one does.
We believe Captain Brent Sadler (U.S. Navy, Retired) is the right person for this role. Before laying out why, we want to address something directly rather than let it surface as a discovery later.
He Didn’t Just Study This Problem. He Proposed the Solution.
Sadler is a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. In a July 2025 report, “Reviving America’s Maritime Strength: Comprehensive by Necessity,” he wrote the recommendation that a Maritime Security Advisor be named—co-equal to the National Security Advisor and the Director of the National Economic Council—and argued the President “should not wait” for legislation to make it happen [2].
That means the case we’re making here isn’t “a qualified person happens to be available.” It’s narrower and more direct: the person who designed this office is also, in our view, the person suited to run it. We think that’s a strength worth stating plainly, not a coincidence to talk around. Anyone can point to a resume. Few people can point to the institutional argument for the job itself, in their own name, a year before the position existed in statute.
The Rest of the Case
Set the authorship point aside, and the conventional qualifications are still substantial. Sadler was nominated by the White House for MARAD Administrator in March 2025—a nomination later redirected to another candidate, but one that means the hardest part of any new appointment, a completed White House vetting process, is largely already behind him [3].
His career built the cross-agency fluency this specific role demands: 26 years in the Navy, including operational tours as a nuclear submariner and service as a military diplomat in the Indo-Pacific helping direct billions in regional defense funding under the rebalance initiative [3]. That is not a resume built around one narrow lane of maritime policy. It’s built around coordinating defense, diplomatic, and industrial priorities simultaneously—precisely what the Maritime Security Board exists to do.
It’s also not a case he’s making for the first time under pressure. Sadler is the author of two books laying out this same argument at length: U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century: A New Strategy for Facing the Chinese and Russian Threat (2023 Naval Institute Press Author of the Year, National Security Book Award finalist), and the more recent Naval Power in Action: Seizing the Initiative in the New Cold War with China [5]. He has also testified before Congress, including before the House Foreign Affairs Committee [6]. Between the books, the Heritage report, and his record of testimony, this is a case he has been building in public, consistently, for years—not a position adopted for the occasion.
The Maritime Security Advisor isn’t a research fellowship. It’s an execution role. The strongest evidence someone can do it isn’t that they’ve written about the problem—it’s that they’ve already been trusted to act on it, at exactly this altitude, before.
Where This Stands Right Now
The FY27 NDAA, which carries the SHIPS Act’s core provisions, remains stalled in the Senate as of this writing [4]. As we noted in our last piece, that’s not actually a reason to wait: Sadler’s own 2025 report argued the President could name this Advisor today, tied to the existing April 2025 executive order on maritime dominance, without Congress acting at all [2]. If that argument was right then, it’s right now—a stalled bill doesn’t change who should hold the chair once it exists, whether that happens by statute or by executive action.
What We’re Asking
We’re not asking for a formal nomination process to be short-circuited, and we’re not claiming inside knowledge of how this decision will be made. We’re making a public case, on the merits, for a specific person—because we think the public argument matters as much as the private one, and because decisions like this benefit from being made in the open rather than settled quietly.
If you agree, add your name. We’ll be sharing the count as it grows, and using it to make the case directly to the people who can act on it.
References
[1] Americans for a Stronger Navy, “The Case for a Maritime Security Advisor,” StrongerNavy.org, September 2026.
[2] Brent D. Sadler, “Reviving America’s Maritime Strength: Comprehensive by Necessity,” The Heritage Foundation, July 24, 2025.
[3] Brent Sadler biography, The Heritage Foundation staff page; White House MARAD Administrator nomination, March 2025.
[4] H.R. 8800 (FY27 NDAA), House passage 216-212, July 22, 2026; S. 4784 cloture failed 50-46, July 14, 2026; no further Senate floor action as of Sept. 2026.
[5] Brent D. Sadler, U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century: A New Strategy for Facing the Chinese and Russian Threat, Naval Institute Press, 2023; Naval Power in Action: Seizing the Initiative in the New Cold War with China, Naval Institute Press, 2025.
[6] Brent D. Sadler, witness biography, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, April 29, 2021.
For readers new to this: the SHIPS for America Act (S. 1541 / H.R. 3151) is a bipartisan, bicameral bill—introduced by Sen. Mark Kelly, Sen. Todd Young, Rep. Trent Kelly, and Rep. John Garamendi—aimed at reversing decades of decline in the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base and the American-flagged merchant fleet. Its core provisions include rebuilding domestic shipyard capacity, growing and training a maritime workforce, expanding cargo preference requirements that favor U.S.-flagged vessels, and establishing a Maritime Security Trust Fund to reinvest industry fees back into maritime infrastructure. Its core provisions are currently riding inside the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8800), which passed the House in July but remains stalled in the Senate as of this writing. One of its most structurally important provisions is the subject of this piece: the creation of a Maritime Security Advisor and Maritime Security Board inside the White House.
BACKGROUNDER — FIRST IN A SERIES
This is the first in a series examining the Maritime Security Advisor role created by the SHIPS for America Act—a new White House post that could end up mattering more than almost anything else in the coming maritime revival. This piece lays the groundwork: what the role actually controls, why it was created, and why the decision about who leads it deserves public attention now, before it’s resolved one way or another. Later pieces in this series will look more closely at the landscape of who could fill it, how it fits into the broader package of maritime legislation moving through Congress this fall, and what coordination work is already happening inside the administration to prepare the ground for it.
Most of the public debate over the SHIPS for America Act has focused on ships—fleet targets, funding mechanisms, shipyard capacity. Getting far less attention, though it’s been argued for by the people actually working this issue for well over a year, is a provision in Title I of the bill that may end up mattering as much as any of that: the creation of a new Maritime Security Advisor, housed in the Executive Office of the President. If the bill becomes law, this single office could do more to fix America’s maritime coordination problem than any funding mechanism in the bill.
The Problem This Position Is Designed to Solve
Right now, no single person in the federal government is responsible for American maritime strategy as a whole. The Navy, the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and Military Sealift Command all operate in their own lanes, reporting up through different departments, with different budgets and different priorities [1]. The National Security Council has directors for regions and for functional issues like counterterrorism—but nobody with a standing brief to ask “what is America’s maritime strategy?” and get everyone else in the building to answer to it [1].
The Heritage Foundation’s own analysis of the maritime legislative landscape makes a related structural point: with four separate bills moving through different committees—SHIPS for America, the Shipbuilding Investment and Workforce Act, the FLEETS Now Act, and the Ready Reserve Force Modernization Accountability Act—the risk isn’t a shortage of good ideas. It’s that good ideas arrive at conference as competing claims on the same floor time rather than as a coordinated package [2]. A standing coordinating office would help avoid that same fragmentation once bills become law and start needing joint implementation.
What the Job Actually Controls
The bill text gives the Maritime Security Advisor real authority, not just a podium. As a Special Advisor to the President, the position chairs a Maritime Security Board that spans every federal agency with a stake in the maritime domain [3]. Its responsibilities include:
— Developing, updating, and implementing the National Maritime Strategy [3]
— Setting fleet-size targets for the U.S.-flagged commercial fleet [3]
— Independent oversight of federal cargo preference programs [3]
— Coordinating the national maritime workforce buildout [3]
— Setting R&D priorities for next-generation shipbuilding technology [3]
— Aligning federal policy to favor U.S.-flagged vessels in international commerce [3]
— Protecting U.S. vessels from physical and cyber threats [3]
Put simply, this office doesn’t just advise on maritime policy from the sidelines—it runs point on it, across every department that touches a ship, from the Pentagon to the Department of Commerce to the Federal Maritime Commission.
A position with real cross-agency authority is only useful if the person in it can actually use that authority—which means the credentials and judgment of whoever fills this chair will matter as much as the statute that creates it.
Why This Is Bigger Than It Looks
It’s worth being precise about scale here. The Maritime Administrator at MARAD is a real and important job—but it’s a single-agency post inside the Department of Transportation, with authority bounded by MARAD’s own statutory mission. The Maritime Security Advisor sits above that, in the West Wing, with a mandate that spans defense, commerce, transportation, and diplomacy simultaneously. It’s the closest thing the American maritime enterprise has ever had to a single point of accountability.
This Office Doesn’t Need to Wait for Congress
Here’s what’s easy to miss: the President doesn’t need the SHIPS Act to sign this office into existence. In a July 2025 Heritage Foundation report, Senior Research Fellow Brent Sadler argued exactly that—the President “should not wait for the [SHIPS Act] to reach his desk” and could name a Maritime Security Advisor directly, tied to the interagency framework already called for in his April 2025 executive order “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” [5]. On that reading, the SHIPS Act doesn’t create this idea so much as it would make permanent, by statute, something the executive branch already has the authority to stand up on its own.
Where the Legislation Actually Stands
The House passed its version of the FY27 NDAA (H.R. 8800) on July 22, 216–212. The Senate’s companion bill (S. 4784) has stalled: a cloture vote to begin floor debate failed 50–46 on July 14, and as of early September, the Senate had taken no further procedural steps to bring it up [4]. Recent NDAA cycles have often skipped a formal conference committee in favor of informal House-Senate negotiation, so even “conference” may understate how this ultimately gets resolved.
None of that changes the underlying stakes. If anything, a stalled bill is exactly the moment when it’s worth being public about what’s riding on it—and a reminder that the executive branch doesn’t have to wait on the Senate to act.
References
[1] Heritage Foundation research on maritime coordination gaps across Navy, Coast Guard, MSC, and MARAD.
[2] The Heritage Foundation, “Maritime Legislation: Explainer and Next Steps,” Factsheet No. 285, August 12, 2026.
[3] SHIPS for America Act of 2025 (S. 1541 / H.R. 3151), Sec. 101, Title I—Oversight and Accountability; Senate Commerce Committee, “SHIPS for America Act Section-by-Section,” Apr. 30, 2025.
[4] H.R. 8800 (FY27 NDAA), House passage 216-212, July 22, 2026; S. 4784 cloture failed 50-46, July 14, 2026; no further Senate floor action as of Sept. 2026.
[5] Brent D. Sadler, “Reviving America’s Maritime Strength: Comprehensive by Necessity,” The Heritage Foundation, July 24, 2025.
The Heritage Foundation published a factsheet this month that does something rare in this space: it lays out, in plain language, exactly where the nation’s maritime revival stands and exactly what Congress needs to decide next [1]. We want to highlight one recommendation in particular, because we think it’s the single most important structural fix available to Congress right now and because it’s the kind of nonpartisan, process-focused idea a nonpartisan organization like ours can endorse without reservation.
Heritage recommends that, whether or not the Senate consolidates the current maritime bills into one, congressional leadership should create a Select Committee for Maritime Industrial Revival to coordinate across the committees that currently have jurisdiction [1]. We think that recommendation deserves support from anyone who has watched this effort unfold over the past three years.
The Problem the Committee Would Solve
The maritime revival effort is not lacking for good bills. The April 2025 version of the SHIPS for America Act carries genuine bipartisan support — 29 Senate cosponsors (15 Republican, 14 Democrat) and 140 House cosponsors (75 Democrat, 65 Republican) as of its last recorded action [1]. Alongside it sit the Shipbuilding Investment and Workforce Act, the FLEETS Now Act, and the Ready Reserve Force Modernization Accountability Act — each addressing a different piece of the same problem, each sponsored by different members, and each currently routed through different committees [1].
That’s not a failure of ideas. It’s a failure of coordination. A House amendment to the FY27 NDAA passed with two of these maritime provisions attached, and the whole package is now headed to House-Senate conference in September [2]. Conference is exactly the moment when overlapping, uncoordinated bills either get reconciled into something workable or get quietly dropped in the scramble to close out a defense authorization. A Select Committee — standing up now, ahead of that conference — is the difference between these bills arriving as a coordinated package and arriving as competing claims on the same limited floor time.
Why This Matters Beyond the Bills Themselves
We’ve spent three years arguing that naval readiness is fundamentally a “who pays” problem — allied burden-sharing through the Gulf Act, and a debt-neutral corporate demand signal through the SEAS Act’s Strategic Technology Responsibility Contribution [3]. Neither of those mechanisms competes with what’s already in SHIPS for America. Heritage’s own factsheet shows SHIPS for America’s funding model leans on shipping-side fees — non-U.S.-flagged vessel fees and Section 301 penalties tied to Chinese-built ships feeding a self-sustaining Maritime Trust Fund [1]. That’s a shipping-side answer to “who pays.” The SEAS Act is a corporate-side answer. The Gulf Act is an allied-side answer. None of these ideas need to compete for the same dollars or the same bill number — but they do need a body capable of seeing all of them at once, which is precisely what a Select Committee would provide.
What We’re Asking
We’re not asking Congress to adopt any specific funding mechanism in this post — ours or anyone else’s. We’re asking Congress to create the structure that would let good mechanisms be evaluated on the merits rather than lost to committee turf. A Select Committee for Maritime Industrial Revival, stood up before September conference, would let Congress treat this as the “generational task” Heritage rightly calls it [1], instead of a jurisdictional scramble.
The nation’s maritime revival has been, in Heritage’s words, a bipartisan, bicameral effort since its inception [1]. It should stay that way through conference. A Select Committee is how it does.
References
[1] The Heritage Foundation, “Maritime Legislation: Explainer and Next Steps,” Factsheet No. 285, August 12, 2026. [2] H.R. 8800 (FY27 NDAA), House passage with maritime amendments, 2026; expected House-Senate conference, September 2026. [3] Americans for a Stronger Navy / Center for Maritime Strategy, “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy,” March 2026.
A recent C-SPAN clip of President Trump discussing South Korea has been circulating, and it’s worth pausing on — not for the politics, but for the arithmetic. Trump described renegotiating South Korea’s cost-sharing agreement for U.S. troop protection, contrasting the roughly $3 billion Seoul agreed to pay against an initial ask of $10 billion, and questioning why the U.S. maintains 39,000 troops defending a wealthy ally that declined to assist with a related Middle East operation [1]. He extended the same complaint to NATO, noting the hundreds of billions the U.S. spends defending Europe from Russia [1].
Set aside whether you think that negotiation was handled well. The underlying question — who pays for the protection America provides? — is one we’ve been asking about naval power for three years, and it’s one the country can no longer afford to leave unanswered.
The Number That Changes the Conversation
As of this month, the U.S. gross national debt stands at roughly $40 trillion — up more than $2.8 trillion in the past year alone, or about $7.9 billion in new borrowing every single day [2]. Net interest now consumes nearly 14 percent of federal outlays, a share the Congressional Budget Office expects to keep climbing [2]. Debt held by the public is already above 100 percent of GDP, and CBO’s own long-term outlook shows that ratio climbing toward 120 percent by the mid-2030s absent reform [3].
That’s the fiscal backdrop against which every naval modernization request, every shipbuilding appropriation, and every forward-deployed carrier strike group now has to be justified. Taxpayers are not wrong to push back on open-ended commitments funded by more borrowing. As Washington debates spending, the Navy’s own leadership has been blunt that this is fundamentally a resource issue, with the Chief of Naval Operations citing a Congressional Budget Office estimate that an adequate fleet requires something on the order of $38 billion a year in shipbuilding funding alone [4] — funding that has to come from somewhere.
The Gulf Act: Burden-Sharing Where It Belongs
This is exactly the gap the Gulf Maritime Protection and Burden-Sharing Act is built to close. The Strait of Hormuz example is almost too on-the-nose: the U.S. Navy underwrites the security of a chokepoint that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil, much of it bound for nations that are not proportionally sharing the cost of keeping that lane open. China alone receives well over a third of the crude that transits the Strait, with India, Japan, and South Korea rounding out the bulk of the remainder — while the United States itself, thanks to domestic shale production and a supply chain built on Canada and Mexico, takes in only a small fraction of that flow [5].
The Iran war earlier this year gave us a live test of what happens when that lane actually closes, and the results make the case for burden-sharing sharper, not weaker. China and Japan largely rode out the closure on strategic reserves and pipeline diversification; India surprisingly weathered it too, on the strength of a decade of stockpile-building [6]. But none of that resilience came free. It meant months of elevated prices, emergency reserve drawdowns, and — for economies like Vietnam with thin buffers — real shortages and rationing [6]. Self-insuring against a closed strait is expensive and imperfect. A functioning U.S. Navy presence that keeps the strait open in the first place is the far cheaper alternative — which is precisely why it’s in these nations’ own economic interest to help fund it, not simply a matter of fairness to the American taxpayer. Trump’s complaint about allies who “don’t want to get involved” in guarding their own energy lifeline is, functionally, the same diagnosis the Gulf Act was written to fix. The Act doesn’t ask American taxpayers to absorb more debt to police a chokepoint for other nations’ benefit — it asks the beneficiaries to pay a proportional share for a service that is, by their own recent experience, worth far more to them than its cost.
The SEAS Act: A Demand Signal That Doesn’t Touch the Debt
The Strategic SEAS Act applies the identical logic domestically. Rather than asking Congress to appropriate still more borrowed dollars into shipbuilding, the Act’s Strategic Technology Responsibility Contribution draws a modest, offset-eligible assessment from U.S. companies with the deepest revenue dependence on China’s economy — the same offshoring era that hollowed out American shipyard capacity in the first place. It creates a dedicated, predictable demand signal for shipbuilders, which is the single thing industry has said it needs most to justify capital investment, without adding a dollar to the $40 trillion balance sheet [7].
That “no new debt” framing matters more today than it did when we first proposed it. Fiscal conservatives, China hawks, and taxpayers who are simply tired of watching the debt clock spin are, for once, aligned on the same conclusion: national defense funding mechanisms that don’t require more borrowing are worth building.
Builders, Not Critics
We’re not in the business of scoring political points off a South Korea negotiation. We’re in the business of pointing out that the underlying math — protection without proportional payment — shows up everywhere, from allied burden-sharing to Wall Street’s China exposure to a shipbuilding budget the Navy itself says is underfunded by billions a year. The Gulf Act and the SEAS Act are the constructive answer: mechanisms that ask the actual beneficiaries of American sea power, foreign and domestic, to help sustain it — instead of asking an already over-leveraged taxpayer to do it alone.
References
[1] C-SPAN, “Trump says Kim Jong Un has responded to overtures,” transcript, 2026. [2] Joint Economic Committee (Republicans), Monthly Debt Update, August 2026. [3] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036, February 2026. [4] Remarks by Adm. Daryl Caudle, CNO, West 2026 conference, San Diego, February 12, 2026, as reported by Janes. [5] International Energy Agency, “Strait of Hormuz Factsheet,” February 2026; U.S. Energy Information Administration, Q1 2025 destination data. [6] Gulf International Forum, “Hormuz Disruptions and Asia’s Energy Resilience,” March 2026; The National Interest, “How China Turned the Strait of Hormuz Crisis into an Advantage,” June 2026; India Narrative, “The Strait That Didn’t Break India,” July 2026. [7] Americans for a Stronger Navy / Center for Maritime Strategy, “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy,” March 2026.
Maritime analyst Dr. Sal Mercogliano recently highlighted a critical dynamic shaping modern trade: “The world is diversifying around China, not away from it.”
While economic headlines often celebrate Western supply chains “decoupling” from Beijing, maritime shipping data tells a very different story. Between 2023 and 2025, Chinese containerized exports surged to regional manufacturing hubs—up 40% to India, 36% to Vietnam, and 37% to Thailand.
Rather than pulling manufacturing out of China’s sphere of influence, companies are increasingly relying on a “China + 1” strategy. Raw materials, components, and machinery are still produced in Chinese factories, shipped to South and Southeast Asia for final assembly, and then sent onward to Western markets.
For the U.S. Navy and the defense industrial base, this isn’t true decoupling—it’s re-routing. And it presents serious risks to American sea power.
The Hidden Risks to the Fleet
Naval power relies on secure, resilient supply chains. The expansion of China’s sub-tier manufacturing network impacts U.S. naval readiness across three primary fronts:
Deep Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Vulnerabilities: Federal regulations strictly forbid purchasing major military hardware directly from strategic competitors. However, Tier-3 and Tier-4 sub-suppliers—who provide basic electronics, circuit boards, and specialized alloys—remain heavily dependent on Chinese inputs. In a crisis, Beijing could restrict exports of critical sub-components, stalling U.S. ship construction and maintenance.
The Critical Mineral Bottleneck: Modern warships depend on Rare Earth Elements (REEs) for permanent magnets, radar systems, sonar arrays, and electric motors. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer requires roughly 5,200 lbs of rare earth elements, while a Virginia-class submarine requires 9,200 lbs. Because China controls over 80% of global REE refining capacity, shifting final assembly to third-party nations does not resolve this primary vulnerability.
Strained Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs): Multi-leg supply chains (China \rightarrow Southeast Asia \rightarrow U.S.) make maritime trade routes longer and more fragmented. This places greater operational demand on the U.S. Navy to monitor, protect, and maintain freedom of navigation across critical maritime chokepoints like the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.
Policy Action: The Return of Domestic Industrial Mobilization
Recognizing these deep supply chain risks, federal leaders recently announced the revival of a World War II-era model: the Smaller War Plants Commission (SWPC), spearheaded by the Department of Defense and the Small Business Administration (SBA).
Because roughly 70% of the defense industrial base consists of small businesses, this initiative targets the exact lower-tier chokepoints that threaten naval readiness. By expanding capital access and streamlining support for small domestic manufacturers, the SWPC focuses on critical areas:
Domestic production of microelectronics and legacy chips.
Critical mineral refining on American soil.
Specialized castings, forgings, and shipbuilding components.
Rebuilding the U.S. Fleet requires ensuring American warships aren’t grounded by missing foreign-sourced parts during a crisis. Programs like the SWPC are essential steps toward restoring true maritime sovereignty.
Rebuilding True Maritime Strength
Securing U.S. naval readiness requires moving past the illusion of trade diversification:
Map Deep-Tier Supply Chains: Track sub-tier components to eliminate single-point dependencies on foreign raw materials.
Onshore Critical Refining: Leverage domestic programs to build processing facilities for critical minerals and defense components.
Expand Shipyard Infrastructure: Invest directly in U.S. commercial and naval shipyard capacity so the fleet can build, maintain, and repair vessels independently.
As Dr. Mercogliano’s analysis reminds us, trade routes may shift on paper, but strategic dependencies remain. Rebuilding American sea power means securing the industrial foundation behind every ship, sensor, and sailor.
Take Action for American Sea Power
Join Americans for a Stronger Navy in advocating for policies that rebuild domestic shipbuilding, secure defense supply lines, and maintain a fleet capable of protecting global freedom of navigation.
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Ask most people following naval policy what’s happening with the Ships for America Act, and you’ll get a confident answer. Ask a second person, and you’ll often get a different one—not because either is wrong, but because “the Ships for America Act” isn’t one bill anymore. It’s four, moving on four different tracks, with four very different odds of becoming law. Even close observers conflate them.
That confusion isn’t a footnote. It’s the story—and it reveals a fundamental truth about how naval policy is won or lost in Congress.
The Reality of Legislative Fragmentation
Complex national security policy rarely moves in a single, neat package. To survive Capitol Hill, broad policy visions get carved up to fit whatever legislative doors are open:
The Core SHIPS for America Act (NDAA Track): By folding key fleet expansion provisions into the must-pass FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), lawmakers gave the core vision institutional momentum heading into the Senate conference.
The FLEETS Now Act (Standalone Track): Focused on maritime diplomacy and allied coordination, this standalone effort faces steep legislative odds without a major annual defense vehicle carrying it forward.
The Ready Reserve Force Modernization Accountability Act (Senate Track): A targeted companion bill addressing the nation’s aging military sealift fleet, moving along its own distinct procedural path.
The Shipbuilding Investment and Workforce Act (Ways & Means Track): Because House rules prohibit tax-code modifications inside a defense authorization bill, essential capital investment credits and workforce incentives had to be split into a separate revenue bill.
None of this is scandalous; it’s standard legislative mechanics. But when complex maritime strategies fracture across different committees—Armed Services, Ways & Means, Transportation & Infrastructure—it creates a massive messaging gap for advocates. A citizen calling their representative to “support the Ships for America Act” during NDAA conference is taking the right action for one piece, but leaving tax incentives, workforce programs, and sealift readiness completely unaddressed.
Beyond Four Bills: Tracking the Issues That Matter
This challenge extends far beyond a single legislative package. Rebuilding American maritime power requires sustained focus across four core operational pillars:
Sealift & Reserve Readiness: Tracking the age, operational availability, and crew readiness of the Ready Reserve Force and domestic merchant fleet.
Dedicated Funding Mechanisms: Following structural proposals like Maritime Security Trust Funds and capital tax credits that end damaging boom-and-bust budget cycles.
Allied Maritime Cooperation: Monitoring frameworks that coordinate shipbuilding, repair capabilities, and diplomacy with international partners to counter peer competition.
When policy breaks apart across Capitol Hill, grassroots energy usually breaks with it. Winning requires tracking not just the intent of a bill, but the procedure driving it.
A Job for a Committee, Not a Comment Section
Following this ecosystem across two chambers, five committees, and a shifting calendar rewards patience and consistency over expertise. It is work that single reporters or think tanks cannot easily sustain—but it is precisely the gap an organized network of volunteers can close.
StrongerNavy.org is establishing a Volunteer Legislative & Policy Tracking Committee. We aren’t building a team of lobbyists; we’re mobilizing citizens willing to check Congress.gov, monitor committee markups, and help translate dense legislative movements into plain-language monthly updates.
By assigning volunteers to monitor specific pieces of the maritime puzzle, we turn confusing Capitol Hill mechanics into clear, targeted action—showing supporters exactly when, where, and to whom a phone call or letter matters most.
No single volunteer needs to master the entire defense budget. The power is in numbers, consistency, and plain English. If you want to help ensure great maritime policies become enacted law rather than missed opportunities, join us.
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Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for a modern, capable fleet capable of deterring conflict and protecting American interests worldwide. Learn more at StrongerNavy.org.
If you’ve been following defense news this month, you’ve probably seen the headlines: President Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum on August 13 aimed at overhaul-level changes to U.S. naval power. The directive covers everything from replacing catapult systems on the carrier USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) to planning a fifth public naval shipyard—the first in over 80 years.
But one specific provision immediately ignited a fierce debate across Washington, the defense industry, and naval policy circles: the proposal to temporarily build certain U.S. Navy ships in foreign yards.
To understand why this is happening—and why experienced naval experts hold drastically different views on it—it helps to look past the political noise and unpack the underlying problem.
The Reality: America’s Shipyards Are Bottlenecked
The United States faces an industrial capacity crisis. Domestic Tier-1 shipyards are heavily backlogged. Maintenance delays mean warships spend too much time tied up at piers waiting for repairs, while new construction schedules continue to stretch. Recent fleet incidents—such as the engineering power failure on the destroyer USS Benfold and extended deployment strain on the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln—show how depot maintenance backlogs directly impact daily fleet operations.
Everyone agrees on the core objective: America needs more ships, delivered faster, backed by a resilient domestic industrial base. The debate is strictly over how to get there.
What the “Finland Model” Actually Does
The controversy centers on expanding what policy experts call the “Finland Model”.
First used for U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers, this framework allows a qualified foreign shipbuilder to construct the first two ships of a specific class at its home shipyard. However, this foreign construction comes with mandatory conditions:
Domestic Investment: The foreign company must simultaneously build a new shipyard in the United States or acquire majority ownership of an existing American yard.
Local Workforce: It must hire and train an American workforce.
Tech Transfer: It must license its proprietary shipbuilding technology to the U.S. facility.
Domestic Transition: Every follow-on ship in that class after the first two must be built inside the U.S.
Proponents frame this as a trade: leveraging near-term allied industrial capacity to rapidly add hulls right now, while using access to U.S. defense contracts as leverage to force foreign capital into domestic yards.
The Core Debate: Leverage vs. Risk
This strategy has divided experienced naval analysts into two distinct camps:
The Case For (Speed & Competition): Proponents, including Office of Management and Budget Director Russ Vought, argue that domestic shipyards lack the capacity to rapidly scale on their own. By offering market access to proven international shipbuilders—like South Korea’s Hanwha Group, which bought Philly Shipyard and bid $1.2B for Austal USA—the U.S. can inject foreign capital, modernized techniques, and competitive pressure directly into American shipbuilding.
The Case Against (Enforcement & Sovereignty): Opponents, including naval analyst Hunter Stires and the Shipbuilders Council of America, point out a major structural risk: leverage. Access to the U.S. market is Washington’s strongest bargaining chip. Once the first two hulls drop anchor, that direct leverage drops. If a foreign partner fails to follow through on building out American yard capacity, the U.S. risks losing domestic shipbuilding jobs without securing long-term industrial independence.
“…diverted from American shipyards this Administration pledged to rebuild.” — Matt Paxton, President of the Shipbuilders Council of America
The Path Ahead: Accountability First
This isn’t a simple fight between “buying American” and “outsourcing.” It is a fundamental question of policy design and enforcement.
How do we take advantage of international partnerships without exposing the U.S. industrial base to long-term risk?
That is where legislative solutions come in. Legislative frameworks like the Defense Reinvestment Credit (DRC) under the proposed Strategic SEAS Act aim to close this exact gap. Rather than taking a foreign firm’s future promises at face value, mechanisms like the DRC mandate audited, verified capital milestones on American soil before contracts are finalized or paid out.
As Congress navigates the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) conference and the Department of War prepares its implementation plans, the key metric won’t be political promises. It will be who pays, who is held accountable, and whether capital actually lands in American shipyards.
I am not a maritime economist. I am not a Jones Act scholar. I am a former blue-water destroyer sailor who stood watches aboard USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) in the 1970s, and a former telecommunications and web engineering executive who spent three decades watching American industry move offshore — including firsthand business travel to China during the early 2000s tech transfer era. I come to this the way I come to most naval policy questions: as a student, not an expert.
I have a bias, and I want to name it up front. I watched American manufacturing hollow out in real time. So when someone argues the fix for a hollowed-out merchant marine is removing one of the last laws requiring any of it to be American-built, -owned, -flagged, or -crewed, my instinct is skepticism.
That instinct is what sent me digging. Over the past several weeks I’ve read the primary MARAD compliance filings behind the 2026 Jones Act waiver, followed the public arguments of four people who know this issue far better than I do, and engaged two of them directly. What I found didn’t confirm my bias. It refined it.
What the Waiver Actually Is
On March 17, 2026, during the Strait of Hormuz crisis, the federal government waived the Jones Act’s cabotage rules, allowing foreign-flagged vessels to move fuel, fertilizer, and related cargo between U.S. ports. That waiver has been extended twice, is now the longest suspension of Jones Act rules in the program’s history, and by August was being driven substantially by gasoline prices ahead of the midterms rather than the original national-security rationale.
I went to the primary source: MARAD’s own compliance filings, which every operator is legally required to submit within 10 days of each waiver voyage, including a specific field — an “Explanation of National Defense Interest.” What I found in those filings surprised me. A meaningful share of operators listed that required field simply as “Not Applicable.” Most of the rest reused identical boilerplate language, word for word, across unrelated shippers and vessels. That’s not proof the waiver is bad policy. It is proof that its stated legal basis — a case-by-case national defense necessity — isn’t being documented as case-by-case in practice, for a real share of its use.
Four Voices, One Diagnosis
Public debate over the Jones Act has been framed as a binary choice: repeal the century-old law, or defend it as written. I went looking for the strongest version of every position I could find, and heard from four people who do not agree with each other, or always with me:
Colin Grabow of the Cato Institute has built the most detailed public data tracking waiver voyages, and reads it as proof the law suppresses legitimate demand.
Dr. Steven Wills of the Center for Maritime Strategy argues reform, not repeal — that the law is connective tissue between America’s commercial shipyards and naval surge capacity, and removing it without building a replacement trades a flawed foundation for no foundation at all.
Dr. Sal Mercogliano, historian and host of “What’s Going On With Shipping,” rejects both camps. As he put it directly:
“It’s not the Jones Act that’s the issue. It’s our maritime policy. We’ve been asleep at the wheel while China woke up and has seized the reins.”
William P. Doyle, a former U.S. Federal Maritime Commissioner, adds a sharper security dimension — documenting a Chinese state-owned vessel operating in U.S. coastwise trade under the waiver while qualified American tonnage sat idle.
Four different prescriptions. But underneath the disagreement, a shared diagnosis: a shipyard base too thin to survive between crises, a mariner workforce that shrinks every drought cycle, and a country that let China take over 70 percent of global shipbuilding orders while looking the other way.
The Question Nobody’s Asking
None of these four voices, in their public positions, centers a funding mechanism as the answer. That’s the gap I wrote this report to address. Not repeal or defend — who actually pays to rebuild the capacity everyone agrees we’ve lost.
Read the Full Report
I’ve written up the complete research — the MARAD filings analysis, all four positions in full, and where I’ve landed — as a diagnostic report rather than a single post, because the material deserved more room than a blog format allows.
Vice Admiral Thomas J. Moore, U.S. Navy (Retired), ran the command that builds and sustains the fleet. As the 44th Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, he spent more than 20 years in the design, acquisition, and sustainment of the Navy’s CVN fleet — and served as the CNO’s Director of Fleet Readiness for more than three years.
In February 2025, he published one of the most important — and most honest — assessments of American naval power to appear in recent years. The title says it plainly: “A Path to the Navy Force Structure the Nation Needs.”
U.S. Navy ships moored at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, July 3, 2024, during RIMPAC 2024. Vice Admiral Thomas J. Moore’s February 2025 Proceedings analysis concludes the Navy needs 381 ships to meet current security requirements — nearly 90 more than today’s fleet. (U.S. Navy/DVIDS)
His thesis is equally plain: “The Navy’s force structure is inadequate because the service has been unable to effectively manage new construction and ship retirements.”
Not China’s fault. Not Congress’s fault. The Navy’s own management failures — documented in detail, with receipts.
What follows is a summary of Moore’s argument, why it matters now more than when he wrote it, and what the Shipbuilding Economic Acceleration and Security (SEAS) Act offers as the funding answer his analysis demands.
Three Self-Inflicted Wounds
Moore identifies three compounding problems — each within the Navy’s control, each making the others worse.
1. An insatiable requirements appetite. The Navy has a persistent pattern of designing ships that are too complex, too expensive, and take too long to build. The Zumwalt-class destroyer is Moore’s primary exhibit — a ship whose cost ballooned so dramatically that the Navy decided to decommission several hulls early, before they had delivered their intended service life. The Gerald R. Ford-class carrier required hundreds of millions in unplanned investment after delivery. The Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship was decommissioned early. In each case, the Navy’s desire for next-generation capabilities produced platforms that couldn’t be sustained at the numbers the force structure required.
His conclusion: “The fits and starts cannot get to 313, let alone 381 ships.”
2. A workforce the industrial base cannot sustain. This is where Moore’s analysis becomes most specific — and most sobering. From 1993 to 2027, the Navy built an average of just 5.5 ships per year. The industrial base shaped itself around that signal. Growing to the 12 ships per year required to reach 381 ships means growing the skilled shipbuilding workforce by a commensurate amount — and that takes years, not months.
Moore is direct about where the constraint actually lies: the problem is not physical shipyard capacity. It is skilled workers. His highlighted conclusion: the current industrial base does not lack the physical capacity to build the required number of ships annually. What it lacks is a skilled workforce in the numbers needed to meet that increase in demand.
That is a critical distinction. More shipyards don’t solve it. More cranes don’t solve it. Only a stable, predictable, multi-year demand signal — giving industry the confidence to hire, train, and retain the workforce — solves it.
3. Procurement whipsaw. Moore’s Table 1 — Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982–FY2028 — is the most damning exhibit in the article. The numbers bounce from 28 ships in a single year down to single digits, back up, down again. Wildly. Decade after decade. His point: a rapid downsizing of shipbuilding creates structural consequences that take 5 to 7 years to reverse. When demand drops, senior workers retire, younger workers leave for other industries, suppliers consolidate or close. The experience and productivity levels needed to support a surge take years to rebuild — far longer than the short-term political signal that caused the drawdown in the first place.
This is the procurement whipsaw. And it has been the dominant feature of American shipbuilding policy for forty years.
The Math Behind 381
Moore’s proposed solution is elegant in its simplicity. Rather than chasing arbitrary ship counts, he proposes building force structure from the bottom up using a “build center” mechanism: divide the required number of ships by service life to determine the steady annual production rate each platform requires. Apply that rate consistently. Give industry a stable and predictable demand 10 to 15 years out.
The resulting force structure requirement — Table 2 in the article — totals 381 ships:
66 fast-attack submarines requiring 2 per year. 87 large surface combatants requiring 2.5 per year. 73 small surface combatants requiring 3 per year. 12 ballistic-missile submarines and 12 aircraft carriers anchoring the deterrent and power projection triad. Amphibious, logistics, and support vessels completing the force.
Today’s fleet sits at roughly 291 — below the 325-ship floor identified in the 2016 Force Structure Assessment as the minimum acceptable risk threshold. We are not approaching a gap. We are in one.
The annual shipbuilding budget required: $40 billion. Moore addresses the affordability objection directly and dismisses it:
Some will argue the nation cannot afford $40 billion or more per year for shipbuilding and the attendant costs to operate, maintain, and man the ships. But of course the nation can afford it. It has a multitrillion dollar annual budget and spends far more than $40 billion per year on many things it deems important. The real question is, should the United States do this?
And then the warning that should be on every policymaker’s desk:
The Navy the nation has today is the Navy it will fight with — and it is not big enough. There are parallels to World War II, but unlike in that war, this time the United States will not have the luxury of waiting for industry to catch up in a conflict with China or other adversaries as it did then when labor and large-scale manufacturing facilities were plentiful. The time to start is now.
That is not analysis from a think tank. That is a judgment from the man who ran NAVSEA.
A Lot Has Changed Since He Wrote This. The Gap Hasn’t.
Moore published in February 2025. The policy environment has shifted significantly since then — almost entirely in the direction of validating his urgency while making execution harder.
The FY2027 shipbuilding budget request came in at $68.5 billion — a 57% increase over the prior year. Moore’s $40 billion floor wasn’t an overreach. It was a minimum. The administration confirmed his math and raised it.
The 381-ship goal has since been superseded by the “Golden Fleet” concept — though the full force-level details remain unpublished. Moore’s analysis remains the most precise public accounting of what naval adequacy actually requires.
The Constellation-class frigate — one of the surface combatant programs Moore’s build-rate math depended on — was cancelled in November 2025 after cost overruns made it unsustainable. One more self-inflicted wound, confirming Moore’s requirements appetite diagnosis.
The SHIPS for America Act — the workforce and industrial base legislation Moore’s analysis implicitly requires — has held only one congressional hearing since reintroduction in April 2025. The legislative environment has not caught up to the threat.
And the fleet is still at roughly 291 ships.
Moore Defines the Problem. The SEAS Act Answers It.
Moore’s article diagnoses three problems: requirements creep, workforce collapse, and procurement whipsaw. All three share a common root cause — the absence of a stable, mandatory, multi-year funding signal that industry can plan around.
Annual appropriations cannot solve this. A single large budget request cannot solve this. What Moore’s analysis demands — whether he frames it this way or not — is a funding mechanism that operates outside the political cycle, delivers a consistent signal to the industrial base, and cannot be raided for other priorities when the next fiscal crisis arrives.
That is precisely what the Shipbuilding Economic Acceleration and Security (SEAS) Act proposes.
The SEAS Act establishes a 2% Strategic Technology Responsibility Contribution (STRC) from U.S. companies earning $5 billion or more annually from China operations revenue, directed into a dedicated Naval Modernization account outside the standard appropriations cycle. Estimated annual yield: $4 to $4.4 billion.
The anchor logic: the companies that built billion-dollar China revenue models — enabled by U.S. Navy forward presence, freedom of navigation operations, and Indo-Pacific security architecture — bear a proportional responsibility for sustaining the force that makes that access possible.
The Defense Reinvestment Credit (DRC) allows qualifying companies to offset up to 80% of their STRC obligation through verified domestic defense investment — in shipyard capacity, workforce development, supply chain, or related industrial base priorities. This transforms the mechanism from a contribution into a reinvestment strategy. And critically, it directs capital toward exactly the workforce problem Moore identifies as the binding constraint.
The SHIPS Act asks who builds the ships. The SEAS Act answers who pays for them.
The Reagan Precedent — In Moore’s Own Footnotes
Moore’s Table 1 shows what sustained investment actually produced: the Reagan naval buildup from 1982 to 1992 — the last period of consistent, multi-year shipbuilding commitment — delivered the fleet that won the Cold War. His article cites Jerry Hendrix and Brent Sadler’s October 2024 National Review piece, “Restoring Our Maritime Strength,” as foundational context. Sadler — Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation — has since published the TRUMP Act proposal calling for presidential sponsorship of the SHIPS for America Act to break the current legislative logjam.
The through-line is clear: Moore establishes the force structure requirement. Sadler maps the legislative path. The SEAS Act provides the funding mechanism that makes either sustainable across administrations.
The Time to Start Is Now
Moore’s closing line is not rhetorical. It is a planning constraint.
The industrial base does not have the skilled workforce to execute a surge today. Building that workforce requires years of stable demand signal. The procurement whipsaw of the last four decades has to stop — and stopping it requires a funding mechanism that outlasts any single budget cycle or administration.
381 ships. $40 billion per year. A force structure derived from service lives and build rates — not politics. Three self-inflicted wounds that a dedicated, mandatory funding stream begins to address structurally.
Admiral Moore has charted the path. The SEAS Act is one serious answer to the funding question that path demands. Washington needs to move from debating whether to rebuild the fleet to deciding how to pay for it — and who has been benefiting most from the security that fleet provides.
The time to start is now.
Americans for a Stronger Navy advocates for a modern, capable fleet capable of deterring conflict and protecting American interests worldwide. Learn more at StrongerNavy.org.
REFERENCES
[1] Vice Admiral Thomas J. Moore, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “A Path to the Navy Force Structure the Nation Needs,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, February 2025, pp. 22–25.
[2] 2016 Force Structure Assessment — 325-ship minimum acceptable risk threshold; confirmed in multiple subsequent CNO assessments.
[3] SEAS Act STRC mechanism and Naval Modernization account structure — Americans for a Stronger Navy framework documentation, 2025–2026. Published: “Defense Reinvestment as Naval Strategy,” Center for Maritime Strategy, March 16, 2026.
[4] Reagan naval buildup (1982–1992) — Congressional Budget Office historical shipbuilding analysis; Moore Table 1, Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982–FY2028.
[5] Jerry Hendrix and Brent Sadler, “Restoring Our Maritime Strength,” The National Review, 24 October 2024. Cited by Admiral Moore as footnote 1 of the Proceedings article.
[6] FY2027 Navy shipbuilding budget request — $68.5 billion, released May 11, 2026.
[7] Constellation-class frigate cancellation — Secretary of the Navy John Phelan, November 2025.
[8] SHIPS for America Act legislative status — one Senate Commerce Committee hearing, October 28, 2025; bill reintroduced April 2025 following EO 14269.